Journey in Being

Anil Mitra © 2009

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Introduction. 3

I. IDEAS. 5

Intuition. 5 — Metaphysics. 14 — Objects. 36 — Cosmology. 48 — Worlds. 64

II. TRANSFORMATION.. 81

Journey. 81 — Being. 84

III. METHOD.. 85

Method. 85

IV. GUIDE AND REFERENCE.. 99

Contribution. 99 — Reference. 103

Introduction

Journey

Journey in being is an exploration of the range of being. The exploration is grounded in the local world and aims at immediate as well as ultimate possibilities

In the chapter Metaphysics it is demonstrated that

The Universe has the greatest possible variety of being

Via identity the individual will experience Universal Identity

Journey in being is an adventure in this world, the Universe, and their relation

Being

Being signifies that the exploration is not mere travel: there is transformation and it is not limited to individual growth or technological or social or other limited kinds of change. The signification allows that the change may be essential. However, only a fraction is known of what kinds of change are possible and what may be desirable—especially at the outset. Being suggests that change may reach depths and kinds that are not anticipated. Journey—the chapter—narrates the process of this exploration so far

The idea of being is central to the developments and the foregoing suggestions are definition or explanation of the idea and its scope. The meaning and significance of journey and being and other concepts will emerge with the narrative—with definition but also as the use of the terms in the context of a system of ideas emerges

Ideas

In providing a map of the terrain, ideas (knowledge) are useful. The process narrated has beginnings in ideas. Ideas suggested certain possibilities of being. Because received ideas from the traditions are found to be limited in either reasoning or scope, the exploration of ideas emerged as essential. While the chapter Journey narrates the exploration of being, the remaining chapters explore and develop the ideas

Metaphysics

After extended experiment with ideas and systems, there resulted a metaphysics that is called the Universal metaphysics or Metaphysics of immanence

The Universal metaphysics is a system of ideas that is developed in chapter Metaphysics where it is demonstrated that:

The Universe has the greatest possible variety of being (Objects)

The meaning of ‘possible’ in the previous statement is the one that is most permissive with regard to variety—i.e., here possible means Logically possible (the capitalization in ‘Logic’ is explained later.) If Logical possibility is replaced by some other kind, e.g. possibility according to the known laws of physics of our cosmos, a lesser variety of being in the Universe results

The foregoing may appear to contradict the canons of science and reflective common sense but analysis dissolves the contradiction—i.e. there is no actual contradiction

The system of ideas is ultimate (1) in the sense of depth—i.e., in the absolute foundation of a demonstrated description of the Universe without reference to assumption: there is foundation in necessary empirical fact and Logic, and (2) in the sense breadth—i.e., that the system provides an implicit description of the variety of being while showing that that variety is the greatest possible

Via his or her identity the individual will experience Universal Identity

These conclusions are part of an articulated system of ideas—a metaphysics—that reveals that the Universe is the greatest possible universe and that the individual will participate in the being of the Universe. The constituent ideas of the articulated system include content and method or demonstration—empirical and rational as applicable and appropriate. There are many hints of this system in the tradition. However, neither content nor method have been approached in their entirety, their completeness, their definitiveness and absolute character, or their elaboration. And in the absence of demonstration, no system or idea from the tradition has claim to the least fraction of the power of the present system (except that even though there is demonstration here, there is no absolute claim that in the evaluation of the ideas of others, i.e. in ideas from the tradition, intuition alone is without power)

It is also seen that

While Metaphysics shows the necessity of an identity of individual and Universal being, it does not show a path to that identity. The studies in chapters Intuition, Metaphysics, Objects, Cosmology, and Worlds provide some illumination of paths but action, experiment and engagement in transformation remain essential to realization… And, if adventure is good, then this ‘incompleteness’ of ideas is without reason for lament for the door remains open to adventure without end (there is no suggestion that adventure is pure enjoyment, no suggestion that pain or trial is avoided or avoidable)

Doubt. The demonstrations are not free of objections. These objections are responded to by alternate proofs and plausibility argument. However doubt may remain

Faith. Journey will then appeal to faith. Faith is not belief in the absurd or belief in the absence of evidence but is that set of attitudes, neither set nor unresponsive to discovery, that is most conducive of action and realization

If a claim were made that the demonstrations are altogether free of doubt, there would be occasion for an apology to reason; even if there were no public acknowledgement of it, there would be some private apology that could be denied but not avoided. The allowance of doubt, the response in flexible faith, and the admission of trials remove any logical necessity of further apology

Faith and action. The role of faith is not just that of a recourse in presence of doubt. One view of knowledge is that it is knowledge of some thing or Object. Prior to the emergence of knowledge in this mode, there may perhaps have been another mode in which feeling—as precursor to independent perceiving—is more directly tied to action. Originally perhaps a given feeling is tied to a fixed action; later it may be that a complex of feeling is tied to more than one possible action. This case involves selection even when there is no conscious choosing. When action continues in the presence of alternatives that may include inaction, faith is the secondary feeling of comfort or confidence regarding the selected action. Later, still, when knowledge becomes knowledge of an Object, faith becomes the attitude that is conducive of sufficiently confident or productive action; at minimum faith is the attitude that permits action in the presence of alternatives and doubt. This faith is faith in the presence of alternatives or doubt; of its nature it is not faith in what is patently absurd even when it is deployed as such

On metaphysics. In this narrative metaphysics will be, simply, knowledge of things as they are; a metaphysics will be a system of metaphysical understanding of being… of the Universe

In about 600 BC, the Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus, held the metaphysical belief that the world started from water. Thales is sometimes regarded as the first Western philosopher and therefore Western philosophy may be seen as having begun with metaphysics. Early metaphysics is not as naïve as it might seem for in contrast to Greek mythology it seeks (1) to understand the variety of this world in this world, e.g. in water, rather than by an appeal to hypothetical and supernatural powers lying at least partly beyond the world and (2) to understand the variety in terms of something simple: in 600BC, it may well have appeared that water had no constitution in terms of even simpler elements

In modern philosophy the very possibility of metaphysics has been questioned. So, in this narrative there will be work to do even before there is any attempt to establish a system of metaphysics. It will be necessary to show that metaphysics itself is possible in terms of the conception of metaphysics above and that that conception is adequate. Only then may it be reasonable to attempt development of a metaphysical system. It is however, notable, that the actual development of a comprehensive metaphysics has the potential to justify the meaning of metaphysics. In this narrative it will turn out that the justification of metaphysics and a system of metaphysics are bound together: this is the case because the system is not just any or some metaphysics but is and is demonstrated to be the metaphysics—and that requires, of course, demonstration that there is effectively one and only one metaphysics. The arguments will further imply the subsumption under the present direct conception of metaphysics of what is valid in a variety of alternate historical uses of ‘metaphysics’ that fall under the study of being (as distinct from other uses such as the study of the occult, the remote, or what is beyond science or experience)

The implications of the Universal metaphysics are immense. However, appreciation will require an explanation of the meaning of the metaphysics and its vocabulary and conclusions, careful demonstration, elaboration of the articulated system, anticipation of and response to objections

On meaning

It may be anticipated that even when words employed are familiar, their use or meaning may be altered or enhanced in a way that depends on a new context of use. Here this alteration and enhancement of use will be necessary on account of the ultimate character of the new context—the Universe understood in a new way which is the way. Understanding the development will require attention to the uses deployed in this narrative and appreciation may be limited unless it is seen that the present system is novel and perhaps unfamiliar, demonstrated, ultimate in ways to be described, unanticipated in the history of ideas, and may be appear to be inconsistent with received thought—the modern paradigms of understanding of the world—but that there is no actual inconsistency

Exploration

Ideas may suggest approaches but do not and cannot show the way or anticipate the variety of experience that may occur. The way or path is therefore an adventure. Exploration is essential to know and arrive at any ultimates

To undertake the exploration is to undertake a journey in being—a journey in ideas and identity

I. IDEAS

Intuition

Knowledge

Significance

1.            Knowledge is an instrument of negotiation and transformation of the world; knowledge enables appreciation of the Universe. It is not inherent in the idea of knowledge that it is a perfect instrument; or that it lacks any perfection at all. An individual may have and a culture may share knowledge of the world. This knowledge may be stored, primarily via language, and this store becomes available to individuals, to that culture and to all cultures. The traditions of mankind include stores of knowledge of various kinds. Science is a significant repository of knowledge for our civilization; and all of technology, art, music, religion, myth, and literature may be seen as embodying certain kinds of knowing

Nature of knowledge: replica or correspondence view

Knowing that

Replica or correspondence view

2.            Replica or correspondence view. Here, a correspondence view of knowledge is adopted and will be placed in a context that is adequate to general understanding of knowledge and to its use in the narrative. The naïve correspondence view is that the individual has an idea that is a replica of the known Object. It is not inherent in the view that the ‘replica’ is precise or that if, for example, the Object should be geometrical the replica will be geometrical. The correspondence may be rough and there is no inherence in the view that any part of the range from no correspondence to perfect correspondence is ruled out. Initially, therefore, ‘replica’ may be regarded as suggestive or metaphorical; this should not be problematic; a vocabulary is being set up; the vocabulary will enable a literal metaphysics of immense power; and the metaphysics may clarify and literalize the vocabulary… This naïve view will be criticized and improved; the critiques will be drawn from the history of thought and enhanced by further reflection. The result will be a realm of perfect correspondence, another realm of sufficient correspondence or faithfulness, a realm where correspondence may perhaps be found, and a realm where correspondence may be without possibility or significance and which is a realm of action that may be undertaken for the quality rather than certainty of outcome. The replica may receive the formal label CONCEPT as explained below; the CONCEPT will refer to the replica as an object as well as to the subject side or experience

Concepts

3.            Concepts. ‘Concept’ has two meanings that are used in this narrative. In the first a concept is, roughly, a unit of meaning. This is perhaps the original meaning of concept and received treatment by Aristotle in defining a species by its genus—what it falls under—and differentia or what distinguishes it. Under this family of meaning there are a variety views and therefore no consensus on the concept of concepts—i.e., unit of meaning—and constitution of concepts—e.g., mental representation versus abstract Object. Further, there can be no definitive resolution of the nature of the concept until such notions as ‘mental representation’ and ‘abstract Object’ are clarified; and it is endemic to any piece-meal approach, e.g. that of analytic and of post-modern philosophy, that such clarification will not be forthcoming. The Universal metaphysics developed and demonstrated in Metaphysics enables both clarification and diffusion of the unnecessary distinction of mental representation versus abstract Object; the clarification and unification of this first family of meanings of the concept is completed in Objects. The second and more recent use of ‘concept’ is that of mental content; thus cognitions, dreams, emotions, experiences without immediate Objects, and intentions and mental states that are part of the constitution of action states are all conceptual in this second meaning. It is clear that in this use not every concept has an Object; later, conditions for having an Object will be developed. This second meaning is used formally in this narrative and therefore the sign CONCEPT will be used here for mental content; the first meaning is used less formally and is designated in the usual way—i.e., concept. Every concept may be a CONCEPT; however, the form CONCEPT will be used for a unit of meaning only when it is desired emphasize that it is also mental content

The elements of the correspondence view: Word, CONCEPT and Object

Importance of separation

4.            Word, CONCEPT, and Object. Some CONCEPTS correspond to Objects. Words evoke CONCEPTS and when the CONCEPT refers to an Object, the word may evoke both CONCEPT and Object. A word may have multiple meanings or uses: this is sometimes formally expressed by saying that though there is one word there are multiple symbols. Therefore it is sometimes important to distinguish word, CONCEPT, and Object. Such distinction will be immensely important in this narrative

Conflation and magic

5.            Conflation and magic. In everyday use it is typically efficient to conflate words, CONCEPTS and Objects. This efficient use is natural: a word evokes an image, an idea, an action; the philosophical distinction would be practically burdensome. The conflation is also a source of the magical: a word evokes a world of wonder; an orator may move a crowd or a nation to action. The conflation is a part of the natural psychology of language, and the occasional confusions arising out of it are perhaps balanced by its magic and efficiency. The exquisite human sensitivity to context minimizes such confusion

Mind and symbol

6.            Mind and symbol. The written word appears to be neat in comparison to mental content and there can be no doubt regarding the power of, e.g. Euclid’s Geometry. Does the proper nature of knowledge and reason lie in the analysis of mental content or in symbolic representations? The development of symbolic representation is of immense importance in the twin development of knowledge and its and inter and cross generational communication. However, it will be seen in Objects that there is no essential distinction between mental content and symbolic representation: putative distinctions are based in confusions regarding the nature of mental content; and some such distinctions are due to the unduly special—different rather than superior—status we instinctively assign to experience. It may be said that mental content has been understood in confused terms due to vagueness in its symbolic representation

Nature of the Object

7.            Nature of the Object. For knowledge to be useful we would expect faithfulness to its Object. The CONCEPT is not the Object and therefore faithfulness of the CONCEPT cannot be a priori to analysis. The Object as cognized—and there is no ultimate going beyond cognition—is a joint product of knower and known and there is therefore nothing inherent in the Object that guarantees faithfulness, perfect or otherwise, or even that faithfulness should have a meaning, explicit or implicit. For example, one sees a block in the shape of a cube and thinks that is a cube; but is the cubical shape inherent in the block? Common sense may suggest of course the block is cubical. However, even if we did not know of limits to inherent forms of space and time, we would still know that since shape is not entirely of the thing-itself, there may be some error or distortion in the perception. That kind of lack of faithfulness concerns the framework of cognition; there are versions of it in the thought of Plato and Kant. There is another lack of faithfulness that concerns the character of the ‘thing:’ Even when we see a surface as smooth we know that the apparent smoothness is a result of the fact that visual resolution is coarser than the particulate graininess; later we will see that there is always a cosmos within every element of being. Perhaps, though, any distortion in shape is small and any unperceived graininess is not relevant to at least some practical purposes. It may then be asked why there should be an interest in perfect faithfulness! The response may be as follows. Practically, for example, the small error in a precise law science can be enormously magnified in application to complex systems or long term prediction. Aesthetically—in terms of our being in the Universe—we might like to know the real nature of the world; and such insight may be ‘spiritually’ as well as practically empowering (and this will turn out to be the case… the practical and the aesthetic are not entirely distinct even if we desire to distinguish them.) However, it remains open that while remaining within cognition, there may be some means of showing the meaning and fact of perfect faithfulness—at least for some Objects: familiarity with error, distortion, illusion, and the incompleteness of science reminds us that there is no faithfulness in general. In summary, that the CONCEPT is not the Object allows that claims to knowledge may range from absence of faithfulness to perfect faithfulness

8.            A preliminary critique of knowledge of the Object. In this narrative a critique will be a criticism and a response. There is a naïve tendency to all or nothing responses. However we find, as has been found in the history of thought, that the response will come in grades, i.e. that certain ‘Objects’ may allow no CONCEPT and that the disallowance may be contingent or necessary, that other Objects may have a sufficiently good concept, that yet others may have a very precise concept without achieving perfect faithfulness, and that perhaps some Objects will be known perfectly; examples follow. We negotiate the world with some success—there is adaptation between knower and known—and therefore there must be some at least implicit and likely imperfect faithfulness that is sufficient for some purposes: a faithfulness even of perhaps surprisingly good precision as in the visual perception of some things. And there is often an amazingly high precision and or astonishing conceptual understanding in some areas of science. Of course, there could be some super-being pulling strings behind the scene so that we are deceived into thinking that we know but not only is this explanation more fantastic than the direct one, this kind of explanation will later be logically discounted. From the discussion so far—on account of the gap between knower and known and especially on account of the imperfect faithfulness of the most precise science—it is sometimes rapidly concluded that there is no perfect knowledge even allowing for high precision in some domains. The conclusion is not valid and the most that can be concluded is that so far there has been no demonstration of perfect faithfulness. While examples of sufficient and good faithfulness have been seen, further search and analysis will be required to establish perfect faithfulness for any Objects

9.            Possibility versus Impossibility of perfect knowledge. What has been said so far in the previous paragraph amounts to some criticism of the possibility and meaning of faithfulness. It is important to be clear regarding critical thought. An analysis of one approach to faithfulness is closed. In general the CONCEPT as ‘objective’ was found wanting. However, this does not imply that there can be no approach to the meaning of the Objective as objective at least for some Objects; and it does not mean that no Objects can be known faithfully. Therefore the criticism amounts to a doubt about the possibility of any perfect knowledge and not to an assertion that there can be no perfect knowledge or that there can be no demonstration of such knowledge. The point is crucial in two ways. First, in this chapter such perfect knowledge will be demonstrated for a class of important Objects; this will found Metaphysics through Cosmology and will provide partial foundation for Worlds. Second, critical theorists often assert the impossibility of certain kinds of knowing when what has been done is to either show that certain approaches are either unviable or doubtful (and of course the practical conclusion should not then be that the knowing in question cannot be used at all but should not be regarded as certain or used if certainty is necessary until a satisfactory approach to demonstration of certainty has been found.) It has been seen that the attempt to go outside cognition to some absolute foundation is doomed to failure (unless some God were to inform us otherwise and we can count this out because we would then want to understand how the God could have this perfect knowledge and if we could understand that we would not need the actual God)

10.        Reflections from quantum theory. Quantum mechanics is commonly thought via the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to demonstrate the impossibility precise measurement of conjugate variables—e.g., position and momentum of a particle. In this chapter and in Metaphysics we will see that the domain of all physical science must be extremely limited (the arguments will be of a different character than the arguments made in science by some scientists and philosophers that the lack of coherence to the conceptual character of quantum theory imply that it cannot be final.) However, even allowing quantum mechanics, the greatest negative conclusion that the uncertainty principle allows is the impossibility of complete perfect knowledge in the realm that quantum theory is applicable: still perfect knowledge of position or momentum is allowed. But even this conclusion is open to question because it is not clear whether there is an uncertainty that pertains to the position and momentum of a point particle or there is a lack of definiteness because the ‘particle’ is not localized. In the latter the uncertainty is not the result of a principle but is in the nature of an inherently non-localized object

11.        CONCEPT as Object. Some philosophies of meaning use the difficulty of separation of CONCEPT and Object to conflate the two. However, it has just been seen that there is a class of Objects for which there is perfect faithfulness; and there are the practical Objects of science and common-everyday-knowing which are known with sufficient faithfulness. Therefore the conflation of CONCEPT and Object is not necessary: it would perhaps be reasonable and useful if disentanglement were absolutely impossible

Framework for knowing: fact and deduction

So far some elements of knowing and knowledge have been considered. Discussion now takes up a framework for knowledge. It is emphasized that the elements and framework are preliminary in that they set up a vocabulary that will the starting point for rigorous development and demonstration of perfect faithfulness for a system of Objects that lie at the foundation of the Universal metaphysics. Since the history of thought has seen a number of knowledge frameworks—in the form of attempted foundation—it is pertinent to ask a particular framework has been chosen and why a certain foundation has been arrived at. For example why not focus on a decomposition of facts into subjects and predicates and the latter into sensations. A part answer is that frameworks have been adopted and rejected or abandoned and it was only when a foundation was found that the search reached some stasis (still however, I continue to have critical doubt and think that perhaps there may be flaws in the demonstration of finality.) It is important to emphasize that the final foundation starts but does not end with ideas from the prior history of thought

Fact or state of affairs

Pattern. Induction and science. Deduction

Pattern as fact. Significance for science: fact and logic

12.        Framework for knowing: fact and deduction. That some state of affairs obtains is a fact. There is no special significance to the decomposition or lack of decomposition of facts: later, subjects, predicates, and facts will be seen to be kinds of Objects. Facts are often perceived or, more generally, cognized as arranged in patterns which may also be seen as facts. Scientific theories may be seen as kinds of patterns that are generalized from data, i.e. facts or collections of facts (in practice the generalization is often indirect, data may suggest laws, which suggest various concepts, which may be articulated in tentative theories that may be disconfirmed or found to have such predictive power that they are generally accepted as describing a domain of phenomena even though later disconfirmation for a larger domain remains possible.) If a scientific theory would claim generality or universality it is then subject to various doubts and criticisms especially of the type that while the theory might be the most obvious or simplest generalization, generalizations are not unique. It has thus come about that one of the most prevalent philosophies of science is that of Karl Popper according to which the criterion for a theory to be scientific is it be testable—Popper’s original term was falsifiable—i.e., that there should be experiments that could falsify a theory even if no finite number of experiments can verify it. However, anyone who has worked with scientific theories knows that there is something factual about the best theories even though any given theory might not project into the future and may be even unlikely to project over expanding experimental or phenomenal domains. In this sense scientific theories are patterns that can be seen as facts—e.g., there is no doubt that Newton’s mechanics has immense precision over many known phenomena even though its phenomenal and temporal domains may be limited. The generalization from data to patterns has been called ‘induction’ and there was a phase in the history of thought that sought a science or method of induction; we now know—it is perhaps safer to say that we now think—that is no method to induction, i.e. that induction involves acts of creation. On the other hand it is often possible to make deductions from a scientific theory, e.g. given Newton’s laws of momentum and of action and reaction the momentum and angular momentum of an isolated system remains constant and the energy of a conservative system, e.g. some systems without friction, remains constant. Deduction is thought to be logical in that conclusions necessarily follow from premises. The narrative will have frequent and significant occasion make critical reference to the ideas of fact (that some state of affairs obtains) and logic—that from some facts, e.g. a fact and a theory seen as a fact, other facts necessarily follow. In this framework the formal role of induction or creativity is suppressed even though it is practically significant and often regarded as having much value. Later, in Metaphysics and as formalized in Method, Logic (the capitalization signifies that a—novel—conception of logic will be introduced) will be seen as a necessary fact and this will reduce all knowing to fact. This surprising conclusion is at odds with common thought, e.g. Wittgenstein regarded logic as having no Object but here Logic will be seen as having the Logos or the Universe in all its detail as its Object, and requires and will be given demonstration and clarification. Until that demonstration, these claims regarding knowing, Logic and Logos will have no definite meaning

Faithfulness

Faithfulness and the Object: categorial divide

Referral to something else—the substance approach to foundation—is unviable

Adaptation and the practical Objects: common knowledge; science and precision

Critique

Recall that in this narrative a critique is a criticism and a response. If a criticism has no response, the object of criticism requires to be dispensed with and given no further consideration. Therefore any criticism that enters the tradition of thought should be part of a critique; at least that should be the case if we were not subject to the folly of repeating errors revealed as egregious

The narrative is now ready to begin formal criticism of the framework for knowing that leads to the Universal metaphysics. It is perhaps necessary to acknowledge and briefly respond to the Humean and the Humanistic critiques. The critiques that are constituted by empiricism and rationalism are significant in that we recognize their concerns and are able to address their concerns by going somewhat around them—by defusing them as does Kant in his transcendental approach. And pragmatism is significant in suggesting a realm in which the significance of concept and Object dissolve in action and transformation

Kant’s critique will be shown—some of the arguments and positions are well known—to fall short of its claims; however there remains a core of insight that has provided some inspiration for the present development. It has taken insight and analysis to see that core; and as a result of the criticisms of Kant’s thought it has been possible to avoid his errors (which are not egregious since identification of the errors depends in part on developments in science that occurred beginning about one hundred and thirty five years after the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.) However, it will take further development of the basic ideas and formulation and demonstration of a system before claim can be made, first, to metaphysics at all, and, second, to the Universal metaphysics its constituent claims which will include uniqueness, universality, finality, and ultimate depth and breadth

13.        The criticism of Hume—science versus necessity. Hume’s argument has already been encountered. It’s significance is that in his time, the immense success of science had led to a belief that Newton’s Mechanics and the Geometry of Euclid were necessarily true descriptions of space, time, and cause. Hume did not criticize the usefulness, the precision, or the practical application of these sciences. His argument was that those sciences and their entailments such as the nature of causation were not logical conclusions from data because as generalizations they could not be logical conclusions. Hume’s arguments were of immense significance because of the belief in the necessity of the science of causation and because the now well known limits of that science had not yet been encountered. It is significant that Hume’s argument does not disconfirm science but only claims that it has not been shown to be necessary. It is interesting that the logic of Hume’s argument is agnostic toward miracles defined as phenomena that are exceptions to scientific theory or law or commonly observed behavior; the happening and the non-happening of miracles are consistent with the argument. Hume also makes an argument that since science is the best summation of our experience we should not believe in miracles and that we should at least doubt reports of miracles. It is further interesting that the revelations of a later science would appear miraculous in the stated sense as well as in the sense of wonder. However, the idea of the miracle is imbued with a certain sense of paradox: if a ‘miracle’ is a common event then it is no longer a miracle. The Universal metaphysics will enable address of the question of the miraculous. Response—the necessity of the Universal metaphysics (of any knowledge) will have to not depend on inductive generalization from empirical data. Criticism of Hume’s argument. There is a variety of levels or degrees of detail with which the Universe can be described. Hume’s argument need not apply when the level of detail is within grasp of the powers of mind. Further, it is not inconceivable that a rational argument should show that only a Universe with certain properties could result in the world as we experience it, even Hume’s empirical world; therefore the argument that the conclusions such as the one regarding causation is not logical does not imply that there can be no such logical conclusion

14.        A humanistic critique—the barrenness and alienation of metaphysics and science. Response—the humanistic critique does not apply to the thought of this narrative. Hume’s argument applies to modern science as much as it did to the science of his time: all science so far has practical validity in its domain but lacks demonstration of necessity altogether and lacks demonstration of its application to the entire Universe. Still, the positivist strain of thought that what is not described in science does not exist has a strong influence and it is this positivist interpretation that appears barren. In the absence of another paradigm it is natural to interpret the Universe in terms of the science of the day and from there it is a short if unconscious step to the thought that that interpretation defines the scope of the Universe. However, in an earlier time the same attitude led to a view of the Universe as described by Euclid and Newton; today that view is replaced by one from the thought of Darwin, Einstein, and quantum theory and the thought that today’s physics may be far in kind and not just in fact from any final physics appears to have little influence on prevailing paradigms: the familiar absence of knowledge being taken as knowledge of absence is at play. Now consider metaphysics—from the positivist paradigm, modern thought often eschews metaphysics and when metaphysics is allowed it tends to be bare and skeletal. However, it will be seen that the Universal metaphysics is infinitely rich in variety

15.        Other critiques—there are implicit critiques in empiricism—without experience there is no knowledge; in rationalism—without the ability to have knowledge there is no knowledge; in intuitionism—e.g., without intuition there can be no ability to have knowledge and so the process of knowing is essentially hidden from view; revelation as foundation—human being is incapable of knowledge; constructivism—there is no justification of knowledge for justification and knowing have no intersection; pragmatism—there is no intrinsic truth or justification. The suggestive power of some of the critiques is occasionally deployed in the narrative. However, these critiques neither block nor contribute directly to the developments and there is therefore no logical need for response

The Kantian critiques will be taken up below

Response—approach

No a priori commitment to or against faithfulness

16.        Foundation in the immanent—referral to something else typically something simpler than the Object, e.g. substance is the dominant mode of foundation from the history of thought. Through experimentation with ideas a role for foundation in immanent rather than remote Objects has come to light and been developed. Immanent Objects will found the metaphysics which will therefore not need further foundation in something else—a pertinent question for referential foundation may concern the foundation of the Object to which reference is made, e.g. substance in older metaphysics and a divine Object in religion… and the immanence of intuition and experience will ground the metaphysics in (our) being and (our) being in the Universe

Critique and demonstration in the present narrative

Perhaps the most significant of the critiques above is the essential gap between CONCEPT and Object. As a result of the gap the CONCEPT is not intrinsically known to be faithful to the Object; faithfulness must therefore be referred to another means which however does not escape being tinged by the idea of the concept; there is therefore no perfect faithfulness inherent in the nature of the CONCEPT

Here the argument will be that (1) the fact of an essential gap does not imply absence of faithfulness, (2) the lack of intrinsic knowledge of faithfulness is a broad and plausible statement rather than necessary—for there is no generic statement or exhaustive examination of cases, (3) therefore the critique may suggest but does not show universal or logical absence of faithfulness

17.        An approach to metaphysics. The present approach to metaphysics is worked out below: find Objects so simple that they are known faithfully and sufficiently universal that they are capable of supporting a non-trivial metaphysics. It is remarkable that such a system is found and is capable of supporting the Universal metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth (the italicized phrase will be given precise meaning and demonstrated.) The approach to the simple Objects will be an abstraction of detail. It is remarkable that abstraction applied to intuition will be part of a method that is empirical and that has rationalist consequences in the metaphysics and pragmatic-empirical elements regarding the traditional disciplines that apply to our world

18.        Framing of the traditional disciplines. It is further remarkable that this metaphysics will frame the traditional knowledge disciplines regarding the local cosmological system and our world in such a way as to enhance elimination of their ad hoc elements and to approach their intrinsic limits of faithfulness

The remaining critiques find a place and suggestive sense within the present approach but do not shake the foundations

Meaning

Meaning, sense, and reference

19.        Meaning, sense, and reference. The relations among word, CONCEPT, and Object provide a neat analysis of meaning. The same word can refer to different ideas. Sometimes the difference is so great that it might be better to use different words and use of the same word may be the result of accident or divergence; at other times the word refers to similar ideas. An example of the latter is the word ‘concept.’ Therefore we cannot invariably talk of the meaning of a word. Even when meanings are similar they may be exclusive or have degrees of exclusivity. Therefore, while the gathering of different meanings may be suggestive, there can be no general distillation to a single meaning. In fact as an isolated sign, a word does not have meaning. It is only in evoking an idea that a word has—becomes associated with—meaning. A CONCEPT has meaning. The CONCEPT is in the mind: that is its sense; and it refers to ‘an’ Object: that is its reference. It was perhaps thus that Frege conceived of meaning in terms of sense and reference. Of course, possession of a CONCEPT does not guarantee that there is or should be a corresponding Object. Therefore clarification may be necessary. But sense and therefore CONCEPTS change according to context; as do Objects. Generally there is vagueness to contexts—they are not altogether clear, they are changing, perhaps growing—and therefore to sense and CONCEPTS. In a precise context, e.g. a mathematical system, there may be some definiteness of sense and therefore of CONCEPTS. The Universal metaphysics will provide at least some definiteness of meaning in the most general of contexts that is the Universe and therefore rather non-contextual. Generally, because of multiple use, word meanings may be gathered; then a decision as to which meaning or family is pertinent to the situation must be made—all meanings are potentially suggestive but not all are necessarily relevant. At that point clarification of meaning may begin: either by analysis in terms of a formal context or the common context; however it would be in error to derive something from every usage. At some point in analysis it may be possible to say that the meaning of word ‘w’ is that it refers via concept ‘c’ to Object ‘O.’ That may be relatively easy in a formal context but perhaps not so easy in the general context; in vague contexts it may be especially difficult even when there is significance to it

The word pair sense-reference is similar to concept-object, connotation-denotation, intension-extension

Stability of meaning. Use

20.        Stability of meaning and use. It is probably therefore that Wittgenstein argued that there is—generally—no final arbitration of meaning outside use (and that use is practice in a context which may of course be specific or general.) That should not spell the death of lexicography; rather it implies that lexicography is discovery and communication as much as it is definition; that lexicography aids rather than instructs. These thoughts also have significance for formal contexts for formal contexts may evolve; and even in a given formal context meanings are not determined by fiat but must have gone through a process of adjustment as articulation and coherence emerged. This is especially true of the concepts of the Universal metaphysics

The inclusive realm of action and faith

The original context of knowing

21.        The original context of knowing. It becomes clear that a theory of meaning is a theory of knowing. Meaning and knowing and doing evolve together. Meaning, knowledge, and action separate out; meaning informs knowing and knowing informs action. However, at root they remain in interaction stabilized by adaptation. There was perhaps a time and there is a realm that is prior to the separation

The realm of action and faith

22.        The realm of action and faith. In this prior realm proto-meaning, proto-knowing, and proto-action remain bound. But why proto-action? It is because pure ‘physical’ process is not action; action is action as the physical-in-binding-with-the-experiential that includes knowing and willing (and choosing.) In this realm there is perhaps no final knowing; even as we have confidence in our common knowing, in our sciences, in our tradition, in our institutions we also doubt them. And the doubts are neither merely academic nor merely neurotic; they are born of at least occasional failure. This is and will be seen to be true even of the heart of reason: logic. And it will be seen that even though the Universal metaphysics has been designed to be above empirical and logical error that there remains doubt which is in the nature of being. It is therefore that the narrative introduces and the journey has some appeal to the idea of natural faith as the set of attitudes that are—most—conducive to be-ing (the idea will be made more specific later)

Intuition

The idea of intuition

23.        The idea of intuition. A family of meanings of ‘intuition’ is that of knowing without fully explicit or conscious processing or reasoning. The knowing or knowledge itself may or may not itself be fully conscious but the cases of interest include those in which the knowing may be conscious and may be recognized as such. Intuition can be common or unusual with regard to the process of knowing and esoteric or immediate with regard to what is known. If someone claims to have intuition of a supernatural God, that would be unusual with regard to process (most people do not have that intuition) and esoteric with regard to what is known (a supernatural God is remote from the familiar world.) Scientific intuition is somewhat unusual in that it may be highly developed in certain (creative) individuals but its subject is not esoteric—i.e. even if unfamiliar and remote the subject is of this world. The kind of intuition that is of interest in this narrative is common and its subject is immediate

Kant’s use of intuition, mathematics, science, metaphysics and logic

24.        The constructive Kantian critique. Kant accepts Hume’s criticism and responds as follows

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. It is his Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, that is of interest in this part of the narrative. Kant had read and wanted to respond to Hume’s criticism that science was mere empirical description that lacked necessity. Instead of attempting to found knowledge or to criticize its foundations from empiricism as Hume and others had done or to approach knowledge from the rationalist point of view of continental philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz, Kant started from the reasonable point of view that we clearly have some knowledge. In fact it was commonly felt that we have much more than ‘some’ knowledge: in Kant’s time the sciences of space, time and cause—Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics which, for brevity, are referred to as ‘geometry and mechanics’ in the following paragraphs—appeared to be imbued with necessity in the manner of what was regarded as the necessity of the ‘science’ of deduction, i.e. the Aristotelian logic that had stood for two thousand years

Kant did not regard these apparent necessities as actual necessities or justification; the success of geometry and mechanics was motivation for belief in their necessity but was not to be justification of that belief. In order to provide justification he enquired into the nature of this knowledge and how it is possible. He wanted to argue that, contrary to Hume, the geometry, the mechanics of his time are necessary—the logic was of course regarded as necessary and had been untouched by Hume or others. He first considers analytic knowledge, roughly knowledge that is true solely on account of the meanings of the propositions. An example is the syllogism: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is immortal. The conclusion follows from the premises; it is not necessary to go out into the world and wait for men to die; perhaps it is not true that all men are mortal but that is not the point: the point is that if the premises are true then the conclusion is true and that this follows from the meanings of the terms of the premises and not from experiment or observation. This is the model of necessary knowledge: the necessity is prior to or independent of observation and is therefore a priori knowledge, i.e. it is a priori to experience or observation. In summation, Kant’s ideal is analytic a priori knowledge. Logic appears to be analytic and a priori. He wants to model geometry and mechanics after this knowledge; that knowledge, however, is not true from meaning alone and, in contrast to the analytic it is synthetic. It seems that synthetic knowledge must be empirical but Kant now wonders whether there is synthetic a priori knowledge, i.e. knowledge that lies within and refers to but is not dependent on experience. Kant will argue that there is such knowledge and that sciences of geometry and mechanics, i.e. of space, time, and causation, are examples of it

