2008 EDITION
In process version with comments and planning
ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © 2008
Format for temporary comments
Design is in Map. Tasks in a unit will be specific to it / generic-collected—paste special—lower level tasks
Current content: this, Journey in Being-New World-essence.html, elements of the narrative.html, docs linked from index.html—§ index.html#_Toc198363063
Outline
Contents… Journey in being… First things. 4… Foundation… Journey… Map
Sketch… On publication… Reading the narrative… The audience
Emphasis: ideas. 9… Origin and doubt—a foundation in-process… Why ideas are taken up first… Significance of ideas… Contribution to the history of ideas
Introduction… Being… Metaphysics… Objects… Logic and meaning… Mind… Cosmology… Journey… Method
Introduction… Human being… Social world… Civilization… Faith
Introduction… Philosophy and metaphysics… A system of human knowledge
Introduction… History of transformation… Basis and theory of transformation… System of experiments… Transformations so far and their further Design
A map for the Journey… Design… The way ahead
Issue and function of reference… Reference in this essay… Select sources
Journey in Being is a journey in ideas and transformation. The ideas, which form a partial foundation for transformation, are the subject of Foundation—the first part of the narrative. The second part, Journey, narrates transformation so far and thoughts and designs toward further transformation
This part has no introduction—it is the introduction and overview. Alternative titles may be Introduction, Overview, Plan, Portal, A portal to the journey, Gateway…
Source: first things.html—the part Material from the 2008 edition—has material for this part and its sections
Sources: on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html and first things.html
Note that there are roughly three units on Journey: this one; Journey—the discussion in Foundation, and the part Journey. Consider, reduction, paste special from the detailed to the overview discussions, and renaming, e.g., Journey in being®Journey
Note that there are roughly three units on Journey: Being—in this division, in the Introduction to Theory of being, and the main discussion Being in Foundation.. Consider, reduction, paste special from the detailed to the overview discussions
This introduction describes origins, nature and scope of the journey. It then introduces the concept of being and its fundamental character
Following is a subset of final—level 5—subsections of this section
In the process of discovery and experiment, the idea or concept of being was found to be pivotal to the adventures in ideas and in transformation
The emergence of these essential concepts, understanding of the concepts, and awareness of their significance was a process—gradual and step-wise—that occurred in interaction with many other ideas, attempts to understand the world in terms of systems of ideas, and experiments in use of the ideas in life
The concepts of being and of experience emerged as central in the development of a Theory of being that frames the journey or adventure. From this theory, ultimate limits of knowledge and transformation are found
The meanings of the terms ‘being,’ ‘experience’ and others emerge in the narrative and their absorption by the reader is expected to be a process. It is crucial for understanding to pay attention to the meanings and uses as developed here
The ultimate limits of being—of the being of the universe—will be found in Metaphysics to be identical to those of Logic. These limits are necessarily ultimate for, whatever the object of the term ‘Logic’ may be, it is inherent in the concept that the limits of Logic cannot be violated—insofar as the limits of realizations of Logic, i.e. the logics, can be violated, they are approximations of Logic
Those limits of science and of educated commonsense that are not Logical limits may be labeled normal limits. From the theory of being it follows that normal limits are not ultimate or absolute. Where it has been thought impossible, the transcendence of normal limits is found to be—perhaps extremely—improbable. Similarly, normal necessities are but highly probable. In the development of science what may have been thought impossible has often been found to be feasible. Thus the normal is not fixed but is relative to states of being and knowing
It will follow that whatever is Logical is possible and therefore actual and necessary. This may seem to violate reasonable sense (1) in the identification of the possible, the actual and the necessary, and (2) in allowing the violation of common ideas of reality including science. There is, however, no violation
If something does not exist or occur in the entire universe (over all time and space) it cannot be possible for there is no other universe in which it might occur; thus what is possible is actual. What is actual is of course possible. Therefore the actual and the possible are identical… The proof regarding necessity requires more than analysis of concepts and must wait until Metaphysics
The common ideas of reality are not violated for, as noted, common impossibility actually immensely improbable. Again, proof and details must wait until Metaphysics
The situation is similar to any conceptual advance. The new conceptual system must agree with the old in its domain of validity and should reveal new phenomena outside that domain
These limits defined above are the outer limits of the journey. The paths of the journey will ‘wander’ within these limits
Ideas are important but—actual—transformation is essential. Transformation includes the idea but more—transformations of—or in—being itself and identity. The adage ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’ ascribed to Edward Lytton, 1803-1873, was penned. Since the writing tends to be the domain of thinkers, it is perhaps natural that in literature importance may shift from transformation and action to ideas. Literature, especially academic and intellectual literature, tends to exaggerate the importance and transformational character of the idea. Without transformation and action, the idea stands incomplete. Still, the idea is the place where action may be conceived and being is appreciated. In the narrative, ideas are emphasized in Foundation and transformation in Journey. Even though the developments in the foundation are demonstrated, their substance is felt to lie in transformation. What is here expressed is not the philosophy that ideas should find application but the thought that without realization the idea stands essentially incomplete. This idea distinguishes this work from the standard academic emphasis and is worked out in greater detail in the narrative
