JOURNEY IN BEING
NEW WORLD
ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © June 2006
Ambition. The narrative. Journey. Being. Metaphysics: Theory of Being. The Object. Logic. Mind. Cosmology. Human being. Morals and society. Ethics and objectivity. Action and politics. Civilization and history. The Highest Ideal. Faith
Journey. Principles of thought. Understanding and Transformation. Philosophy and Metaphysics. Problems in Metaphysics. A System of Understanding. History of Transformation. Transformation. Bases and Theory. System of experiments. Transformation so far. Designs. Further investigation. The Future. System of concepts. The Author
The Journey is an exploration whose ambition is knowledge and experience of all being
If the ambition is realized, the story of the individual will be that of all being
The actual paths and achievements are channeled by interest, which includes the present, and subject to limits. In an extended journey interests and Understanding of limits may change as a result of experience and reflection. One goal of the ‘Foundation’ is to understand limitation and Possibility. The nature of limits and distinctions between theoretical limits (possibility, Necessity and actuality) and practical limits (feasibility) is a central concern that is introduced in the section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being’
Even though moral concerns are fundamental, their explicit consideration and their relations to limits and interest are taken up later. This is because the concept of Ethics that is developed provides a more comprehensive foundation than the previous topics that include metaphysics, object (knowledge,) and cosmology
The foundation is placed at the beginning even though its development has been intertwined with process. It develops a description of the Universe, a Metaphysics, based in careful thought. Reason alone is insufficient: imagination and experience are required as well
The resulting picture or metaphysics is explicitly ultimate in depth: no further depth is possible or needed
In breadth, the picture is implicitly ultimate: it provides an approach to describing and experiencing the Variety of being. However, that the picture is implicit for variety means that it is not possible to describe the variety of being in its entirety. This is true because the number of actual states of being is an order of infinity that is too large to be placed in a sequence, even an infinite one
A Variety of being is ever open to discovery and exploration!
A purpose of the first division, ‘Foundation’ is to serve as conceptual base for the exploration through Understanding and transformations of Being and Identity (a Theory of Identity is developed in the foundation.) It is not in the nature of the foundation that it determines the exploration; instead the foundation may be seen as ‘what conceptual foundation may have been found on the way.’ The arrangement of the topics in the foundation occurs in a natural order from general to particular and further refined to suggest paths to the exploration
The exploration is narrated in the second division, ‘Journey in Being’ whose overlapping phases are understanding and transformation. The foundation is part of understanding and understanding part of transformation; however transformation also includes physical change and transformation of identity. It is expected that the transformations will suggest revisions in the foundation. While foundation serves as conceptual base, it is expected that experience (in transformation) will independently suggest further possibilities for transformation. The second division contains practical material regarding foundation for transformation
The narrative may call to readers who have an interest in the journey itself and or in the discoveries on the way. Some of the areas in which these discoveries lie are Metaphysics including the depth and variety of being and of Identity, knowledge and conditions that knowledge should satisfy, Logic, Cosmology, Mind, the nature of Human being, Ethics, society, faith, and the dynamics of transformation
Although the important concepts of the narrative are defined, the meanings of the ideas are revealed in developing them and not by definition alone. Therefore, ‘definitions’ are suggestive rather than authoritative. Definitions are not necessarily placed at the beginning of the narrative or the beginning of a section in which a concept is discussed
In the text, an entire paragraph placed in brackets marks elaboration or a peripheral issue that is not essential to but may help illuminate the main narrative
The text introduces a number of ‘theories.’ The reader may refer to the discussion of the concept of Theory in the section ‘Logic’ where in the present meaning, Fact and theory are not distinct and the factual character of theories (over appropriate domains) is made clear
When referring to such theories as are developed here, the narrative employs capitalization e.g. the Theory of Being. Typically, when names Logic, Cosmology and so on are capitalized the reference is to the meaning as defined or specified here; when capitalization is not used, reference is to common meaning. When the name occurs frequently in one paragraph or the space of a few paragraphs, not every instance is capitalized. Capitalization has another use: to distinguish when a word is used to focus on a concept and when it is used unselfconsciously as part of the narrative; in this case, the conceptual use may be capitalized
They searched for the Real, for what is true – for the ultimate and the meaning of ‘the ultimate’