The argument begins with an analyses perception of which he observed that while we do experience the world in terms of space, time and cause, we do not see or justify the underlying process—i.e., perception in terms of space, time and cause occur in intuition. Given, he argues, that geometry and mechanics have revealed the true categories of nature, it follows that those categories are built into perceptual intuition. I.e. although within experience, geometry and mechanics are not dependent on experience: they are examples of synthetic a priori knowledge. Kant then looks at the process of elaboration of knowledge: the systematic elaboration of the consequences of the sciences via deductive logic which is the natural category of reason. That is, the entire development of geometry and mechanics has the necessity that the empiricists with Hume as their champion argued against (and for which the rationalists argued but without clear necessity.) What Kant has done is to find a justification in their synthetic a priori character for the necessity of propositions of the natural science of his time, i.e. of geometry and mechanics

In addition to the synthetic a priori propositions of science, Kant also enquired into the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics and metaphysics. In this essay the propositions of mathematics are not important to the main development; they do however receive a brief treatment, at least superficially different from Kant’s, in Objects. Regarding the synthetic a priori propositions of metaphysics, Kant argues that since the metaphysical Objects do not lie within experience there are no synthetic a priori metaphysical propositions. This does not imply, as Kant says, that there are no true metaphysical propositions but simply that we do not know—the necessity of—their truth. Regarding metaphysics the argument of this essay will diverge from that of Kant. As did Kant, the narrative will distinguish general metaphysics from special metaphysics. The general metaphysics will concern concepts such as experience, being, the Universe or all being and the Void or absence of being. For these topics experience and reality will be shown to be identical (equivalent.) Perhaps the most amazing conclusion from the general metaphysics will be the truth of the propositions of special metaphysics even though the latter may lie outside experience (it is shown that not only are they not excluded from all experience but that they must ‘at some time’ enter experience.) The special metaphysics concerns topics such as the existence of infinitely many cosmological systems of which some may have laws that diverge widely from the laws of our cosmos and even more specialized topics such as those from myth, religion, and fictional literature. The theory finds that subject to Logic, all ‘fiction’ is realized. That does not imply that they are realized in my immediate experience. The conclusion is remarkably similar to that of Kant’s in that while here their realization motivates a journey Kant finds that (special) metaphysics is inherently dialectical; he also finds general metaphysics to be dialectical but that is because he did not analyze the general Objects—e.g. Being, Universe, Void, and Logos—as analyzed here (below.) This narrative diverges from Kant and almost all Western philosophical and secular thought in showing the immense variety of being—the variety is subject only to Logic—and the necessity of its entering experience via, e.g., the transformation of the identity of the individual. And there is divergence from much myth and religion in showing their limits in a normal sense but also their poverty in a universal sense (the notions of ‘normal’ and ‘universal’ will become clear later)

Criticism of Kant

In this narrative which is not a history of ideas, the goal of criticism is primarily point out the negative so that movement can proceed without unnecessary hindrance and to accept what is positive for possible incorporation to movement. We learn from error and success and the space devoted to Kant is a measure of the quality and quantity of what the narrative has learned from his thought

25.        Criticism from Kant’s vantage point. It may be said that Kant gave plausible but not necessary arguments against Hume’s argument which therefore still stands—except for criticism of Hume above

26.        Criticism from a modern perspective. Three pillars of Kantian thought Euclidean Geometry, Newtonian mechanics, and deduction are now known to not define necessities of the nature of the Universe and of—deductive or logical—thought. The story regarding geometry and mechanics and therefore of space, time and cause is well known from the twentieth century developments in physics. The story regarding logic is perhaps not so well known but in outline which will be elaborated later it is this: the necessity of every axiom of logic stands questioned and it appears that even logic has a empirical character not only in its constitution but also in its justification

Kant’s contribution. The transcendental approach, i.e. analysis rather than foundation, the thought to start with the fact of knowledge, and the use of intuition are insights of a high order. An argument can be made that necessity should not be the only criterion of good philosophy. The argument becomes especially good in a critical era in which all necessities are doubted for if there are no necessities then our actions, the paths we choose for our lives and societies cannot depend on necessity. A role of philosophy would then be to illuminate regions that lack the aura of necessity. Kant’s approach continues to provide and remains an immensely promising avenue for the development of illumination

This highly selective and abbreviated interpretation of Kant’s Critique may be used as a starting point for the present use and analysis of intuition (the actual starting point was in fact quite different: it was motivated by the discovery of the general Objects mentioned above and the subsequent realization and then analysis that they did not lie outside experience)

Intuition in this narrative

27.        In this narrative all CONCEPTS lie within intuition

The discussion so far entails the following conclusion: there is so far no knowing or process of knowledge that is transparent and necessary or rational in its entirety. In perception the percept may present in awareness but the process of the presentation lies largely outside cognition. The application of science may be transparent but neither its truth is neither transparent nor necessary. Deduction—logic—alone has some appearance of necessity. However, as we have seen even logic lacks full necessity. And while the process of deduction is classically transparent the source of the rules of deduction is not; and that lack of transparency is significant for there are doubts regarding every logical axiom despite their apparent necessity (tautological character.) Even the classical transparency of the process of deduction has been lost now that computer aided proofs are admitted and proofs are so complex that human verification of those proofs is difficult. Therefore all cognition is tinged with the non-transparent arational character of intuition

Later we will see that emotion has an Object and that that process also lacks transparency and rationality (we normally think that emotion cannot have these qualities but if we show that emotion has an Object it then becomes meaningful to say that the process of Object formation is non-transparent and has arational elements)

It will be shown that all mental content, i.e. the entire range of the CONCEPT, is defined by emotion and cognition (cognition corresponds primarily to cognition of the world outside the body and emotion to an aspect of mental content regarding the body.) Therefore all CONCEPTS are characterized by intuition

All CONCEPTS are reigned in under intuition. The purpose of doing so is strategic. In not arguing any a priori character to any objectivity of concepts, it is allowed that the faithfulness of some concepts may be perfectly faithful to their Object and that this may emerge from investigation. Therefore there is no error in reigning in all concepts under intuition even if it should be in the constitution of some CONCEPTS to transcend intuition

28.        That all concepts lie within intuition does not imply that there are no concepts that are perfectly faithful to Objects (perfect faithfulness is precisely a case in which the Object can be regarded as the object-in-itself)

Intuition, abstraction, and the empirical

Now that it has been allowed that all CONCEPTION is intuitive, it may be asked whether there are any perfectly faithful CONCEPTS

Since all concepts and therefore all knowing lies within intuition, no concept can be referred to another to determine its faithfulness; this point has been argued earlier. I.e., it is in the nature of the presenting situation that the standard approach to foundation is ruled out. Some other way of ‘foundationalism’ will be required in order to provide foundation

In Newtonian mechanics the real—whatever it may be—is represented as a collection of point particles and forces. However, there is every reason to believe that the real is not a collection of point particles and forces. There is a positivistic tendency to regard current science as defining the ultimate real; one reason for that is the immersion of the scientist in the ideas of science; another is the lack of another realm to which to refer. However since success is not a reason to believe that a science defines the real, there is no reason to think that today’s combination of quantum theory and theories of forces of various kinds (the four fundamental forces) define the real and there are historical reasons as well as hints from within science itself that the real has not been captured. Later, the Universal metaphysics will reveal that no science of detail can capture all of reality. The sciences proceed by abstraction that may be called token abstraction: the Object is approximated by a token Object whose CONCEPT is simple

Looking beyond the CONCEPTION, beyond knowing is incapable of providing foundation. Perhaps then, looking within is a way

It was observed in connection with Hume’s thought that his criticism of necessity of science rests on the fact that generalization—induction, free or creative concept formation—is not necessarily true when there the empirical facts do not constitute all the facts

Therefore, perhaps, objectivity of the concept will result for simple Objects. Since the goal is a Universal metaphysics, the Objects should also be universal

This suggestive paving of the way for the present development has been fabricated for the convenience of an audience. The original way was more haphazard, more intuitive, based on insights that followed extended search, far more exciting. The actual development was experienced as an adventure

29.        Abstraction. By eliminating sufficient detail from the CONCEPT it may be possible to have perfect empirical knowledge. For example we might not know the precise difference between two states of affairs but we can know with perfect faithfulness that there are differences. In contrast to scientific abstraction where the ‘Object’ corresponding to the abstract concept is other than the real, the Object of the present kind of abstraction is immanent in the real. This process of abstraction could be called abstraction to the immanent. This a source of Metaphysics of immanence as an alternate name to Universal metaphysics

Necessary Objects

30.        Necessary Objects. Any Object that is known perfectly will be called a necessary Object; in calling an Object necessary, it is implicit that the knowledge is known to be faithful. For the necessary Objects, concept and Object may be conflated. Some Objects are perfectly known as a result of abstraction.

Already, in analyzing the idea of the universe, it has been seen that not only is there correspondence between knower and known but there is also a hint of a power to abstraction. This suggestion will be made manifest below

Universal Objects

If we think of an experience as concept and Object, we might think of it as trivially necessary however it would not constitute knowledge for there is no real Object

Some Platonists think that the number ‘one’ is an Object. More precisely, the thought is that the concept ‘one’ is the—perhaps incomplete or imprecise—of a real number One that, however, does not lie in this mundane or physical world but lies in an Ideal or Platonic universe. Since the number One lies in an Ideal universe it may be thought of as lying everywhere in this world. Given the Platonism, One may be thought of as constituting a universal Object. In Objects we will see that One is indeed an Object but that it lies in this world, i.e. in the Universe, and that it is simultaneously necessary and of the world

The notion of Universal Object introduced here is somewhat different. The Universal Objects are those necessary Objects that are capable of forming the basis of the Universal metaphysics that will be developed in Metaphysics and is previewed below. Some of the Universal Objects that lie at the foundation of the metaphysics and Logic of Metaphysics, and the general cosmology of Cosmology are Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos. Extension and duration are also Universal in this sense provided that we do not think of them as defined in terms of a metric or any detail of quality or quantity that might make them subject to distortion in the concept

A preview of the Universal metaphysics

The following preview is not intended to be complete with respect to content or method

The Universe

Consider the idea of the Universe which is here taken to be all that exists or, as we will see later, all being (existence and being are important concepts and their meaning should be analyzed; the analysis should be adequate to the present purpose and should also acknowledge their known difficulties; the analysis is deferred to Metaphysics.) More precisely the Universe will be thought of as all that existed, all that exists, or all that will exist; this defines an atemporal sense of ‘exist,’ of the verb to be ‘is,’ and of ‘being;’ the common use of ‘is’ as in ‘is at the present time’ is a temporal sense; problems regarding the idea that time spans the Universe are left for later clarification. It is important to note that in this narrative ‘Universe’ is distinct from (a) ‘cosmos’ for, as conceived, the Universe may contain infinitely many cosmological systems, (b) the physical Universe for this allows that there are non-physical Objects in the Universe and this is important because it allows analysis to determine whether there are such Objects and if there are not then the case for physicalism is proved and if there are—in whatever sense—then we will not have ruled out truth by prejudice, (c) the ‘empirically known universe,’ for conflation of the empirically known universe with the Universe is often tacit even though it is explicit primarily in positivistic thinking

Consider the following CONCEPT: my experience of a cube of metal. The CONCEPT may be reasonably faithful to some ‘thing’ but the faithfulness is certainly not perfect. If I do not perfectly know a simple Object such as a cube, surely I cannot claim perfect knowledge of the Universe. However, if all detail is abstracted out of the Universe which is then regarded in its oneness, it is perfectly known as such. Since it is perfectly known it is not problematic to not distinguish the Universe and its CONCEPT

If we recognize the Universe as having detail without precise specification, e.g. in saying there are concepts that have rough correspondence to things, perfect faithfulness is not destroyed. We can say: there are patterns and laws without destroying perfect faithfulness

Whether a general idea such as Universe is necessary depends not only on the idea but the specific way in which it is used. One way to make ‘universe’ necessary is to abstract out all detail. Another way is to regard detail abstractly as in the fact of detail (or pattern or law.) In Metaphysics the ideas of domain, duration, and extension will be introduced. Provided that it is not required to precisely specify or quantify domains, durations, or extensions under consideration, ideas may allow definition necessary Objects

It may be useful to recall the earlier discussion of law as fact versus law as hypothesis (tentative.) A generalization (law) may have significant application but is still tentative if thought of as extending beyond its domain of application; restricted to its phenomenal domain (space, time, and other parameters such as scale and tolerance) the law or pattern is a fact. We can think of the Universe as divided into domains; then, over a limited domain a law is a fact. Later, when the Universal metaphysics has been developed, we will see that there are infinitely many cosmological systems that provide cases of domains with local laws as facts (there will also be an infinite variety of laws)

Consider the nature of a law. It is our reading of a pattern, i.e. a law is a CONCEPT (and may also be conceptual andor involve concepts.) There is some the pattern or law that we read corresponds to some actual pattern or immanent version of the law; this immanent version of the law is labeled Law. Therefore

The Universe is all being and contains all Law

Consider the concept of a creator of the Universe. If a creator is external to what is created the Universe can have no creator. This is because there is nothing ‘outside’ the Universe. And this, in turn, is not because there is, e.g., an empty space and time outside the Universe but because as all being the Universe cannot and does not have an outside. Similarly, the Universe has neither beginning nor end. However, a manifest phase of the Universe may have a beginning and an end

The Universe has no creator

If the Universe had been conceived as the physical universe there would be the possibility of its having a non-physical creator

Foregoing discussion immediately suggests that space and time are—whatever their domain may be—immanent in the Universe and do not constitute absolute frameworks as a stage for the play of being. Space andor time are called absolute if there existence is independent of the being of the Universe and its parts. On the other hand if space and time are part and parcel of being and owe their being to being, they are relative. Space and time must then be part of the play of being. This is the point of view that from for the entire Universe space and time are relative (the contrary viewpoint would be that space and time are absolute in that they constitute a scaffolding for the play of being.) This point of view allows that there may be domains in which space and time are as if absolute. It does not imply that a Universal or global space and time framework exists or that where local frameworks exist they are continuous or infinitely divisible

In Metaphysics and in Cosmology improved analysis of space and time will be preceded by analysis of extension and duration

For the Universe, space and time are immanent in being—and are not externally imposed

The power of abstraction from intuition begins to become evident; however the power revealed so far is a minute fraction of what is to come

Introduction to logos and logic

If we define the logos as the universe of logically possible states then the logos includes the Universe

It does not appear that satisfaction of the principles of logic implies existence. With an indefinite notion of the universe some state whose concept satisfied logic might or might not exist. However, the Universe is all being. What is the significance of a state whose concept is logical but does not exist? That state lies out all actuality; in a not unreasonable sense it could not exist. But this appears to contradict the fact that the state satisfies the principles of logic. Perhaps, then, satisfaction of the principles of logic does imply existence. If that is true every state in the logos is in the Universe and therefore the logos and the Universe in all its details are identical. In considering the Void, this will be seen to be true but will require introduction of an alternative conception of logic

The Void

The Void is the absence of any existing things, i.e. it is the absence of being. In Metaphysics the existence of the Void is demonstrated. In this preview its existence is taken as given. Therefore since all Law is in the Universe:

The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Law

This is the fundamental result of Metaphysics and it is the logical anchor of the Universal metaphysics that may act as framework and sieve for imaginative or constructive endeavor. It should therefore be the subject of intense doubt and criticism which is taken up in Metaphysics

Now consider the CONCEPT or description of a state of affairs. If the state does not emerge from the Void, that would be a Law of the Void. Therefore every state of affairs must emerge from the Void. Since the Void exists, every state of affairs must obtain or exist (somewhere and when)

There is an obvious exception. Consider the state of affairs ‘An apple that is fully green and fully not green at the same time rests on a table.’ Such a state violates the logical principle called the principle of non-contradiction and it is reasonably obvious that state of affairs described cannot obtain. Therefore the assertion of the previous paragraph must be modified: every concept of a state that does not violate any principle of logic, the state must exist

The only states that do not exist are those that cannot exist in principle, i.e. those that violate the principles of logic. I.e., the Universe has the greatest logically possible variety of being

It was noted earlier that every axiom or principle of logic has been questioned. The thinking is therefore inverted and Logic (capitalized) is defined as the principle of being. A state of affairs exists if and only if it is ‘Logical:’ if it is Logical it must exist, if it exists it must be Logical

The principle of reference now follows:

Subject to Logic every concept has an Object

Or

Subject to Logic every concept has reference

The principle of reference is the basis of the unified theory of Objects developed in Objects

Even though Logic is introduced as a definition the conclusion is far from empty because the known logical principles are at least approximations to Logic

The fundamental principle of metaphysics now follows:

The Universe has the greatest Logically possible variety of being

And

The only Universal law is Logic

There is no Universal Law

It now becomes clear why the Universe defined as all being is an efficient idea

The immense power of abstraction from intuition now becomes evident. Subject only to Logic the following are true it follows that our system of physical laws is one among infinitely many; for each physical law there are infinitely many cosmological systems of immense variety; and for each cosmological system there are infinitely many identical as well as infinitely many similar systems… Further variety is taken up in Metaphysics, Objects, and Cosmology

The Logos

Now define the Logos as the Object of Logic: as the collection of Logically possible states. Earlier it was seen that the logos must contain the Universe. It is now seen that:

The Logos is the Object of Logic; it is the Universe in all its variety

There is no universal Law. All Law is immanent in the Logos

The power of abstraction is evident once more. There is no need for some vague notion of a Logos. The Logos is the Universe; that the Logos is the Universe is reference to the absolutely unlimited variety of being; there are Logical limits to the concepts or description of the variety but no limits to the variety itself

Development of the metaphysics

Although the development above is foundational, it does not go to (what will be seen to be) the root. This ‘return’ will be undertaken in the preliminary discussion in Metaphysics, section The Universal metaphysics, topics The concept of metaphysics, The Universal metaphysics, Existence, Experience, External world, Being

The variety in the foregoing hints at the factual power revealed. The invocation of Logic hints at the conceptual power. However, much in the way of foundation is so far absent—what is existence, what is being and what are there necessary foundation? How shall we articulate a system of necessary Objects that enable a full Universal metaphysics? What is metaphysics? How may we address the paradox apparently immanent in the allowances of an imagination that sees the infinite variety described above? And what of relevance? And how shall we address the critics austere and generous—we may begin by formulating and addressing doubt—regarding credulity and formal doubt that may arise, for example, in the proof of the existence of the Void—ad hoc at first, then systematically?

The systematic elaboration of foundation and articulation of concepts and ideas, and of the factual and conceptual powers begins in Metaphysics; Objects focuses on the conceptual power; and Cosmology focuses on the factual power (which includes Pattern and Law.) We would like to know more about the immense variety of being that has been revealed: how can that be done? That last question is of intense interest but not overtly foundational. It is however foundational to observe that while we can now say that we know that the elements of the variety exist we do not know them (except the local elements.) The question arises, how can we come to know them—i.e., how may we ground the knowledge? The problem is anticipated in the earlier distinction of general and special metaphysics. Although we know from the foregoing that the Objects of the metaphysics exist, it is only the general Objects that we know. As observed, the situation as it stands is an immense advance for the analysis has shown the existence of entire ‘universes’ of Objects that in their reach exceed what had been earlier imagined. It remains to ground or know the Objects of special metaphysics—how might this be done? A response is twofold: from the side of the knower, grounding is via intuition as explained above and experience as in Metaphysics; and from the side of the known it is open—via discovery and the journey. It could be argued that the knowledge in question is useless but that is not true for it illuminates the Universe and provides practical motivation for search and knowledge of the necessity of realization (it is probable that search makes outcome more likely and better appreciated)

Elaboration and address of these concerns are among the topics of Metaphysics and subsequent chapters

Metaphysics

Introduction

What is metaphysics?

Although it seems naïve from a modern perspective, Thales’ idea that the world is made of water is a metaphysics. Perhaps the earlier Greek mythology in which the Gods are forces in this world could be called metaphysics. However, the significance of Thales’ idea includes (1) the basis of explanation—water—is simpler than what is explained—the world—and (2) the basis or foundation is of the world. There is little in Thales work that deserves to be called ‘explanation.’ However, there is little in the prior history of metaphysics outside science that deserves to be called explanation if it is required that explanation springs from the same soil as the explained. And Thales’ idea does not appear to be significantly self-conscious

An interesting side-note to the present discussion is the way in which ideas develop. Supernaturalism gives way to a groping naturalism and then to a self-conscious naturalism that paves the way for science and the sweeping away of metaphysics. Then, however, metaphysics makes a return but restricted in its outlook but sophisticated in its vision. Now, in the present narrative, first by a groping, then via self-conscious development, and finally by relinquishing substance in favor of the inherent force of ideas a final, dynamic and mature metaphysics emerges

A self-conscious notion of metaphysics stems from Aristotle—it is the study of being-as-being or, colloquially though not as precisely, the study of things-as-they-are. The use and significance of ‘being-as-being’ is clarified below in section Universal metaphysics

Clearly any metaphysics that shall be instrumental toward the goals and intents of this essay shall lie in the family defined by this meaning

There is a familiar story regarding the origin of the name ‘metaphysics’ that runs rather as follows (from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Metaphysics.) ‘Metaphysics’ was not Aristotle’s term; it stems from later Greek authors who use the term ‘Ta meta ta phusika’ meaning approximately ‘the ones after the physicals’ and referring to the books that are now thought of as containing Aristotle’s metaphysics. Thus metaphysics was not Aristotle’s term was not intended to mean ‘the subject beyond the subject of physics’ but may have been intended to suggest that the books on metaphysics should be read after the ones on physics. And, even though ‘beyond the subject of physics’ may be suggestive it is not accurate for as will be seen in relation to physics, metaphysics is neither after nor before. It is before ‘science’ in being more fundamental and ‘after’ science in reaching to the edge of cosmology. The subject matter of metaphysics encompasses but is not limited to that of physics or science; but ‘encompassing’ may be misleading for the actual study is different in method and uses distinct even if related concepts

The original motive may have been that there are various special sciences which study ‘divisions’ of the world, e.g. matter and life and so on. Metaphysics, however, is reserved for the study of the world without regard to any special nature. Perhaps there is nothing to study beyond the special sciences; if that is true then metaphysics may allow confirmation rather than mere assumption of its truth; and if it is not true then metaphysics may allow emergence of its truth. The use of ‘being’ i.e. what is there is not especially illuminating at outset for it says essentially nothing. However, that turns out to be a power of its meaning—it allows the investigation to emerge rather than have it be stamped at outset: and since we are seeking illumination allowing a stamp at outset may be to allow the stamp of darkness and absence of knowledge

The study of being-as-being now appears quite clear in intent and, allowing for the necessary lack of specification, in meaning. However, this crystal clarity gives way to clouding when we look deeper

There is a popular use of metaphysics as the study or science of the occult or hidden. Which use is the true metaphysics? The question is not meaningful for the two ‘metaphysics’ correspond to distinct meanings and it would perhaps be more efficient to use different words. The question is closely analogous to asking Of biology and physics, which one is Science? The present use of metaphysics, then, is the study of being-as-being and it is significantly distinct from the study of the occult because it does not distinguish the (apparently) occult from the manifest, the remote from the immediate, or the opaque from the transparent

A second source of equivocation regarding the meaning of metaphysics is more serious. It is the question Since what is known is known in experience, how can we know things-as-they-are? Or, Since all knowledge is CONCEPTUAL, how can we know Objects as ‘pure’ Objects? This is the source of the modern use of metaphysics as metaphysics-of-experience; it is the source of the Kantian tradition of the criticism of pure metaphysics. This concern has already received address. Pure metaphysics is broken down into general and special metaphysics. The Objects of general metaphysics are known faithfully even though they are known in experience; although the CONCEPT of general metaphysics not the Object it is known empirically or experientially and faithfully. Then: from the general metaphysics we know that the Objects of Special metaphysics (the cosmological variety and so on) exist even though we do not know them (experientially.) We know some of those special Objects: they are the Objects of our world: cosmos, Earth, life, human society and culture… However, though we know them with degrees of faithfulness—sometimes just well enough to have illumination, sometimes sufficiently well as in visual perception, and sometimes with immense precision as in certain branches of physics; still, that knowledge is not perfect (in general.) Pure metaphysics may be used to illuminate these Objects. If the Objects are studied at a sufficiently general or abstract level, they may be known with perfect faithfulness; such Objects will fall under general Cosmology

Applied metaphysics studies those Objects that we do not know faithfully and that perhaps cannot be known faithfully. However, the term Applied metaphysics is used because metaphysics can be used to enhance the study of these Objects. The principles of the approach are taken up in the section Applied metaphysics below and summarized in chapter Method. The principles are applied to the study of normal worlds, i.e. worlds such as ours in chapter Worlds. which covers physical cosmology and human being. The study in Worlds is not metaphysics at all even though we allow it under Applied metaphysics. The motive to that allowance is that the pure metaphysics enables the approach to the intrinsic limit of the special disciplines

These reflections confirm the earlier suggestion that understanding the nature of metaphysics may remain unclear until metaphysics itself reaches some sufficient degree of completion. Early metaphysics proceeded naïvely without reflection on the nature and possibility of knowledge. Perhaps even Plato’s metaphor of the cave did not get to the core of the divide between knower and known. In the modern era, the ascent of reason brought the gap into clear view and Kant thought he had shown it to be eternal. This stage of metaphysics must remain without clarity regarding the nature of metaphysics and the kind and possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Abstraction from intuition shows a way out; and this way is executed here; which simultaneously provides a map of knowledge that includes metaphysics and understanding of an ultimate nature of metaphysics

Another concern regarding the nature of metaphysics is the various characterizations of it from the tradition of metaphysics in the overarching sense of the study of being-as-being. In the searching of the tradition many characterizations of metaphysics arise: here are some: an inquiry into what exists, the science of ultimate reality, the science of the world as a whole, and the science of first principles. How do these relate to the study of being-as-being? In the present narrative it is seen that the first three are perhaps different aspects of what falls under metaphysics as being-as-being (supplemented by the treatments in Objects and Cosmology which of course are metaphysics) while from the developments in Intuition we see that there are no first principles that come before all investigation and we have begun to see—and this will be confirmed and elaborated in Method—that knowledge of content and knowledge of principles emerge together and are not distinct categories even though there are practical differences. The incompleteness of thought suggested by the various notions of metaphysics and method from the tradition stems from the incompleteness of metaphysics as science developed via demonstration and its reliance on imagination. Imagination (and perception) as we have seen and will continue to see is essential because it seeks to know and because it provides the material that can be the subject of criticism and demonstration. In the present narrative interaction of construction (imagination) and criticism has permitted a maturity that results in metaphysics and understanding of the nature of metaphysics

The simplest conception of metaphysics

Although there is a history of criticism and doubt regarding metaphysics as the direct study of being—i.e., being-as-being—it is seen that in this conception metaphysics is possible and most powerful

While we learn and owe some debt to the tradition and perhaps even to etymology, truth is not bound by tradition and even less by etymology

The significance of present development of metaphysics

In common knowledge including science the aim must include the practical

In metaphysics however, the first aim is truth. In the modern tradition however metaphysics as conceived here has been regarded as futile because of the supposed impossibility of perfect faithfulness

Here, however, metaphysics is shown possible and a metaphysics whose Object is the Universe is developed and demonstrated

An immense significance for thought and its application to practical concerns and to meaning-in-the-sense-of-significance is developed in this essay. The developments include approach and systematic laying out of possibilities for further work

There is at most one metaphysics

Metaphysics is the study of being-as-being. Implications include (1) being is not studied with regard to special kind and (2) the CONCEPT is perfectly faithful to the Object

Therefore except for variant formulations, degree of detail of the development, and range of being there can be at most one metaphysics

Pure and applied metaphysics

If the divisions of metaphysics into pure and applied metaphysics and so on seem unnecessarily fine in their distinctions, the following may be regarded as response. First, the entire Universe has been mapped. All knowledge, received and potential lie within; and, in this narrative, what is outside the received is seen as immensely larger in magnitude than the received (while remaining somewhat neutral to any question of ‘importance.’) Second, the number of divisions is not unduly large: the following lie under the broad topic Universe / Knowledge

Pure metaphysics

General metaphysics

Special metaphysics. Includes general cosmology

Applied metaphysics—application to special disciplines as in Worlds. General cosmology could be placed under applied metaphysics but this is not done here

Systematic approach from Intuition

The following formal aspects are crucial. Care in selecting the fundamental Objects—the basic concepts—for faithfulness, articulation, and universality. Inclusion of Logos—the fundamental Object that straddles the rational and the empirical: this amounts to bringing deduction or logic from the a priori and perhaps tinged with mystery to the clear plane of Object or content; which is natural since the Object of deduction, i.e. relationship between facts, is in the world

Finally, sequence of development has flexibility but is significant for efficiency and understanding. The preliminary ideas are foundation, existence, experience, external world, being, and metaphysics. The sequence of the main necessary Objects is Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos. Universe is placed before Domain because the former frames the development of the latter; and it is natural for Law, Extension and Duration to follow Universe. There are doubts regarding the nature of the Void so it is placed where the doubts will not cloud development of Universe and Domain. The Logos is placed last because its development is dependent on the existence and properties of the Void—and on the fundamental principle of metaphysics. The remaining topics are important but do not anchor the development. The sequence of development may be as follows

Foundation in the necessary Objects — Existence —Experience — External world — Being — The concept of metaphysics — The Universal metaphysics — Universe — The ideas of law and Law — Possibility and actuality — Introduction to logic and logos — Domain and Complement. Cause, creation and duration — Extension and Duration — The Void — The fundamental principle of metaphysics and Logic — Logos — Form — The equivalent forms of the metaphysics —Proof and interpretation: token proof — Space, time and space-time-being — Doubt. Formal doubts: doubts regarding the deduction; doubts from science and common sense — Doubt. Subjective doubts: the metaphysics as artifice; the metaphysics yields so much from so little — Humanistic doubt from the austerity of Logic: the metaphysics is dehumanizing — Doubt: residual doubt. Doubt and faith. Metaphysics and animal faith — Properties of the Void — Being and existing — The possibility of metaphysics — A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth. The problem of substance. Determinism and indeterminism. The habit of substance thinking — A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth. Cosmological consequences. Adventure. Absolute indeterminism and structure — Problems of metaphysics — Preliminary comments on method — Metaphysics and action

The Universal metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics entails Objects and Cosmology. These constitute the first core of the system of ideas

The foundation of the Universal metaphysics lies in the necessary Objects

The development of the Universal metaphysics begins with a discussion of the nature of existence, experience, external world, and being. It will be significant that they are necessary Objects

This is the point at which it will be efficient to review the concept of metaphysics and define the Universal metaphysics in terms of the necessary and Universal Objects

The main such Objects are Universe, Law, Extension and Duration, Domain and Complement, The Void, and the Logos. The development of the Universe begins with the development of the nature and properties of these Objects and fundamental implications that show the Universal metaphysics as an articulated system that has ultimate depth or foundation and breadth or variety

The remaining topics are elaborations of the metaphysics, application to some important problems of metaphysics, and anticipation of doubts and criticisms to which responses are given

Being

Existence — Experience — External world — Being

Existence

Consider the statement ‘There is an apple whose color is green’ in which the italicization of ‘is’ indicates that it is emphasized. The phrase ‘There is an apple’ is equivalent to ‘An apple exists’

Here, ‘is’ is used as a form of the verb to be. Something exists or has the property of existence if it may be said to be—if it has being

Reasons for deferring the introduction of ‘being’ will become clear below

In the history of thought existence has been contrasted with essence. Roughly, essence is identity—if something lost identity it would not be that thing; existence has been called the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things—e.g. sentient or knowing individuals. That distinction is analogous to essence as reality and existence as appearance

What has been seen so far in Intuition and the present chapter clouds the distinction. It has been seen that the Object is neither thing nor mere appearance; that there is a class of things, the necessary Objects, for which the distinction breaks down; and that there is another class of things whose ‘being’ is so interwoven with the concept that there is no thing-in-itself. The latter class of things includes the practical Objects—the Objects of adaptation for which the concept is ‘sufficiently’ faithful and which, it makes sense to say, may be taken to behave as given in the concept for certain practical purposes but not all purposes. Although ‘There is an apple…’ must clearly refer, first of all, to a thing-as-cognized, we start at that point with full awareness that neither pure not applied aspects of the metaphysics are affected by the choice since in the pure case the cognized versus in-itself distinction is without consequence and in the practical case we tolerate the distinction

Does anything exist? Practically speaking, of course—if nothing existed these words would not be written! However, such questions may be asked in order to clarify or illuminate some issue such as the meaning of terms the meaning of terms. Perhaps ‘the words of this narrative’ are an illusion but if so the illusion exists

Further clarification may depend on elucidation of ‘existence.’ However, some terms must be fundamental or primitive; this does not mean that they have no meaning or that their meaning is unfounded. The fundamental character of ‘existence’ is part of our being! But do we have being? Even if we have no being as we think we do there is at least an illusion

The fundamental concern regarding existence is not whether anything exists at all but rather, What exists? It is practically obvious from our sense of being in the world that there must be experience—this is taken up below where the meaning of experience is clarified and it is shown that there is experience. Then in the sub-section External world it is established that there is an external world, i.e. not all experience is illusion and some experience has an Object

Because ‘everything exists’ existence has been argued to be trivial or not a concept. That it is trivial does not imply that it is not a concept. The phrase ‘red or not red’ is trivially true of everything but is conceptual. However, ‘red or not red’ is not a useful property. Perhaps, then, ‘exists’ is superfluous when applied to something. The claim is valid: existence is a trivial property and superfluous when used to describe something. However, it is precisely the triviality in the case of existence that will be a source of the power of the metaphysics. Clarification of the nature of existence will lead to deep answers to the question ‘What things and kinds of thing exist?’