The limits of ideas and transformation are the outer limits of the journey
All being
One of the connotations of being in the tradition of thought is that which is most fundamental to understanding the world or some aspect of the world
It is natural, then, that being should also be fundamental to transformation and action
This is the connotation of interest in selecting Being as the central concept in a system of thought that is fundamental to the journey and to thought and action
The idea that being is most fundamental… is an implicit and perhaps partial specification of the concept of being
The semantic or linguistic origin of the word being is the verb to be. Of course, this observation does not exhaust the concept of being. Additionally, there are subtleties to the use of the verb to be—not all uses of the verb connote be-ing. These concerns are taken up later
A connotation of ‘to be’ is ‘to exist.’ Can being be equated to existence? There is a line of thought in which existence is ‘the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things’ while being includes the connotation of independent or pure being or being-in-itself. Thus it is conceivable that existence and being are not identical. However, not every connotation corresponds to something actual. Therefore, distinctions in connotation do not necessarily correspond to actual distinctions. That the—apparently—distinct thoughts ‘being-in-interaction’ and ‘being-in-itself’ can be had does not imply that there is a corresponding actual or real distinction. Therefore, without further analysis, it cannot be concluded that being and existence are distinct
It will emerge later that being and existence are identical
Existence will found to be ‘objective’ but objectivity requires some kind of grounding
The grounding of existence, of being-in-itself and of being-in-interaction, of existing and knowing, will be in—the concept of—experience
These assertions require demonstration. The meanings of the terms being, to be, existence, experience require clarification. There are a number of problems and paradoxes, some well known, that are associated with the terms. These concerns deferred to Foundation where it will be seen that demonstration, meaning, resolution of problem and paradox are intimately related
It may be said that everything in the universe exists or has being. Thus existing or being does not distinguish one thing from another. In using being as fundamental the character of things is not referred to something more fundamental or simpler. In contrast, in substance theory which will be considered in detail later, the character of things is explained in terms of something simpler. For example in materialism there are explanations in terms of matter. For these reasons, it might appear that an explanation in terms of being might be trivially true but also unenlightening
However, in substance theory, things are explained in terms of something else, something that stands behind or under. This ‘something else’ cannot be truly outside the world but is something else in that it is not on the surface andor in that it is a part of the variety of things. Thus while substance theory may be powerful, it is also open to error—it is not given that the world will be explainable in terms of what is below the surface of phenomena or that the whole will be explainable in terms of a part of it. The nature of substance theory, its potential, and its ultimate untenability as the basis as an understanding of the world will be taken up later
On account of its trivial character, explanation in terms of being cannot be in error. Explanation in terms of being is, in effect, an explanation of the world in terms of itself. The idea to explain the world in its own terms may be seen as including the position that at the outset of study, of investigation, the nature of the world is regarded as unknown. Thus the approach from being is similar to the use and naming of the unknown in algebra and the approach from being has powers that are similar to those of the algebraic approach
It will emerge that, despite this trivial character, explanation via being is ultimately profound. First, such explanation cannot be in error. More importantly, however, the use of being encourages and permits the formulation of a system of understanding of the world in terms of its most general and universal of characteristics such as being, all being and absence of being which will be found to be capable being the basis of a powerful system of understanding (metaphysics, theory of being.) This system does not say anything about the particular and detailed aspects of our world. However, when used in interaction with detailed understanding, the general enhances and corrects understanding of the particular and the particular provides details and examples of the general. While the result is indeed profound and unexpected, what has been said so far is but a glimmer of the actual developments
The section Introduction to a new picture of the world below provides some account of these developments
The idea of a theory of being is explicitly mentioned in Aristotle’s work. In the particular sciences, things are studied in some aspect or other—material aspects in physics, the living aspect in biology. Aristotle’s idea, in metaphysics, was to study ‘things as such,’ i.e., that things as they are
In the history of thought, being has numerous connotations. Some of these will be excluded from the meaning of being developed in this narrative. This might lead to confusion that, however, may be avoided by attending to the meaning as developed here. The gain in suggestive power from the tradition is worth the care that is required. It is probably true that the every significant concept has a rich multiplicity connotations. Therefore careful attention to meaning is not necessary only to avoid confusion but also to productive and creative thought
Use perception-logic; develop metaphysics of immanence, consequences, implications for journey
Consider the problem of the end of the world: it is an existential problem that has an existential and a real resolution
This is the probable place to discuss what has been before—by whom or in what tradition
Sources for the new picture: first things.html and on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html