The problem of the non-existent Object. What is the meaning of ‘Unicorns do not exist’? The problem is that if there are no unicorns, what is it that is being said to not exist? There is at least a confusion. However, the confusion arises because a principle of meaning already discussed has been ignored. Before appealing to that principle consider first the meaning of the phrase on medieval maps ‘Here be dragons.’ What could that mean if intended literally but if there were no dragons or if no one had seen one? Many people might have seen drawings or paintings or have heard stories of dragons as large, dangerous, reptilian, flying, fire-exhaling creatures. The literal meaning, then, of ‘Here be dragons’ would be that ‘Here there are in fact creatures that are like the drawings or paintings or as described in the legends.’ Next consider, ‘Horses exist!’ What would that convey if there are no horses present and the listener had never seen a horse or even a picture of one? The speaker could perhaps produce a picture of a horse and show it to the listener and explain ‘That’s a picture of a horse. In my country there are creatures just like that.’ Even when something exists a concept is necessary to be able to talk about it. Although there are no unicorns, I have an idea or a CONCEPT of a Unicorn. The meaning, then, of ‘Unicorns do not exist’ is that there are no creatures that correspond to my concept or that look like the images of unicorns from books

Experience

‘Experience’ has a number of meanings. The meaning here is so primal that it is not conveyed in terms of something else but by pointing out by way of example and generalization The example of the following paragraph specifies the meaning of ‘experience’ that is being used here

Bricks have a color that by convention is named ‘red.’ If another person says ‘that brick is red’ I know what to expect; I look at the brick and see that it is indeed red. Thus there are two ways knowing the world: the intensely personal way when, for example, I experience the brick as red and a second way which may be labeled ‘description,’ ‘convention,’ ‘public’ or ‘objective’

Experience need not be simple; corresponding to every complex intuition—in the sense used here—there is a (complex) experience

How is it known that there is experience? It is the primal and immediate character of experience. Experience is a name for the most immediate aspect of our being and as such requires no proof

In a higher animal such as human being, in addition to ‘pure’ experience there is experience of experience. Experience is the phenomenon for which CONCEPT and Object are the same kind of ‘thing.’ This does not prove that there is experience but enables to recognize and point out the ‘proof’

Experience is a necessary Object: there is experience

Experience: detail

Experience and intuition ground knowledge in the individual. Experience is the ‘substance’ and intuition the ‘form’ of the grounding. ‘Substance’ and ‘form’ are not entirely distinct for there is experience of experience, i.e. experience is a necessary element or Object of intuition: experience is the substance of intuition

Because experience is private, it may be the case that my experience of red is the same as your experience of green; this is the problem of the inverted color spectrum. If an individual’s physical (brain) state corresponds to red we do not expect that the same state for the same individual could also correspond to green. However it has been argued that the same brain state may correspond to both red and green without violating logic. Since the correspondence between the physical state of the brain and the experience does not appear to be logical, this certainly appears to be true. Then from the lack of logical connection between physical / brain state and experience, the argument continues, it follows that (a) that experience exists and is not physical and, alternately, (b) since experience is not physical it does not exist. Option (a) is a dualist option in which there is both mind (experience) and matter (the physical) which do not interact (if they do interact mind and matter do not constitute true duals.) This option is fraught with difficulty: how do mind and matter interact? Option (b) is the physicalist or materialist option—a monism in which the single substance is matter which is the subject matter of physical science. This option is fraught with absurdity: experience does not exist. ‘To bad for your belief in experience,’ the proponents of the view say as if making a moral admonishment ‘but all experience is illusion.’ The motive to the claim appears to be the problem of experience in a material world. The problem is as follows: material description—e.g. the sensation of water flowing over the skin or the description of water according to physical science—excludes the mental. Therefore, given that the world is physical, experience cannot exist

What is the connection between physical state and experience? The possibilities are (1) There is no connection: matter and mind are distinct and have no interaction. The absurdity of this is pointed out above and is manifest. A modification that mind-matter interaction is weaker than matter-matter or mind-mind violates the thought that mind and matter are distinct. The Cartesian explanation that the interaction is mediated by God also violates the distinction in addition to the introduction of an enormous complexity (which may have seemed natural in a time dominated by religious belief.) (2) Matter causes mind. What is the nature of the cause? It must be that mind somehow arises in the cumulative behavior of matter in process via collective process, elaboration, interaction, and layering. The difficulty of this resolution is that it explains the complex function of mind (in principle) but not the simple fact of mind, i.e. of experience. In the recent literature the explanation of the fact of mind from matter has been called ‘the hard problem’ of mind (in the literature on consciousness it is the hard problem of consciousness while explanation of the complex function has been called the scientific problem of consciousness.) The assumption behind the hardness of the hard problem is that matter excludes mind. On this assumption, the harness is not merely hard but impossible. Therefore we consider a third option that might have been suggested in the first place if we were not burdened with the history of thought on the issue which is burdened with the paradigmatic assumptions of its eras. (3) Matter and mind—particles and feelings—are sides of the same entity. The first difficulty is that material distinction excludes mind / experience. The response is that material description does not explicitly include the mental but it does explicitly exclude it either. The Newtonian picture of the world as inert particles in motion under their mutual influences seems very devoid of mind. However, in the quantum view neither the particles themselves nor their (non-local, probabilistic, disorder to structure) interactions seem inert. Although mind is not explicit, the quantum view seems much more hospitable to mind (and the quantum view is even on its own merits likely incomplete.) What is matter? The very fact that we see a block of wood as devoid of life and mind suggests its inertness and exclusion of mind. However, the material view itself destroys this view. If matter is all there is then mind must be material and therefore the inertness of the block of wood is at most apparent. The view under consideration is close to what has been called the identity theory: mind and matter are the same. This view faces the difficulty that a dead organism loses its mental side but not the material side. The error of the objection is as follows. That mind and matter are sides of the same entity is introduced because we are forced to that conclusion from failure of the alternatives. Therefore, at the level of matter as matter, e.g. atoms and molecules, elements of mind must be present. When organized in the brain processes of a living being, the result is mind-as-we-know-it from two directions: the external and the internal. The external is, e.g., how we experience the intelligence of another individual; this is the result of the complex organization and layering. The internal is my own experience which is the primitive feeling that, in addition to the complexity, is also amplified via collective process. The view is forced by the initial view that matter is all there is regardless of theory of matter (classical or modern) but subject only to the thought that mind is not explicit in matter

Let us approach the mind-matter issue from a slightly different perspective. One apparently reasonable solution to the problem of experience in a material world is to say that it is the organization and processes of matter in brains that results in experience. However, perhaps this explanation is not all that reasonable after all. For the organization of matter would seem to explain the organization of experience into intuition and cognition and emotion but not experience itself

Another explanation suggested by Thomas Nagel in addition to experience and physicality, there is some third element that shall be implicated in the explanation

That third element could be something we know in modern physics (but are not able to compute—or have not yet computed or seen how to compute) or something that is missing from physics so far. In this case of course there is not truly a third element

The following explanation is entirely possible. Primal physical behavior, e.g. at the level of elementary particles, can be described ‘objectively’ e.g. the motion of two particles under their mutual interaction. However, ask What is the interaction? How is it felt by one of the particles? Answer as follows: the interaction at an elementary level is elementary experience. Complex organization described ‘objectively’ is physical; complex organization of elementary interaction results in feeling at the animal-human level. In this explanation experience and physical or objective description are two sides of the same phenomenon. There is no problem of the origin of experience in the physical. It could be said that the physical causes the mental or is correlated with it but those are very weak versions of what is happening: one phenomenon, two sides. Objection. This is pan-psychism: little atomic minds. In fact it is not; it is not said that there are ‘little’ minds but simply that the mark of relationship in the elementary particle is primitive to what manifests via complex organization as human level experience. Objection. It is anti-materialist and anti-physicalist. In fact it is not; all it says is that (perhaps) elementary feeling already is an aspect of ‘matter’

Now the foregoing is an explanation and not a proof. However the alternative is that matter excludes the mental and therefore (1) there is no such thing as experience or (2) some third element is involved

The argument that there is no such thing as experience is absurd. Experience is primal and needs no explanation. Therefore the alternatives are that the mental and the material are two sides of one phenomenon or, two, a third unknown element is involved. It is unnecessary to invoke a third element. Tentatively then the mental and the material are two aspects of the same phenomenon and there is experience; this argument will be improved in Cosmology. For now however, we conclude from the primal character of experience and the fact that there is no necessary or reasonable argument against experience that there is experience

Stated simply a somewhat modified argument is: we have experience of experience just as we have experience of Objects; doubting an Object is an experience therefore doubt confirms experience; the materialist arguments against experience are not valid but lead to two alternatives of which simplicity tentatively suggests that experience and material description are two sides of the same phenomenon and that the two sides go to the root level of the phenomenon; final resolution—regarding the alternatives—is given in Cosmology. The final resolution will confirm that:

There is experience

Experience and intuition ground knowledge in the individual. Experience is the ‘substance’ and intuition the ‘form’ of the grounding. ‘Substance’ and ‘form’ are not entirely distinct for there is experience of experience, i.e. experience is a necessary element or Object of intuition: experience is the substance of intuition

External world

The idea of the external world is that it exists independently of being experienced; it is not literally external to anything.

We experience Objects but there may be error in the experience—illusion, hallucination, distortion, selection and so on. The possibility arises that all experience is in absolute error—that there is nothing that experience corresponds to. Surely some experience has an Object but we entertain the thought that all experience is in error so that we can assess the objectivity especially of perception but also of cognition generally. We would like to know, first of all that experience has some Objects even if the faithfulness is not perfect. That is, we would like to know that there is a world that exists independently of experience. This world is labeled the ‘external world.’ We know that there is experience, therefore experience is part of the external world: however it is experience as Object that is part of the external world. The body, if it exists, is also part of the external world. The external world is not literally external to anything

Our interest in showing that there is an external world stems from the philosophical desire to have a secure foundation. Since significant claims are going to be made in developing a metaphysics, it is important that the foundation should be secure. After establishing that there is an external world we may then investigate its structure

Solipsism is the position that there is nothing but experience—that experience has no Object (except perhaps experience itself and this admission must be made because the solipsism admits that there is experience.) Solipsism, then, is the position that experience is the entire world. If we can disprove solipsism, it will follow that there is an external world. The extreme skeptical position regarding existence would be that there is no world at all. Therefore solipsism is already somewhat compromised as a skeptical position

There is a common sense argument against solipsism: it is that the Universe is far too varied and complex to be merely the content of the mind of a single individual. Let us say the individual knows some mathematics but also knows that there is much more mathematics than he or she knows. All that unknown knowledge—and infinitely more—must be latent in the individual’s experience; and this is in contrast to the normal position in which the individual does not have full knowledge of the Universe but comes to know parts of it by coming into contact with them

The common sense argument does not work because solipsism simply says that experience is all there is; it does not assert that that experience is someone’s experience. However, the common sense argument suggests a logical argument

The system of solipsist experience is either limited or it is not

If it is limited the solipsist stance fails

If it is not the system is a renaming of the phenomenal world and is not a true solipsist stance

Being

Being—what is there, what exists

In the history of thought being has sometimes been used in the sense of being-in-itself while existence has been used to signify being-in-relation. Since knowledge is a relation, what is known is existence. Consider, on the other hand a concept and an Object. The Object is the dual product of knower and known and therefore has some relation to being as being-in-itself. Therefore there is some relation between being-in-itself and being-in-relation. It has been seen that there is no essential distinction for the necessary Objects. In this chapter, however, the plan is to develop the properties of the necessary Objects and their consequences. It will be seen that the class of necessary Objects is immense. In the later section Being and existing of this chapter, it will be seen that the lack of distinction between being and existing extends to practical Objects. Therefore there will be no need to distinguish being and existing

In the phrase what is there, the verb to be ‘is’ is employed in the atemporal sense

In the previous sections various concerns have arisen regarding existence—that it is fundamental therefore not referred to another more basic concept, that it is trivial, the distinction from essence, the problem or paradox of the non-existent Object… These concerns need not be addressed again

There are two ‘sides’ to existence: experience and the external world that are not distinct. These therefore have unity within being; and they show being to be robust. Of course the fundamental question ‘What has existence?’ is imported as ‘What has being?’ and developing the kinds and Objects that have being is a central concern of Metaphysics through Worlds

A concern regarding use—shall being refer to ‘things’ or to the common quality of all things that exist… or shall being refer to ‘process’ or ‘relationship’ or the common qualities of all processes or all relationships. We typically think of being as rather thing-like or noun-like. However, this is not given; as a common quality being is adjective or adverb-like. These are interesting concerns but not as important as might be supposed. Final resolution appears in Objects. It is significant that resolution should emerge rather than be taken as given

One reason for the choice of ‘being’ is the neutrality just described. Also it is fundamental to language via its root form ‘to be’ and is therefore more immediate than ‘existence;’ and this immediacy brings puts on display the fundamental character. There is interest in being because of the tradition behind the word: provided we do not import confusions and provided that we are clear about the meaning used here, the tradition is a source of suggestions

From the variety of uses in the tradition it might appear that the concept of being is vague or indefinite. Reading the tradition supports this view. And until metaphysics is definite the understanding of being must remain indefinite. It is this that renders the concepts of being indefinite. In the present narrative a final and ultimate metaphysics is developed: this is manifest in the form of the metaphysics—readers may question the demonstration of the metaphysics but the metaphysics is manifestly ultimate. Therefore it has been possible to remove indefiniteness, to show that when alternative interpretations arise there is either a clear choice or the distinctions are merely apparent

The idea of being is trivial; this is a part of the power of the idea. It permits the nature or the aspects of the nature of being to emerge rather than be assumed at outset. An analogy may be made between the use of ‘being’ in conceptual thought and the use of unknowns in algebra. In conceptual thought, however, the unknown elements regarding being include not only measure or quantity but also kind—e.g. it is not supposed at outset that being is mental or material or that there is any substance or set of substances that ‘constitute’ being

The nature of being and its power. Thus being is what is there. In conceptual thought this empowers a metaphysics. In life, in a journey it empowers realization by a dual openness, first to the powers of the individual and second to the metaphysical dimensions and magnitudes of transformation that may be available

Although the details of being may be imperfectly known, that there is being is without question: there is being—i.e., being is a necessary Object

At this early stage of development of metaphysics, being may be regarded as a marker that is open to discovery

Introduction to the metaphysics

The concept of metaphysics — The Universal metaphysics — Plan of development

The concept of metaphysics

31.        Metaphysics is the study of being

The Universal metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics is the metaphysics that emerges from the study of the universal necessary Objects. It is the system of consequences entailed by those necessary Objects and their properties

The foundation of the metaphysics is in the necessary Objects

Except for variant formulations and degree of detail of the development there is one Universal metaphysics

Plan of development

The Universal metaphysics will be developed from the necessary and Universal Objects and their properties

Universe

The Universe and its characteristics: the Universe is defined to be all being — The atemporal sense of ‘being’ — There is exactly one Universe — The Universe has neither cause nor creator — The ideas of law and Law — Possibility and actuality — Introduction to logic and logos

The Universe and its characteristics: the Universe is defined to be all being

The Universe is all being

As all being with all detail abstracted out so that what is left cannot be simpler, the Universe is a necessary Object

The atemporal sense of ‘being’

In the definition of ‘Universe’ being is used atemporally—i.e. the Universe is all that existed, exists, or will exist. The atemporal or global sense of existence and being is extended and clarified in the section Extension and duration below

The essential points regarding the definition is that it refers to being and not just physical being, it refers to all being and not just our cosmological system or to the known universe. The openness allowed at outset allows that the restricted cases will be confirmed or a greater truth revealed. The justification of the definition, then, is that it is one of an articulated system of concepts that makes the Universal metaphysics ultimate, i.e. the choice is conceptually efficient. This approach required that the entire system of concepts shall be the subject of conceptual experiment—whose variables included choice and nature of the concepts—in the search for an effective scheme. It is worth pointing out that the Universal metaphysics and the recognition of its ultimate and necessary character was not anticipated but emerged from numerous trials

There is exactly one Universe

32.        Since the Universe is all being there is exactly one Universe

The Universe has neither cause nor creator

If a creator is external to what is created the Universe can have no creator. This is because there is nothing ‘outside’ the Universe. And this, in turn, is not because there is, e.g., an empty space and time outside the Universe but because as all being the Universe cannot and does not have an outside. Similarly, the Universe has neither beginning nor end. However, a manifest phase of the Universe may have a beginning and an end

If a cause must be at least partially external to the effect the Universe is not caused. A creator is an example of a cause

33.        The Universe has neither cause nor creator. There is and can be no God who is the creator of the Universe

If the Universe had been conceived in the mold of a category, e.g. the physical universe, there would be the possibility of another category, e.g. a non-physical category, as cause or creator. If the Universe is conceived of as our cosmos or as the known universe, there is the possibility that it would have been caused or created by something else, e.g. another cosmos

The ideas of law and Law

If we recognize the Universe as having detail without precise specification, e.g. in saying there are concepts that have rough correspondence to things, perfect faithfulness is not destroyed (‘New York is 2800 miles from Los Angeles’ may be practically true; that New York is about 2800 miles from Los Angeles is perfectly true.) We can say that there are patterns and laws without destroying perfect faithfulness

It may be useful to recall the earlier discussion of law as fact versus law as hypothesis (tentative.) A generalization (law) may have significant application but is still tentative if thought of as extending beyond its domain of application; restricted to its phenomenal domain (space, time, and other parameters such as scale and tolerance) the law or pattern is a fact. We can think of the Universe as divided into domains; then, over a limited domain a law is a fact. Later, when the Universal metaphysics has been developed, we will see that there are infinitely many cosmological systems that provide cases of domains with local laws as facts (there will also be an infinite variety of laws)

Consider the nature of a law. It is our reading of a pattern, i.e. a law is a CONCEPT (and may also be conceptual andor involve concepts.) There is some the pattern or law that we read corresponds to some actual pattern or immanent version of the law; this immanent version of the law is labeled Law. Therefore

34.        The Universe is all being and contains all Law

This is a primitive form of what will be introduced as the fundamental principle of metaphysics

The foregoing suggests that a Law is Object-like; later we will see that Laws are Objects. We will also see that the Universe contains all Objects. Put another way, all Objects lie within the Universe. From the definition of ‘Universe’ above it may seem obvious that the Universe should contain all Objects. However, if we accept that there are abstract Objects such as numbers we may ask where in the Universe is a number and how does the notion of number decompose into CONCEPT and Object? The view that such things such as number are real is called realism or, after Plato, Platonic realism—or, sometimes, Platonic idealism (not other than realism since in that idealism an idea is real in fact more real than the mundane stuff of the material world.) A contrary view is that of nominalism which holds that an abstract idea may have a name but does not correspond to a real thing. Nominalism is perhaps less problematic but it leaves unanswered the question of the real nature of abstract ideas and names—are they ethereal, are they fictions or figments, and do they have location? These issues are addressed in Objects, where a powerful analysis of the idea of Object will lead to a unification of all kinds of Objects—there are differences but they are not essential or categorial—which is both surprising and against mainstream

35.        (In the chapter Objects it will be seen that) The Universe contains all Objects, specifically all Law and Form

I.e. the Universe contains all things and kinds: things, abstract kinds, all mental content—in addition to having mental content we have experience of it, and all concepts—although the CONCEPT is usually seen as lying on the ‘subject’ side, it may also be seen as lying on the object side

Possibility and actuality

Consider the concept of the possible. If a state of affairs obtains, i.e. if it is actual, it is possible (if were not possible it could not obtain.) A preliminary thought is that something that does not obtain is possible if it could obtain. That thought is indefinite because, (1) even if we are certain that something does not obtain, the meaning of ‘could obtain’ is not clear, and (2) if something does in fact obtain but is not known to obtain, the meaning of ‘could obtain’ is irrelevant. Therefore possibility may be defined as follows:

36.        Relative to a defined context, a state of affairs is possible if it could obtain

It is trivial that an actual state of affairs could obtain. Except for that case, the meaning of ‘could’ obtain remains indefinite. Accordingly there different kinds of possibility may be introduced

In thinking of some context, e.g. a nation or a family, a state of affairs is practically possible—feasible—if it can be brought about without excessive difficulty or burden on the resources of the context (e.g. nation)

A state of affairs is physically possible if in obtaining the laws of physics are not violated

A more restrictive definition of physical possibility results if it is required that the state of affairs should, in addition to satisfying the laws of physics, be realizable in our cosmos

A state of affairs is logically possible if in obtaining no logical principle is violated

There is an intrinsic context regarding logical possibility: the laws of logic itself. Given that we do not know the laws of logic perfectly, we cannot not perfectly know what is logically possible. And, only if there is perfect logic can there be perfect knowledge of logical possibility (the condition is necessary; the problem of computation of the logically possible states would remain.) Significant clarification of these issues will be given in discussing the Void below

Now consider possibility when the context is the Universe. What does it mean that it is possible for a state of affairs to obtain in the Universe—i.e. what is possible when the context of possibility is the Universe? Since the Universe is all being, there are no ‘other circumstances.’ For the Universe, then, the only possible states are the actual states (where ‘are’ is used in the atemporal sense.) It is obvious that the actual is possible. Therefore: With the Universe as context the possible and the actual are identical—or:

37.        For the Universe the possible and the actual are identical

We may think of possibility when the Universe is the context as absolute possibility and then: the absolutely possible and the actual are identical

Remembering that every context occurs within the Universe—in Objects it will be seen that this is true even of imagined contexts—it can be said that: if a state of affairs is possible in a given context it must be actual in some context

It is interesting to ask What can it mean for a state of affairs to be logically possible but not obtain in the Universe. This suggests a connection between logic and possibility relative to the Universe; this is taken up in the section Void, below, where a more complete treatment is possible

Introduction to logic and logos

Now it is reasonable to assert that if a state exists it must satisfy the principles of logic. What this really means is that the concept or description of the state must satisfy the principles of logic (it is implicit of course that the principles are all ‘the’ relevant correct principles.) Therefore:

If we define the logos as the universe of logically possible states then the logos includes the Universe

It does not appear that satisfaction of the principles of logic implies existence. With an indefinite notion of the universe some state whose concept satisfied logic might or might not exist. However, the Universe is all being. What is the significance of a state whose concept is logical but does not exist? That state lies out all actuality; in a not unreasonable sense it could not exist. But this appears to contradict the fact that the state satisfies the principles of logic. Perhaps, then, satisfaction of the principles of logic does imply existence. If that is true every state in the logos is in the Universe and therefore the logos and the Universe in all its details are identical. In considering the Void, this will be seen to be true but will require introduction of an alternative conception of logic

Domains

Domains and complements — Cause, creation and infusion. Limited gods — Extension and duration — Space, time, and being

Domains and complements

A Domain is a part of the Universe. That the Universe is more than a single point implies that there are parts. Therefore Domains are necessary Objects. The Complement of a Domain, also a domain, and the Domain together make up the Universe

If a Domain exists, it has a Complement. Complements are necessary Objects

Cause, creation and infusion. Limited gods

One domain may effect change in another: that is logically possible. The effect may be called causal but the actual assignment of cause will depend on factors that include the meaning of cause. The origin of mind or matter will be taken up later; however, if one domain has mind it may infuse mind into another

While there can be no creator of the Universe, it is logically possible for one Domain to create another. Limited gods are logically possible

Extension and duration

The existence of domains is a sign of Extension; Extension is a necessary Object

The experience or CONCEPT of Duration is a sign of Duration; Duration is a necessary Object

Extension and Duration are immanent in the Universe

Space and time can be set up as measures of extension and duration

From the immanence of Extension and Duration, universality of space and time does not follow—in the large or in the small. Measures of extension and duration may be foamy in the small (as in quantum gravitation) and patchy—e.g., from one cosmos to another

The dimensionality of space does not appear to be a logical feature

In the Universe, space and time are immanent and therefore relative

The effective space and time for a limited Domain may be set up by another domain; therefore local space and time may be as if absolute

From the manner of the introduction of space and time it appears that there are no further measures of difference. However, this is not a logical conclusion; it may reflect lack of perception or imagination

Although Extension is Universal (Duration will be seen to be Universal) it does not follow that there is a Universal space and time. For the Universe, therefore, there may be at most a space and time patchwork

Local description is in terms of the space and time patchwork. The history of a spatial Object may be seen as a ‘historical Object.’ The view of the Universe as an historical Object is the global view

Space, time, and being. It is efficient to discuss this topic after the sections on the Void. However, it is possible to say already that for the Universe as a whole, space and time are immanent in being and therefore relative

The effect of one domain may be such as to erect an as-if absolute space and time in another domain. After deriving implications from the existence of the Void it will be easy to show that there are and must be domains that erect as-if absolute spaces and times for other domains

The Void

The Void and its characteristics — The first form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The Void exists and contains no Law — The concepts of logic and Logic — The fundamental principle of metaphysics expressed in terms of Logic — Necessity — Some properties of the Void — Being and existing — The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics — A preliminary development of the variety of being — The fundamental principle of metaphysics in terms of Law — The Object of the concept of all being is the greatest possible Universe

The Void and its characteristics

The Void is conceived as the absence of being

The first form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The Void exists and contains no Law

Proof of existence. The Void is the complement of the Universe (relative to itself.) Since complements exist, the Void exists

The Existence of the Void is the pivotal result from which the essence of the Universal metaphysics flows. It is crucial to subject it to doubt and criticism. This most important concern as well as other doubts and criticisms are taken up in six sections on doubt below

Since the Universe contains all Laws the Void contains no Law. The conclusions regarding the Void may be summarized in the first and original form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics:

38.        The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Law

This is the fundamental result and logical anchor of the Universal metaphysics that may act as framework and sieve for imaginative or constructive endeavor. It is therefore the subject of intense doubt and criticism taken up below

39.        (In the chapter Objects it will be seen that) The void contains no Object

Now consider the CONCEPT or description of a state of affairs. If the state does not emerge from the Void, that would be a Law of the Void. Therefore every state of affairs must emerge from the Void. Since the Void exists, every state of affairs must obtain or exist (somewhere and when)

There is an obvious objection. Consider the state of affairs ‘An apple that is fully green and fully not green at the same time rests on a table.’ Such a state violates the logical principle called the principle of non-contradiction and it is reasonably obvious that state of affairs described cannot obtain. Therefore the assertion of the previous paragraph must be modified: every concept of a state that does not violate any principle of logic, the state must exist

The only states that do not exist are those that cannot exist in principle, i.e. those that violate the principles of logic. I.e., the Universe has the greatest logically possible variety of being

The concepts of logic and Logic

It was noted earlier that every axiom or principle of logic has been subject to reasonable doubt regarding its universality. The thinking is therefore inverted and Logic (capitalized) is defined as the principle of being. The concept of Logic is that it is the set of sufficient and necessary conditions that the conception of a state of affairs must satisfy for that state to exist. A state of affairs exists if and only if it is ‘Logical:’ if it is Logical it must exist, if it exists it must be Logical

The fundamental principle of metaphysics expressed in terms of Logic

The second form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics or principle of reference now follows:

40.        Subject to Logic every concept has reference

The principle of reference is the basis of the unified theory of Objects developed in Objects

An obvious system of objections arises. What is the reference of a system of ‘laws of physics’ that are consistent but quite different from the laws of our cosmological system? It will be seen later that corresponding to every consistent set of laws there must be a cosmological system. Next consider that the principle suggests that the laws of physics of our cosmological system do not have necessary or eternal purchase: this should not be an objection for it is consistent with what we know for our laws to be contingent and of finite duration. However, since our laws are ‘a concept’ it is necessary from the system that they should have some purchase as for example in our cosmological system so far and so far as is known. Thus although the principle hints at contradiction, it is not contradictory and although it hints at chaos over law it actually supports law. Thus the Normal behavior of our cosmological system and others is supported by the principle. The concept of the Normal as used here will be developed below; it may be emphasized that it will not receive meaning such as a statistical or functional or normative meaning

That every concept should have reference appears to not make grammatical sense, e.g. what is the Object of the concept of ‘redness.’ The resolution of this concern is addressed in Objects. In anticipation of the later development:

41.        Subject to Logic every concept has an Object

Even though Logic is introduced as a definition the conclusion is far from empty because the known logical principles are at least approximations to Logic

Necessity

In the literature, logical possibility is called a logical modality in that possibility is a judgment and logical possibility is the logical mode of possibility. Another logical modality is that of logical necessity. A proposition is logically necessary if it is not logically possible for it to be false. It is common to regard logical necessity as necessity

The development so far has clear implications for the concept of logical necessity

Every Logical concept of a state obtains. If such a concept obtains it must be Logical. If ‘Logical concept’ and ‘necessary concept’ are equated, then a state is necessary if and only if it obtains. Therefore with Universe as context the actual, the possible, and the necessary are identical

Relative to the Universe, the classical distinction between necessity and possibility dissolves. However, regarding a local world such as this cosmos as context the distinction remains

Consider a state of affairs that satisfies all applicable laws belonging to Logic and to the physics of this cosmos (in this paragraph it is assumed that the laws of physics of this cosmos are known precisely.) What distinguishes Logic? The general laws of Logic are those that obtain in every context. Special divisions of Logic may be specified by specializing focus to classes of context

Some properties of the Void

There is at least one Void. The number of Voids is without further relevance. This follows from the fact that multiple Voids must be equivalent to a single Void

Every particle of being may be regarded as having a Void attached to it—for such multiple Voids are equivalent to a single Void. A particle may therefore self-annihilate at any time

An infinity of Voids may be taken to exist and occupy every ‘corner’ of being. Spontaneous creation of particles and Universes is possible and necessary

The Void is equivalent to every state of affairs, to every Domain, to the Universe—it is under the reign of the Normal that there comes to be a divide that disallows the emergence of some states from a given state. This disallowance, however, is not necessary but may be thought of as highly probable (the concept of the Normal is further developed in the discussions of doubts and objections below

Being and existing

In the history of thought a contrast has been drawn between being and existing. Earlier in the section Existence, essence was seen to have been equated with identity or being-in-itself or being-as-such; this is the idea that has been equated to being. In contrast existence has been equated to being-in-relation of which an example is being-as-known or appearance

In Intuition the necessary Objects were seen to be those for which the concept is perfectly faithful to the Object. For these ‘things’ the distinction between being and existing breaks down

Since the introduction of the idea of the distinction between being and existing was introduced an immense class of necessary Objects has emerged: the Logos which is the Universe in all its details. Thus for the entire Universe there is this sense in which being and existing are not distinguished

We know that these Objects exist even though a small number of them are known

In the practical case the Object is not the thing in itself but is a joint product of knower and known or world. In this case the Object behaves as thing for practical purposes—i.e. with sufficient faithfulness over a limited range of states of affairs. It is only in a desire to regard practical Objects as perfectly known that a divide between being and existing occurs. However, once it is established that there are Objects that are essentially practical there is no reason to regard them as perfectly known. Practically the distinction between being and existing breaks down

The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics

The third and cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics makes the power of the metaphysics manifest. This form follows:

42.        The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest that is Logically possible

Or, since the Logically possible is the greatest Logically possible

43.        The variety of being in the Universe is the Logically possible

A preliminary development of the variety of being

The fundamental principle implies at once that the variety of being in the Universe and the extent of the Universe are without limit. As an example, it every concept has an Object (in this and the following examples the phrase ‘subject to Logic’ is implicit.) This implies that all literature has an Object. As a second example every actual state recurs infinitely

This variety is elaborated in section A variety of Cosmology (a full variety is deferred primarily because subsequent developments will make the cataloging of variety more systematic and more full and secondarily to avoid repetition)

Systematic understanding and cataloging of variety is taken up in the section Applied metaphysics of this chapter and chapters Objects, Cosmology and Worlds below

The fundamental principle of metaphysics in terms of Law

The fourth form of the fundamental principle follows from the third or cosmological form

44.        Law. There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic

It now becomes clearer why the Universe defined as all being is an efficient idea

The Object of the concept of all being is the greatest possible Universe

Johannes Scotus Eriugena conceived of the Universe as all that exists and all that does not (in the atemporal senses of ‘exists’ and ‘does.’) There are a number of possible motivations to this conception even though it does not appear to define an actual Universe. A conceptual motive may be its abstract ‘neatness.’ A practical motive is that though the concept is different from the standard ones, it may be instrumental in understanding the actual one; another practical motive is the quantum mechanical effect of non-existent states on actual ones. What has been revealed here is that the only ‘states’ that do not exist are the Logically impossible ones. Therefore, unless these are considered to be states, Eriugena’s concept is equivalent to the concept of the Universe present narrative; further, even if the Logically impossible states are allowed in concept, the Objects corresponding to the different concepts are identical. Also since the only ‘states’ omitted from the present conception are the ones that violate Logic, the quantum mechanical effect of ‘non-existent’ states appears to be void. The present conception appears to be most efficient, most transparent and most comprehensive

Logos

Logos — Form

Logos

Now define the Logos as the Object of Logic: as the collection of Logically possible states. Earlier it was seen that the logos must contain the Universe. What follows now is a fifth and computational form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics:

45.        The Logos is the Object of Logic; it is the Universe in all its variety and detail

46.        There is no universal Law. All Law is immanent in the Logos

The power of abstraction is evident once more. There is no need for some vague notion of a Logos. The Logos is the Universe; that the Logos is the Universe is reference to the absolutely unlimited variety of being; there are Logical limits to the concepts or description of the variety but no limits to the variety itself

There is a variety of interesting questions opened up regarding Logic that center around two main concerns—What are the implications for the logics? and What are the implications for the actual, i.e. for the Universe? Is and can there be a Logic that has examples such as the logics and the physics that can frame or generate understanding of all being? From the history of logic there must be immense doubt about the possibility of such an endeavor and the sources of doubt are conceptual (completeness) and practical or computational

Form

In classical thought Logos and Form are linked. In the present metaphysics Logos is a fundamental concept while Form will be seen without especial significance. The inclusion of Form in the discussion is due in part to its classical importance. A second reason for inclusion, clarified below in this section, is to compare the two classical concepts—Form and substance—that vied for the role of ‘essence’ of things. In the present Universal metaphysics, there are no ultimate essences even though proximate or practical essence may be allowed and this is the reason that neither Form nor substance is important. However, Form will be found viable as a concept while substance will be found untenable. Roughly, that is because in the present Universal metaphysics all ‘things’ are immanent in being and while Form has immanence, substance ‘stands below.’ The meaning of these assertions will be clarified and their truth established in Objects

The idea of form is similar to that of pattern. Some examples are: a shape has the form of a triangle, a pattern of clouds is a form, all the patterns of behavior that satisfy a law or a theory are a form

If a form is what is read—i.e., the concept—then there must by the principle of reference be a corresponding Object that is called the Form and from the properties of Universe the Form must lie in the Universe

Clearly, a Form is not a thing, i.e. it is not an Object in any naïve sense. However, a thing can be regarded as its own form / Form and therefore some Forms are Objects in a naïve sense. Later, in Objects, we will see what kind of an Object a Form is

Whatever a Form is, it lies in the Universe. Unlike Plato’s ‘Forms,’ in the present use of Form, Forms lie in the one Universe, are immanent in being even though they have the role here that Plato’s ‘Forms’ have in Plato’s theory of Ideas. The kind of thing that a Form is will be clarified in Objects as will be the meaning of the fact—it is a fact in the context of the present metaphysics but on account of the universality of the metaphysics that fact is not relative to any particular context—that there is one Universe

What is a form in the present sense and where does it lie? Clearly forms are concepts and must also lie in the Universe. What is a concept? That has already been specified as, e.g. mental content but as ‘thing’ what is mental content… and in what sense is it thing-like? Clarifications are needed and these too will be given in Objects

The idea of Form is not particularly significant in this narrative. However, it is interesting because it is one of two candidates that classical thought held as the essence of a thing as an Object: the idea of Form and the idea of substance. In this narrative, Form will be seen to be trivial and substance untenable. In this narrative, therefore Form is preferred as essence but it is not particularly important because (1) it will be subsumed in another broader class—the abstract objects and (2) the present metaphysics does without essences altogether—i.e. it allows essences but sees them as special and trivial

The equivalent forms of the metaphysics

Introduction — Forms of the fundamental principle — Characterizations of the metaphysics

Introduction

A gathering of equivalent forms of the metaphysics suggests enhancements in form and articulation; encourages improved understanding and deployment of the metaphysics. Of the following forms, all have already been demonstrated—except two which are given brief proof here

Note that the use of ‘form’ in this section is informal and may be regarded as abbreviation for ‘formulation.’ That this section should follow a section devoted to Form is coincidental

The equivalent forms of the metaphysics correspond, in the first place, to forms of the fundamental principle: the seven forms of the principle below are a primitive and six major forms. The remaining (two) items are direct characterizations of the metaphysics

When a concept is perfectly faithful it is not necessary to distinguish it from its Object. Therefore, Universe, Void, and Logos are may be regarded as perfectly faithful Objects of intuition. That is, the developments have shown that these ideas are given in intuition rather than received and this is especially emphasized for the Logos. It follows that the foundation for Universe, Void and Logos is clear even if their origin is remote. Universe and Void are primarily perceptual and for these the same symbol designates concept and Object. The idea of Logic stems from the logics: although there is a variety of logics, the concept of logic in the tradition is not clear. It is Logic that has been shown to be a desired and ultimate form of the sense or concept of logic. The Object of Logic is the Logos

Forms of the fundamental principle

I.                    Primitive form—based in the concept of the Universe. The Universe is all being and contains all Objects, specifically all Law and Form

The reference to ‘Objects’ rather than just Law is clarified in Objects

II.                 First and original form and original anchor of the metaphysics—basis: the Void. The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Object

Therefore: every state of affairs emerges from the Void; therefore every state of affairs or being is equivalent to every other; it is only in Normal systems that a divide occurs: in any state in a Normal system, some states are Normally inaccessible and Normal impossibility is roughly improbability… Normal necessity is roughly improbability of non-occurrence

III.               Second form—basis: reference. The principle of reference: Subject to Logic every concept has reference—i.e., an Object

This defines Logic which, in its approximate forms as the logics, is far from empty. The definition of Logic is equivalently the theory of the possible and the actual and, since the classical and modern logics are approximations to it, is far from empty. It is not given that Logic may be formulated explicitly; and it is likely that it may not

IV.              Third and cosmological form—basis: variety. The principle of variety: The variety of being in the Universe is the (greatest Logically) possible

The Logically possible is the greatest Logically possible

The variety of the Universe is at least as much as that of any conceivable universe. Suggestively, the Universe is one of maximum freedom or variety; being fills every niche; this has been called the principle of plenitude

V.                 Fourth form—basis: Law. There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic

VI.              Fifth and computational form—basis: Logos. The Logos is the Object of Logic—it is the Universe in all its variety and detail. All Law is immanent in the Logos

This form of the fundamental principle makes clear that the principle may be a computational tool via the approximation to Logic by the logics

VII.            Sixth form—basis: determinism. The Universe is absolutely indeterministic

This form is developed later in the section A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth. However its truth can be seen from the fact that of the Logically possible states none is unrealized; every state is accessible—accessed—from every other state. Similarly, since all possible states are realized the Universe is absolutely deterministic (this determinism is distinct from the usual temporal notion of determinism)

Characterizations of the metaphysics

VIII.         Uniqueness of the Universal metaphysics. Since the foregoing are necessary in intuition there is exactly one Universal metaphysics that is the metaphysics which may have more than one formulation and may be developed in different degrees of detail

IX.              The Universalization of metaphysics. The variety of cosmological systems is without limit; there is and can be no typical cosmological system (an atom is a cosmos) and the Universe does not have the form of any finite or normal or given cosmos. The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic—it has no universal form

This conclusion is the endpoint of a sequence of universalizations of viewpoint in which special vantage points are relinquished and is discussed in detail later in this chapter. The shedding of special vantage points or paradigms such as ethnocentrism, anthrocentrism and anthropomorphism may be seen as continuing on through the shedding of a view of the Universe in the image of any given cosmos. This is the source of the term ‘non-cosmomorphism.’ However, the essence of the universalization is that the Universe has no universal form; this is equivalent to the statement that there is no Universal Law (a Law may be seen as a Form and a Form as a Law)

Proof and interpretation

The proofs of many results are similar and simple in nature

The proofs of the forms of the fundamental principle are trivial—it is already noted that it is the founding and development of the Universal metaphysics that is non-trivial

The proofs of further results generally require simple application of a form of the fundamental principle to the case in question. However, there is a non-trivial aspect to the results. It lies in the meaning and clarification of the results; it is in the appreciation of their consequences and significance for this world; and it is in the clearing up of apparent contradictions and paradoxes; and it lies in the interpretation of lesser paradigms of understanding in terms of the new and ultimate paradigm

The arguments of chapter Worlds are often non-trivial but even here there is no particular complexity of demonstration. Rather, what is required from the special topic in question is clarification of the nature of the concepts in question and, especially, lifting of a variety of inherited prejudices and, sometimes, further analysis in light of the Universal metaphysics

Space, time, and being

The metaphysics so far has significant implications for the nature of space and time. These include the ubiquity of duration and time; a meaning and necessity to multiple times in some cosmological systems; the interwoven nature of space, time and being; possible sources of the apparent universality of time within our cosmological system and others

The development of such implications will be more effective and complete if taken up after Objects. This is because the treatment of Objects introduces (a) a sophistication of thought regarding abstractions from intuition and (b) clarity of thought regarding the ‘concrete’ Objects that reside in space and time… and a description of a variety of concrete and concrete-like Objects—the particular Objects, and (c) a great variety of ‘non-concrete’ Objects that also have some residence in space and time. The additional Objects of item (c) are the abstract Objects that are generally regarded as being unchanging, acausal and not existing in space. However, in Objects it is shown that the abstract Objects are not constitutionally non-spatial but are Objects for which spatiality is more or less significant (meaning and demonstration is in Objects.) Thus while some abstract Objects effectively lack spatiality, others may have some degree of effective spatiality

Treatment of space, time, and being is therefore deferred to the final section of Cosmology

Doubts, objections and responses

Formal doubt regarding the deduction of the fundamental principle — Formal doubt regarding consistency — Formal doubt from science and reflective common sense. The concept of the Normal — Subjective doubt that sees the metaphysics as artifice—the metaphysics is as if a deus ex machina — Subjective doubt that so much appears to have been derived from so little — Humanistic doubt regarding the austerity of Logic. The objection that the Universal metaphysics is ‘dehumanizing’ — Alfred P. Sloan’s objection — Residual doubt

Formal doubt regarding the deduction of the fundamental principle

Insofar as truth is important—it is a matter of principle to doubt and to criticize a new theory, a metaphysics. For it is by doubt and criticism that error is uncovered and it is by resolving doubt and by passing criticism that confidence in the truth grows

What must be the essential doubt regarding the fundamental principle? Since a demonstration has been given, the doubt is not the doubt regarding a scientific theory which invariably (perhaps) contains an element of the hypothetical. The essential doubt regarding the fundamental principle must concern the validity of its demonstration

There is a further motive to doubt. The fundamental principle of metaphysics is fulcrum of the metaphysics. It is the pivot point that provides the leverage for the immense power of the Ultimate metaphysics. It is this immense power that is a significant motive to doubt the fundamental principle. In the standard paradigm a scientific theory gains in confidence by the slow incremental expansion of its domain of application (more than incremental expansion may be allowed as, e.g. in ‘big-bang’ cosmology, but such extrapolation is associated with more than usual doubt.) However, the Universal metaphysics arrives without announcement but is immediately heralded via proof to be of Universal application. This motive intensifies the significance of doubt regarding the proof of the fundamental principle

An early doubt regarding the fundamental principle was that its demonstration was (apparently) purely logical; nothing is derived by logic alone—a premise is required. However, the appearance that the proof is purely logical stemmed from an incompletely thought out foundation of what later became called the necessary Objects—i.e., those for which the concept is perfectly faithful. This early doubt spurred the development of a foundation in intuition—essentially the entire formal content of chapter Intuition (an intuitive version of some aspects of it had been developed earlier.) Thus the early doubt was resolved and in doing so resulted in a theory of intuition that is an essential advance over what is received from the history of thought and enables the ultimate metaphysics

What is the weakest point of the proof of the fundamental principle? There is no significant doubt regarding the existence of the Universe as all being and the thought that the Universe contains all Laws (there may be lingering doubt due need for formal clarification of ‘Law’ but such clarification is given in Objects.) Then, the Void is defined as the absence of being; therefore, if the Void exists it contains no Law. It is the proof of existence of the Void regarding which there is doubt: every domain has a complement; the complement of the Universe is the Void; therefore the Void exists. Encountered by itself, the statement ‘for every domain, there is a complement’ generates no doubt. However, when we consider that when the domain is the Universe, the complement is the Void doubt arises. In analogy consider a crescent; generally there is no question regarding the existence of the crescent; but when the thickness of the crescent becomes zero, does the crescent exist? We may of course give reasonable arguments that the crescent does exist but the fact that we feel obliged to argue the case indicates reasonable doubt. The existence of this doubt does not mean that it cannot be removed; however it does imply that until removed, the doubt will remain

The task, therefore, is to remove the doubt regarding the existence of the Void. A first proof of existence that addresses the doubt regarding the existence of ‘absence of being’ also clarifies the nature of the doubt. Think of a domain defined by a boundary. The boundary expands so that more of the Universe is within it and the boundary at all previous stages lies within it. Now think of the domain expanding so to occupy the Universe. As long as the domain is not the Universe, there is no doubt that the complement exists; it is only when the domain is the Universe that there is doubt regarding the existence of the complement. The argument is as follows: the limit of the expanding sequence of domains is the Universe and exists, therefore the limit of the contracting sequence of domains exists and is the Void. However, doubt remains because each complement prior to the limit of the Void is ‘substantial’ whereas the Void is insubstantial. The argument may improve our confidence in the existence of the Void but on account of the transition to insubstantiality at the limit doubt is not entirely removed. In mathematical set theory the empty set is thought to exist just as much as non-empty sets do; however, sets are abstract. The concept of the Universe exists, and the concept of the Void exists; but the existence of the Void cannot be concluded from the existence of the concept of the Void (in the case of the Universe it was argued that the Universe exists and from simplicity the concept of the Universe exists; in the case of the Void the existence argument would flow from concept to Object.) And it should be obvious that it cannot be argued that from the concept of the Void there must be a corresponding Object because the principle assumed follows from the existence of the Void

The strategy, therefore, shall be to provide alternative proofs. The following are alternative proofs

The Void is the absence of being. If there is being there is absence of being; therefore the Void exists

The strategy, therefore, shall be to provide plausibility arguments so as to defuse doubt. The following are plausibility arguments

The original proof and its ‘improvement’ via a boundary that approaches the boundary of the Universe

That any quantum state may have a non-zero probability of transition to any other quantum state

That any eternally possible state shall be realized

‘What’ is not in the Universe? Apply a minimalist argument to the question: only those concepts disallowed by logic are not in the Universe. The principle of variety which is an alternate form of the fundamental principle follows. The minimalist argument is a form of Ockham’s principle applied to what does not exist rather than to what does exist

The working through five alternate forms of the fundamental principle. The forms are (1) Subject to Logic every concept has reference. (2) The variety of being in the Universe is the (greatest Logically) possible. (3) There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic. (4) The Universe is absolutely indeterministic. (5) The Logos is the Object of Logic—it is the Universe in all its variety and detail. All Law is immanent in the Logos. Each of these forms has an intuitive appeal and therefore adds plausibility

Plausibility arguments may increase familiarity and confidence but are not proofs (they may suggest proofs)

The strategy, therefore, may now to appeal to faith as the attitude that is conducive to the greatest outcome

The idea of faith and its role has been discussed in chapters Introduction and Intuition and is formalized in the section Metaphysics and action below. Here therefore comment is limited to significance: (1) Faith is the attitude—cognitive as well as emotive—that is conducive to the greatest outcome. This suggests that on account of limits to rationality and computational power of mind andor machine, action under uncertainty is essential and multivalent. I.e., resources should be devoted to the immediate and the practical and the remote but immensely valuable. (2) The fact of doubt has suggested and required working out a notion of faith and its consequences for action

Still there are doubts regarding the fundamental principle on other accounts as noted and addressed in what follows. These doubts include inconsistency associated with the idea of all being and absurdity associated with the idea of anything is possible (even if restricted by Logic.) However, these doubts are satisfactorily addressed. It may be therefore observed that the fundamental principle is of such power and interest—already established and to be greatly amplified—that given that it entails no essential paradox or absurdity it would be of immense value to pursue its conceptual and action implications even if it lacked proof altogether

Perhaps it is the appearance of inconsistency and absurdity in some of the traditional religions that helps engage the faith of the believer—perversely as in the ability to faith even in the absurd or reasonably as in the service of a higher truth

Formal doubt regarding consistency

Concepts such as ‘all being’ are notoriously associated with indefiniteness and potential for inconsistency

The response is that the Object—the Universe—is already given and not specified via a concept. It may be specified via a concept, the Universe free of detail or the Logos in which detail is implicit which therefore entail no inconsistency

Formal doubt from science and reflective common sense. The concept of the Normal

It is clear that the Universal metaphysics appears to violate science and common sense. It implies that within the constraints of Logic, there is an infinity of cosmological systems with an infinite and unlimited variety of physical laws. There are winds of ‘ghost’ cosmological systems blowing ‘through’ ours at this moment but without a whisper. However, there is no violation. In the first place it may be reflexive to think of physics extending to the entire Universe; however that is not entailed by the methods of science: science is known to hold in its empirical domain and it is likely that it extends beyond that domain but unlikely, by its own principles, that the extension is without limit; and extension without limit is without necessity. Second, from the point of view of the Universal metaphysics what is actual is necessary: therefore the Universal metaphysics requires the actual, i.e., our cosmological system

Amid the immense variety entailed by the metaphysics, the immensely limited variety that is our cosmological system is necessary. Cosmological systems such as ours with defined structure and patterned behavior are examples of what is termed Normal

The Normal and the probable are related but not at all identical

The Normal is a function of the world but also of our knowledge. Energy from atoms, curvature of space and time are now known to be Normal; two hundred years ago these features of today’s science would have been regarded as fantastic

The edge of the Normal is not definite

The Normal includes the Logical. Except Logical limits, Normal limits are contingent: they are so but not necessarily so and not eternally given to be so. Logical limits are necessary

The Universal metaphysics as a scientific theory. The metaphysics is not a scientific theory in that it does not unify a mass of detail and laws into a coherent framework. Instead it starts with simple, empirical, universal, and necessary Objects. The Objects are so simple that Hume’s objection to the necessity of generalization does not apply. Therefore the metaphysics is necessary. It may, then, be seen as a theory of the Universe based on the necessary Objects. Further, it includes all scientific theories in their realms of validity but goes beyond those realms. This progression is analogous, for example, to the progression from the Newtonian framework to Einstein’s general theory of relativity. The Universal metaphysics is—perhaps—not immediately testable in the sense of critical experiment but the progression of scientific theories suggest its verification; and it is testable in the sense of chapter Journey. The progression is analogous to the progression of scientific theories in that special vantage points are relinquished in favor of universal vantage points:

47.        The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic

In detail:

The Universalization of metaphysics. The variety of cosmological systems is without limit; there is and can be no typical cosmological system (an atom is a cosmos) and the Universe does not have the form of any finite or normal or given cosmos. The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic—it has no universal form

The shedding of special vantage points or paradigms such as ethnocentrism, anthrocentrism and anthropomorphism may be seen as continuing on through the shedding of a view of the Universe in the image of any given cosmos. This is the source of the term ‘non-cosmomorphism.’ However, the essence of the universalization is that the Universe has no universal form; this is equivalent to the statement that there is no Universal Law (a Law may be seen as a Form and a Form as a Law)

Subjective doubt that sees the metaphysics as artifice—the metaphysics is as if a deus ex machina

A deus ex machina is a device ‘pulled out of the blue’ to overcome the seemingly insolvable. It may appear as though aspects of the Universal metaphysics are such a device. This concern is now addressed

The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest Logically possible

This view is atemporal: it may include duration but is not of or about duration. It has an absolute character: subject to Logic every concept has reference; the Universe is absolutely indeterministic…

My early views were temporal, material and non-absolute: I sought understanding in terms of an evolutionary paradigm; the world was taken as it is without attempt to encompass all being. I may add that while I worked with this view I did not think it complete

After the temporal view was worked out I sought a more complete and timeless view. Along the way I came to think that equivalence of the world to absence of being might generate the new still unformed view that I sought. In 2002 it occurred to look at the Void and its properties rather than at the world-as-I-knew it. That was the transformational insight

Thus while it may appear that the Universal metaphysics is a deus ex machina—a contrivance—it may be said that it is well motivated. And further, it has emerged via demonstration as robust in that it is consistent, coherent, founded, and consistent with what is valid in what came before

Subjective doubt that so much appears to have been derived from so little

The doubt is that the sources and argument that found and generate the Universal metaphysics are ‘so little’ but the consequences so immense that we are forced to wonder how the immense result may be possible. This doubt is now addressed

First, although the results are immense in the foundation and immense variety revealed, they are not unreasonable, they contradict no truth, and they are founded. Further, various plausibility arguments make the demonstrated but austere metaphysics reasonable

Second, in that what is revealed is not immediately in experience and in that an immense journey of transformation is required for realizations the results are not ‘so much’ after all

Finally, review the inputs to the developments—intuition and its analysis, insight into and definition and selection of the necessary Objects so that proof becomes trivial, articulation of the system of universal and necessary Objects so that the system achieves universality… These inputs are not ‘so little’ after all

Humanistic doubt regarding the austerity of Logic. The objection that the Universal metaphysics is ‘dehumanizing’

Response. Since the only disallowed states are those that violate Logic, the metaphysics is the richest possible—even perhaps to the point of embarrassment: the remaining states are not merely allowed but are necessary

Alfred P. Sloan’s objection

This section is partially in humor

If an auto-manufacturer is too good, it runs the risk of putting itself out of business. That is not entirely true but if product life were the only consumer criterion it might be. This thought may be seen at the basis of planned obsolescence that Alfred P. Sloan introduced as president and chairman to General Motors; it resulted in General Motors’ ascendancy over competitors—especially the Ford Motor Company… and it is likely that Sloan’s lie among the root causes of the failures of General Motors

Similarly, too good a metaphysics would resolve all the classical problems of metaphysics. Even more it would put an end to the endless debates regarding piece-meal concepts considered in isolation and perhaps even necessarily considered in isolation because there is no framework of coherence or interconnectivity. Too good a metaphysics would put an entire industry of thinkers—e.g., academics—out of work and would dash the aspirations—the trials, promise, and comforts of an academic life—of an entire cadre of apprentices—e.g., students

Residual doubt

Although demonstration has been given, doubt has remained. Although doubts regarding the demonstration have been addressed with heuristic argument, doubt remains

Recall the following forms fundamental principle of metaphysics—The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest that is Logically possible and Being is limited only by Logic. Immediately from the first form, there is an infinity of physical laws and for each there is an infinity of cosmological systems; among these is ours and infinitely many similar to ours in which what is possible in ours is realized; and such formed systems do not exhaust the actual. Immediately from the second form the individual will experience Ultimate Identity via his or her own identity

Even if there were no demonstration and no plausibility argument, the lack of disproof would make pursuit of the implications of worth. Doubt would not dispel this worth

It could be argued that resources should be devoted to more immediate and practical ends. However, the application of some resources to the ultimate need not detract from the immediate. If values were attached to the immediate and to the ultimate and expected outcome maximized then for some numbers devotion of some resources to the ultimate would be indicated. The purpose of the instrumental approach to choice is not to determine choice but to argue against any necessity to application of all resources to practical ends. The actual choice will ever have some personal element. These arguments have not taken into account the thought that the ultimate is not essentially impractical, that it may have practical implications, and that it may give value—though not all value—to the immediate

This indicates, even in the absence of demonstration and heuristics, an appeal to faith as the attitude that is most conducive to action in the presence of possibility and doubt

That there is demonstration and plausibility strengthens the argument for faith

Although the Universal metaphysics requires ultimate realization and may suggest approaches it does not show a path—which is good if unending adventure is good. While traditional practical and disciplinary knowledge including the sciences may help in search for and construction of ways but do not determine them. Even if the demonstration of the metaphysics is perfect, experiment and faith remain essential

The possibility and magnitude of the Universal metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics — A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth — A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth — Implications for the problems of metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics has been an important philosophical concern at least since Hume and Kant. Consequently one modern approach to metaphysics has been to focus on what has been called a metaphysic of experience

The general metaphysics of the present narrative first concerns the simple Objects Universe, Domain and Void. For these Objects experience is perfectly faithful and therefore metaphysics of experience is metaphysics. The analysis extends metaphysics to Logos ‘the Universe in all its variety which is shown to be the greatest Logically possible variety.’ We know of the variety, we know of immensely many of the Objects even though we do not know all of them.

That metaphysics is possible is understatement. The Universal metaphysics has been demonstrated; it has an empirical scaffolding that supports an infinite and true conceptual core; it is ultimate in variety and depth. Metaphysics is not merely possible for the Universal metaphysics is necessary, empirical in its framework, ultimate, and actual

A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth

Substance and determinism. In seeing the world as water, Thales introduces water as substance. The world manifests with variety or non-uniformity and change or non-constancy. One form of understanding is to see the complex in terms of the simple. The ultimate in simplicity might be a substance that is uniform and unchanging. How might the world be seen in such terms? The world will emerge from substance. How will this emergence occur? If the emergence is completely random or indeterministic there is no explanation (a process is deterministic when the outcome or trajectory is already determined in initial states.) The greatest in simplicity of emergence or process is deterministic process. Therefore the ultimate in substance explanation would appear to occur when the world can be seen as emerging deterministically from a single uniform unchanging substance. Substance and determinism are ‘twins.’ Heidegger’s argument against substance did not explicitly extend to determinism

Monism is the term applied to a metaphysics in which a single substance is sufficient. Monism appears to be the simplest understanding of the world

It is characteristic of understanding in terms of substance that the understanding of all Objects is referred to a simple Object. Thus a problem of substance metaphysics is the nature of the substance itself

If it is possible to understand the world in terms of substance, a foundation may be said to have been given. Foundation need not be in terms of substances as understood in science but in terms of other kinds such as process or, in linguistic or mental modes of thinking, in terms of sentences or concepts. These kinds could be thought of as generalized substance. In all cases of substance metaphysics it appears that the world is founded in the unfounded

If a metaphysics is to be non-relativist, i.e. to require no further explanation, it appears that it must be founded in substance. In the alternative, i.e. relativist metaphysics, it appears that understanding does not terminate: any attempt at foundation will require infinite regress

If substance is determinist, uniform and unchanging there can be no emergence of change or variety. The idea that such a substance can yield complexity involves implicit appeal to some other element and violates the thought that understanding is substance understanding. Substance explanation must yield on some point of the simplicity requirements and therefore there can be no true substance understanding. While absolute simplicity cannot yield complexity there is no paradox the thought that relative simplicity may yield complexity. When some point or points of non-simplicity are allowed but the ‘substance’ is still relatively simple, a ‘substance’ understanding may be possible but would not be true substance understanding. Such ‘substances’ may be called practical substances and these include apparent monism, dualism, process, language, and science

Universal metaphysics and substance. In this metaphysics, the Universe may be seen as being generated by the Void (or by any state.) In fact, from the fundamental principle the Universe must pass through the Void state (and every state.) Perhaps then the Void may be seen as substance. However, the emergence of manifest states from the Void cannot be deterministic—see subsequent discussion—and therefore the Void cannot be regarded as substance in the traditional sense. The Void cannot even be regarded as causing the manifest states in the usual meanings of causation even though the Universe emerges from the Void

However, though the Void is not the classically simple substance par excellence, it is supremely simple in another sense. Substance contains determinism which is a form of Law. The Void is the absence of being and contains no Law. The Void does not even contain Law—viewed this way the Void is simpler than classical or traditional substance. In positing substance as simple some hypotheses are made about it (determinism.) No hypothesis is made about constraint or non-constraint regarding the Void. From this point of view, then, the Void is the ultimate in simplicity

Since the Void may be seen as generating the manifest phases of the Universe, it may be seen as foundation. Since it need not refer to anything else here, then, is a non-relativist foundation without substance. This is an observation of immense significance, first, in itself, and second in that it stands against the standard thought that there is no non-relativist metaphysics without substance. However, any state of being may substitute for the Void as ‘pseudo-substance’

The understanding of the Universal metaphysics—the foundation—is ultimately shallow: every state may be understood in terms of itself (as well as in terms of any other including the Void.) Though ultimate in depth as non-relativist without substance, that depth is ultimately shallow. Being is its own foundation—without substance or unending regress—or, in another sense, the Universal metaphysics is a move away from foundationalism

In a sense to be seen, the ‘depth’ of the Universal metaphysics lies in variety rather than depth of understanding

Determinism versus indeterminism. It is seen that every state emerges from the Void. Therefore the annihilator state of any state must also emerge from the Void. It follows that every state is accessed from any state. The sixth form of the fundamental principle follows:

48.        The Universe is absolutely indeterministic

I.e. of the Logically possible states, none is unrealized; every state is accessible—accessed—from every other state

Similarly, since all possible states are realized the Universe is absolutely deterministic (this determinism is distinct from the usual notion of determinism as temporal determinism)

The Sortal. In the use of substance so far, a substance is the fundamental ‘thing’ of the Universe. Another meaning, one used by Aristotle, is that of the kind of the various species of thing—including but not at all limited to biological species. A sortal is roughly such a kind seen as essence. The sortal horse is the mold for all horses. The fundamental principle of metaphysics clearly denies any ultimate foundational need for sortal. However, the sortal may be practically tenable—for example as gene material

The habit of substance thinking. The motive to substance may be seen as search for simplicity regarding the world manifested in enduring Objects. This approach to understanding manifests in other areas of thought and may be called the habit of substance thinking. As a practical approach the ‘habit’ has a natural and useful side. Taking the practical as the ultimate leads to error, aborts development

In the examples that follow the assertions are instances of the habit of substance thinking. These assertions are intended to point to the absurd consequences that follow from the habit

Epistemology. CONCEPT-Object: uniformity across all Objects, e.g. perfect knowledge of all Objects or no knowledge. Uniformity over elements of cognition: no empirical data can be necessary; only tautology can be necessary—and tautology must be necessary; emotion has no Object. The received as tacit a priori. Critical doubt as theory. Positivism: absence of proof as proof of absence. Word-Object: current limits of demonstrated understanding as limits of the world; my limits of understanding as the limits of understanding

Ethics. Separability of context; universalization of ethical meanings; universalization of principles of justification

Aesthetics. What is essential in art can be captured by a formula. But if the essential cannot be captured that does not mean that there can be no objectivity

Civilization. What is essential in a civilization can be captured by a formula

Meaning. Meaning as fixed; dictionary theory

Traditional metaphysics. The options are monism or dualism; ‘zero’ substance either as thing or terminal point of explanation is not an option. Monism versus dualism: idealism and materialism as essentially different—ideas and things as different; if matter is Object, idea must be subject. Experience is experienced as ‘different;’ therefore experience is essentially different and cannot be conceived otherwise

A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth

The fourth form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics is The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic—that is, there is no Law on the limit to the variety of being

A preliminary variety has been given earlier. A more full variety is developed in Cosmology. The limitation of Logic implies that the actual variety is uncountable; therefore a catalog of the variety cannot be given. It follows that experience of the variety of being is the ultimate variety; as noted earlier the true depth of being lies in variety and not in foundation

Clarification. It might appear from the variety that there is a contradiction: Jesus Christ exists and does not exist. There is in fact no contradiction. There is an infinity of cosmological systems. On some there is a figure whose life and biology is identical to the Biblical story of Jesus; on others there is identity. In some of these the name of that figure is ‘Jesus Christ;’ on others it is something else (an immense variety of names.) Then there are other cosmological systems on which there is no Christ-like figure

A possible paradox regarding structure. The fundamental indeterminism inherent in the fundamental principle of metaphysics suggests a paradox: from indeterminism there can be no structure. That thought is clearly erroneous. The indeterminism in question has been seen to be absolute indeterminism: from any given state there is no unaccessed state. Therefore given absence of structure, structure must emerge. The principle does not show how structure will emerge. Mechanisms of emergence are discussed in Cosmology

Implications for the classical and modern problems of metaphysics

If the Universal metaphysics is ultimate there should be implications for the traditional and modern problems of metaphysics. It should not be unreasonable to expect that (a) Metaphysics shall be understood in new ways, (b) The question of the possibility of metaphysics shall receive resolution, (c) The traditional and modern problems of metaphysics shall receive illumination which will include resolutions and dissolution

In chapter Contribution these issues will be addressed with immense but not unexpected success. A concern of that chapter will be to systematically define and catalog the problems of metaphysics

This section provides a taste of the problems and resolutions

The problem of absolute versus relative space and time. The problem has been addressed in the earlier section Space, time and being

The problem of substance. The problem has been addressed in the section A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth

The fundamental problem of metaphysics. Heidegger called the problem of why there is being—why there is something rather than nothing—the fundamental problem of metaphysics. Recall the fourth form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic. Therefore (1) the Universe must enter into the Void state in which there is no manifest being and (2) ‘when’ the Universe is in the Void state, manifest states of being will and must emerge. What has been called the fundamental problem of being is trivially resolved. A true fundamental problem of being is the twin problem What is being? and What has being? The first part is addressed earlier. The second part of the problem has been partially addressed earlier and a more full treatment is given in Cosmology where it is shown that there is and can be no complete treatment in the sense of a cataloging of all Objects

A many worlds metaphysics

The metaphysics that has been developed is the metaphysics of the one Universe which has no limit. The notion of ‘limit’ is not qualified—e.g. as limit on spatial or temporal extent or variety and so on. The Universe can be conceived in principle but not in practice—i.e. the breadth is implicitly known. However understanding of the absence of limit without qualification can be expressed in the by now familiar term ‘subject only to Logic…’

A number of doubts and objections—belonging to a variety of kinds of doubt / objection—have been entertained and addressed. The discussion of critical doubt ended with an assertion—However there is residual doubt

The residual doubt has a significant psychological (rather than formal) content

Therefore, although I prefer to regard the Universal metaphysics as real, I will give it a many worlds interpretation

This interpretation may appeal to others who retain phases of psychological andor formal doubt (the term ‘phases’ refers to the fact that the doubt may not obtain at all times and for all purposes)

The many worlds metaphysics

Consider the concept whose only limits are those of logic. This defines a conceptual universe or conceptual metaphysics. For this section alone define this conceptual metaphysics to be the universe

Regard the World as the known World of modern science; and let the world be its concept. Of course that world is not perfectly defined because, first, there are alternate projections from current science and, second, because (with near certainty) more remains to be revealed. This incompleteness of definition is not relevant to the present purpose because the concern is with a limited world whose character is rather like that revealed by conceptual-empirical science

Then the world lies within the universe. However, there are many other (conceptual) worlds that lie within the universe but do not have an object world

A significant part of the foregoing and subsequent developments have interpretation in terms of this conceptual metaphysics

Preliminary comments on method

It may be useful to recapitulate the method or approach taken so far. The thoughts that follow will be the basis for a more complete and formal treatment in chapter Method. Although the history of ideas suggests that even in very special disciplines there are typically no general algorithms we shall avoid a priori claims regarding the possibility of algorithm in relation to metaphysics—the study itself rather than pre-judgment shall determine this issue. In this section, however, method is approach. The approach to the Universal metaphysics has been as follows

At the outset some uncertainty is admitted with regard to all aspects of knowing. (although it has not been emphasized this uncertainty extends to the nature and possibility of knowledge itself.) However there is no commitment to faithfulness or its lack. Judgment may emerge from the process of investigation

At outset some uncertainty of lack of faithfulness is admitted for all aspects of knowing and coming to know. However, there is no commitment to faithfulness or its absence. All that shall be said at outset is that there are general schemes of analysis according to which perfect faithfulness is universally questioned and often absent but is not universally disconfirmed. From this lack of confirmed faithfulness according to a scheme of analysis, some critics conclude that all knowledge is suspect and others go further to conclude that no knowledge is possible at all. However the conclusion from the general analysis ranges from the negative to the neutral and this leaves open the possibility that more particular schemes that may confirm perfect faithfulness in some cases

Model or framework for knowing. It is true that the model of knowing selected was one in which faithfulness has meaning. Had this model turned out to be inadequate, it would have had to be abandoned

Realm of acting-knowing; faith. As it turns out there is a realm in which knowing-according-to-this-model is without significance and therefore the model is outside its realm of applicability. In this realm of inapplicability mental content (which may be experienced as knowing) and acting are bound together. In this realm, faith is an attitude that is conducive to maximal outcome. In the absence of outcomes, faith is implicit though not blind trust in the present (we are aware of the possibility danger but not unduly influenced by it)

Intuition—tentative reigning in of all knowing under intuition. Intuitive knowledge is knowledge that is the result of biological or cultural conformity of knower to known. The process by which intuitive knowing presents is opaque to the knower. Therefore intuitive knowledge does not come with any explicit mark of its degree of faithfulness. Perfect faithfulness is neither natural to nor generally desirable for intuition. At outset all knowing—perceiving and conceiving which includes deduction—is reigned in under intuition

How may metaphysics be possible from intuition? For metaphysics to be possible via intuition there must be some Objects for which intuition is perfect. These Objects are called necessary. For metaphysics to be potent, the necessary Objects should include Universal Objects

Origin of metaphysics and Logic in analysis of intuition. Analysis of perception shows the following to be necessary: Universe as all-being-in-its-unity, the fact of detail though even though knowledge of detail is not necessary, Law as mode of being, Domain, and Void as absence of being and therefore of Law. Conceptual analysis of the Void reveals the Logos as the Universe-in-all-its-detail to the Object of Logic as an abstract ideal of the logics. Universe, Domain, Void are empirical because they lie in perception. Logos is empirical because it is defined implicitly to correspond to the world. The actual working out of logos via logic is a program that is driven by with experience with conceptual understanding and its linguistic formulation. That logic appears to be a priori is a result of its origin being remote and therefore obscured from view

The Universal metaphysics and its fundamental principle result from the foregoing

The ultimate variety or breadth and the ultimate foundation or depth now result

This leads to General metaphysics—the known necessary Objects, and special metaphysics—the inferred Objects

A summary of the observations on method—so far. The method of deriving the Universal metaphysics starts by reigning in all knowing under intuition. One source of the success of this approach is that it relinquishes a priori commitments regarding the nature—empirical, rational and so on—and justification of claims to knowledge. The Objects of perception are not precisely known in general. However, abstraction results in certain simple Objects that are necessary, i.e. necessarily known with perfect faithfulness. Analysis of these Objects results in the Universal metaphysics as well as the concept of Logic. The laws of Logic are, however, empirical in their origin. Intuition is analyzed as concept and Object. Here, then, in intuition—at the intersection of concept and Object, at the intersection of knower and known—lies the dual and coeval origin of content and method. These comments on method do not exhaust the extent of its development in this narrative; method is further extended in Applied metaphysics, Objects, Worlds and, finally, in chapter Method

Concerning psychologism. What has been done may sound as if it is a psychologism. Psychologism is the identification of psychological with non-psychological entities. For example, it is a psychologism to identify logical laws with psychological laws or a subset of psychological laws. Many thinkers, especially logicians, think that it is a mistake to think that logic can be founded in psychology. Frege argued that whereas logic and mathematics are precise, psychology is imprecise and vague—Psychologism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) It could be said—logical systems are precise, brains are messy. The label ‘psychologism’ is commonly a term of rebuke. However, the argument here is not that logic is founded in human psychology as such

The source of Logic in the present development. Precisely what is the relation of the Universal metaphysics and Logic to intuition? We can think of the intuition—brains—as messy. However, there is a precise net within the ‘mess’ that corresponds to the Universal metaphysics / Logic. Think of the precision of formal logic as the precision of symbolic definition relations between symbols so defined—this is a precise net within the set of all iconic / symbolic conceptions. Think of unending random scribbling on an unending piece of paper. Somewhere in the scribbling this essay will be reproduced; and somewhere it will be possible to see this essay by removing parts of the scribbles—this is a form of the ‘infinite monkey theorem’ that if a monkey hits keys on a typewriter for an infinite amount of time the probability of typing any given novel approaches certainty as time approaches infinity. Similarly, any precise logic will fall out of the messy scribbles. Thus the present approach is not a psychologism in the sense of foundation in terms of fuzzy laws or concepts any more than logic is nothing but random typing or scribbling. It is true that in Platonism the mathematical symbolic systems are thought to capture real mathematical Objects in some ideal space or world. The Objects of the Universal metaphysics could be thought of as residing in an ideal world but we have seen that they lie intensely in the one Universe. In Objects it will be seen that mathematical Objects and Logic are Objects but though ideal in some sense of perfection they, too, lie in this Universe—i.e. they are not ideal in the sense of being mental Objects or in the sense of lying in an ideal world

Cosmology—i.e., general cosmology—lies at the intersection of the metaphysics and those special objects that permit perfect faithfulness

Identity. These developments show the identity of the individual and Universal Identity. They suggest but do not show how this identity is realized

Applied metaphysics lies at the intersection of the metaphysics and disciplines for those special Objects that have not so far or will never allow perfect faithfulness. This includes the sciences including physics and physical cosmology and anthropology

Applied metaphysics further illuminates realization but only incompletely

Faith and method. The journey and other application require experiment and trial and their maximal enhancements require faith

Metaphysics and action

To count as action, process must be bound to experience as conceiving-selecting (here ‘conceiving’ includes cognition and emotion.) However, action is not limited to body-as-body process or the effect of the body of the individual on the environment. It may also be thought provided that the thinking is itself at least partially driven by conceiving-selecting

Inaction is action that has no body-environment-process

The process of action is not invariably unique. Lack of uniqueness may be the result of doubt regarding knowledge or its cognitive consequences or lack of unique determination. It is not necessary for the process that is selected to be unique; more than one path of action may be undertaken simultaneously. Whether single or multiple paths are chosen, action occurs under doubt, uncertainty, or indefiniteness. Faith is the attitude that is conducive of sufficiently confident or productive action; at minimum faith is the attitude that permits action in the presence of alternatives and doubt

Such faith may be seen as imposed on or appended to metaphysics. Alternatively there is a larger metaphysics that encompasses action and faith

Applied metaphysics

The first core of the system of ideas is the Universal metaphysics and its further clarification and elaboration in Objects and Cosmology. Partial foundation for the metaphysics is in Intuition

The Applied metaphysics and its detailed development in Worlds constitute the second core of the system of ideas. The Applied metaphysics lies at the intersection of the Universal metaphysics and disciplines for those special Objects that have not so far or will never allow perfect faithfulness. This includes the sciences including physics and physical cosmology and anthropology

What follows is a brief discussion and foundation for Applied metaphysics. The foundation is further elaborated in Worlds and in Method

What is applied metaphysics?