It is unlikely that any picture or metaphysics will be entirely new—aspects of the view have been in a variety of traditions. However, the picture has, apparently, not been seen before as a dynamic whole, with a rational-empirical foundation, as a foundation that has no infinite regress and yet no substance, and with a breadth of scope such that all being is implicit in it, and with the breadth of application covered in the narrative
The title was A brief motivation from the metaphysics. The goal is to show the power of the metaphysics and its methods of proof and demonstration. Make the section as brief and as simple as possible in order to make the point
…and action, process and relationship
Seek a better title. Lengthen it to ‘An orientation to the narrative.’? ‘Narrative’ versus ‘essay’ versus ‘piece’…
Task—import material: ’06 and earlier versions may be useful sources for The narrative if the ’07 version is not adequate
This section is, tentatively, a sketch of the journey and an outline of the narrative
Contents. Outline or map
Sources: first things.html and on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html… include ‘the picture’ and the problem of demonstration (proof)
Specifics first things.html
Part 2003 Edition: Relations between our world and the absolute
Part 2006 Edition: Power of the vision and the next section Brevity of the story
The purpose of this section is to assist in understanding the narrative by alerting readers to the possible difficulties. The next section has suggestions on negotiating the difficulties
The narrative contains a deepening—in significant ways ultimate—of foundations of knowledge and being and may therefore present difficulties of understanding. Although some difficulties may be technical, a significant difficulty may lie in recognizing that a new picture of the world—a metaphysics—is painted and in grasping the logical foundation and quality of that picture and of the immense variety of being portrayed within and shown necessary by it. This difficulty may be especially acute for those immersed in the traditional pictures, e.g., from Western philosophy, metaphysics and science—i.e., for academics and experts
When a narrative is expected to present difficulties of understanding, it is helpful to the reader to have some acquaintance with the presence of the difficulties and their nature
Sources—specifics first things.html
Part 2003 Edition: To the reader
Part 2004 Edition: Reading the document
Part 2005 Edition: Reading the essay
This is the section legend in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Sources—specifics first things.html
Part 2005 Edition: The audience
Part 2006 Edition: The audience—general and specialist and the next section Some special interests
There is an interest in the journey itself, its nature, its ways and means, its ambitions and goals
Interest is typically in the treatment of a specific topic or discipline from the point of view of the Journey—the Foundation or the ways of Transformation. The interest in the topic may be technical and for further study and research. Typical topics may be found in Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation
Sources-general for this part: index.html; possibly first things.html
Foundation focuses on—transformation in—ideas; in the next part Journey the concern expands to transformation in being and identity
The ideas have achieved some maturity; the transformations in being and identity are in process
Origin of the Foundation. Fundamental incompleteness of ideas. Doubt. Foundation as ‘what foundation has been found along the way’
While the journey has a personal aspect, there is, also, along the way, exploration and discovery in ideas and foundations, the tradition of ideas, of what foundation is possible, and in being and identity
Foundation did not arise in a single step as a unitary whole—it arose piece-meal, iteratively, cycling through a growing range of ideas, exposure to the history of thought, subject to a universe of criticism and resolution until it was realized in its state as a unitary whole
In the Metaphysics it is demonstrated that the system of metaphysics is ultimate with regard to depth and breadth. Further the principles of demonstration arise organically, in interaction with discovery; the Method is part of the interaction between knower and known. However, the ultimate character with regard to breadth or variety of being is shown to be necessarily implicit and this is what keeps the Journey infinitely open. The variety of being provides infinite realms of discovery and adventure. The Foundation is expected to see further iteration in interaction with the Transformation of being and identity
As transformation ideas are important but incomplete. Doubt is a minor and perhaps subjective aspect of the incompleteness of ideas. The fundamental incompleteness of ideas is that, in their normal interpretation at least, they constitute only part of being, identity and power
Since doubt served the exploration well, since there remain questions about the foundation, and since the approaches to transformation remain experimental, the regard for the foundation is that it may be best thought of as what foundation has been found along the way
Early in the story, the universal aspects of the journey were seen implicitly to be in terms of ideas. This may reflect an original personal orientation; it is also a reflection of the sentiment of the Western intellect. It was later that transformation in the universal realm was seen to be possible and the ideas came to be regarded as incomplete
Ideas are taken up first since they have been fundamental to understanding the nature of the journey and to determining possibilities of—and approaches to—transformation
Ideas are an essential part of the journey, provide a critical and ultimate vision that is a foundation-in-interaction with the journey. The idea is the place of experience and appreciation of being
Although Foundation is not in the form of a journey, development of its ideas has been and remains a journey—a part of a larger journey in transformation of being. The ideas seek to be a contribution to thought. The first purpose of the ideas is to provide a vision of the world that will be critical and, as far as possible, ultimate. The vision will be a foundation for transformation and further developments in ideas and thought
In the more complete understanding of Metaphysics, Objects and Mind, the idea is seen to expand to include being. In the immediate realm and in its normal interpretation, however, the idea remains limited