Applied metaphysics is the working out of consequences, not necessarily precise, of the intersection of the general metaphysics and the disciplines

The methods of applied metaphysics

Pure metaphysics—knowledge of the universal Objects—frames practical knowledge and may enhance it (1) Because there are analogs of the practical Objects in the metaphysics—i.e. the metaphysics frames practical knowledge, (2) By enabling analysis of the fundamental elements of the practical knowledge as or in terms of absolutely fundamental Objects, and (3) By encouraging revision of the conceptual elements of the practical systems in light of the metaphysics

When the limit of faithfulness is obtained, further faithfulness cannot be desirable. That is not merely the practical viewpoint

Applied metaphysics and the normal

The fundamental principle of metaphysics immediately suggests paradox—the only fictions are Logical, i.e., every work of fiction is realized subject to Logic

A first question—how shall we bring all thought, all literature all formal and technical treatises… into coherence? This concern motivates the definition of Logic

Secondly, what is the significance for our—and other—worlds… worlds of apparently definite behavior and patterns and laws that are not merely Logical?

The resolution of this second concern is in the concept of the Normal. This concern combined with the fact of our world suggests the concept of the Normal. However, the concept of the Normal is not merely an intuited idea

The fundamental principle requires Normal worlds—e.g. ours—of patterned, regular-like, law-like, stable-like, symmetry-like behavior. Mechanism is not required for the existence of such worlds even though the vast majority of such worlds may be the result of mechanism making mechanism immensely probable

It is implicit here that there is a precise side even—subject to Logic every concept has an Object—to applied metaphysics that is a consequence of the fundamental principle and is brought out further in Objects and Cosmology

Discussion of Normal worlds is continued in the chapter Worlds

Science

There is the fact of science—the practice, the scientists, the academies-publications-universities-theories-and-so-on—and the concept of science. Science is sufficiently indefinite—its complexity, its transformations—that it is unlikely to be captured by a fixed concept. Perhaps every specific philosophy of science captures at most an aspect of science

What is science? Here, the focus is on the nature of the theories of science. The production of scientific theories—intuition, hypothesis, law, concept formation, theory—is deemphasized. We have seen two viewpoints regarding theories. In the first, a theory is seen to aim at the universal. From this point of view every theory has a tentative or hypothetical aspect: new data may overturn the theory (limits to this viewpoint have been mentioned but those limits are not relevant in this section.) There is something remarkable about scientific theories that is not brought out by this viewpoint: the major scientific theories are applicable to immense precision over vast domains (the domains are vast in relation to the immediate.) That is, there are domains over which such theories may be regarded as facts. This is the second viewpoint: that scientific theories are facts; the limitation to certain domains does not separate scientific theories from simple facts such as the fact of the existence of an electron—an electron is not a universal Object

Metaphysics and science

The Universal metaphysics reveals a Universe that is infinitely larger than the world of traditional science. However, within the Universal metaphysics the scientific theories are facts: they are very special facts. The fundamental principle of metaphysics requires these facts

Miracles

If miracles are exceptions to Normal knowing—e.g., reflective common sense, science—miracles are obviously necessary

In the Normal ‘realm’ it is not reasonable to depend on miracles

The two previous statements are in agreement with Hume’s view. The following is neutral with regard to Hume’s view on miracles:

Outside the Normal realm, miracles are common and necessary. However, they lose their sense as miraculous. Still, though there is no loss of adventure or wonder

Developments in Applied metaphysics

The main developments in applied metaphysics are among the contents of chapter Worlds. Cosmology may also be regarded as applied metaphysics—the chapter Cosmology takes up those aspects of a variety of being suggested by experience but still amenable to faithfulness

Objects

In the development so far, the first and naïve prototype of the Object is the ‘concrete thing’

In contrast to particular things Plato introduced the idea of Form that does not reside in the world of sensible things. Plato regarded the Forms as more real than the things of the sensible world

While there is no precise knowing of the practical Objects of the world, the ‘Objects’ of mathematics are defined with precision and ‘live’ and appear, within mathematical systems and intuition, to have independent existence that is in some ways more real than the existence of practical Objects

The Platonic Forms and the ‘Objects’ of mathematics are among the sources of the idea that there are such things as abstract Objects. In contrast to the abstract Objects, the Objects of the previous chapters are labeled concrete; the concrete will be generalized as the particular

The first contribution of this chapter is as follows. Here, a broader view of Objects is developed by showing that the abstract Objects are indeed Objects. I.e., the basis of their being Objects is not mere intuition and it is not the force of any thought that abstract Objects appear to have a higher reality. Instead the existence of the abstract Objects is demonstrated

A second contribution is that the traditional divide between the abstract and the particular Objects is dissolved. A uniform theory of Objects is developed. This unified view is most powerful in that the existential status of the variety of Objects is resolved. The view is also most surprising in that it is perhaps counter intuitive and in that it stands against the mainstream view that the abstract and the particular are essentially different. The development further solidifies the idea that there is one Universe: the thought that there is a variety of worlds—a physical world, a world of mental things, a world of ideal Forms and so on—is shown to have no hold on the real

The Universal metaphysics lays foundation for a theory of variety that is developed in Cosmology. A further contribution of Objects is an immense broadening of our knowledge of variety

Objects—a review

Concept and Object

Let us begin with a selective review what has so far been learned about concepts and Objects

When a knower has a concept of an Object the Object is a product of knower and known

The concept is not the Object but there are cases in which the concept is perfectly faithful to the Object; in this case we know the Object; and there are cases in which the concept is perfectly faithful to some Object; in this case we know of the Object. In both cases the Object is called necessary and for instrumental purposes we may conflate concept and Object

In practical cases the concept is sufficiently faithful for some instrumental purposes. Here, we may conflate concept and Object for practical purposes (care is necessary because—for example—a chain of practical reasoning does not necessarily yield a practical result)

The foregoing ‘unifies’ the necessary and the practical

The principle of reference

From Metaphysics, Forms of the fundamental principle: Subject to Logic every concept has reference—i.e., an Object. This is the principle of reference. Not all those Objects lie in this cosmological system. It is via this principle that we know of the Objects of special metaphysics—e.g., gods—which includes the variety in Cosmology

We know the Objects of general metaphysics—these include the Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos; these are empirical Objects. We know of the Objects of special metaphysics—e.g., gods; knowledge of these Objects is generally a consequence of the principle of reference—i.e. deductive consequence from the empirical (in special cases the knowledge may be directly empirical)

Particular Objects

General

The naïve prototype of the Object is the ‘thing.’ A brick is a ‘thing’ and therefore the first view of Objects is that Objects are ‘concrete.’ While bricks are practical Objects, consider the concept of a brick. According to the principle of reference, this concept has real necessary Objects—perhaps in other cosmological systems—that approximate our real bricks. The collection of references could be called ‘universal’ and an actual brick that is known empirically may be regarded as local

Similarly, the concepts of a specific process and a specific relation have necessary references that approximate real processes and relations of interaction or, simply, relations

Thus while we may prefer to not think of processes and relations as things—we do not usually experience them as concrete—they are aspects of things. We can conceive of processes and relations and they are aspects of things. When a number of atoms make a body the causality of the body may naïvely be the sum of the atomic causes. Similarly process and relation may be regarded as formally causal and spatial and therefore physical and, further, since they fit the concept-reference mold, they are Objects. A reason to not suppose them to be Objects is that they do not seem to be complete. The same charge, however, may be leveled against the concrete Object. It is the particular place of the concrete Object in our psychology that makes process and relation less immediate; however, there is no formal reason to not consider them to be Objects

Some states of affairs are composites of thing-relation-process or, more precisely, of {concrete Object}-{relation Object}-{process Object.} These, too, may be considered to be Objects. A solar system—a system of planets orbiting a sun under their mutual influences; a fluid system—an atmosphere moving under the dynamic system of internal fluid-fluid and external forces are typical example of such state-relation-process Objects

In this section the examples of Objects so far lie ‘solidly’ in the physical world. Objects need not be physical. A university, for example, has a physical aspect but is not a physical entity—at least not entirely: a university has buildings and perhaps lawns but the university is more about the people, the knowledge, the education, and the research: an appropriately structured online community could be a university

Similarly, a person may perhaps be considered to be an Object. There are special concerns regarding persons: persons will be taken up under Personal identity below

All such Objects, though not altogether thing-like, are (composite) singulars and their nature is naïvely rooted in their physicality and thus labeled particular Objects. From the examples given it appears that a particular Object has location and may undergo change

The first notion of particular Object or, simply, particular is defined by (1) A particular is singular—the concept is regarded as corresponding to a single Object (even though may via the principle of reference be seen as corresponding to many Objects) and (2) A particular is rooted in the physical, it has location (in space) and may change and be implicated in cause and effect

Concrete Objects are prototypically causal. While other particulars are do not satisfy all aspects of paradigms of causality they are implicated in causality

A pattern may be seen as a particular Object: it is the particular Object that has the pattern minus certain details. Similarly, forms and Laws may also be seen as particular Objects. However, as will be seen, this is not the only way to regard patterns, forms, and Laws (it might be more precise to capitalize ‘pattern’ and ‘form;’ and from a practical point of view it might be seen as unnecessary to capitalize ‘Law’)

Identity

The primary sense of identity in philosophy is that the identity of an Object is what it is. This is suggestive even though circular. Clearly though and talking roughly, different Objects must have different identities and the same Object cannot have two identities. The idea of sameness and difference are used below to show a way out of the circularity. Because there is a one-one correspondence between Objects and identities, identity may be regarded as a particular Object. Identity is an important concept in philosophical thought

The study of identity will have the following secondary but significant outcomes: its analysis will result in a clarification of the nature of the Object and of meaning; analysis of identity will be an occasion to reflect on holism and reflexive versus piece meal approaches to thought… and consequently to reflect on the idea, possibility, and actualities of systematic philosophy; and, finally, personal identity is important in Cosmology

The sense of the term identity in philosophy centers on the question What makes an Object the Object that it is? If there were essences (sortals) then identity would be closely related to the idea of essence (sortal.) One way to approach the idea of identity is via difference. Suppose that there is a box with a number of Objects in it. Each of two observers selects an Object and calls out its properties—shape, size, position, color, mass and so on. If a single property is different then, we think, they Objects selected are different. Suppose all the Objects have the same finite number of properties. If every property is the same then the observers have selected the same Object. If the number of properties is infinite then the list does not end but if property after property turns out to be the same, we begin to suspect that the Objects are the same. Although there is a practical difficulty of verifying that each of an infinite number of properties is the same we may perhaps generalize: the Objects are the same if all their properties are the same. This view, originally formulated by Leibniz, suggests: identity is sameness. In addition to the problem of an infinite number of properties there is also the problem that the principle equates an Object with its set of properties

Some problems facing this view of identity follow. If a wall in a house is removed is it the same house? If all the cells as well as the matter in the cells in a living organism are replaced after a number of cell divisions is it the same organism? Or, generally, when an Object changes over time how do we judge that it is the same Object or that its identity does not change? In particular how do we judge that an individual is the same person from childhood to adulthood?

The issues are addressed here by first asking What is the Object? That is, if a house material composition in a certain definite arrangement or if it is a definite collection of walls, doors, windows and so on in a definite arrangement then certainly removing a wall makes it a different house. We resist that conclusion but the reason that we resist it is that we do not think of a house as a definite arrangement but rather as a dwelling. Of course houses need not be dwellings and location and design are not irrelevant. A key issue now comes into perspective. The idea of ‘house’ may be held rather intuitively but the intuition is not fixed across cultures, individuals, times or other contexts. A house is a human artifact and its designs and uses are malleable and therefore the concept of ‘house’ is also malleable the boundary between ‘house’ and ‘not-house’ sufficiently indefinite that no pre-script for ‘house’ can be given. Thinking of a house as a home—as an example—removing the wall does not necessarily make the house different. We probably cannot specify in advance what changes will make a house a different house and what changes will not and that is because we do not have—and do not need to have—a definite concept of house or of any particular house. And the judgment may depend on culture, person and other contextual variables and this need not be occasion for puzzlement or debate even though it may be occasion for illumination of the ideas of Object and identity. There is something special about ‘Objects’ such as houses and hammers: it is part of their conception that they are not—merely—natural Object but they are artifacts and have functions: and the function is one additional parameter that is at least implicit in their conception. The concept for a natural Object such as an electron does not have the same kinds of freedoms and malleabilities as do the concepts for artifacts. However, even for natural Objects there may be freedoms in conceptualization. If there are competing theories regarding the nature of matter at a sub-atomic level then there may be different but equally acceptable conceptions of the electron: the electron is typically thought of as a point particle but some physicists believe that this conception is the result of an incompleteness in fundamental physics. In technology, a cube may be a cubical block of wood; in mathematics a cube is an idealized form of the block of wood. Thus an Object may be regarded as its physical structure, its function as artifact, of its form. In all of these kinds there may be play (whether physical structure includes the idea of physical constituent, whether form is taken geometrically or topologically.) And the identity will vary accordingly and contextually; and so it is not mark against the concept of identity that judgments of identity will vary; but such variance will not be altogether fluid or arbitrary: regarding the question of whether changes to a house change its identity there will be a core set of changes that will not normally be regarded as change, an extreme set of changes that will normally be thought of as change, and an in-between continuum of mixed judgment; and there is or should be nothing puzzling or remarkable about that

On the other hand, the concepts of some Objects are fixed. The Universe is all being. Someone may differ and say ‘No, the Universe is the known physical universe.’ Earlier analysis revealed that the apparent disagreement does not point to vagueness in identity; rather the same word ‘Universe’ is used in two different meanings... and while a similar analysis could perhaps be given for artifacts the judgment here is that each of the two different analyses is most efficient for its domain of Object

Fixed Objects are identical in being the same in all aspects; incompletely defined Objects are identical in having the relevant aspects the same

The notion of substance thinking arises again: the problem of identity that we have been contemplating arises from thinking that there are essences to things that do not have essences or, perhaps more precisely, from thinking that things have a greater degree or greater fixity of essence than is inherent in them

Personal identity

We are interested in personal identity of its immense importance in this narrative; the topic will be taken up again in Identity and death in Cosmology. Personal identity is also a significant concern in philosophy

Personal identity concerns an individual’s sense of who he or she is: what makes me ‘me’ or I ‘I.’ We begin discussion of personal identity with a brief discussion of how we judge that another person is the same person over his or life span. This discussion will lead into analysis of personal identity

In the present discussion concern is primarily with judgments of identity from the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of other persons. What constitutes personal identity is touched upon in Worlds but is not of direct interest here

We judge that another person is the same person over his or her life span from a diverse and diffuse set of data. The judgment over the whole span from newborn to death probably requires some approximation to continuous acquaintance: this is because appearance and patterns of behavior change so much from, say, newborn to even childhood and again, sometimes, in infirmity and death. Over the span of childhood to old age, however, there are recognizable features of appearance and behavior (personality) that remain fixed even during change; it is not necessary that we should be able to specify what these features are in order to recognize them or in order to trust them: it is true that error is possible but the essential concern here must be with the normal and usual case

What are the constituents of the sense of identity of the person from his or her own viewpoint? A first set of constituents concern memory: the individual recollects his or her life as a progression or stream through time—a stream that is constantly being added to but for which regions prior to the present contain a recognizable, familiar even if strange, and unchanging core. A second set of constituents concerns extension. What do I consider to be myself? The normal core of ‘me’ and ‘I’ would include the body and a set of personal experiences and attitudes (this is perhaps a normal modern western core)

The Object ‘I’ or ‘me’, in so far as it may be definite, is constituted of a sufficiently abstract and roughly defined set of experiences that I can validly think of my personal identity as fixed even through great change

What happens to personal identity in severe brain damage or end stage dementia? It may be reasonably surmised that there is a loss of identity in the Normal sense (this judgment does not determine ethical judgment.) However, while the judgment may be reasonable it is hard to know whether the absence of communication or whether absence of brain activity implies complete loss of mind including the ability to feel pain

Perhaps I see myself as a lonely isolated accident. If I do that would probably be the result of adoption of some materialist world view. There is no theoretical reason to think that way; even if materialism holds in some sense the question ‘What is matter?’ should have no fixed response that excludes ‘mind.’ (See, especially, the discussion of Mind in Cosmology.) We have and will see that the modern cosmological picture is immensely limited with regard to extension, duration, variety, and nature (what is the nature of the atom…) Even on the view of modern cosmology: the atoms in my body were forged in an ancient fire called the original singularity or big-bang and sequelae; although I have typically experienced my ‘being’ as limited temporally and spatially, these limits are not at all required by the non-local aspects of quantum theory. Those who respond to modern science—including prominent scientists and thinkers—with a sense that their identity is alien, accidental, and insignificant are responding to positivistic cultural interpretations of science and not to its necessities. Sometimes when I respond to self-negating experiences in life my sense of self becomes very limited. Other times, when in an expansive mood I have a sense of a larger self: one that includes the potential as well as the actual. And that potential is not merely what is culturally defined. The present narrative has shown the immense limits of the—western—cultural definition. I wonder at the limits of my personal extent even though I know that when I command the world to move it is only my own limbs that are under direct neural control. I wonder what comes after death. I know that there was a ‘before birth’ that resulted in an ‘I.’ If it happened once, there is no necessity to its not happening again and there is no necessity to its happening again in the same form. And occasionally I sense infinity—especially in nature. And I know from the principle of variety that these relatively subjective thoughts and feelings are an infinitesimal fraction of what is necessary and will be taken up in Identity and death in Cosmology

The earlier section Mind in the chapter Cosmology was devoted to general and conceptual questions. This section looks at human and animal mind in light of the earlier discussion

The discussion begins with what is to be explained in the section Elements of mind: the phenomena to be cataloged andor explained. The explanations follow in the sections Elements and concept of mind: explanations of the phenomena and Timelines and origin of the higher elements

Elements of mind: the phenomena to be cataloged andor explained

Mind and its nature

The place of mind, relation to body and external world

While mind and its nature have been considered in the earlier section, this section continues the earlier discussion, elaborating it particularly with regard to detailed phenomena and the place of mind, relation to body and external world

The elements of mind

Element—primitive state, process, relation; afferent-neutral-efferent

State—bound, free; intensity, modality, quality; memory, transient, stable; compound, object or gestalt

Modality and quality—primitive feeling, five senses and their qualities; external feeling—the world, internal feeling—the body (including kinesthetic feeling, internal pain, affective feeling, and the feeling of feeling)

Object—origin of gestalt, binding, constancy

Function—intuition, conception—mental content or cognition-affect—i.e., inner-outer or body-world feeling; perception, higher-conception, icon, symbol, language; cognition, emotion; external world—i.e., inner-outer mental content

Experience and consciousness—primitive feeling—i.e., all experience, pure experience, attitude-experience, action-experience, awareness, consciousness, consciousness—degrees, awareness without consciousness, on-off character of consciousness, focal and volitional aspects of consciousness, consciousness of consciousness

Modes of organization

The following modes are implicit in the subsequent section Elements and concept of mind: explanations of the phenomena

Elaboration—modality, quality; layering

Integration—adaptation via exposure to the Object—the origin of binding in adaptation; degrees of integration—independence, interaction and holism… holism of emotion and cognition… and its essential character—degrees of binding, variation, and self and interactive volition

Integration of cognition… and affect—thought and its experimental integration in synthesis and fragmentation in analysis, affect-thought and its constructive and experimental integration in higher emotion… non-volitional modulation of emotional response over time and cultivation of volition in emotion

The categories—a system of intuitive or adapted Objects

The following categories are to be justified, explained and elaborated: the Natural, the Psychosocial, and the Existential

Timelines and origin of the higher elements

Elements and concept of mind: explanations of the phenomena

Explanations of the phenomena follow. The explanations are those that are not at least tacit so far or that benefit from elaboration

The following aspects of the concept of mind were considered in section Mind of chapter Objects: The concept of mind, Consciousness and awareness, Free will, and A preliminary psychological account of Objects. The following more detailed topics are taken up below: The elements, Introducing states that include elements of volition regarding mental content, Object as element

The elements

The primitive elements of mind—state-inner relation-process—are the inner side of the elements of interaction

These elements are coextensive with outward effect or efference, equilibrium or ‘pure’ feeling, and incoming effect or afference. Therefore, efference-action, stasis-pure experience, and afference-attitude are not distinct ‘dimensions’ of mind

These elements are adapted to the environment. In a Normal sense, one with a different extension than the earlier use, there is a level at which such elements have no freedom in the individual to adapt. Adaptation is supra-individual. However, for anything but the most primitive sentience, it is far more efficient to have developmental adaptation overlaid on the supra-individual or genetic adaptation than it is to have adaptation to be entirely genetic

The elements elaborate as intensity, modality and quality. Modality includes the ‘five senses’ associated with perception of the world outside the body—vision whose primitive quality includes color, hearing whose primitive quality includes pitch, taste, olfaction, and touch that includes tactile feeling, heat and pain… and feeling that includes kinesthetic senses of location, orientation, muscular tension, and general organic feeling; the latter is what is often referred to feeling in the sense of primitive emotion. This feeling includes the recursion of the primitive and all inclusive feeling, i.e. the awareness of mind (later the consciousness of consciousness)

The foregoing includes the distinction of inner and outer sense i.e. of what are commonly called feeling of the affective kind and perception; this distinction does not correspond, however, to the idea of an external world which is, simply, the idea that mental content has an Object

Comments—these are asides in that the logical place for these comments is later— ‘internal feeling’—internal feeling refers to the knowing, not limited to internal ‘perception’ i.e. perception of ‘body’ states but also to the free or higher-conceptual side, therefore refers generally to ‘cognition’ of body states and includes primitive ‘feeling’ as well as emotion; this includes also the reflexive perception of mental states, i.e. to knowing that one is knowing, seeing, feeling, emoting, thinking…

There is a convention that these inner states are logically inaccessible to others. We do read inner states by facial expression and other external manifestations; however this is not a contradiction of the logical inaccessibility for the connection between the inner and the external manifestation is not logically necessary and, though there is physiological causation this causation can be disrupted by non-volitional factors and suspended, at least to some extent, by volition. However, we have identified inner awareness with physiological states—although there is a problem of 1:1 identification, to think otherwise is to posit an unknown substance and is therefore disallowed. Reading minds. It follows, then, that there are various ways in which another agent could connect to and know these states; the term ‘logically inaccessible’ must, therefore be changed to ‘actually accessible but with difficulties of connection and clarity.’ This is an enhancement to what has been called theory of mind in the recent cognitive science literature: theory of mind refers to how an individual knows that other individuals have minds and how they surmise what the mental content of the other may be—theory of mind is not a formal theory but an intuitive function

Introducing states that include elements of volition regarding mental content

There are degrees of binding between this affective feeling and sense perception; this is essential for connection of organism and environment; without any binding there results the ‘free-wheeling’ of autistic-like isolation or disconnection

In a relatively quiescent state, while affective feeling and perception have a degree of binding, the intensity of perception depends largely on the intensity of the stimulus, while the intensity of the affect depends on the nature of the stimulus—some combination of development and genetics results in archetypes that generate intense feelings of fear, love and so on that are absent in the absence of the ‘affection-al archetypes;’ the binding of affect or internal feeling and outer feeling—normally called perception—is the binding of body to world as adaptation; we will soon see that the freeing of the connection is the adaptation of creative adaptability; of course, the ‘free’ does not eliminate the ‘bound’ and the two are present together

Volition regarding mental content is an element of freedom of choice

Object as element

The concept of an Object results from elaboration and integration in adaptive evolution with the world; adaptive evolution results in the capacity for Object recognition; the actual ability arises in development

The general Object is the joint product of organism—mind—and world

Object binding and object constancy require no explanation at the level of adaptation; there may however be genetic, developmental and functional explanations that include binding of the complex of elements in a perceptual archetype in some combination with laying down of the Object in memory—since the Object is what presents—rather than the mere laying down in memory of the elements of the Object of course, developmental adaptability requires that the Objects not be rigidly fixed and the elements can also be Objects (and thus arises the ‘problem’ of Object integration)

Object binding and object constancy are aspects of the Object; they are not other than the Object and do not require explanation over and above that of the Object. Thus the Object is a gestalt that includes binding and constancy and whose basic explanation lies in adaptation; this is not to argue against structural or functional explanations but is to argue that lack of such explanation does not constitute lack of understanding

Development bifurcates as simple development and conditioning. Conditioning in regard to perception emerges as memory which is the origin of the ‘free’ state. Simple transient recall is enhanced by adaptation as the control of recall; stable recall is of what is imprinted and includes elements and Objects; of course, as we know, elements are elementary Objects; the introduction of random elements in memory is the source of creative iconic imagination—these are likely the earlier developed transients; once icon imagination becomes generally adaptive—adaptability of mental process as an adaptation—it bifurcates into iconic and symbolic imagination; again the subject side of the symbol is the concept of an Object

The icon and the symbol enable the knowledge of Objects beyond the Objects known in bound perception; these may take us beyond the world of immediate adaptation to the Universal; however, it is then possible, as we have seen, to return to the intuition and see the Universal in it

The cognitive Object remains in degrees of binding with feeling-emotion; the general object is cognitive-affective; it is essential for connectedness to have strong binding; it is essential for creative imagination, symbolic and iconic, to have freedom; however, some low level binding of varying degree to affect is essential to avoid autistic disconnection and poverty of imagination

The categories

In this Normal world, the modes of Object are the Natural and the Psychosocial. These may be further divided as Physical and Biological—the Natural; and the Psychic, i.e. the psychological and the Social—the Psychosocial

Regarding the unknown of the larger Universe and its unpredictability, which may include the unpredictable aspects of this world, one further category may suffice—the Existential

A short list of the categories might be Natural and Psychosocial; the natural includes the physical and the biological and the psychosocial includes the existential. Following is an expanded list of the categories

Existential

Being (Becoming, Being-in, …), Experience and Content—precursor to self and concept, Object, Humor (the intuition of indeterminism and chaos)

The contrived joke is to humor as pornography is to love-sex

The world has in it much immanent joke-humor, still not pure humor, that is of a higher grade than the mere produced joke even though the latter displays wit; and a little cultivation of an art of perception of immanent joke-humor offers immanent comic relief

Physical

Space, Time, Physical Object, Causation, Indeterminism

Biological

Life Form and Ecosystem, Species, Heredity

Of the psyche

Concept and intuition. ‘Concept’ is used in the generalized sense of mental content and includes percept-affect, and higher concept and emotion: free icon and free symbol and systems of the same

The free icon and symbol require the abilities to recollect and dissociate and to originate

Social

The institution

Of perception and judgment

Perception and judgment are the basis of knowing. Perception provides data. The data are not originally raw or Objective; they conform to the categories of perception that are the joint product of mind—observer—and world. Reason—the categories of judgment—have been traditionally divided according to deduction or necessity and induction or likely. The likely is not however merely and simply likely but may conform to categories causal which may range from deterministic to likely

In this essay it was found immensely productive to bring both perception and judgment at least initially into the fold of intuition and therefore lacking in necessity. This would allow necessity and other grades of precision of perception and judgment to fall out of investigation. The result was that we found certain necessary Objects of perception—experience, being, all and part and absence of being and so on—and certain necessary categories of judgment defined implicitly as Logic. These defined a Universal metaphysics where metaphysics is knowledge of the world as it is. The claim is not that all knowledge is knowledge of the world as it is but that within the Universal metaphysics are identified the ways or at least some ways of knowing the world which do not avoid the ‘stamp’ of mind but reduce the effect of the stamp to zero

In the twentieth century analytic philosophers who abandoned metaphysics per se under the banner of the impossibility of metaphysics spoke of a metaphysic of experience. The motive to abandoning pure metaphysics was multifold—it included Kant’s insistence that while a realm of pure being, called by him the noumenon, did in fact exist it could be thought but not known since its elusion of knowing was logical in nature; it included the rejection by British Philosophers—especially Russell who along with Frege was influential in the analytic turn—of the largely speculative idealist metaphysics typified by the thought of Hegel… which rejection we now see as premature because, first, we have seen that some modes of perception and judgment are Objective and, second, the rejection of all metaphysics was of the form ‘since some schools and trends in metaphysics are merely speculative therefore all metaphysic must be cast from the same die.’ What is crucial here is that pure general metaphysics is the place where metaphysics per se and metaphysics of experience coincide

The degrees of binding of cognition and affect in the moment to moment and in the motivation of directed versus ‘laissez faire’ becoming are crucial in keeping connection with and freedom from the world—nature and society—in appropriate if implicit ranges of balance

Mechanisms of integration

The actual integration of objects is clearly a function of ability to integrate—which is a function of kind of organism and exposure (growth.) This would appear to be most efficient; the alternative that integration is entirely built in or innate would place a burden on heredity and would mean that all adaptations would be pre-adaptations. The individual is regarded as having the ability to integrate. The integral forms are laid down in memory (neural) which is modified (grows) in exposure

Personality and Identity

Personality is innate and learned, rather enduring but adaptive with degrees of plasticity, patterns of thought, behavior, feeling, affective expression, drive—direction and force—and their integration and interaction in relation to self, commitment, others, and world

Personality is an integral form as is Identity. Personality will not be analyzed further here except to observe that the integral form is not fixed, requires adequate development, sustenance or maintenance and may be subject to disintegration. The theory of identity has been considered earlier

Health and disorder

Health. Functional factors—cognitive and affective response, tone and regulation; interaction between factors of physical and psychical health; personality

Disorder. Single, multiple and interactive breakdown of function

Timelines and origin of the higher elements

Stimulus-response, i.e. afference-efference; generalized ‘touch;’ the intensity parameter

Conditioning—a form of learning and memory

Emergence of dim consciousness that is perhaps unrecognized as such

Complexity—modality and the quality spectra; (1) The afferent modalities—‘five’ senses, kinesthetic senses, affective feeling, feeling of feeling…, and (2) The efferent modalities—attention, movement…

Compounding—the Object; degrees binding of the external modalities—cognition; degrees of binding of cognition and affect—the general grounded Object

Reflexivity—memory as stimulus

Emergence of animal consciousness

Control of reflex—volitional and constructive thought; cultural learning; icon, symbol, language—spoken and written, communicative and expressive

Emergence of the perhaps special aspects of consciousness that may be labeled ‘human’

Analysis—the ‘element’ as Object

Meta-theory: further reflection on the nature of the explanations

The explanations start with primitive elements of mind—feeling; a picture of human mind is built up—the variety of elements, e.g. the sensations and the elementary affects, the bound and memory and the free, perception-thought-affect, the categories of perception-thought-affect, development, personality…

Is it claimed that the higher aspects are reduced to the primitive elements? That is not what is done here

Let us reflect via analogy. The physical sciences include physics and chemistry; chemistry is thought to involve no principles outside physics but on account of complexity of explanation, explanation in chemistry requires concepts that do not belong to the fundamental theories of physics. Similarly, biology is not thought to involve principles outside physics—and chemistry—but because of the difficulty with explanatory reduction, biological explanation cannot do without biological concepts. Whether biology and chemistry involve extra-physical principles—i.e. whether the difficulty in the higher level explanation is not merely computational but constitutive or logical—can be debated but the standard view today is that they do not require extra-physical principles and not much attention is given to the question inside the mainstream—philosophers, of course, have devoted efforts to articulating this standard view. The present point is that for explanation in biology and chemistry to proceed, concepts and theories beyond those of physics are required—and, especially for biology, immensely illuminating—even though the concepts and laws of chemistry may be labeled both physical and chemical; biological concepts, however, are generally not considered to be physical even though a constitutive reduction is generally thought to be possible in principle

Similarly, there is no attempt here to reduce the phenomena of mind to the elements. What is done? The foregoing discussions have provided an outline sketch of the various levels and some general features of explanation to the extent that shows the features at various levels with varying degrees of necessity. The necessity of primitive feeling as the essence of mind follows from metaphysical feelings. The variety of senses is contingent upon adaptation to physical environments. The emergence of memory is not necessary but is necessary to learning and to the emergence of free feeling and then to iconic and symbolic thought. The presence of random elements amid structure is essential to true novelty; and the balance of structure and freedom in iconic and symbolic forms is necessary to take advantage of random elements in the ‘generation’ of novel thought. The system of categories is contingent in its emergence but necessary to appreciation and negotiation of the boundary of our world and the Universe…

Society

Introduction

The social world provides a context for development of meaning—as significance—and commitment to values held or deemed worthwhile. Commitment is instrumental toward outcome and meaning is the place that outcome and effort may be appreciated. In addition to the provision of context, institutions make possible works that are beyond the power of an isolated individual

In Social world, the ideas of society, culture and institution are developed from the ideas of group and group interaction in light of the nature of Human being and the Metaphysics. The significance for the journey is that in the elaboration of its nature the group—the Social world—is an object of interest. Groups undertake journeys and for the individual society is both ground and support

The explanatory triad

Phenomena—groups and activities; kinds—natural, social, psychic and universal; variety; change, stability and instability

Elements—person; knowing and foresight; language, expression, and communication

The boundary between constitution and theory is somewhat arbitrary. Note, also that use of structure is not structuralism

Theory—institution, person, blood and other kinship groups; culture—discovery, coding and recording, reflection, and transmission; social function—economic, political or group decision, cultural

Culture

In sociology, culture is often used to refer to the sum of learned and transmitted human knowledge, belief and behavior

Knowledge and therefore culture may differentiate according to fact and value. The distinction is at least conventional—we may think of fact which hear includes conception as knowledge of definite things as they are… of course to some degree of approximation. On the other hand we may think of values as, e.g. some mix of feeling and norms that do not correspond to any facts but are perhaps guides to behavior in the areas regarding which we have choice

Alternately, value may be thought of as having the following components. First, they are guides to ‘successful’ behavior. Because the future is open they are not altogether definite guides but have some play; still there are definite prescriptions and proscriptions. Thus ‘value’ is a form of knowing that contains an openness on account of indefiniteness… new value systems supplant old ones. Knowledge of fact we think is not like that. However, in an open domain knowledge of fact becomes like that—there are elements of definiteness and elements of openness and new knowledge may expand upon old knowledge while supplanting it. Also in a fixed context value may become fixed except of course for cultural play and creation. Thus value lies in a dual space (of knowing the world as it is and creating the world of culture.) Knowledge of fact is the same as that in the knowing side but not in the creating. Open up now into the Universal realm revealed by the Universal realm—there, knowing and creating may merge. Thus ‘fact’ and ‘value’ are felt to be different but in a—more—Universal perspective the distinction breaks down. It is characteristic of growing insight and knowing that the distinction between apparently disparate realms dissolves in newer perspectives while, of course, the older perspectives do not go away and do not invariably lose all purchase on the world

Freedom

A central idea is that human freedom is a contributing factor in the makeup of the human social world. It is not suggested that there is any set of determining factors for it is unlikely that such a set could be found; and it is not thought that individual freedom is necessary for all societies—human and non-human. However, it is part of the central idea that human freedom is essential for some aspects of human society—and the thought is that that freedom is essential to the self-determining aspects of human society (again, it is not suggested that there is complete determination by any set of factors.) Human freedoms of thought—linguistic and other—and action contribute to human culture and it is human culture that defines and binds the various aspects of human society that acquire their structure in the form of institutions

The concept of the institution

There is a variety of functions and arrangements within society that constitute the whole. A post-structuralist might not agree that this provides a faithful description but would agree that society is not uniform—laterally or vertically

Designated functions may be called Institutions and the arrangements may be called interaction; alternatively the institutions may be seen as already in dynamic interaction. An institution—lower case—is the particular manifestation of an Institution in a given society

Institutional form and the idea of institutional purity

A dynamic scene may be described in terms of state, process and genesis. Therefore:

The institutional forms are defined by action—and choice—and organization or structure; and the founding or genetic institution—culture that includes, reflexively, the institution of the institution

For future study and research consider that future forms of knowledge of social institutions including knowledge, politics, and economics will require study at abstract and detailed levels. Abstraction must be a component of a science of social forms—allowing a precise and faithful level to interact with the detailed and imperfect; enhancing both. Consider also new modes and means of political-economic organization

The idea of institutional purity is that the only function of the institution is that of the corresponding Institution. It is the idea, for example, that the church should engage only in Religion. Reasons for institutional purity include reification of the Institution, ‘abuse,’ and efficiency. There are of course multi-functional institutions such as government whose functions include not only political concerns but, for example, economic, military and educational concerns as well. In the United States, separation of church and state has some constitutional basis

In fact absolute purity of the institution may be near impossible to maintain for practical reasons and not for reasons of ‘corruption’ alone. The definition of a pure Institutional function alone is not reason for purity of the institution; however, efficiency may require some separation of function and promote further separation—but efficiency may require and promote some accumulation of function as well; Normative arguments are generally difficult to defend on any absolute terms and generally refer back to both practical concerns and Normative principles (ethics)

In general, arguments for and against institutional purity be on a case by case basis and may include (a) Historical factors—Is the cost of dismantling a received institution worth the benefit? (b) Positive factors—efficiency of arrangement, historical factors…—and Normative factors

The discussion of Ethics takes up the distinction and separation of the Normative and the Positive—of fact and value

The institutions

People—persons—and groups

Here are some institutions

Individual, role, infant, child, adult, man, woman, warrior, worker, professional, priest, shaman

Pair, love, family, sibling, kin, friends

Community

Actual, virtual

Institutional groups

Culture

Simply—this is elaborated and critiqued below—culture is the sum of knowledge and habit of a society. It includes: language; art, literature; technology; knowledge—contextual and universal, myth, religion—its personal and group and formal varieties; science; ethics, morals, norms, value; paradigm—lateral and vertical, disciplines, belief, learning, transmission; culture of the institution

Culture is significantly but not entirely institutionalized; roughly, in the sense of Max Weber, 1864-1920, the non-institutionalized is, ‘charismatic’ and the institutionalized is ‘patriarchal.’ Society needs the institutional and the non-institutional, the patriarchal and the charismatic—approximately, the stability and transformational, conserving and liberal

The conserving and the liberal become institutions in themselves as does the culture of the institution

The institutions are for the most part present in the general discussion. The ‘culture of the institution’ is an exception; this and other institutions of importance to the narrative will receive special attention below

Language

Language falls under culture but because of its importance is not a sub topic

Introduction

The first goal of this discussion is to investigate the overlap of metaphysics and language. Why? Language is used in the expression of metaphysics. However, language does not cover the entire expression of metaphysics. A part of metaphysics is an abstraction of perception or intuition. Language points to but does not express that part; however, language may encapsulate this part. A second part of metaphysics, symbolic reason, may be expressed by language. The distinction of a part expressed by language and a second part not expressed by language depends of course on a conventional interpretation of what language is

A derivative goal is the study of language; the study of language—in light of the metaphysics—may be taken up later

At least some linguistic forms have meaning. However, since ‘language’ is a concept, the meaning of language is also an issue. In the study of language, as for any concept, it is possible to proceed by defining language at outset. We have seen, however, that investigation may reveal that the idea-thing being sought is given only roughly by an initial conception of it

What is language?