The narrative seeks to be a contribution to ideas in the topics—chapters—and their foundation, and to transformation
Although acceptance is determined in the course of a contribution in the stream of ideas and action, it is thought that the contribution includes an estimate of what directions in ideas are capable of ultimate foundation, that such ultimates have been sketched and proved, that knowledge has been pushed to a number of its boundaries, and that the envelope of transformation is traced and shown
Sources include all documents for the chapters, especially Being and Metaphysics
Theory of being is metaphysics
Integrate the following pre-Introduction comments
An outline of the development from experience
That there are universal ‘elements’ whether named, experienced as such, or experienced only implicitly
These elements are necessary
And entail, of necessity, a metaphysics:
The metaphysics of experience
Whose depth and breadth are ultimate
…
For is not all ultimately in experience in some way? (That which is outside experience is named in experience—‘that which is outside experience!)
And what lies ahead, lies ahead in future experience…
That it is exciting the only fiction is that which harbors contradiction—which is outside Logic. And if Logic is ultimate in paucity of what it excludes it is ultimate in the richness of what it permits
And if what is merely possible is too unlikely, then what is feasible and worthwhile is even more exciting for it involves high creation over and above mere adventure
It is important to note that the introduction of being-as-being, being-as-existence, and experience are not counter to the purpose of not introducing substance, not regarding the nature of the world as something else… of seeing the nature of things, first, as—immanent in—the world
Note that the foregoing neither eliminates nor requires substance or essence or nature at the outset, i.e., it is neutral in these regards and allows any non-neutrality to be the outcome of investigation
What is a Theory of being? The question has two sides. The first side concerns the idea of a Theory of being and the second is about its content
The two sides above correspond to the ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ or ‘concept’ and ‘object’ sides of—linguistic—meaning. The distinction is crucial to the concept of meaning and to understanding concepts. It is considered in detail in the later discussions of meaning
The following introductory discussion of Theory of being may contain significant material on Being itself and perhaps also on Metaphysics. Some material may go to those chapters. Eliminate repeated material where repetition serves no purpose
So far, the idea of ‘being’ has been specified in functional and very general terms. However, an explicit concept of being has not yet been given. An explicit concept that is at the core of a coherent and consistent system of ideas—one that will be a ‘metaphysics’—that has powerful—ultimate—application will be developed in what follows
What is the idea of ‘being’ so far? It is ‘that which is most fundamental’ and ‘that which is universally applicable.’ Thus, roughly—i.e., as a first approximation, a theory of being would be a ‘theory of everything’
What form shall this theory take? That is not specified at outset and, from discussion so far, it is probably most efficient to not make specification at outset
The idea of being ‘that which has universal application’ indicates that whatever should emerge, the concept will be very general—will make little distinction. The concept has been criticized as making no distinction but as will be seen the concept does distinguish the—logically—possible (versus the logically impossible.) Whether this is a true distinction or not is a matter of perspective. What is critical is that the distinction is necessary—not under-specified—and sufficient—not over-specified—to the powerful and empirical metaphysics that will be developed
It may be expected, then, that as a ‘theory of everything,’ a theory of being will not be a theory of the details of all things but will be a theory of, roughly—in a second approximation, the most general kinds or aspects of things—a theory of the common aspects of all things. Alternatively and perhaps equivalently though still tentatively, a theory of everything will see the universe, not in its details and modes of distinction, but as a whole
The most general kinds and aspects will turn out to be being itself—that there are things, all being, the absence of being, difference or distinction, extension-duration, and domain… and, seeing the universe in light of these aspects is seeing it, first, as a whole and, second, in terms of a minimum of generic distinction
These thoughts are now laid out in further detail
An implicit specification of idea of Being was seen to be whatever is most fundamental in the world. whatever is in the world. Perhaps whatever is in the world is made of matter. This appears to be the modern scientific and secular sentiment. Still, even in the twenty-first century, materialism is not the universal view; and even if one accepts materialism there is the question ‘What is matter?’ Science does not answer this question or claim to answer it
The claim that ‘everything is made of matter’ is not clearly true and, in any case, is not a complete explanation of whatever is in the world. That is clearly true for materialism is at most implicit or tacit rather than explicit. In science, explanation stops at matter without showing its fundamental character or referring to something more fundamental. In the sense of ultimate explanation, materialism is not even part of an explanation of what is in the world
The scientific materialist might respond that scientific materialism is the best that can be hoped for, that it is the foundation of an extremely potent instrumental knowledge of the world, that it provides an excellent stand in for ultimate explanation, and that it appears that such explanation is impossible and that what is impossible cannot be desirable
In response to the scientific materialist, note that there is no proof of the impossibility of ultimate explanation—there is at most a record of failure in the attempt to get such an explanation. It will emerge that such an explanation of what is in the world is possible and this will be demonstrated, not merely in principle, but by developing and demonstrating the validity of an ultimate explanation. Why is the view that such explanations are not forthcoming widely spread?