A definition is a place to start even if not the place; here is a definition from Wikipedia—A language is a dynamic set of sensory symbols of communication and the elements used to manipulate them. Language can also refer to the use of such systems as a general phenomenon

What might this definition have to recommend itself? It is suggestive. However, it does not distinguish language from animal communication. I am not arguing that animal communication is not language; however Wikipedia immediately adds ‘Although other animals make use of quite sophisticated communicative systems, sometimes casually referred to as animal language, none of these is known to make use of all of the properties that linguists use to define language…’ That is, having ‘defined’ language, Wikipedia is saying—implying—that its definition is incomplete

We might ask What is the meaing of ‘What is language?’? We would be asking, in other words, how concepts are elucidated by search in a dual space of concept and object. Clearly, such search is not guaranteed to have any reasonable outcome unless it has ‘mountains’ corresponding to concept-objects. A concept or definition will be crisp if the projection of a concept-object onto concept space is a spire. This will not be the case for all concept-objects. What is the relation of metaphysics to this concept-object space? The necessary objects will have spire-like concepts. Other objects may have spire-like concepts for restricted contexts but mountain-like concepts outside those contexts. Even if we define a ‘table’ as something with legs, a flat top and that is stable we will find objects that do not satisfy this definition but that we might want to call tables. If we replace the property definition by a functional one we will run into the same problem. If we consider that the properties of this cosmos are not necessary, the same lack of definiteness will obtain of some ‘natural’ objects such as electrons. The natural languages—e.g. English—and artificial languages—Esperanto, programming languages and so on—do not necessarily come near exhausting the kinds of possibility for language. In Process and Reality, 1927, Alfred North Whitehead said that A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge. In a ‘creative universe’ the precise language may exist only for those objects—the necessary objects—for which there is a completed metaphysical knowledge

Approaching language

Instead of starting with something discrete such as ‘A language is a dynamic set of sensory symbols…’ let us ask a dual question. The dual question will supplement property definition ‘A language is…’ by a functional one ‘What a language does is…’ which will be supplemented by experimental and analytic approaches. In an analytic approach we will ask about the parts of language and how they fit together: the analytic approach will include structural study—however, there need be no debate about ‘structuralism’ because the inclusion of structure is not a claim that understanding and definition are wholly structural

What are we doing when we use language? Perhaps the first notion that comes to mind to a scientist or analytic thinker is that language describes the world… is a ‘picture’ of the world. As in science, this may be powerful when patterns are described for patterns permit prediction. As we have seen that picture has precise as well as indefinite parts and the indefiniteness does not arise solely on account of indefiniteness of language but also on account of the indefiniteness of objects. Also, signs and symbols refer to acts of intuition and therefore in many cases where we might seek precision of sign and symbol, that search is misguided andor unnecessary though sometimes useful for, first, the understanding of what is intuitive and, second, for the analytic extension or re-foundation (including understanding) of intuition

However, description of the world is not at all the entire story. In ‘doing’ language,  it ‘flows’ from a person or persons, it is an expression of mental content in the broadest sense, and it may be received by a person or persons. Receivers and senders are not necessarily distinct. A sender and receiver may be the same person; this may enhance reflection

Therefore a more complete conception of language requires a complete elaboration of kinds of mental content—conception in the general sense, i.e. cognition-affect. Cognition-affect is complete in the sense that affect refers to body-states while cognition refers to world-states (which may include body states.) In most inclusive sense conception prescribes linguistic form

While we tend to associate language with sign and symbol, its main functions are expression, representation and communication

A standard form of description is the subject-predicate form. This corresponds to the idea that the world is a collection of states of affairs (that include relations and processes.) Correspondingly, the modes of communication are assertion, direction, commission, expression, declaration (assertion includes the sub-forms of fact, exclamation, and question…)

Pre-language

Perhaps the first function is spontaneous expression that becomes selected for its communication function. Later, expressions become words but it might be that the transition from the spontaneous expression is to words-and-sentences

The spontaneous expression is not explicitly a description. Therefore even if the subject-predicate is the standard form of description it is not universal. The terms of mathematics and the sciences are not always in standard-predicate form but can often be so re-written as can much spontaneous expression of feeling. It is therefore a project to determine the true level of universality of the subject predicate form

Meaning

Therefore, meaning is not essentially atomic and originates and remains in use. Which is not to say that fixed atomic—lexical—meaning is without use even if it does not tell the whole story

Speech

The thought that speech and music occur in different brain areas—with or without overlap—does not imply a conceptual divide between music and speech (there is of course a conceptual distinction)

Speech is likely the first medium of language. It is not necessarily the first; perhaps there were other signs; perhaps non-spoken and spoken signs converged

Sounds, words, sentences are not entirely atomic. ‘Speaking’ atomically, there are compound words that are built up from simple words that have origin in mere expression but meaning is not originally explicitly-universally ostensive but may be functional, i.e., use based. Simple words may be derivative of expression but words, complex words, and word arrangements originate together

Speech is manifestly—temporally—linear when spoken by one person. However even though it is often actually linear it is not necessarily linear since speech may refer to speech

Language—the symbol—may now be expression and now (mental) content

Before written language, culture is maintained in practice and language memory

Context

Speech occurs in a context that may or may not set the confines of what is spoken

Para-verbal communication

‘Speech’ occurs in expressive combination with various qualities of speech—rhythm, pace, volume, pitch, cadence, emphasis…—as well as gesture, drama, ‘acting’ that include facial expression

Conventionally, para-verbal language is not language. Even though drama in its various meanings and music may occur in different brain centers from conventional language and even though the concepts have distinction it does not follow that the varieties cannot fall under an interactive umbrella that we may think of as communication or Language

Therefore, a theory of language that focuses on symbolic expression may be easy to write because of the definiteness of its object. However, if regarded as complete, such theories may be misleading

Writing

Writing may have originally been little more than pictures; pictures may have come to signify words; the introduction of alphabet may have been selected for because of its efficiency regardless of its origin

Writing makes possible storage and communication much larger amounts of information over greater distances and times. Writing encourages self-reference—the symbolic analysis of symbolic structure and so grammar, reasoning, logic, mathematics, literature, drama, science, and philosophy

Grammar is of course not absent from original spoken language but writing encourages its formalization

Conventional grammar is perhaps dominated by representation—states of affairs including process and relation

As is seen in chapter Method, self-reference may be a source of paradox but is also a source of powerful construction—new ideas, reasoning and criticism

Written language is dissociated from context. This is strength and weakness. And,  context may be introduced or created

Writing is not inherently linear. Writing may be essentially non-linear in reasoning and mathematics forms… and, at least originally, contingently non-linear in relation to expression including art. Writing may be enhanced by art and sound

Is the distinction between writing and such para-linguistic form essential?

Recording and speaking may be combined

Symbol and icon

Icons—visual, auditory, other—are sources of iconic and non-iconic elements of languages. Languages originate in icon and icon-less signs as symbols… or in other languages

A balance between language and imagery provides balance and integration

Too much formal language ability at an expense of imagery may pass for appearance of intelligence but may hinder thought

Summary, conclusions, further development

The boundary of language is not definite even if particular brain centers are devoted to natural language. If we take the boundary of language to be defined by natural languages, synthesis with general imagination and intuition is required for the most complete and realistic thought

These comments are not against specialist developments, e.g. algebraic language; such formal developments are powerful extensions of language; however, for their greatest power they require integration with language in its broad sense—the sense that is not limited by the indefinite boundaries

The broad sense of language corresponds to the integration of pure and applied metaphysics, of intuition and formal representation

Future versions of the narrative may further investigate the concept of language and its relation to or place in understanding at center and edge

Organization and transaction

Economic, work, political, legal, discovery, knowledge, ethics, value, transmission, learning, education, university, school, archival, play, tradition, church, performance

Some definitions and explanations

This list of definitions of the Institutions—even when supplemented by definitions scattered throughout the narrative—is not intended to be exhaustive

People and groups

Individual—While the Individual and the self are definite biological and psychological entities, the ‘Individual’ has a social component that varies in fact and concept from one culture to another. This leads some to believe that the ‘self’ is a mere ‘social construct’

Role—Among cultures roles vary along two continuums or continua: the degree of universality versus particularity to specific cultures and the degree of flexibility versus rigidity. Although infant, child, adult, man, and women have a degree of universality some features that define, e.g. ‘man’ or ‘woman’ or ‘child’ are culture-specific

Actual group—a definite group of people, e.g. a family; of course the members of a family change over time

Virtual group—defined primarily by place and function

‘Actual’ groups may have virtual aspects as in the occasional incorporation of persons not included under the normal idea of family; and ‘virtual’ groups may have an actual component—a market that meets on particular days and has no fixed buyers or sellers may have, e.g. a designated organizer

Culture

In defining a widely used and important concept such as culture we face a number of difficulties. The first is that the word will have a number of distinct uses that may be somewhat related and therefore confused. This confusion may be a source of difficulty but is an inessential difficulty that could be resolved by using different terms

It is not as though the laws of physics or even psychology associates any fixed meaning of the word and all that remains is to elucidate the meaning

Rather the problem is to identify an intended meaning and then focus on what is perhaps the best expression of that meaning. That task is of course not independent of the nature of—human—society. Therefore, if culture is to be an element of society the clarification of its nature will proceed in parallel with the understanding of the nature of society and any other concepts with which those understandings may overlap

To keep matters simple—open for future learning and analysis—we use ‘culture’ in the important sense of Edward Burnett Tylor, 1832-1917, ‘Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” This may be simplified to regarding culture as the sum total of knowledge and habit of a society—where belief, art, morals and so on are regarded as modes andor grades of knowledge

We leave the concept at this stage with the recognition of course that this relatively specific form remains open—intrinsically and to more recent thought

The culture of the institution

The meaning of ‘culture of the institution’ arises when a society is sufficiently flexible in its arrangements—manifest e.g., by flux—andor to the extent that there may be reflection on social arrangement, a culture of the institution may arise. This may be labeled the philosophy andor science of the Institution and may be also the subject of empirical and mathematical-scientific analysis

Religion

The ideas of religion and science are important in this narrative. Science is considered elsewhere. Religion will be considered briefly here; religion is related but of course not identical to myth; therefore ‘myth’ will be part of the discussion

It is important to distinguish the practice and institution of religion from the concept… and also from the ideal of religion

Most ‘definitions’ of religion relate it to what is mundane—to this common / ordinary world. The concern of religion appears to be that of another rather ideal realm that gives significance to this life

The institution of religion has come under criticism and attack for various ideological and other reasons. The ideological include the belief in what has no support in reality or the empirical; practical criticisms include its opiate effect (Marx) and the abuses of various kinds. Therefore there are today many who distinguish spirituality from religion; they may have affinity for some motives to religion—the true nature of the Universe, meaning and so on—but would distance themselves from the institution

The ‘great religions’ fall into two groups; those originating in the harsh desert of the Middle East—the relatively harsh Abrahamic religions, i.e. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and the religions of the tropics—Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and so on that are perhaps more tolerant, more open to plurality, less the occasion for militancy but still of course not without abuse. It is not thought that the two groups are exhaustive

The religions are generally not unitary structures even though there different elements—metaphysical, historical, moral, practical, and the mystical that is directed at inner-outer union—are bound by common themes and myths

Hunter-gatherer religions are rather different from the religions of the ‘agriculturalists’ (the ‘great religions.’) A characteristic difference is that the religion of the hunter-gatherer, regardless of its literal character, tends to tie the individual and the group to the environment. The images and the norms of the hunter-gatherer mythologies include a language for the elements of their environment and prescriptions that, even if not altogether effective, have an element of efficiency

While the ‘great religions’ have efficiency or adaptedness in their moral side—no claim is made regarding the degree or nature of the effectiveness or the significance of such—the unmooring of the agriculturist from the environment appears to have led to metaphysical systems in these religions that are detached from the immediate environment and that may therefore assume Universal form which in turn opens up the possibility of Universal sense as well as Universal absurdity

Absurdity and militancy are two criticisms of the modern religions today—especially of Christianity and Islam

However, religion—especially fundamentalism—has been rising and is therefore impractical to ignore. If we do not ignore religion we may resist the impulse to institutional purism and, first, open dialog and, second, be open to the positive meanings even in the absurd (it is of course not being said that even the fundamentalist canon is empty of value)

There is a variety of reasons, including the political, that religion and other institutions of culture, e.g. science and philosophy including metaphysics are relatively insular

Recall though the argument of the present narrative that metaphor is on the way to being literal; this is not an argument against the poetic uses of language but simply an argument that the representational uses will be the ultimate form of metaphor (we are not blind to the thought that the literal / metaphorical distinction is not absolute)

Now consider the following concern. If science and philosophy and religion are all about truth, can they be altogether insular? Now consider the follow concept

Ideal Religion is the relating of individuals and groups to the entire Universe, their means of knowing and being and negotiating, and involves all modes of knowing and being…

These thoughts are continue in the next two sections The limits of institutional religion and The future of the idea of spirit…

The limits of institutional religion

The section Religion has discussions of the concept and institution of religion; the discussion of the concept included that of an ideal form. Since the issue here is Normal limits, this section addresses institutions and the sub-ideal conceptions of religion

An obvious limits of religion concern the archaic cosmologies

However, the functions include the meaning and the non-meaning. Meaning includes the non-literal as in ‘rising from the dead’ pointing to our limited understanding of death. The non-meaning include social bonding which may be enhanced by literal meaning

The liberal religions continue to struggle with meaning and inherited limits even of metaphorical and symbolic limitation

As an institution whose function is symbolic andor instrumental, religion has clear limitation

The future of the idea of spirit or the ideational form

A subtitle for the section might be—The role of reason, politics and economics in the acceptance of ideational form

An ideational form is a system of ideas that represent the world or part of it; or they assist perhaps even metaphorically in negotiating the world

Discussion here presumes the earlier discussions, first of religion generally and then of the limits of institutional religion

The general role of faith is discussed in chapter Method

Science and religion are examples of ideational form in that they provide a picture of the world or, at least, the base for a partial picture

The mesh of modern economics and ideational forms, e.g. secular humanism, is such that a return to a religious paradigm of the past is difficult to imagine. This difficulty—but not impossibility—is compounded in view of the immense improvement of the political and economic status of the common individual

The future of the ‘ideational form’ may be difficult to anticipate but Universal metaphysics emphasizes the practical necessity of its future evolution… of course the Universal metaphysics requires further realizations of ideational form that may be remote from contemporary thought but whose best expression may be realized in perception

This evolution will be likely though flexibly tied to the evolution of political-economics; truth requires reason but its spread is interwoven with political-economics—the understandings of immediate and ultimate truth may impinge upon one another

The world is not divided into two ‘spheres,’ the sacred and the ideal or ideational and the mundane that includes the political and the economic

A past form is religion. A major present form may be called secular humanism which is some amalgam of science, especially, scientific method and approach, an emphasis on modern economic values that is balanced by an emphasis on human values; elements of religion—taken metaphorically rather than literally; and perhaps some elements of ‘spirituality’

Although the future form may be labeled ‘Religion’ or ‘Ideal form,’ it is not clear or known what the extension of these ideas will be or what the future names will be. It is not clear to what extent the ideas will be pure and to what extent in interaction with action and transformation

This form which has no necessary limits may be called ‘Religion,’ ‘Science,’ ‘secular humanism,’ … or may be so far unnamed

It is commonly thought that the primary source of the ‘demise’ of religion is the ascent of science and reason. Of course, science and reason are not absolute and as we now know in the early years of the twenty first century, religion is not at all dead. Yet there is a fundamental change in attitudes toward religion and in the place of religion in day-to-day life. In Western Europe, the place of religion is at its lowest ebb. On the other hand, there is a new fundamentalism in many places in the world and in a significant portion of these it is a militant fundamentalism. However, even the ascent of the new fundamentalism, religion is not so much woven into daily life as it is an instrument—a refuge, a political instrument…

The reason for the demise of religion as interwoven into daily life is not directly the ascent of reason. It lies, instead in economics and politics. In the new economics and politics, i.e. roughly since the middle ages, the freedom of information and reason has become instrumental. Older economies and politics were bound by tradition and authority. In the newer, the instruments of economics and politics are significantly free and distributed; of course such change is never absolute but even the politically and economically powerful gain by the new arrangements. The new arrangements make traditional belief far less relevant to daily life and this is perhaps the immediate cause of the demise of tradition that include religion. Of course, the new arrangements require reason and information to be immanent in society and are significantly dependent on reason for the transformation. However, it is not the case, as is commonly thought, that the demise of traditional belief is primarily the result of the explicit assault of reason on tradition

Organization and transaction

Economic—Arises on account of scarcity and the institutionalization or pure economics over and above traditional arrangements—the science and art of feasibility or the positive; and the desirable or the Normative

Political—The arrangement of group decision and action

Legal—Coding and implementation whether by value, incentive or—attempt at—enforcement of desirable and efficient institutions and actions including the coding and negative enforcement of the undesirable; where possible we prefer explanations to rules, incentive to enforcement—this is both a value and an estimate of what efficient even though it is admitted that the value colors the present meaning of efficiency… practical persons do what they do but the scholar who praises enforcement is here thought of as the ultimate perverted sycophant to the power broker and his hired bullies. May distinguish ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’

Learning—e.g. the University—Discovery, Transmission regarding Knowledge and other cultural roles, Preservation of learning and culture; play, performance and action are lesser functions

Discovery—New knowledge of existing worlds and knowledge of ‘new’ worlds

Performance—Ritual modeling of culture and world, reality play—learning and creating and preparing, ritual in which the symbol enters the unconscious and the body

The network of institutions

The purpose of this section is to show the logical completeness of a system of institutions. This begins by asking ‘what are societies needs?’ Of course, an estimation of needs may be ad hoc. How can we rise above the mere ad hoc—it is permissible to begin with it—into the realm of necessity? We distinguish survival and continuation needs from meaning; survival and continuation relate to equilibrium and process in interaction with the local context; meaning concerns the approach to the universal (the two realms are not entirely distinct and while the first supports the latter sustains.) That is a logical cover of all being. And the two are sustained by ‘culture;’ culture is the common system, implicit and explicit, of knowing and communication

It is necessary only to see that the system cover all the stated elements—culture itself, and the institutions concerning context and the universal. This is manifest in the division according to people and groups, culture, organization and transaction

Ethics, value

It is clear that whatever ethics is, it concerns choices in cases that options are available. The existence and necessity of degrees of freedom of choice has been demonstrated and explained in the section Freedom. The consistency of the idea of structure and change in an indeterministic Universe and the fact of the indeterministic Universe have been demonstrated in the metaphysics. While reconciling choice and determinism, which requires something like explaining choice away, may be an interesting exercise it—apart from its ideological-political motives—is nothing more than an exercise (except of course that the presence of such arguments is tolerated due to freedom and that those arguments are a spur to refining the argument regarding choice and indeterminism in balance with structure)

In Western thought there is a context of human behavior that is labeled ‘moral’ and, more generally, ‘value.’ The latter includes aesthetics

When this context is separated from the whole of human activity questions such as the concern with deontology versus teleology in ethics—the ethics of right versus the ethics of ends or consequentialism. Essentialism tends to reign and it is either deontology or consequentialism. Of course among the professionals the original question of the isolation of a moral context tends to be left untouched. In the absence of metaphysical clarity the nature of ethics and its contact with other contexts must ever languish in degrees of vague and vaguer clarity

We have seen that ethics and other contexts of human mind—and being—are not separated even though there are proximate distinctions. In thinking of value we explicitly relinquish the habit of substance thinking; morals will not be regarded as a separate institution; there will be an ontology of morals and values but it will not be an ontology that is distinct from Universal ontology—i.e. meta-ethics is not a distinct study even though it may be a study; we will think of ethical concerns in a Universal context; we may be guided by prior ethics but not by its essentialism; we will not be committed to the either or of deontology or consequentialism or to the separation of ethics from e.g. economics; the problems of choice will require balance between ‘warm hearts and cool minds’ but in a context that lies within contours of Universality

Civilization

History and design

Note that history and its significance are discussed in chapter Being

Policy

The state of civilization—an ongoing concern

Modes—impurity, i.e. overlap and ‘interaction’ of institutions

Assessment—the world today—opportunities and problems (and the nature and problem of opportunity and problem and such thinking)

Solutions—

(See Journey in being-politics.html)

…

The Human endeavor and its normal limits

In this section we review the mass paradigms of behavior and thought that have some governance over mass and daily human behavior. One goal is the justification of such paradigms on a limited and practical basis. A second goal is to review their mutual basis with economics—and therefore, via adaptation, their hold and, importantly, the hold that paradigmatic thought has on individuals generally. This hold is of course not Universal and therefore the balance of the ‘liberal’ and the ‘conservative;’ the good of change—since change is good at times and may be necessary for survival at others—in balance with the good of conserving an already adapted system—even if only partially adapted systems

The mass paradigms are examples of Normal human behavior and reveal Normal limits

Another purpose of this section is to show the intrinsic limitations of the mass paradigms. We have seen from the Universal metaphysics that the paradigms must be limited and, of course, common sense suggests probable limits even while it suggests some adherence to a limited system (if it isn’t broken don’t fix it.) However, even in terms of their internal logic the mass paradigms have limits. By showing these limits I intend to nudge individuals from their unconscious acceptance of paradigm into a conscious awareness of paradigm and so into receptivity to the picture of this narrative which is not altogether different from the paradigms but harbors them as degrees of approximation over limited domains. Thinking this way provides a bridge from paradigm to the Universal metaphysics without the necessity to destroy what is useful in the paradigm

These observations permit a comment on the ‘truth’ of systems of faith. We know that religion is subject to abuse and that part of the abuse is dependent on the sway of the absurd; we know that religion may be an opiate but not that it is the opiate. We are also facing the inertia of the institution. However, literal truth is not the only truth and, further, the world presents us with paradox. Eliminating the faith systems does not eliminate paradox. It is probably true that individuals come in different grades of requiring literal accounts as guide and to this fact is appended the further fact that not everyone has the luxury of intelligence-time for analysis which, in the end, is a life-preoccupation. Therefore while I may feel conflict about the character of faith systems I also feel some degree of irresolution regarding their final value

Common and experimental endeavor

An issue—tension between adaptedness and adapting

The categories

Modes of being and knowing and normal their limits

The animal

The animal ‘is’ its contingent or Normal possibilities and limits

Primal holism—early religion-myth, and science

Insofar as these are flowing, limits are tacit

Religion / religion

The limits are discussed earlier in the section The limits of institutional religion

Science / science

Current science has limits

Physics and physical cosmology defines their own limits—at the boundaries of the very small, the simple—and the complex, the distant, and the remote in time. The Universal metaphysics shows that these limits are indeed infinitely limiting; it also shows the limitations of biology in relation to other necessary life forms and their science. Modern psychology is clearly limited with regard to the necessary transformations of Identity

Essential limits of science

Recognizing that our understanding of the nature of science and its processes may change, it follows that any essential limits of science may well be essential limits of human being. There are, however, no necessary limits of human being—even though there are Normal limits

Secular humanism

There are two kinds of limits. The first is general—secular humanism comes nowhere near satisfying all Religious function including the spiritual (which in isolation is rather odd and limited.) Since secular humanism draws from science, a second kind of limit derives from the limits of science

The common human endeavor and its limits

A priori, ultimate limits of the human endeavor are not given. There is today a common though not universal picture within which all mythic and rational schemes are evaluated. What is this picture? It has been emerging at least since the dawn of the enlightenment and, at first, in philosophical thought it concerned how we think of the world—of reality and then, under the growing influence of science it concerned what we think of the world—it’s extent in time and space and its constituents. The combined picture of the how and the what is some incomplete marriage of rational thought and science

Rationalism. ‘Rationalism’ has more than one sense. In a limited but widely used sense, rationalism is the position that the criterion of truth is intellectual and deductive but not sensory or, perhaps less restrictively, that the main criterion of truth is intellectual. In a less limited and diffuse sense, rationalism is any view that appeals to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. Here, rationalism is used in the latter—enlightenment—sense. We may label the common view arising out of standard philosophical thought—admittedly a vague term—and science common rationalism and will hereafter in the immediate discussion call this rationalism. The limits of rationalism on the philosophical, reflective, or intellectual side are the limits of such thought as it is practiced in the dominant paradigms of today. Here we refer to the analytic and Continental traditions. These are analyzed later in discussing Philosophy and metaphysics in the chapter Contribution. The main conclusion of the criticism in that section is that modern western thought is prematurely critical; western thought has rejected real metaphysics for inadequate reasons, i.e. the failure of prior metaphysical systems and the ascent of science. From the failure of prior metaphysics we cannot conclude the failure of all real metaphysics. The present narrative has developed a Universal metaphysics and it is shown that it is both ultimate and empirical; the modern critical attitude is a premature generalization combined with a hasty but inadequate analysis of what it is to be empirical and Logical… Discussion now turns to the question of the ascent of science

Nature of the physical world. Under the influence of Newton the world came to be viewed as mechanistic and this is retained through the twentieth century revolutions in physics although under quantum theory there is some relief from strict mechanism. It remains however, that under a quantum paradigm there is no exception to it and it is not at all clear that the quantum and relativistic paradigms are sufficient to explain all that we see in the world—cosmos, life, and mind. In physical cosmology—from ‘big-bang’ theory—the universe is seen to be roughly 13 billion years old and an equal or greater amount of light years in extent (greater because of the expansion of space itself.) Speculations on bubble universes suggest perhaps much more but still more of the same. There is a lower dimension on sizes or distances and times defined by the limits of experiment and of theory that we can see or currently know on grounds of physical science. However, the fact that the current laws of physical science recognize these intrinsic limits to the laws has no implication that these are limits of being—of the universe. This is one limit of the common paradigm; yet the picture of the physical universe built up from science is taken as an essential part of the common paradigmatic view

Nature of the living world including mind and behavior. Factual knowledge of life is restricted to this world. Theoretical knowledge is primarily that of evolutionary biology and secondarily from functional biology. It seems that these modes provide the best explanation of the origins and nature of the living world including human being and any material foundation of mind. It is clear that the explanations are an immense improvement over what comes from myth and religion. That is not to say that there is no ultimate or metaphorical truth to myth and religion but that myth and religion are not proximate explanations at all. Under myth and religion, complexity—life, thought and behavior—are replaced by or reduced to something of unknown complexity: God. Under science, life thought and behavior are reduced to simple matter and law. Are the explanations complete with regard to life on Earth? They are our best explanations and may be taken as tentatively and practically final but it is clear that not all elements of life are explained, especially mind and behavior; rather it may be paradigmatic that that explanation may be regarded as having been accomplished. Are the explanations complete with regard to life in the entire universe? Because scientific explanation has made inroads into all realms—physical, living, and mental—it finally became commonly accepted in the twentieth century that science provided the boundaries of a common and dominant but not universal picture. Additionally, there are arguments that if we are far from unique, that any intelligent life elsewhere would have already communicated with us. These arguments of course rest on the common picture of the physical universe with regard to extent, nature and kind. Even under these assumptions other civilizations may have had reasons to not communicate with us. Further, even under the paradigmatic physical picture, it is not given that our knowledge of life is definitive. However, it is consistent with physical science that the universe may be infinitely larger than is revealed in physical science. Therefore, only under the tendency to see only what science sees—i.e. under the common paradigm, is it possible to conclude that the common picture defined in its limits by current science has practically reasonable elements but cannot be regarded as rationally necessary. It is important to point out that while the Universal metaphysics shows positively the immensely limited nature of the common paradigm the thrust here has been to show the intrinsic limits of the common paradigm and so to loosen its psychological though not rational sway as psychological preparation for alternate pictures

Human being. What is the picture of human being under science? It is not completely defined. Pictures of the nature of human freedom and the nature of meaning-as-significance that emerge from psychology and philosophy of mind are conditioned by the pictures of the universe and of life from the physical and biological sciences. From the physical sciences, some though not all scientists see the human world as a lonely accident in a material universe and although the thought is not universal it conditions the paradigmatic picture that has been emerging. Biological science tends to confirm a mechanistic view of human being. Mainstream twentieth academic psychology has not focused on a full picture of human being; the focus has been conditioned by a view of science that demands that only observables be admitted into discussion. Psychoanalysis has addressed the nature of human being—here, however, there is no full picture of human being and human limits. Especially under Freud, human freedom is seen as quite limited. However, while Freud’s insights may be profound in their sphere of application, human being is not a simple machine and therefore it is entirely consistent that immense freedom and immense limits should stand side by side

Secular humanism. While science enables a common practical but by no means rationally demonstrated boundary to the extent of the universe in age, size, and variety, the picture is generally regarded by those who accept it—except the most hard headed of positivists—as incomplete with regard to human meaning and the richness of human culture. Secular humanism is a label for the multi-faceted building up of a rich picture on the bare scaffolding of the common bare bones paradigm under science. The picture under secular humanism has explicit components but is and cannot be entirely explicit and is interwoven with our world of cultural, political, economic and other values. Although secular humanism is not the only possible paradigm that lives within the outer bounds of modern science it is perhaps the most common and broadest one in the Western World. Despite its immense appeal it is limited within its own sphere of influence by the limits of its envelope—the scientific side of the paradigm—and its own version of rationalism that accepts the scientific picture even though that picture is at most a practical picture within its domain of application which may itself be immensely limited. It might be argued, however, that the picture from science is the best picture that we have. (Universal metaphysics shows its immense limits but we are here not rationally appealing to that realm of pure necessity)

Myth and religion. Although displaced by the common paradigm under science, myth and religion continue to have immense influence. Of course the metaphorical and other non-literal and non-lexical-meaning functions of religion and myth and other literature are manifest and immense and secular humanism may use such meanings in building up its picture. The common paradigm shows the limits of the common mythic and religious pictures within the realm of the scientific cosmos. That there are adherents to the major religions is testament to the combined force of tradition including social bonding, and, for those who have not thought out the limits of the science based paradigms, some combination of suspicion and desire for something beyond the limits of humanism. If there is something beyond secular humanism—and it is consistent with its rational side even without recourse to pure necessity i.e. Universal metaphysics that there is—then we can see myth and religion as an attempt to see that beyond. Therefore the main criticism of modern religion must be that it builds up, as far as the literal / metaphysical side is concerned, a picture based on a story account that and then defines that picture to be the truth. Therefore, there is a disservice in that we replace the immense possibility of truth with an immensely limited but reassuring picture. We should no longer be defining God by the pictures of Islam or Christianity, by the speculative pantheism of the Vedanta or of the nihilism of Buddhism; instead we should, again setting pure necessity aside, approach the possibility of infinite openness and infinite being without a priori conception

Science and belief. The question arises why, if it they are not rationally-scientifically-empirically necessary, the science based paradigm is taken as truth within whose boundaries all objects of thought must lie. First, of course, science does provide best explanation within the ‘material’ realm (but that realm is the realm defined by science itself.) Certainly, the common rational-scientific picture-paradigm is immensely practical; but here it is not the merely practical that is of concern. The scientific positivists—current science defines reality—therefore hold to a strict scientific paradigm. Second, if we forget the immense limits revealed by reflection and science itself, it is quite possible to think that because it is our most useful practical paradigm, current positive science extends into all reaches of being even though it does not provide a full account of being. Therefore, there is an element of belief among those who hold it for this reason. However, it is not an entirely conscious element of belief. In an earlier era when science had not yet displaced religious metaphysics that may have had sway for want of something universal and better (and also for political-economic reasons,) common belief may have adhered to the religious picture because it was immanent in the culture of the time. Although the underpinnings of the beliefs are different, they have in common that they are held because they are immanent in a culture and because their lack of rational necessity is either suppressed or shielded from common view

 Future of the ideational form

… Discussed under ‘culture’ and just after religion above

II. TRANSFORMATION

Journey

What are the ultimate possibilities of human being and being as such? The Universal metaphysics suggests that the possibilities of human being are the possibilities of being. Metaphysics through Worlds paint a picture of the ultimate nature of the actualities from local experience and exploration to the merging of identity in Universal Identity

Journey emphasizes the process or becoming side of being—it narrates the experiments in transformation. Because the experiments of Journey are in a preliminary stage, it is brief in comparison with the conceptual developments so far.  which are in a preliminary stage. The process approach here is complemented by the approach of the next chapter Being which is realization in the present

This chapter develops a foundation for transformation; it sets up a system of experiments that attempts to be comprehensive while minimal; it narrates the experiments in transformation, trials and achievements so far; and it lays out vision and plans for the future. The system of experiments, the vision and the plans are designed for efficient and effective realization

The development draws from (1) Metaphysics through Cosmology—the limit and variety of being, (2) Worlds—knowledge of the immediate world of human being, (3) The traditions in transformation from shamanism to science, (4) Experience and experiment, (5) Dynamics of being—the application of Method in action

Transformation is an essence of be-ing. In the normal sense, ideas are exciting but are a limited form of transformation. Ideas illuminate the process of transformation but do not do so completely. It is necessary to undertake transformation. However, it is in experience that process and ends are appreciated

The individual experiences the Universal via transformation in identity. In this sense, ideas are perhaps complete—they constitute the subject side of the actual or ‘material’

The Universal metaphysics defines the boundary or envelope of any journey of ideas and transformation. Any idea that lies within Logic has an Object that lies within Logos as Universe

The journey seeks to experience this limit. However, the experience or process is a selective adventure within and at the limit. The metaphysics shows the necessity of this journey but only hints at the way

Infinite variety implies infinite experience and appreciation, it implies an infinite variety of cognition and feeling… and cognition-emotion, and it must also that pain and joy are interspersed without end. Naturally, pain is not sought but it appears that it cannot be avoided. Even though pain may have proximate purposes, realization of the ultimate may require occasional transition through pain

There is no given way. Discovery of ways is part of the adventure

A journey in being

Ideas and transformation

Transformation is the essence of be-ing—the ultimate adventure

As knowledge, ideas are instrumentally essential although not complete; and as experience, ideas are appreciation. Ideas are a form of transformation and adventure

In the tradition, ideas—philosophy, science, literature, and myth and religion—that paint the Universe in grand strokes tend to be limited in their reasoning; ideas that emphasize and are executed according to reason tend to be limited in scope. A journey in ideas has been essential

Ideas and transformation are the modes and means of transformation

Why ‘Journey’?

The way is not given—analogy between the exploration of being undertaken and a journey without fixed path or itinerary or destination. The way would not be linear even if the ultimate were the only goal. The path will go through worlds of being; there will be dead ends and fresh starts; the modes and means are among the ‘ends.’ The individual discovery of the journey is itself a journey

Transformations are essential and not appended to the ideas. Therefore there is a physical journey but even the physical journey is not at all restricted to being geographical

Discovery of the traditions—from shamanism to science is itself a far from linear undertaking

The traditions were found inadequate—ideas and approaches to transformation from the tradition were inadequate to the goal to approach ultimate realization. This inadequacy has been shown—Metaphysics through Worlds—in the demonstration of an ultimate metaphysics that goes beyond received thought and which shows the necessity of ultimate realization. The path taken is a journey in that the instruments of the voyage are required to be improvised and crafted along the way

Doubt and faith—critical doubt and imagination are necessary for constructive thought with demonstration. However, doubt remains; and even without doubt the way would not be given. The attitude most conducive to realization is labeled faith. This faith is not a given faith in fixed system but, perhaps, faith in being

All creation is re-creation… all paths have been traveled before… and yet re-creation is ever fresh—this follows from the Universal metaphysics. Every individual, every culture, each civilization rediscovers its own way. Rediscovery is as good as discovery. There is no patenting of authorship

The journey of an agent who enjoys travel and destination, who relates process to ends which both change in interaction

A principle of the journey—without a journey… without action and transformation, being is incomplete, a shadow…

The narrative form of the essay complements the traditional academic forms. It integrates those forms with the travelogue in an essential way rather than as artifice

The ambition

What are the ultimate possibilities of human being and being as such? Journey in being is an exploration of that question

Scope and process

Originally personal—there is an account of the personal process in Journey—a process that grew into an understanding of the identity of the individual and the Universe and undertook a journey within this ultimate ‘boundary’

Grounded in this world… Intuition and Worlds provide grounding as does insistence on action and transformation

Individual-Universal. An individual journey whose envelope is identity with all being. The essential journey of an individual or society is not a following but a recreation; and all creation is recreation. Universe as process

Immediate-Ultimate. A journey through the immediate to the ultimate

An individual journey: origin and development

The elements of an individual journey

A brief history of the ambitions

Origin of the focus on being

Origin of the Universal metaphysics and the Cosmology of Identity

An individual journey

Method

Dynamics of being

Basis in the Universal metaphysics

The dynamics

Essential concerns of the dynamics of being

Catalytic states and modes of transformation

The catalytic states

Combination with the dynamics

Appendix—History of transformation

Aims of a study of history of transformation — Western systems — Shamanism and other prehistoric systems — Indian systems

Nature of the Object

Development of the dynamic

The transformations

Emphasize: what can be done immediately. Meditation, transformation through practice of thought, concentration, physical activity, mind, and savant… combine with tradition. Society and Machine—assess what’s done so far

Principles. Reflect. Combine with what’s done, e.g. the minimal list, the 21 and their headings… Think: four phases; application of ideas to phases II, III, and IV; application of transformations to phases III, and IV

A minimal system

Four phases:

Main

Ideas

Transformation of being and identity

Secondary

Society and charisma

Experiment and concepts in transformation matter and organism manifest as life and mind

The journey so far—illustrations of the dynamic

Ideas

Identity or being-as-being

Identity — Personality and charisma — Dynamics of mental function — Healing and medicine

Assessment and the way ahead

Investigation in the modes and means of transformation

Ideas

General — Logic — An atemporal metaphysics — Strengthening the relation between Theory of being and science — Foundation of modern physics and biology — Extending modern physics — A quantum or genetic and dynamic theory of laws — An ensemble of laws — Is a quantum theoretic proof of the fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence possible? — Human World — Language, grammatical forms, emotion and will — Social world — Application to other areas of experiment

Being-as-being

Sources — The transformations — Areas of study — The range of experiment: definition — The range of experiment: extension — Plants and their transformational properties — Animal ways

Society and culture

Sources — Transformation — Charisma and influence — Journey

Organic and material being

Sources — Transformations

Narratives and narrative form

Goals — Narratives — Forms — Presentational form — The story — A novel — Automation

Appendix: further possibilities

Cosmology of objects — Logic, reference and the problem of the infinite — Space, time and being — Dynamics of and in social systems — Research topics: transformations of being-as-being — Research topics: social world — Research topics: transformations in organic and material being

The future

Being and becoming—perception and transformation

Being

The aim of Being is realization in the present—in contrast to Journey where the focus was realization of the ultimate via process. There is, therefore, a focus on the meaning of being—in the sense of significance in being

It may be the case that realization in the present has limits. However, these limits are not given and are an aspect of realization

A finite—limited—being may find significance in what is beyond the immediate and in the immediate. What is beyond the immediate is labeled History. Being-in-the-immediate is labeled Pure being

There are, then, perhaps two approaches to realization in the present. In the first, significance in the present is found in the record of the past—i.e. in history: in invoking history, however, there is no insistence on objectivity for the goal is transformation and for that purpose myth and legend are also good. There is of course no insistence of any superiority of either fact versus myth; each is likely to have its own realm of instrumental power and myth and fact may bind together in synergy

That is, a meaning—significance—of history is its suggestive power, the way in which it influences views of ourselves and others: individually and collectively, i.e. as persons, cultures, nations, civilizations… The traditions of history influence the way in which we view our potency in the world

In a second approach significance and realization are sought in being-in-the-immediate. The approach is that of Pure being

An instrumental thought regarding ‘entry into pure being’ is the acceptance of opposites including what is attractive and what is repulsive. How is this instrumental? In not avoiding either—and there is avoidance of the positive—life, i.e. our lives and the world, energy is not lost in avoidance and this opens up to experience of the real; naturally there are practical limits to acceptance of destructive things

I continue to seek transcendence of process

The approach of Being may be seen as preliminary to that of Journey. Perhaps Being will enhance realization without eliminating significance

History

History represents the search for meaning outside the immediate. History may be thought of as—a sense of—connection in relation, i.e. across or through space and time

Therefore any substance or essentialist view of history is avoided. An essentialist view is a limited notion in combination with a commitment to that notion and a commitment against any complementary or contrary notions. Therefore, the avoidance of essentialism allows the notion as well as others, i.e. it allows the occasional appearance of essentialism

As noted earlier there is no ultimate meaning to history outside all history—just as there is no meaning to or of being in any ultimate outside

Therefore we find in history what significance we may; in some sense—in that history can never be complete—there is no objectivity to history; but in this sense there is no ultimate significance to objectivity in history and any goal of objectivity is founded in significance

Therefore history represents our common stories and myths with objectivity as one story

What is history?

Vision

Transformation

History in the light of being

Pure being

The idea

A world and therefore meaning unmediated by substance

A problem

No crystal purity or avoidance of proximate death

If there is no ultimate death, it need not be avoided—it is impossible to avoid what does not exist

Attraction and repulsion

Ever present

Wonder without crystal purity; or the way to ‘purity’ lies through not avoiding all things ‘impure’

Pure being

Is therefore in the union of these opposites

III. METHOD

Method

Introduction

Prerequisites to reading this chapter

The reader who has not absorbed the material of Intuition and Metaphysics will lack essential background to this chapter. The material of Worlds is necessary to the understanding of the treatment of special disciplines. The material of Objects and Cosmology will helpful to understanding

Readers will profit from some acquaintance with the histories of the modern academic disciplines and their methodologies

The idea of method

The idea of method in the history of thought

The origin of method

When solving problems common features of solution may be noticed. Features of solution that may be common to problems may be referred to as method or methodological

Method in relation to knowledge. Development and validation

The issue of concern here is knowledge. Can we discern elements of method in the development of knowledge? From the significance of knowledge, the questions of how to develop and validate knowledge arise. These questions are the concern of method as that term is used here

Method includes algorithm but is far from algorithm. Method as guide to creativity and realism

Given that ‘development’ is concerned with what is new, it is not expected that there shall be a general recipe or algorithm

Philosophy

Here philosophy is synonymous with general thought regarding the Universe developed imaginatively and critically with reference to ideas or concepts and experience and especial reference to the imaginative and critical use of the history of ideas. It is hardly to be expected that a general approach let alone algorithm should emerge in so general an endeavor. However, some features may be established

No external foundation, i.e. no substance

It is surprising that substance should be so strong in the history of metaphysics. While there are aesthetic reasons that motivate substance—economy and simplicity: a single unchanging and uniform substance as the source of all variety and change—and there appears to be scientific support for substance—the immense power of the materialist or matte-energy paradigm, a little reflection should doom the idea of substance as universal explanation. The issue is treated at some length in Metaphysics where it is remarked that the Universal proscription of substance is not a logical ban on local-practical use of substance as in science and other endeavor

Since philosophy concerns the entire world or Universe, it is not expected that there can be any external foundation for general philosophical development. This is a source of the Universal proscription of substance—what is the foundation of substance itself. We may therefore think that no foundation is possible at all. This thought is encouraged by the rough demonstration in the narrative that no substance theory of being is tenable

As it turned out, foundation without substance is possible—and accomplished in Metaphysics

The non-foundation in ‘something’ else though not emphasized in early Western Philosophy is emphasized by some modern thinkers especially the early twentieth century analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in response to his criticism of his own earlier attempt at a substance foundation in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of 1921

Foundation in this world

Substance has an appeal noted earlier. The earliest substances were stuff-like, e.g. the first philosophical substance theory of Thales that posited water as the stuff of the world. Water may have been suggested by its pervasion and importance, the appeal is that in contrast to myth and religion water is of this world and—apparently—simple

However, substance is untenable

Therefore consider every being or region of being as its own explanation. What this appears to lose in simplicity, it gains in obviousness; what it appears to lose in explanatory power, it gains in removing need for explanation; it gains immediacy; it cannot be ‘wrong’

There is a movement in philosophy that eschews explanation—especially explanation of the scientific type. The foundation in being achieves the aim of this movement

It is therefore perhaps astonishing that it is via being—that which is common to every being—that the Universal metaphysics has been attained. On reflection, it is perhaps not so astonishing since it is gained by abstraction and after its ultimate depth has been achieved, depth is seen to be immediate as built in at start; and after ultimate breadth has been achieved as a very real achieved, further work must be—and has been—done

Concepts

Concepts have been regarded as the language of philosophy. This is a strength but is also regarded as a weakness—it makes philosophy limp in comparison to other endeavor e.g. art, history, religion, and music

Extension to concept as mental concept brings philosophy to life

What is the relation to science? Where science employs experiment does not philosophy employ experience? Do not both philosophy and science employ concepts? The difference is not only in the tools but also in the aim. Whereas science is concerned with validity by any means, philosophy is concerned with truth as validity. Therefore if science is able to explain domains of natural phenomena by particles or fields of undescribed nature it is of lesser concern if the particles are not precisely known or if they are not ultimate or atomic entities; in philosophy the concern with the nature of the particles is important. Perhaps because science goes to a current ultimate in its own domain and because philosophy cannot exceed science in that domain, science and philosophy have become separate. But the division is not as absolute as it has been made out to be. The criteria of utility and validity are not precisely the same and their realizations are manifest—validity as success, validity as truth and so on—but the differences define continua. See for example the later considerations regarding whether the Universal metaphysics is science

Metaphysics—foundation by abstraction of the necessary Universal Objects in intuition

However, as we have seen some foundation is possible—a foundation that does not go beyond or outside being (there is no outside) but remains within being. It is not expected that all knowledge should receive absolute foundation but perhaps, we thought roughly and allegorically at outset, there are some Objects that are so simple that they may be known with precision. It turns out that there are some such Objects—the necessary Objects—and, further, that a system of Universal Necessary Objects may be found that provide foundation for a Universal metaphysics

Two pillars—History of thought. Reflexive avoidance of the habit of Substance thinking

In any such development if we are facing the world with only ‘my experience’ we may find ourselves floundering for lack of support. Two pillars provide support. The first is the history of thought. The ideas from the history of philosophy are useful; even when inadequate they remain suggestive. I have learned much from taking on, e.g. the mind-matter or mind-body problem, as conceived in prior thought; this problem is first of general metaphysical interest and, second, its analysis affords a number of conceptual clarifications that are useful in development of the metaphysics. Kant’s use of intuition has also been useful even though the concept of intuition in this narrative is significantly more inclusive than Kant’s notion and the present use of it is quite different from that of Kant.  Many examples from philosophy that have provided an education to my thought and the developments of this narrative could be cited. Science, too, has been immensely useful. The reader will notice that the development of the metaphysics through the disciplinary studies in Worlds derive much from science and analogy with scientific theories. In the general developments which do not depend on science for foundation or data, science provides analogy which may be generalized and then subject to critical analysis. Some of the developments in general cosmology would hardly even have been conceived without modern philosophical cosmology as metaphor. In the disciplinary studies science may provide the first version of a theory which may then be subject to conceptual analysis in light of the Universal metaphysics (details in Worlds and the section Applied metaphysics of Metaphysics.) The second pillar the one that is against the habit of substance thinking. The injunction is applied reflexively. We are against substance thinking at outset; however to be against substance as a universal prescription is a form of substance thought. Examples of such second order substance thinking arise in critical philosophies that are criticisms that are in light, e.g., of a certain paradigm of philosophical thought and therefore apply in so far as those paradigms are philosophy: philosophy should not be paradigmatic at outset for we are without foundation and it should not clutch any particular paradigm as though it were thought. Further, as we have noted philosophy is not only about knowing but it is also about acting; it is not one or the other but each may be emphasized on different occasions (the action aspect is more general and includes the knowing side.) The second pillar, therefore, is constructive in using imagination and history and critical in not accepting, e.g. a metaphysics, until and when the emerging ideas show their own truth

Foundations of the disciplines

Modern and recent philosophy has been concerned with the foundations of the modern academic disciplines. Some disciplines are taken up below

Metaphysics and epistemology have been prominent in such foundational investigations. As a result of critical thought especially with Hume and Kant and then later with Wittgenstein, epistemology has figured more prominently in later modern and recent periods. Recently metaphysics has made inroads, especially formal metaphysics and a metaphysic of experience. The present development returns metaphysics to central status but not at the expense of epistemology for it shows the two to not be distinct disciplines (in more than one way.) The Universal metaphysics has vast implication for epistemology as developed in Intuition, Metaphysics and Objects which in turn have implications for Cosmology and the local disciplines developed in Worlds

Logic and mathematics

There are numerous algorithms to provide exact and approximate results in logic and mathematics e.g. Gaussian elimination for solving systems of linear equations

Observations on algorithm

However, even in what are perhaps the most precise of symbolic systems—logic and mathematics—the important problems have no algorithm. That they have no algorithm is part of what makes them significant. Additionally there is no algorithm to develop algorithms in logic or mathematics

There have been hopes for knowledge algorithms in general but if we are truly engaged in discovery or development we should not hope for that kind of method (algorithm)

However there may be suggestions and parts may be or seem as though there are algorithm

Logic as mold rather than algorithm

Even use of logic to prove a theorem in mathematics is not so much an algorithm but a mold that a proof, once discovered, must fit. The problem in mathematics is not only that of demonstration of a result or the establishment of a branch of mathematics but the insight into what results are worth proving and what branches are worth establishing on account of their significance and probable truth

Scientific method

The significance of ‘scientific method’ in discussing methods that arise from the present narrative is not that we import some formulations of it but that what we read and reflect regarding scientific method may be instructive

A modern formulation of scientific method

From early post-agricultural times thinkers have sought a scientific method—e.g., a modern formulation, the hypothetico-deductive model which may be written as a process (1) Gather data, (2) Formulate an hypothesis that explains the observations, (3) Deduce a consequence (consequences) and formulate and conduct an experiment (experiments) that tests whether the consequence occurs, (4) If experiment agrees with the deduced consequence, go to item 3 but if not go to 2

Discussion

The actual situation is more elaborate and may involve communities of researchers; and the consequence and experiment phases include application. The steps constitute no algorithm but may instead be seen as guidelines that incorporate both creativity and realism. Step 3 is deduction and may use the mold of logic andor mathematics; however not insignificant creativity may be involved having insight into what to prove and how to prove it (even though it has been called puzzle solving by Thomas Kuhn.) Step 1 is not mere gathering of data—science does not operate in a vacuum; existing ideas and theories may hint or suggest where to look and for what we may want to look—but imagination is also needed; and gathering data and experiments (step 3) are not distinct. The entire process is rather non-linear with tinkering alterations of hypotheses conducted to agree with data and while there are the occasional and celebrated dramatic experiments there may also be tinkering experimentation. Step 4 is not as clear cut as it may seem for if there is agreement, it is often desirable for confirmation and reconfirmation by other experimenters; and disagreement may suggest looking at both experimental and deductive processes for errors

Creativity in science

It is the second step (hypothesis formulation) that is often associated with scientific creativity—there may be multiple hypotheses involved in formulating a scientific theory such as Newtonian mechanics or a theory of evolution

Induction—a method for scientific creativity?

A number of thinkers have reflected on whether there is a method to hypothesis or theory formation. In an attempt to see this process on par with deduction it has been called induction. Induction is the formulation of laws or systems of laws that explain—agree with—the data. In the early history of science, i.e. before we became familiar with scientific revolutions in which older theories were discarded in favor of new ones, it was sometimes thought that the process of induction was necessary process of conclusion from data to theory and it was sought to establish it the nature of this necessary process as one that would stand on par with the necessity of deduction

Why was a method for scientific creativity sought?

Why should this have been sought if theories are essentially systems of hypotheses? From the significance of science a method may have been thought to be useful. Note, however, the often remarked view from this essay that deep concerns and algorithmic method are not consistent. There may be suggestions / guidelines but perhaps at the deeps of knowing there is not even guide—this is borne out by, e.g., the development of the Universal metaphysics

It was the success of science itself that lent credence to the belief that the theories of science were necessary—from its formulation to mid-nineteenth century Newtonian mechanics was successfully applied to a vast array of phenomena and this resulted in it being thought that the mechanics had captured truth. If the mechanics was necessary, surely its proof must be necessary

Hume’s withering criticism of a logic of induction

The philosopher Hume swept away the thought that induction is necessary and his proof is essentially simple—from a data set that is smaller than the set or space of application of a theory there can be no necessary induction of a theory. Later, the emergence of scientific revolutions brought home the truth of Hume’s criticism of the necessary truth of scientific theories. Later, Kant attempted to re-found science from the axiomatics of the Aristotelian logic, to the geometry of Euclid and the mechanics of Newton

Kant and a local restitution of induction

Kant’s ideas have been reviewed earlier in the narrative and while we found, as is commonplace, that his re-foundation does not stand if scientific theories are regarded as universal we will see below that there is some good standing when the theories of science are regarded as local

Neither Kant nor his contemporaries and successors held his philosophy of knowledge to be ‘local.’ The local interpretation is developed in this narrative

Interpretations of scientific revolutions—Overturning of tentative Universal theories vs. Going beyond factual local theories

What happens in a scientific revolution, e.g. from Newtonian mechanics to the mechanics of the special or general theories of relativity? The earlier successes of Newton’s mechanics do not become ‘wrong.’ Instead the newer theory reveals that the earlier theory is an approximation and that in the domain where the early theory is good the two theories have close agreement. However, there is a larger domain in which the only the new theory provides agreement with data. This suggests strongly that even the newer theory will have limits even though those limits may as yet be undiscovered. However, it is not logically ruled out that a final theory may be discovered even though it is not clear how it would be shown that any tentative final theory of science or physics is necessarily the final theory

The Universal metaphysics is a final theory but even though its truth is necessary and significant it is not scientific in that it cannot not be disconfirmed by experiment; however it would be disconfirmed by a final ‘theory of everything’ that did not allow the variety of the metaphysics. However, the Universal metaphysics is about the world in that it is derived not by speculation but first by extreme abstraction from the world and then by abstraction of what may suffer distortion, e.g. a metric over space and time but retains what is not capable of distortion e.g. the fact where is obtains of space and time

Thus Universal metaphysics and theoretical physics are distinct in that the former applies to a vastly greater variety while latter applies to a greater level of detailed precision. Both disciplines have application; the applications of theoretical physics are well known; the present narrative has developed application of the Universal metaphysics and shown potential application in theoretical physics. However, there is a root level at which the distinction disappears regardless of the labels ‘science’ and ‘metaphysics’

Returning to the mechanics of Newton we may say that it does not apply to the entire universe of known phenomena. In that sense we can say that it is wrong. I.e., Newtonian mechanics is invalid as a universal mechanics. However, there is a domain of observed phenomena so far regarding which it is definitely right (can define the mechanics such that it should apply with reasonable precision.) Now, with Hume, we can reasonably but not logically claim that the mechanics applies even a microsecond into the future. Still it remains a fact in its domain which is restricted to the past

Irreducible faith

Additionally, the stability that is built into the applicability of the mechanics is roughly the same kind of stability that is the condition of our being. Given that stability as a single axiom or assumption, there is a domain that includes future times and interpolations of phenomena over which the mechanics of Newton is a fact. Though this fact is not true from logic it is just as good for without the stability axiom nothing has significance. Still there is an element of faith in the assumption of the axiom. This is a real meaning of faith which stands in contrast to the faith in what should seem absurd that is religious fundamentalism. The fact that this faith is not purely logical gives us not even any existential dilemma for our own death and other limits provide a dilemma of greater significance (which the theory of identity brings down from its absolute status but does not remove its significance)

No absolute logic of induction—or need for such a logic

It remains true, however, that there is no absolute logic to the discovery of a theory such as Newtonian mechanics. Despite all the suggestions—economy of hypotheses, beauty of the scientific theory, and statistical interpretations of validity there appears to be an irreducible element of creativity in the discovery of theories

Some elements of a history of scientific method

Elements of scientific method arise early in the post-agricultural history of human thought—see, e.g., History of scientific method - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. There are contributions from Egypt and ancient Greece—Plato is among the contributors to the tradition. Egyptian texts parallel the ‘empirical method’ and the Greeks engage in early forms of science. The following names also occur in a History of scientific method—Aristotle, Ibn al-Haytham, Al-Biruni, Avicenna, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Newton, John Stuart Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn. Aristotle emphasizes empiricism as well as induction of primary premises from which results may be derived in a finite chain of reasoning (Aristotle also formalized a logic—the syllogism—that stood for 2000 years as the logic.) The list of names includes those whose primary interest was science, others whose thought was mainly philosophical. Although it is possible to outline the method of science, e.g. the four steps above, a methodology can be provided in greater detail and may vary according to discipline. The range of thought provides numerous reflections that may be helpful when concerned with issues such as the nature of science—e.g., the following thought from Newton, ‘To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a little with certainty, and leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things.’ The inclusion of Arabic thinkers such as Ibn al-Haytham and Al-Biruni is interesting because early textbook histories of science and its method tend to emphasize Greek and European thought. If we did not know that ‘Avicenna’ is the Latinized form of ‘Ibn Sina’ we might not recognize that the physician-philosopher and polymath and ‘foremost philosopher of his time’ was Persian. The history also shows origins of what we may take for granted today, for example Galileo’s emphasis on mathematics in physical science at a time when the role of mathematics was neither widespread nor obvious. Given the intertwining development of science and mathematics, especially since the sixteenth century, it is hardly surprising that there was a time when mathematics did not—and could not have—figured prominently in scientific method. Since this is not a treatise on scientific method, interested readers are referred to other sources, e.g. the Wikipedia article on scientific method for further details. The story is one of philosophy of method and science developing in interaction. A scientific method may be stated in a phrase—hypothesis and test. On reflection this formulation suggests what we know—there is no external foundation and this, in addition to all the positive prescriptions from the history of science, is an important element of what we learn from the history. As a result we see reflection method range from agnosticism to strident positivism to careful hypothetico-deductive formulation. A modern emphasis, made possible by the emergence of large institutions of science, is the study of science as institution—the sociology of science. Kuhn and Popper are remarkable in that their work in the twentieth century appears after the idea of scientific revolutions had already become established. As a result their ideas tended to anti-realism of scientific theories and emphasized their tentative nature—according to Popper a scientific theory cannot be verified but may be shown to be false. The anti-realist sentiment however is unnecessary—as is shown in this discussion the displaced and ‘falsified’ theory is false in the sense of being universally applicable but still has a domain of phenomena over which it is valid (in referring to phenomena-as-appearance we avoid the issue of the gap between concept and Object—which issue we do not need to address since we are not arguing that science is metaphysics)

The idea of method in this development

Method: validation and development

In the present narrative, Method concerns what has been done—development and validation of the metaphysics and of the special studies taken up in Worlds. Method is not at outset a prescription regarding how to do other studies

We will divide this ‘method’ into validation which shall be called method and creative development which is treated in the section A guide to creative processes

Given the Universal scope of the metaphysics, there is no other case therefore no general prescription

However some methods and elements of method do fall out—the evaluation of science (above,) Logic (earlier,) and religion (in Worlds)

There are elements of method regarding the disciplines—but these are not algorithmic; rather they are guidelines. This is to be expected for the disciplines—even as extended according to the methods outlined in Applied metaphysics—do not altogether transcend the realities of scientific method

Generally we expect no algorithmic method of creative development. There are of course suggestions. The developments here are rich with suggestion

Observations on religion.

It may be worth repeating that there is no universal evaluation of religion. Religions are multifunctional and have dysfunction. Dysfunction itself is not invalidating. In the largest of realms the meaning of validity is not clear. The functions of religion concern metaphysics and wonder; and morals and society; the idea that overlap with politics is dysfunction is not a necessary truth. The idea of religious freedom is strange from the perspective that truth is sought for the religious metaphysics seem to be more about belief than truth. Perhaps what ought to be free is experimentation with metaphysics rather than widespread belief. The value to religious freedom is rather negative even if significant—it prevents persecution but it is still a good question to ask why close to absurd beliefs should be tolerated intellectually as though they were more than beautiful metaphor and why they should not be ridiculed intellectually when they are taken for fact for there is strangeness to the thought that a belief should pronounce its own sacredness and use that sacredness to argue against intellectual ridicule. However, the absurd is mixed with the sublime. Not all religions have absurd metaphysics—e.g., Buddhism which in its original form eschews most metaphysics except the negative ‘commandment to do no metaphysics.’ And religions are historical events; the meaning of a metaphysics may be that there is a universe beyond the mundane and the world of matter and science and of the older dysfunctional religion. The intuition of the incompleteness of our secular knowledge has been established with spectacular success and in spectacular degree by the Universal metaphysics. Perhaps the best that can be said of the Abrahamic religions is that they have generic metaphysical truths of beauty and wonder; that they provide ethical codes of some value; that they have dysfunction but they continue on in function and dysfunction because they are sufficiently functional and sufficiently socially binding. We have seen that every scripture must subject to Logic but not to our science have an Object somewhere and somewhen in the Universe but that this gives almost no credence to the truth of scripture on our Earth in our cosmos

Because I have a sympathetic attitude toward it, the reader may feel surprise that I express critical thoughts regarding religion. There is no paradox. The sympathy is a product of the counter that religion provides to the empty secular view and my attempt to respect all people. My criticism that the religious are often closed to real truth and to others who seek truth

Religion is of interest in that it provides an example of ‘knowledge’ in interaction with action. In one way of looking at religion in practice is that it refers to a phase in which literary imagination is well developed but knowing has not yet separated from action—religion has roots in the era of myth and the strength of its appeal has not given way to a science that as has been is silent regarding metaphysics. Perhaps the best alternative to the modern forms of religion is one of metaphysical experimentation which would be conceptual experimentation and criticism—there may be actual consequences that could be compared with the real—within the framework of Intuition through Cosmology and supplemented by Worlds

Stuff begins

Origins

While working on the ideas, I noticed the absence of prior paradigms for my mode of reflection. It became manifest that my thought was concerned with establishing method as well as content. It became apparent that method and content emerge together but that method emerges at a slower pace perhaps because it is abstracted from examples of—first order—content. Perhaps because of this slower emergence and perhaps because of its greater difficulty—it is thought about thought, i.e. second and higher order thought—the springs of method are as if invisible—method takes on the cloak of the a priori

Scope and depth

The content of the ideas is sufficiently novel and outside received paradigms that novel method was required. Method turns out to be an aspect of content—discovery and so on lie in the Universe—and therefore method and content are coeval. The shrouds of mist that typically seem to veil the origin of method (e.g., logic) have cleared up in the development. Naturally, then, the developments in method have ultimacy with regard to depth and scope. In this chapter, the standard methods of deduction and induction will be seen to fall under Method

On the character of method

Method is not algorithmic. It is how we did it but not how everything can be done. Naturally, there are hints for application. In some cases there may be prescription and algorithm. This is not the general case. The inductive approach of science, for example, is far from algorithmic

Plan for the chapter

This chapter collects and formalizes the developments in method; it places received method within the present development

Principle of the approach regarding the necessary Objects

The principle of the approach is that both content and method are placed within intuition; neither is taken as a priori; Objects that satisfy the following dual criteria are sought: sufficient simplicity that perfect faithfulness results, sufficiently universality that a Universal metaphysics inclusive of method results. The result has been seen: the Universal metaphysics whose empirical Objects found the metaphysics and whose conceptual Object, Logic, enables further demonstration and derivation. While the Logic is a defined Object, it is approximated by the logics and is therefore far from empty

Enhancement regarding practical Objects

Applied metaphysics, the Normal world, and disciplinary studies. An enhancement of the method is the Applied metaphysics: the framing and enhancement of practical knowledge by the Universal metaphysics: (1) Because there are analogs of the practical Objects in the metaphysics—i.e. the metaphysics frames practical knowledge, (2) By enabling analysis of the fundamental elements of the practical knowledge as or in terms of absolutely fundamental Objects, and (3) By encouraging revision of the conceptual elements of the practical systems in light of the metaphysics

Summary

In summary, method and content arise together; both are taken out of the realm of the a priori and therefore of mystery but not out of wonder

Induction and necessity

The developments have also been an occasion for reflection on and development of some ideas on ‘induction’ which is the ‘method’ of adequate hypothesis formation, i.e. of creative thought that are here labeled A guide to creative processes. These are seen to be formally empty: pattern recognition is the recognition of fact. They are also formally empty because while there are suggestions, there is no algorithm for creative thought. The central idea is ‘reflexivity’ which is the cross interaction of all elements of construction, criticism and content; the latter includes experience and received knowledge. Although induction over infinite data is tentative, the negative judgment of Hume is not universal for (1) the necessary Objects of the Universal metaphysics are known faithfully in part because they are finitary and (2) the Universal metaphysics has certain necessities

Method

Here, method is related to knowledge

What is method and what is its function?

Function of knowledge—negotiation and appreciation

Knowledge is an instrument of negotiation and appreciation of the world

Negotiation includes technology

Method and its function

The function of method is determined by the role and development of knowledge. From its role, the significance of knowledge derives from validity

Since appreciation has an aesthetic dimension, aesthetics in symbolic form sometimes substitutes for validity. Aesthetics has forms that do not involve claims to knowledge—as aesthetic this is of course valid the aesthetic form is often invalidly confused with the form of knowledge. If an aesthetic form is a knowledge claim then it is empty without validity as knowledge. It appears and has emerged from the development of the narrative—the claims regarding the nature of ‘fiction’—that valid knowledge claims have high degrees of aesthetic perfection. Perhaps however the thought that valid knowledge is maximally aesthetic is not universal

Therefore the functions of method concern the development and validation of knowledge. From these concerns it does not follow that method can be developed as a universal algorithm. To the extent that problems from different disciplines may be similar, it follows that methods may involve general suggestions and guidelines

From its success knowledge must have some validity

Because we have some success in negotiation of the world, our knowledge must have some validity

If knowledge had no validity, we would not have the words ‘knowledge’ or ‘knowing.’ The existence of the words suggests that knowledge must have some validity

Success is an implicit and gross measure of validity

However, this does not tell us what knowledge is valid and in what measure, i.e. it does not tell us how we may ascertain validity. Further, it does not even tell us what validity is

Origin of the idea of method in the origin and validation of knowledge

Since our knowledge is a mixture of received and developing knowledge, we would like to know (1) how knowledge is developed and (2) how its validity is determined

The problems of method are (1) the development of knowledge and (2) determination of the validity of knowledge. Although these aspects of method are stated separately, they need not be—entirely—separate in the practice of knowledge

We therefore ask, first, What is knowledge or knowing?