First, there is, in most cultures, the tacit acceptance of the dominant paradigms of explanation of the culture
Second, there is the generally accepted failure of the grand metaphysical systems of the past as merely speculative—of these explanations perhaps the grandest in Western thought is the Hegelian metaphysics. However, it does not follow from a sequence of failures of a type of explanation that that type is impossible; for impossibility, the necessity of such failure must be demonstrated. The wide acceptance of scientific materialism and secular humanism is implicitly regarded as tacit demonstration of the impossibility of ultimate / metaphysical explanation. Additionally, the philosopher Immanuel Kant is taken as having demonstrated that it is impossible to know the validity of a metaphysics whose foundation lies outside experience. In this narrative there are two arguments that counter the Kantian position. The first argument is rational: it is the logical demonstration of the validity of an ultimate system of metaphysics—the metaphysics of immanence—taken up in Metaphysics. The second argument is empirical: it looks carefully at what lies in experience and finds that it is characteristic to consider that question in terms of such detail as to exclude certain general characteristics that appear to be ‘merely metaphysical’ but are in fact intensely and centrally empirical. This argument is of course not logically counter to the Kantian position for it locates—certain aspects—metaphysics within experience. However it is counter to the effective Kantian position as follows. The effective position depends on the tacit and common assumption that all being is an essentially metaphysical concept in that it cannot be empirical. The position makes sense for it appears to say that some being lies outside our experience and therefore all being cannot lie within experience. However, the concept of all being has a generic meaning and multiple specific meanings within the general framework. One specific meaning is ‘all being in all of its details.’ Another is ‘all being with the details filtered out.’ The former has contingently though not logically empirical content; the latter does not have even logically empirical content. In this sense, all being is empirical. The point identifies and counters the common assumption tacitly embedded in the Kantian position that the notion of all being cannot be empirically knowable—even in a form in which detail is filtered out of the concept. The first argument demonstrates the fact and possibility of an ultimate metaphysics; this metaphysics may appear to lie outside experience; the second argument locates the ultimate metaphysics within the realm of experience, i.e., of things experienced and other things that, though not yet experienced, are capable of being experienced and, according to the metaphysics, must lie in the experience of some individual. It will be seen that the rational and the empirical approaches are not separate but are in fact strongly intertwined
A third argument against an ultimate explanation that claims to stand on its own is that every system must have some fundamental unexplained terms and unproven axioms—that all chains of explanation must be either unending or must end in something unexplained. The rational-empirical approach referred to above will show the error of this idea that has widespread acceptance. Although the actual considerations shall be more intricate, the general idea is that there must be something given in experience that though not given in terms of something else is nonetheless given. What is it that is given? This must fall out of the study rather than be posited at outset. It is entailed that, while it is of fundamental importance to development and foundation of a variety of logical-mathematical and other systems, the axiomatic ‘method’ it is not ultimately fundamental. This point also addresses concerns regarding issues of completeness and consistency of axiomatic systems and thus the completeness aspect of ultimate explanation
The discussion has found the general reasons for rejection of systematic thought to be inadequate. The situation that should result from these reasons is not a rejection of systematic thought but, of course, an openness to its impossibility. In terms of reason and logic, this necessarily entails a simultaneous openness to the possibility of systematic thought
The demise of system in analytic thought is generally regarded as being coincident with Russell’s rejection of idealist system that occurred roughly at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the rejection was more putative than actual with pockets of significant idealism and system in Britain and America continuing well into the twentieth century
Given that the rejection of system was not logical even though it is often presumed to have been so, it is reasonable to suggest that its putative demise is significantly the result of academic fashion—even dogma
It has been common for authors of modern and recent works in metaphysics—especially analytic metaphysics—to reject system at the outset. It would be more logical for these writers to disclaim system in their thought
The present work has elements of system. However it is emphasized that what system there is stems from two sources. The main source is the result of analysis; i.e., what system there may be is largely the result rather than the presumption of thought. It is significant that the metaphysical system emerged from sustained experience and reflection. What is system? One way of looking at it is that it is the continuation or extrapolation of some metaphor of pattern and wholeness in the world. The writer’s thought has gone through a number of phases of system and rejection. In this final system there was no a priori metaphor. It is a result of the investigation that when the world is sufficiently understood, there is neither need nor place for metaphor in the understanding (though of course metaphor will remain powerful in sub-domains of incomplete understanding and, naturally, in other kinds of literature.) The original insight regarding the logic of the void initiated its own relentless but fluid unfolding in contact with the dimensions of thought… Thus the work exhibits system without the intent to be systematic. This fact together with the fact that the system emerged together with its principles of demonstration shows its system to be both natural (unpremeditated) and necessary. The ideas, the system and the logic are naturally co-emergent… The second source of system lies at the interface between the emergent logic of the metaphysics of immanence of the narrative and the houses of human thought. The process of interaction has not been one of subsumption. Instead it has been one of destruction and reconstruction. The destruction was necessitated by the logic of the metaphysics, especially the principle of reference. In the phase of destruction, significant elements of prior metaphysics, the ideas of object, of logic and of meaning, of mind and its conception, and of cosmology are found to crumble. The reconstruction was the natural result of the momentum of the same logic. Since system emerges it is not imposed; there is no psychological or logical commitment to it; its emergence is natural. In a sense there is no system; the sense is the same one in which the world has and needs no foundation
The result, the gift is an ultimate system of thought; the ultimate character, too, is emergent rather than forced. It is system that is not forced, not imposed. If the being of the world has a logic, the system that emerges is that logic
To be committed to or against system at the outset of thought is a form of substance theory, i.e., a commitment to the form and character of thought and being. The form of modern university education may be said to be a rampant exercise in substance theory applied to the world, to thought and to action; undergraduates are told what to think before they learn how to think; they are given to believe that how to think is something that can be said rather than learnt or that the how of thought can be implicit in a course of lectures on the disciplines… In considering substance theory in this narrative there is no a priori commitment and it emerges from the logic that the notion of substance at the foundation of an understanding of the world, i.e. as foundation of metaphysics, is untenable. Similarly, it has been learnt in the ‘journey’ that, even if system should in fact be either necessary or impossible, the actual case can only be strengthened by having no a priori commitment and allowing the actual case to emerge naturally in the course of investigation
A final criticism of the idea of ultimate explanation is one that questions its utility rather than its validity. Is not scientific explanation enough? What is the point of an ultimate explanation that has no utility? The first answer to this criticism is that there is a distinction between immediate and deferred utility. Science itself has often had no immediate utility; discovery came first and utility later. However, explanation and understanding may be criticized as such—for what is the use of understanding and explanation that are not instrumental, that do not enable any prediction or technology? In the first place, understanding the nature of the world is of immense significance to the quality of the experience of the world. Secondly, while mere understanding and explanation is not instrumental in itself, it may be the framework for instrumental knowledge
Perhaps there is no ultimate explanation. On the assumption of materialism, for example, reasons for though not proof of the final lack of explanation may be given. However, an alternate approach to the question of—ultimate—explanation is to attempt other explanations and see if they can be—made—ultimate. That would not be counter-scientific but parallel to science or, in a broader sense, inclusive of science—at least in principle and in so far as science is valid
How might the search for explanation be approached? Something would be different from science—from scientific materialism. The explanation would still be empirical, would probably still employ concepts. The discussion already suggests what might be different. Look at the world. It does not appear to be made up of the fundamental forces and particles of modern physics. In a sense the foundational part of the approach of modern physics is to describe the world in terms of something else. The alternative would be to not refer the world to something else
This suggests an explicit specification to the idea of Being: it is whatever is in the world just by being in the world… or perhaps, Being is the quality of being in the world. The latter use is syntactically rather like ‘things are material’ or ‘things have the quality of being material’
The use of being—consistent capitalization may be tedious—just suggested is the historical idea of being, the one that derives from the linguistic root be-ing, the idea to study being-as-being, i.e. to study things-as-they-are—to study the world-as-world
It might seem that the idea of being cannot generate much in the way of understanding beyond ‘what is there is what is there!’ That is where the developments that follow hold an immense surprise. The developments from this plain beginning are enormous. It is not enough to say they are profound—profundity signifies depth, perhaps. The outcome is not merely deep but it is that what is ultimately deep is also ultimately shallow and that there is no entity or kind that is not implicitly included. Of course, these developments are not the result of ‘what is there is there’ alone but of imagination and careful reflection. However, one source of power is already in hand. It saying that the world is not made up of matter it is not being said that it is made of something else. It is not being said that the world is being made of anything at all. The nature of the world, if any, will fall out of our researches. Since there is no advance commitment, the approach does not begin with the kind of mistake to which substance theories are subject. And the rational-empirical foundation of the approach has already been suggested… but these general thoughts about the approach remain to be put in to practice and that will require imagination and diligent care in the development of the system of ideas