Knowledge and its framework

Nature of knowing in relation to the world

The world has structure and process. The structure and shape is of the world, not in our minds / brains. An initial notion—in having knowledge we have some kind of map or representation of the world

Primitive knowledge not entirely separated out from action (success)

Since knowledge and knowing are instruments of negotiation we may say that they occur in interaction with the negotiating—i.e., knowing and acting are in interaction. Originally, perhaps, knowing and acting are not separate

To talk of knowledge there must be some separation from action

However, there is a degree of separation otherwise we would perhaps not talk of knowledge. And while we have concern with validity, there is some perhaps basal level at which knowing and acting are not separated; at this level what is known is the result of prior adaptation and, though possessed of validity, the idea of validation has no sense. Still we live in a realm in which we have concern with the validity of some of our knowledge and that includes both received and developing knowledge

A first measure of validity may be success

In perception I see the lay of the land and I begin to walk down a path; the path is there and I am walking on it and not falling through it or veering off it. Since I don’t fall through I think there is some validity to my perception of the ground; Since I don’t veer off I think there is some validity to my perception of the path. I trust the knowing of my perception (but on account of error, limits to perception, illusion and so on I do not trust it entirely; and while I can improve on perception by instrument even these have error and limits and distortion.) In extending knowledge, we use (higher) concepts to conceive new terrain, new kinds of Objects—e.g., as in science and philosophy. There are various tests that we can perform in science and philosophy—experimental and conceptual. The conceptual tests are at root logical and of the kind an apple cannot be green and not green—and are thus a kind of empirical test. The experimental are comparisons with the world. Success is the measure

Success as validity leaves validity indefinite and provides no insight into validation

This however gives us confidence but does not tell us whether the knowledge in question is valid or to what degree—precision and accuracy are restricted to a domain of phenomena—or what validity is

To address the issue of validity, a model or picture of knowledge is required

Knowledge as concept and Object

Introductory comments on concept-Object

In as much as knowledge is in the mind / brain, it is at least roughly some kind of replica. The concept-Object model has a natural character even though the concept may be nothing like the Object—i.e., if we had a scan of the brain while the individual perceives a mountain there need be nothing like the mountain that obviously emerges from the scan. This is of course not practically important because the individual has a concept of the world and its Objects and these are all in his or her mind and for him or her both Objects and relations (which are also Objects) are concepts

And we know that these have degrees of validity but we still do not have purchase on degree of validity or what validity is

However, with the notion of concept and Object we can talk of validity as faithfulness of the concept to the Object. It is clear that this faithfulness is not, e.g. a 1-1 correspondence of a geometrical Object to a geometrical brain-Object that is the concept or a color-Object to a color brain-Object. There is some kind of rough function that maps world to brain and even though it does not give us faithfulness it permits us to talk of faithfulness as validity. We have seen in Intuition various refinements regarding the notion of concept and Object that clarify the notions and their relations. These do not need to be repeated for we are not going to rely on them

Validation via foundation

To develop the approach to validity used here we shall talk first about a standard approach to establishing faithfulness. This is the approach via foundation

Foundation as given fact and derivation from given fact

A standard approach via foundation establishes certain facts as given and derives other facts from them. There are two modes of derivation

Deduction

The first is deduction that proceeds via logic and is regarded as necessary

Induction

The second is induction which is, roughly, generalization and therefore, even when immensely successful, does not have guaranteed validity even if the base facts are true. Induction is therefore regarded as provisional or hypothetical—there are other inductions, e.g. laws, that describe the given facts or data equally well but not all of these laws will survive discovery of new facts

Induction as perception of patterns—i.e. as seeing fact: theories as fact

We have seen, however, that there is an alternative viewpoint regarding induction in general and science and scientific method in particular. That a scientific theory describes a significant given domain of phenomena is not what is in doubt; what is doubted is that it will universalize—to larger regions of space and time, to higher ranges of energies, to greater levels of detail—the molecular, the atomic, the sub-atomic and so on, to the cracks between the data points and so on. There is some domain for which the theory is a fact even if a complex fact such as a law or pattern—even if the domain is nothing more than the set of data points (we doubt that a robust scientific theory is limited to the data so far and even though it appears to be logically possible it is reasonable that the probability is zero that in so far as it is valid that Einstein’s theory of relativity applies to no more than the data so far. How this fact or pattern is arrived at is important and involves creativity but this is not important in the present discussion. I.e., the various debates regarding scientific method that have occupied the last few centuries may be seen as rather peripheral to or perhaps a small corner of the present development. This may be put another way. Facts are important in the present development but science and induction—e.g. perceiving patterns—are subsumed under fact

Knowledge founded in fact and logical deduction

Thus knowledge is founded in and develops as fact and deduction from fact. Deduction is logic and this is regarded as precise and perfect

Question of the foundation of fact

Therefore the primary question appears to concern the foundation of fact

Question of the foundation of logic (often suppressed outside investigation of logic itself)

Of course we should also enquire regarding the validity (and nature) of logic for What is the foundation of logic? The concern regarding logic is valid and must be answered

It will be seen that Logic too emerges from development (together with the development of  the Universal metaphysics) and may be subsumed under fact

It will turn out that logic too emerges from the development and it too may be subsumed under fact (in the next paragraph however logic is not presumed to lie under fact.) It will turn out that both fact and logic are tentative, empirical, and subject to incomplete faithfulness and error. But a pure realm that is of this world and no other will be identified regarding fact and logic—the Universal metaphysics of ultimate depth and variety. This frames the world of practical Objects including logic. However, it is more than a framing for it provides enhancements in foundation and variety of the practical Objects in the direction of intrinsic limits that are achieved in some cases

Discussion now resumes the standard foundation of factual knowledge

What then is the foundation of factual knowledge? The standard method of foundation is to refer the complex welter of world facts to simple facts and to see the welter as a system of compound facts. This has the immediate problem of the foundation of the simple facts. In substance theory in its extreme form a single unchanging and uniform ‘substance’ is single real thing of the world and from it emerges all variety and change

Problem of substance in the standard foundation

What is the foundation of the substance? It is posited. From science we inherit a paradigm of world as matter and we may then argue that matter is the single substance. We have seen in passage after passage that this viewpoint is fraught with problems. However, the first essential problem of materialism is the essential incompleteness and lack of foundation of science which shows that materialism is at most merely posited (as far as foundation is concerned)

Logical concern regarding the standard foundation

The second problem is more serious—it is essentially logical. For substance theory to have sense, the variety and change of the welter of the world must arise deterministically but from a uniform unchanging thing there can be no deterministic origin of variety and change. The history of foundation of knowing in terms of something else—a set of base facts—is history of failure

Note that introduction of multiple substances provides no relief from these problems except in the case that the number of substances equals the numerical variety of being and in this case a substance is no foundation but is another word for ‘a being’

Relativist alternative to the standard foundation

The alternative is a relativist theory or ‘foundation’ of knowledge (here no relation to the theory of relativity in physics is intended by the use of ‘relativist.’) A relativist theory is one in which there may be a tentative foundation but any foundation is always referred to another. I.e., the referring is without end. This is unsatisfactory in that infinite regress in ‘foundation’ violates the intention in seeking foundation. In any case these appear to be the alternatives: a non-relativist theory founded in some kind of substance or a relativist theory without foundation

Thus relativism appears to provide no foundation. Perhaps there is an infinite sequence of referring that may be founded step-wise but, again, according to what principle? The ostrich principle perhaps! Therefore relativism appears to be an admission of ignorance andor a cry for help

It has been shown in this narrative that foundation without substance is possible

As seen earlier the Universal metaphysics has foundation without substance. How is this possible?

Intuition

An essence of foundationalism is to posit substance

The essence of foundationalism is to posit a foundation, e.g. substance. There will of course be good reasons to posit the substance—since the world is immediately mediated via mind, mind is suggested as substance; since matter appears to be the character of the immediate world and since science appears to reveal matter as the nature of the cosmos, matter is suggested as substance

But substance theory is untenable

However, (1) there is no derivation of the substance and (2) substance theory runs into inescapable difficulty

Therefore at outset we retract all foundation and claims to foundation

Therefore at outset we retract all foundation and claims to foundation. If there is foundation we will let it emerge rather than determine analysis. We do not posit any aspect of foundation. We know that substance—external foundation or foundation in terms of something else will not work (except that we may find some ‘thing’ that we could call substance but will be rather different from the defining characteristics of substance as uniform, unchanging and deterministic)

Intuition will be the vehicle for a priori retraction of all positive and negative knowledge claims

Why intuition?

Since the first mode of knowing is intuition, intuition will be the vehicle for the retraction of claims. The idea of intuition as used here has been developed in Intuition and there is no need to repeat that development. We will retract all knowing of the concept-Object kind under intuition since intuition includes the concept-Object mode. We know that intuition has some degree of faithfulness but make no outset claims for it—or against it even though we have both confidence and doubt regarding intuition

Use of intuition in this context is not logically necessary

The concept as mental content could be used equally well

However it is efficient and empowering to use intuition

It encourages continuity with what is perhaps the strongest tradition in Western epistemology—the tradition of Kant. The claim regarding the Kantian tradition is made even though Kant’s program cannot be regarded as successful in its original form. The claim is possible because the present development uses some of Kant’s ideas and insights in modified form and in the modified program of the Universal metaphysics

However, it is suggestive to bring all knowing under intuition—as we shall do below… and, further, it is immensely empowering to do so regarding intuition

A priori agnosticism regarding intuition

We are open to the forms and contents of intuition lying in the range zero to perfect regarding faithfulness. Even though there are immense practical domains of good knowledge and even though may know items of explicit faithfulness, it serves our purpose to not make a priori commitment. We avoid substance or a priori thinking regarding faithfulness

A priori agnosticism regarding agnosticism

I.e., we are not committed to eternal agnosticism. It may (and, with hindsight, will) emerge that we do have some knowledge—the Universal metaphysics (and with the minimal axiom of faith, much more)

What shall we have lie under intuition?

We bring all perception and reason—iconic and symbolic—including logic and science and principles of science and criticism under intuition or conception; and as we have seen perception fully understood includes affect and awareness of mental content of which self-awareness is a form or case; also included is experience-attitude-affect under conception. Again this serves our purpose; it is freeing for it allows even emotion or emotive-feeling to have Objects; and it encourages—has encouraged—the realization that emotion and cognition are not fundamentally distinct in fact or in kind. We do not say—‘we know’ or ‘we do not know’ but instead judgment is allowed to flow from investigation

Thus all elements of understanding become empirical—i.e. not merely those elements that we routinely think of as ‘empirical’

In doing this all elements of understanding become empirical and we open the way to discovery of which empirical objects are perceptually necessary, which are Logical, and which are practical (the practical objects may have high degrees of faithfulness within their domain of application but are not generally of universal application)

But the concept-Object mode is taken as given

It is true that the concept-Object mode is taken as given

Limits to the limit implied by the given-ness of the concept-Object mode

However, the approach itself will reveal the kinds of Object and degrees of faithfulness and further, this approach will mesh with the realm in which faithfulness is not achieved or meaningful. The mesh will be natural because this is the realm from which intuition and discreteness of concept and Object—knowledge and known—emerged. What is more, the vastness of being revealed by the Universal metaphysics will provide motivation for action in faith in the region between the discrete knower and known and the ground of being that lacks all distinctions

The Objects

The road is now open for the development of the necessary Objects of the metaphysics and cosmology and the practical Objects that characterize the remainder of our possible acquaintance with being

Escape from concept-Object as given

Merge this. Since Object is at the intersection of knower and world, it is ready to incorporate both and therefore action. With efference-afference it includes process

Method—old treatment

Essence of method

Intuition

All knowledge is reigned in under intuition and therefore, although it is clear from the fact that we have some success in negotiating the world that intuition must have some validity, all knowing is tentative with regard to perfect faithfulness. Under intuition there is commitment to neither faithfulness nor its absence

Origin of the Universal metaphysics and Logic in intuition

The Universal metaphysics and Logic and consequences—Metaphysics through Cosmology—is derived from a set of necessary and Universal Objects. The Objects are ‘necessary’ in the sense that knowledge of them is perfectly faithful even though there can be no faithfulness for all Objects. The necessity is a result of their supreme simplicity which is the result of conceptual abstraction of distorting detail. That a set of Universal Objects was found is fortuitous from the vantage point that obtained before the intuition and then the development of the metaphysics. However, given the intense motivation combined with relentless search of ideas and literature combined with relentless skepticism which did not allow intuition to be regarded as final, the emergence of the Universal Objects—the Void, the Universe, Domain and Complement, and Logos—no longer appears to be merely fortuitous. And, in retrospect, since there has always been a dual focus on the immediate and the ultimate it is perhaps not surprising that abstraction should have resulted in Objects both necessary and Universal… The concepts Universe through Logos do not exhaust the necessary Objects. The Universe is all being from which all detail has been abstracted. However, detail is reintroduced after the metaphysics has been developed. While the detail is not known faithfully in intuition, the fact of detail is known and this and similar necessary Objects are instrumental in the development of the metaphysics

Empirical character

Thus the Objects are conceptual in nature but their origin is empirical. Further, given the necessary Objects the laws of Logic are also empirical in their origin.

Coeval origin of method and content

It is seen, then, that it is in intuition—at the intersection of concept and Object, at the intersection of knower and known—that the dual and coeval origin of content and method lies; and this is natural for all knowing lies in the world and therefore method is a form of content. Method and content are not distinct and therefore not separable. However, method may be seen as second order content and therefore develops more slowly—its origins are veiled and may therefore appear to be cloaked in the a priori. The appearance of an a priori character to method is enhanced by the precision of symbolic logic and thought. However, the present development removes the veil, brings method out from the a priori and into the empirical

Applied metaphysics

Applied metaphysics is the use of metaphysics (the Universal metaphysics, Logic and so on) in enhancing understanding and knowledge of Objects that are not know or incapable of being known faithfully. The development is possible in the following way. (1) Because there are analogs of the practical Objects in the metaphysics—i.e. the metaphysics frames practical knowledge, (2) By enabling analysis of the fundamental elements of the practical knowledge as or in terms of absolutely fundamental Objects, and (3) By encouraging revision of the conceptual elements of the practical systems in light of the metaphysics. Knowledge of the practical Objects and disciplines is nudged in the direction of their inherent limit of knowability. In the case of mind this limit has been attained in some senses. In general assessment of whether the limit has been attained is case by case

Framework for knowledge

Intuition, abstraction and the necessary Objects

Intuition

All knowledge as Intuition

Abstraction and the necessary Objects

The nature of abstraction

Here abstraction refers to the suppression of detail without token abstraction—i.e., without replacement of the content of conception or intuition by token abstract icons or symbols

Therefore abstraction is already empirical; thus the abstract is immediate and empirical

Being / existence are names for what are already empirical—it is the external world that may require demonstration—the classical distinction of being-in-itself or being versus being-in-relation or existence is dissolved and therefore there is no distinction between existence and being

The ideas of logic and reason are empirical in their own way

The abstractions

From perception to the necessary objects experience, being, all being, object, absence of being…

From reason via the nature of the Void to Logic

Objection. Circularity. Counterargument. Abstraction is not circular; analysis of experience is in parallel with investigation

Conclusions

The ‘independent’ foundation of metaphysics of Metaphysics is founded in the merest fragment of Intuition necessary to establish that there is a world and therefore a Universe

Method—empirical and necessary character of Abstraction and the Metaphysics

Abstraction in this sense, the necessary Objects that found the pure and general metaphysics, and therefore the metaphysics itself are empirical and necessary but not a priori

Necessary and empirical though not a priori

The reasoning has been given earlier where is was seen that the concepts of these objects is empirical and necessary though not a priori. This extends as seen even to Logic

Objection. Every rational scheme requires at least one unproved axiom and one unproved rule of deduction. Counterargument. ‘There is being’ may be regarded as a name; therefore the requirement of one unproved axiom is obviously false; further the program here is not the development of a rational scheme in which facts are discovered and consequences proved by logic; rather the ‘scheme’ is factual-reasoning in which both elements are empirical—but are however ‘enveloped’ by the Logical objects (which include the necessary objects.) There are no ad hoc rules since rules are inherited or postulated but always subject to revision until shown otherwise

Note. ‘There is being’ is unproved in the sense of being derived from something else. However, it does not follow that ‘There is being’ is not true. Proof is derivation from something else that is perhaps more fundamental. That there is being, however, is most fundamental. If I say that ‘so and so has being’ that is a claim that typically requires demonstration. But that there is being has and requires no proof as derivation. Its truth has been shown earlier. Simply, without being, there is nothing, not even the doubt regarding being

Objection—The foundational fallacy is the twin idea that no foundations are possible and that absolute and complete foundations are possible. Response. Stated simply, what has been found is that while depth foundations are possible, the exploration of variety is an ‘adventure’

We find, via abstraction, that there are necessary objects

The necessary Objects are: Experience—a name for the subject side of things that is more immediate than the closest element of the external world: so close that it is often missed or rejected; External world or Object—including necessary or faithful Objects and the fact—being—of the practical or sufficiently faithful Objects, i.e. Objects of adaptation that include practical forms, patterns, and laws… and that may be ‘framed’ by the necessary and Universal Objects; Being or existence—what is there—which includes Pattern and Law and Form; all being or Universe—which necessarily exists and contains all Law and Pattern and Form; part or Domain and Complement—which exists when the Domain exists, space-like Extension, and time-like extension or Duration with their degrees of freedom—e.g. our space is as if three-dimensional, and perhaps other unrecognized generalized coordinates of extension; perhaps the Mass or Extensive—increasing with amount, and Intensive—quality, independent of amount—attributes of Objects; the absence of Being or Void—which, from the existence of complements, must exist and which from the properties of the Universe, contains no Law or Pattern or Form and whose properties imply that there is no state that is inaccessible from any other state except states whose conception would entail violation Logic; and therefore Logos which is the Object of Logic—i.e. which is (identical to) the Universe or all being in all its magnitude and variety

‘Later’ in Objects we see that Being is the intensive quality common to every Object. It is pertinent that in Objects we see that the ontical distinction between quality and entity is erased

One and many—Universal metaphysics

Here, unity is not merely oneness. It is an encompassing oneness

The outcome of the analysis is that when the Universe is considered under the aspect of its being ‘One,’ absolute faithfulness may emerge and the results include the Universal metaphysics and Logic. The perfect faithfulness is a consequence of the simplicity of the ‘One’ and the results are naturally trivial. However, even though trivial, the Universal metaphysics and the Logic are profound in their consequences

The most significant step in seeing the essential oneness of the Universe is in the derivation of the fundamental principle from the perceptual necessary Objects. The Logical oneness is the abstraction out of distinction from the variety of being to all being-as-a-unit. The practical oneness follows from the necessity of interaction of all elements of the Universe

The further step of seeing the lack of essential distinction between the particular and the abstract follows from the principle of reference that is a consequence of the fundamental principle

Method—demonstration

That demonstration is possible as is demonstration of the way of demonstration

That this is neither infinite regress nor vicious circle—because the absolute given has been found and shown

Inseparability of method and content

As seen

In abstraction from intuition and subsequent emergence of Logic, chapters Intuition and Metaphysics, we see the coeval character and inseparability of method and content. It is only because we do not normally see the origin of method but regard it as given that we think otherwise. But on reflection how could it be otherwise? Method was not given to us by a God! Also method which applies to reasoning about the world also applies to the world since reasoning is in the world. This argument has been seen before above

I remember having encountered the argument ‘How do you know… what you say isn’t given by God’ against some point I may have been trying to make. However the response is that that’s a good thing because it means that our arguments, whatever they may be, are within the realm of actual beings rather than hypothesized omnipotent beings; and if a topic is beyond being that too is good for it could not be otherwise

Method does not stand outside investigation; it is not essentially algorithmic even if parts of it may be reduced to algorithm; it is in process… it has been discovered; openness to construction and criticism may be required at all levels

The term ‘inseparability’ is weak—separation is taking apart distinct Objects that have become intertwined but method and content are not distinct

Knowledge

The necessary and the practical and their mesh

The mutually enhancing nature of the interaction

Rational and heuristic elements of the interaction

Exploration of the necessary emphasizes the symbolic

Exploration of the practical emphasizes the empirical

One and many—Normal and local studies

The ‘oneness’ of the Universe lies in a concept in which distinction is omitted. There is no thought that there is no distinction.

Knowledge of the practical Objects arises in the accumulation and analysis of experience, e.g., paradigmatically in science. This knowledge and the Universal metaphysics are mutually enhancing. The Universal metaphysics provides the framework within which each discipline has only its intrinsic limits—the disciplines are illuminated. Simultaneously, the disciplines flesh out the metaphysics. The result is rich in breadth and ultimate in depth

‘Theory’ as the intersection of the necessary and the Intuitive. Objectivity limited only by the precision of the Object on the Normal world side. Otherwise, study of the pertinent Objects may, in principle, be elevated to an ultimate level

The study of Normal worlds in chapter Worlds falls under the many; these, of course, have local unities. The local unities result in simplicity and improve confidence though generally not to the point of necessity

The Universal metaphysics forms a framework for local studies or disciplines

The Universal metaphysics is given example and flesh; the local studies may elevated to their intrinsic level of faithfulness or objectivity

The objects of study may be labeled ‘practical’

Note that the usual principles of science, reason, logic, criticism are re-understood, integrated with the Universal metaphysics to perhaps their intrinsic critical level, and deployed

The method of applied metaphysics. Framing

Examples

Theoretical physics—far from the root. Proof: variety

Mind—the root. Proof: see Cosmology

Trivial resolution of a catalog of problems of ancient through recent metaphysics—the root. Proof: Metaphysics

Far from the root—imagination and literature… source of adventure

The existential character of limits

A source of limits—what is received, that into which we are thrown

The nature of overcoming—the interaction between substance or the received and the elimination or fluidity of substance

Science

Faithfulness—its meaning and range

What has been established sets boundaries to the meaning and extension of faithfulness from zero to one, i.e. from complete absence to perfect faithfulness; the actual situation was seen to necessarily lie in between the extremes

In the history of thought the estimates regarding the actual status of human knowledge has ranged between the extremes

Here, however, we have seen that there is no universal estimate of the faithfulness of knowledge. The actual status depends on what is being considered. There is perfect faithfulness for the necessary Objects, perfect but not Normal faithfulness for the Logical Objects, and fair to high but Normal faithfulness for the Practical Objects

Action and faith

How contingent or Normal knowledge is regarded is not a the result of its faithfulness alone. The absence of universal and absolute faithfulness which has sometimes been regarded dismally may also be seen as an opportunity for discovery and realization. The end of Intuition is not invariably or perhaps even primarily in knowing but also lies in realizing, in remaining in interaction with acting or becoming

Journey

While the Universe and its inhabitants generally remain in becoming, it occasionally enters into or passes nearby states of ‘perfection’

Dynamics of being

The way from the human or here and now to the ultimate. Although the use of ‘method’ above is not intended to suggest algorithmic activity, here the move is further away from that concept of method

The theoretical bases include the Dynamics of being that is an incremental approach toward achieving possibility (in light of the fundamental principle.) Also included are bases from the history of thought, e.g., Samkhya from Indian Philosophy and Freudian and subsequent psychodynamic thought and offshoots including Jung and, perhaps, Maslow

A guide to creative processes

Reflexivity and faith

Principles of perception, thought and action

Reflexivity

A common conception of critical reflexivity is that a critical theory or system should satisfy its own criteria. Not all theories fall under their own criteria but it is a reasonable claim that a critical theory should. As it stands it is not a particularly strong claim. Here, a generalized idea is that of cross-interaction among all elements and levels of discovery-action and knowledge-being—and at any point or occasion that is opportune. Specifically, principles arise in practice and remain or ‘should’ remain open to revaluation in practice—principles are not in another category than practice. The interaction of principles and practice is not merely a suggestive principle and is seen most clearly in Logic

Experience, Being or existence, all being or Universe, Object form, pattern, Law… (versus law), Difference and its Intensive (quality, independent of amount) and Extensive (mass or coordinate) kinds—Duration, Extension… (and their degrees of freedom e.g. our space is as if three dimensional,) Domain, absence of being or Void, Logic (or word, law, or Logos)

The original ‘idea’ and its cultivation

Reflexivity as a source of originality

When it is asked what differentiates the—human—mind from an algorithm, reflexivity and reference arise as strong differentiating candidates. The organism is embedded and this is a strong source of creativity; additionally self-reference, especially the ability to reflect on what one is doing—one’s arguments, one’s method or approach to argument—presents as particularly strong

Reflexivity is simultaneously a source of paradox and an essential source of creativity

As noted in the earlier studies of mind in this essay, elements of indeterminism are essential in creation of the essentially new in ideas—necessary for newness and for structure. This element is an essential part of the constructive side of reflexivity whether applied to the imagination of variety or of new ways of and insights into criticism

Elaboration and examples

Interaction and interaction of criticism and imagination or construction in thought, action and transformation—e.g. criticism of criticism, criticism and construction rather than an either-or attitude, construction or imagination applied to critical approaches and philosophies… thought and action experiment. Interaction of knowledge—e.g. the disciplines—and thought, of principles and applications, of sense and reference or concept and object, of psyche and its elements, of life and ideas, commitment to goals and projects and spontaneity of direction—even dissipation, of seriousness and light, of institution and occasion

Sources of ideas. Construction. Listing possibilities

Literature and conversation, imagination, reflex

Concept formation (similarity and difference)

Logic applied to construction

Construction and criticism

Logic (literature and conversation, imagination, reflex,) and construction applied to Criticism. Construction and criticism may both involve experiment in thought and action

What reflexivity covers

In previous versions of this narrative the following were regarded as principles but may be subsumed under reflexivity

Attention to meaning

Integration of the psyche

Thought and action

Action and faith

The point elaborated earlier is that while action is informed by creative-critical thought, that alone is insufficient. It is essential to occasionally have animal faith in the stability of the world, in the occasion for ‘pure’ action that is experiment without regard to an outcome of failure or success—which is not to exclude hope or even faith in success… or equanimity in the possibility of failure

Perfection

While the Universe and its inhabitants generally remain in becoming, it occasionally enters into or passes nearby states of ‘perfection’ whose occasion is a necessary consequence of the fundamental principle

IV. GUIDE AND REFERENCE

Contribution

The purpose of this chapter is to gather together and make explicit what I think to be the contributions of the essay. For the classes of contribution see the section titles

The attempt to formulate objective criteria for significance does not displace evaluations by others or the ‘judgment of history’—but note:

The metaphysics may be subject to history but history is subject to the metaphysics

And materialist and secular metaphysicians may think on John Maynard Keynes quote In the long run we are all dead

Criteria for significance

Correctness

Significance

Major contributions

The contributions

These contributions belong to the main thrust of the work

The main development has a number of developments that I consider to have immense significance for human being, society, and the history of ideas. Although the ideas center around the Universal metaphysics, the metaphysics is developed into a significant range of consequences; and there are numerous additional disciplinary developments in parallel to the main development. The significance of the ideas has been given some evaluation in the narrative

Hesitation to call the developments contributions stems from the following sources. (1) Doubts about validity. (2) Questions about originality. (3) Issues of significance. (4) The judgment of history

The issue of doubt has been addressed extensively. Although formal doubts have been addressed residual doubt of formal and psychological origin remain. However (1) The proofs and the address of the doubt is itself a significant and original and (2) Even if we postulate the fundamental principle of metaphysics the consequences are so immense and the arguments against it so lacking in Logical character that it is worthy of consideration as an intellectual and action principle

Although there are glimpses of a number of the ideas from a variety of traditions, the present development appears to be new. Nowhere, in extensive exploration, have I seen any hint of proof of the fundamental principle. There have been suggestions of the fundamental principle that lack proof and in lacking proof there is also lacking the immense system of consequences regarding depth and breadth. There are also suggestions regarding variety but in lacking foundation these suggestions of variety are immensely limited and of course mere speculation (their heuristic explanations may be shown to be unfounded.) Lacking foundation, the historical developments are incapable of the present resolution of the comprehensive range of problems of metaphysics—e.g., the mind-matter problem and the problem of why there is being that Heidegger called the fundamental problem of metaphysics that shown here to be a non-problem and replaced with another fundamental problem ‘What is it that has being?’ which receives significant address but is shown to be incapable of complete symbolic specification and requires transformation for realization.

The significance of the ideas is manifest

The precise judgment of history lies outside the scope of prediction. I have come to think that the ideas and developments of the narrative lie outside the familiar paradigmatic modern modes of thought—academic, secularist, religious-spiritual, and common. Recognition of the ideas in their present narrative form may occur by chance. Otherwise, however, recognition may occur in the following ways (1) Writing for recognition—style, brevity, significance and appeal are possible elements of such writing, (2) Devoting energy, intelligence, and charisma to recognition, and (3) Recognition by an individual or individuals who have sympathy with / preparation for the ideas of the work

What is new in this work ?

Introduction

Others who are not versed in the fundamental ideas often ask What is new in your work? Recently a friend commented, your ideas amount to Anything is possible—and that is not new, it is commonplace. The following discussion addresses these issues

A reminder. Assertion that my system is new means (1) I have not seen it in extensive reading and discussion, (2) from this exposure I have formed an idea of the reach of recorded thought and think it unlikely that my system is present in the main world traditions

A preliminary

While I claim that the system of ideas developed in this essay is a significant advance over prior understanding of the Universe, a common reaction is that there can hardly be any fundamental advance over the modern system—that surely someone has thought these thoughts before. This is a thought behind the question ‘What is new?’

The question of whether and to what extent the system may have been thought before is addressed in sections beginning with Relation to sources in the history of thought. This preliminary will address the issue of the possibility and fact of fundamental advance over prior thought including the modern system

What is the source of this gap between my claim and the common reaction that essential advance is not to be expected? Here is an analysis of a source of this gap

Ideas arise as possible understanding of the world. The early history of thought about the world is mythic—it is in the form of stories but there is little attention to validity or even the idea of validity. Later, when (as in science) the idea arose that a world view might have application a natural corollary of this development was the idea of validity—of criticism, reason, and logic

We can ask two questions of the nature and extent of the Universe. (1) What is required by science and reason? (2) What is allowed by science and reason?

The explicit view that the universe is as defined in (1) has been called positivism. The view that it is in (2) may be called epistemic liberalism or simply liberalism (with regard to knowledge)

It is shown in what follows that, from critical analysis of science itself that (1) is an immensely small fraction of (2.) Although liberalism does not follow from this analysis, liberalism does not violate science and reason

The ideas developed in Metaphysics through Cosmology show that the Universe is as in (2) and that this entails that the Universe has the greatest possible variety of being: this is shown in the metaphysical development. This metaphysics is shown to be the one and only metaphysics and is called the Universal metaphysics. The cosmological development fills in the variety—what is filled in is immense even though it is immensely far from complete. It is shown in the earlier chapters that the variety cannot be preconceived but will be experienced and it is suggested that the likelihood and quality of the experience will be much enhanced by active and intelligent search. This defines an unending adventure in variety which, incidentally, is one in which pain cannot be avoided but need not be sought (except perhaps as a tool to develop strength)

Except for those who are religious or immensely skeptical, the natural or secular view of the Universe is roughly defined by science and may be held consciously or subconsciously absorbed from modern culture. This secular view is the default modern non religious and non mythic view. It is most commonly held implicitly and subconsciously even though many hold it explicitly and consciously. Because we do not think outside our natural world view (if we did it would not be our world view) it is a natural consequence of secularism that we should see the Universe roughly as (1) above, i.e. as what is definitely revealed in science. It is therefore natural under the modern secular paradigm to identify (1) and (2)—to reduce (2) to (1)—and to be uncritically blind to the possibility of anything outside the default modern view that centers on (1)

I.e., it is nearly instinctual to hold to the default modern view and to be blind to the part of the Universe that is infinitely greater than what is revealed in the default. There is no thought of a greater world and when something greater is suggested there is no easy means with which to comprehend or imagine it. This is the source of the gap between my metaphysics and the common metaphysics—between my claim and the common reaction

This divide between the two metaphysics—the Universal and the secular—is cognitive. There may also be a variety of reactionary factors that I have analyzed elsewhere but omit here

Summary of the preliminary. When what is allowed by experience and reason under any system of understanding is greater than what is required, there is a natural tendency of those educated in the system to hold that the Universe is defined by what is required. If held explicitly, this view is positivism

The position that the Universe is what is allowed by experience and reason may be called extreme epistemic liberalism. This kind of liberalism has been contemplated in the history of thought but a full understanding of its nature has not been developed before. Here, this liberalism is demonstrated and also called the Universal metaphysics. The tools of demonstration permit an understanding and articulation of the metaphysics as well as significant development of the cosmological variety. The experience of this variety defines an unending adventure in ideas and being

It is pointed out in the discussion below that based on extensive reading and reflection on the traditional pictures of the Universe, it is very unlikely that this total system has been seen in prior thought

Relation to sources in the history of thought

Many of the names of the important ideas of the narrative have been encountered in the history of thought. However, in almost every instance the ideas have seen fundamental enhancement. The sources of this enhancement includes (1) careful reflection on each idea, (2) implications of the reflections on each idea for the other ideas so that simultaneous enhancement occurs and the new forms of a particular idea are not dependent on the old forms of other ideas, and (3) the development of an articulated and non-speculative—i.e. demonstrated and logically coherent—metaphysics that confirms the validity of the meanings of the ideas

Various aspects of the theory of intuition and the metaphysics and the consequent system (Objects through Method) have been encountered in the tradition to which the development owes an immense debt. However, never before has the present system been developed in the following aspects—it is demonstrated, the notion of demonstration is taken to an ultimate form, there is foundation without infinite regress, and the variety of being in the Universe is shown to be the greatest that is Logically possible. An outline of the theory of identity is seen in Vedanta but Vedanta provides no demonstration even though its insight is great. My system includes its own demonstration

A system includes its own demonstration? That means: there is no reference to something outside itself! Is that not circular? Does not any system need undemonstrated propositions or axioms, undefined terms? There is this model that the real is to be captured in a set of sentences. Some of those sentences are axiomatic—without demonstration. However, via naming of abstracts from intuition there are basic ideas that require no demonstration. But surely there are unproved rules of proof? The discovery of rules of proof is not a mystery of the a priori but an empirical endeavor—the certainty of the a priori is an illusion and the empirical endeavor may be the best that there can be and perhaps even better for certainty gives way to infinite adventure. The Universe itself simply is. It requires no description. What of a being in the Universe? If it finds sufficiently simple (abstracted from intuition) but still Universal Objects, it finds a perfectly faithful description. Outside this there is and need be no perfect faithfulness but there is the possibility of the approach to this limit. The system the pure core of a system of beings—including Universe—whose relations may be mediated by sentences as propositions

Demonstration is immensely empowering because of the confidence it provides regarding what was previously merely intuitive (in the common modern sense of that term.) Demonstration is also immensely powerful because the methods and tools of demonstration that have been especially developed here are also among the tools for exploration of the consequences of the metaphysics. This is a commentary on the argument that philosophy should be about insight rather than demonstration—it becomes manifest that demonstration and insight are equal partners

New concepts

Here are some aspects of what is new. Terms in SMALL CAPITAL letters in what follows—in most cases only the first occurrence is capitalized—are concepts whose meaning is developed and defined in the narrative and may be quite different in meaning from both historical and common use

A reminder. Assertion that my system is new means (1) I have not seen it in extensive reading and discussion, (2) from this exposure I have formed an idea of the reach of recorded thought and think it unlikely that my system is present in the main world traditions

The fundamental Universal OBJECTS, UNIVERSAL, DOMAIN, VOID, LOGOS, and others are shown to be known with perfect faithfulness in INTUITION (this is not and cannot be true for Objects in general.) The Logos is the Object of Logic and thus the metaphysics and demonstration are entailed via intuition. The entailment appears to be brief but its content lies in the development of INTUITION, ABSTRACTION, and the various concepts including the CONCEPT itself. If the development appears improbable, note that what is developed is a framework for both content and DEMONSTRATION or METHOD within which particular discovery is EMPIRICAL

The metaphysics

It is shown that, as knowledge of all being, there is one and only one metaphysics that is here called the Universal metaphysics. Although unique, this metaphysics can have different but equivalent formulations and may be developed in greater or lesser degree

The full metaphysics and its demonstration are new

The fundamental principle of the Universal metaphysics is that whatever is allowed by Logic is contained somewhere and somewhen in the Universe. Leibniz held that the only impossibilities are logical impossibilities and Hume and Wittgenstein subscribed to something similar—their idea amounts to Whatever is allowed by logic is possible. Thus it has clearly been thought and may be a commonplace idea that anything is possible. However, the metaphysics is not that anything is possible but that every Logical possibility is actual somewhere and somewhen. This and much more have been demonstrated

As a first example, the nature of POSSIBILITY has been clarified. Normally we t