What, then, is the (or a) Theory of being? It will not be that the nature of the world is something ‘more fundamental’ as in science or something else or, as in some religions, something outside the world, for example, ‘God the creator.’ This idea will be taken up in detail in discussing ‘substance theory’ where the idea of substance as ‘underlying’ the world will be shown to be untenable
One thing is clear. In talking of the world as or having being, the criticism of referring to or explaining in terms of something else cannot be made. And it is would be a deep criticism for the next concern would be ‘what is that something else?’ This is how use of being cuts the Gordian knot of substance; how being cuts the endless chain of explanation at something real. Since the world is referred to itself perhaps the gain is a loss—nothing is truly explained in saying ‘the world is itself.’ This is the surprise. Something is gained—as noted above. In saying things have a deep explanation there nature is referred to something else which may harbor error; in not making the deep reference that possibility of error is blocked. Simultaneously, the possibility of looking at what is ‘immediate’ is opened up and this has, at least, the potential of opening up understanding. The story of Foundation is one story of an opening up of understanding
If it is not to begin with something else, it will begin with what is immediate. What exists is immediate, not in that everything that exists is close by, but in that it is not being said that it is something else. ‘Existence’ is another word for—or at least close in meaning to—being. So it seems that not much is being said in introducing existence. The concept of existence has been subject to much scrutiny and criticism, e.g., since ‘everything exists’ existence does not really mean anything at all; there are other fundamental criticisms taken up later. However, something is gained. Addressing the criticisms will lead to much clarification of the meaning and uses of being and of existence
What exists? Does my worktable exist? It has a flat top and four legs and has a certain geometry. But I also think it is made up of atoms and forces and so on. Is it those? And if so, what does that mean for the geometrical solid shape that I experience the table as having? Obviously the table—something corresponding to my idea of the table—exists but I don’t know precisely what it is. Is there anything that I know that exists? The universe exists! I do not know all the details of it and from the example of my table I may not know any of the details but I do not need to know them. In saying that the universe exists I am not referring to the details. The universe, then, is roughly ‘all being’ and this term is used a lot in the narrative so readers should not confuse it with other uses such as in the phrase ‘multiple universes.’ In the present use there is one universe and there is nothing outside it. Immediately it follows that it has no outside creator
Here is one doubt. There is an experience of the universe (all being) but perhaps experience is all there is. In the example of the table, experience was to not be a certain guide—this is of course common knowledge. Discussion of ‘experience’ is taken up later. One aspect of the discussion is to show the intimate weave of existence and person (it is nowhere going to be said that being perceived is required for or confers existence—at least in the naïve meanings of the terms used.) This is another place that the kind of analysis done here is different from that of science. Experience or perception is analyzed in grounding science but, as far as possible, the aim is to show the truth of science as outside the subjective realm. Here, instead, the aim is to analyze what overlap there may be between the objective and the subjective and this line of thought will lead into showing the empirical nature of the Theory of being and to show where analysis and experience meet and this leads, in addition to the weave of being and person, to the empirical-rational character of the Theory of being. It is relevant to note that nowhere is it said that objective truth is grounded in mere experience. The philosopher Immanuel Kant had an idea that could be interpreted as follows. Since we live in and negotiate in this world our experience of it in perception, emotion and thought must have some reliability even though it is not perfect and even if the nature of the correspondence (reliability) is not clear. The evolutionary thought of Charles Darwin adds something to this. It sees ‘imperfection’ as ‘being in a process of adaptation’ where perfect attunement to an environment is not so much impossible as lacking in meaning
Discussion began with ‘what is there;’ and continued with ‘how can what is there be explained;’ the idea of existence was introduced; the question whether I know anything that exists precisely and surely was entertained. The outcome was that there is one thing that I know for sure exists—the universe; and it was discovered that it has no creator (on the reasonable thought that a creator is an external creator.) A thought about the reliability of experience leads to some understanding of the nature of experience and to the relation between individual and world
The outcome of discussion so far is not a Theory of being but it seems as though it may be part of such a theory
The discussion so far has glossed over numerous difficulties—some mentioned, others not. These will be brought up and dealt with in what follows. Some of the ‘problems’ may seem like quibbles. ‘Does the table exist?’ Of course to doubt the table in a practical way would be neurotic. However, philosophic doubt, as has already been seen in a small way, may lead to profound understanding—this is well known. ‘What does it mean to say that the table exists?’ casts the quibble as a conceptual question. In this narrative it will be found that profound results may occur as well and this is contrary to much contemporary thought—analysis of ideas leads to clarification, for results we turn to practical knowledge and science
What, then, is a Theory of being? In the sense of being hypothetical it is not a theory at all. Its process is the process of looking at the world as it presents and reflecting on what is known and can be known in immediate terms. Of course, there is no reason to exclude science except in dogmatic forms and the development often draws from science in various ways. However there is an emphasis being-as-being and this, as seen, goes rather outside science which often sees the world in ‘other’ terms
A look at the contents of the division Theory of being suggests what the content may be. Two dimensions are ‘depth’ and ‘breadth.’ The depth which is seen to be quite shallow (and it is in the shallowness that some profundity lies) is in the analysis of the nature of immediate things: the contents of chapters Being, Objects, Logic and meaning, and, to some extent, the contents of Mind and of Method. The breadth or variety concerns what variety of things and kinds of thing are there: the content of Cosmology. The discussions above show beginnings of how these topics may be approached and just a brief hint of results; the logic and the detail is left for the narrative
A short reflection on ‘what there is in the world’ may be interesting. In addition to things such as trees, mountains and galaxies there is also behavior and there are also laws. Obviously, behavior is in the world. A law of nature is a more or less general verbal or mathematical expression of patterns, behaviors and dynamics in the world. Is a law in the world? If a law is valid then it corresponds to something of the world, not something else, that may be called Law and is in the world. Next consider numbers. One apple is in the world, more precisely there is one apple (and more) on the apple tree. But where is the number one? Is it anywhere? Numbers are an example of what have been called abstract objects. In today’s thought there is no full agreement on the nature of abstract objects and their relation to the non-abstract or particular objects such as apples and stars. In the developments that follow it will be shown that the distinction between particular and abstract objects is artificial. Abstract objects are in the world as is behavior. A form like a number is also and abstract object and is therefore in the world. Where are the abstract objects? The considerations taken up later show that contrary to most current thought abstract objects may have spatial location and temporal being; in the more abstract objects the spatial and temporal character is not of consequence. Consideration of ‘what there is in the world’ reveals that there are not only things, but laws, patterns, forms, mathematical objects and many other kinds taken up later
Consider the void. It is what is left when the universe or world is ‘taken away.’ The idea has difficulties for how can the universe are ‘taken away?’ Such concerns are addressed later (the ‘taking away’ is conceptual.) Since all laws are in the world, there are no laws in the void. Therefore the void can transform to (or annihilate) any state except logically impossible states, i.e., those whose description or concept has a contradiction; therefore any logically possible state exists or will exist and will transform to any other
That every logically possible state exists is a critical idea in showing that particular and abstract objects are not distinct
These thoughts encourage and conjure up ideas of paradox and more; these concerns are addressed in the narrative
Imagine, now, the universe of possibilities that arises. It is possible to speak meaningfully on the variety of things and kinds in the universe, on karma, on recurrence, on God and identity, on the identities of and among individuals…
But what then of science and ‘common sense’ and practical experience? Surely ‘anything is possible’ is absurd. The narrative resolves the absurdity, preserves science and practical knowledge but modifies their interpretation in a way that is consistent with their own principles, and develops implications: these ideas inform every chapter of the text including the variety noted above and that is on display in greater scope and detail in Cosmology. Thus not only it is possible to speak meaningfully on the variety of things and kinds in the universe… but the logic permits this talk to be definitive; the developments in identity provides significance to ‘mere’ facts
There is a story of a disciple who was excited to learn from his teacher that God is in all things. The disciple sees an elephant walking toward him and thinks the exhilarating thought ‘God is in me, I don’t need to move.’ Later, bruised in body and ego, he complains to the teacher about the teaching. The teacher says ‘Yes, God is in you but why didn’t the God in you see the God in the elephant and move out of the way?’ This is the ‘paradox’ of ultimate truth immanent in the present. One may have to learn how to walk that path carefully. There is ultimate truth but the immediate world is no less real for it. Truth revealed shows not just itself but how to relate to this world as well; this concern is addressed in many traditional religions. In this narrative a logic of the side-by-side character of the ultimate and the immediate is developed; this can only help the intuition in accommodating to the real
Naturally, the fist topic in a theory of being will be the working out of the nature of the most general kinds or aspects of things. This is the subject of Metaphysics whose empirical character and some of whose conceptual elements are set up in Being. It is essential to the development of the me