They searched for the ultimate in the Real and the Good
Their ambition was the ultimate and its realization in the present
They felt that direct contact with the Real was of the essence and that immersion in the traditions was essential; that immersion in the immediate was (a way to the) real
Many paths were taken, many abandoned. Some paths were taken to their (known) end and then beyond the edge to the interior of new landscapes where footing was (initially) insecure
They had and followed ideas about the true and the great and thought they had arrived – again and again. Early, they thought they could arrive through perception and ideas – through knowledge and Understanding. Later, they saw that action and transformation of being –of Identity– were also essential
It was sought to translate the indefinite end of the ‘ultimate’ into more definite terms. Toward this end they found the traditions of learning and experience –even when limited– to be invaluable; these provided some foundation, some inspiration upon which to build. As understanding and experience grew, so did their recognition of what is possible. The goals of their endeavor changed as their understanding grew
The undertaking assumed the character of a journey
They wrote of their travel in Being. They wrote because they felt that there was something of value to say. They experienced attachment to their ideas and words. The attachments became a burden. They sought to retain only what was of essence and what suggested essence: so as to be clear, to be open to understanding and criticism, to bring closure to a phase. In shedding excess, what might have been an expedition became travel, what might have been only diffuse acquired also clarity
[Yet, writing and reading are ‘linear’ acts and bare in form while understanding is or aims at being whole and occurs within a universe of context. The expression of a whole in linear form is itself a creative labor – and so it is with reading: a single reading may be insufficient for comprehension as a whole or to build up a universe of context. The contextual world evoked for a reader may be quite different than that of a writer]
From the traditions ‘Being’ is a central idea that has, as part of a system of ideas, been used in an attempt to express the essence of the Real in words. The idea of being is not esoteric. The root is the verb ‘to be’ whose forms include ‘is,’ ‘was,’ ‘will be,’ ‘am’ and so on. Whatever is – is or has being. The idea knows no discrimination of esoteric or mundane, of Matter or Mind, of state or process or relationship, of near or far, of higher or lower Form, or of form or Formlessness. Being is immediate and remote. These thoughts, they found, recommend being
It is precisely the fact that ‘being’ refers without commitment as to kind that makes the idea useful. In contrast, use of committed and therefore prejudicial, and so possibly limited, specialized concepts e.g. of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ may be inadequate to capture what lies open to discovery, to capture, in a concept, the nature of the entire Universe. (It will be seen later that, in their usual meanings (see the discussion of ‘extension’ under the topic, ‘Meaning in general. Concepts,’ below) mind and matter are limited and that their application to the entire range of being entails paradox.) In other words, the power of the word ‘being’ derives, in part, from naming (all of) what is unknown (and known.) In this there is an analogy to the power of naming the unknown in the algebraic approach in mathematics
[The use of the concept of being will enable an evaluation of ‘foundationalism,’ the thesis that knowledge (and action) are capable of ultimate foundation]
Although they used ‘being’ to connect to tradition, this was not the primary reason for the choice. ‘Being,’ was the idea that they found capable of adaptation toward touching what is real, to channeling their understanding of the real, of what is good, of what is true and great – and ultimate
So far, the meaning of ‘being’ has not been specified even though there is a connection with ‘existence’
Here, ‘Being’ shall be that which exists or has existence
What does it mean to exist? What ‘things’ exist? Defer these questions until the understanding that permits reasonable answers has been developed. I.e., in identifying being with existence nothing (except generality) has yet been specified
[The following acknowledges a familiar distinction. The verb to be, indicates existence as in ‘I think therefore I am.’ However, some forms of the verb have other senses e.g. to show a property as in ‘grass is green’ rather than existence. The point also illustrates variant and family Meaning that are significant immediately below and subsequently. Variant meaning can also be understood by saying that the different symbols, corresponding to the variant meanings, have the same sign]
Typically, ‘is’ means ‘exists at the present.’ They found it convenient to use an alternative and extended connotation in which ‘is’ stands for ‘was,’ ‘is,’ or ‘will be.’ In English, ‘is’ does not distinguish ‘is here’ or ‘is there.’ The use of ‘is’ and ‘exists’ may be used to cover such variant connotations. It is not clear that space and Time –extension and duration– are appropriate to coordination of all being. The terms phase or manifold may be used to refer to generalized coordination. Then, ‘exists’ may refer a point, a region, or to the entire manifold of being (universe.) These two uses of ‘is,’ ‘being,’ and ‘exist’ may be referred to as the temporal and the atemporal. However, more than time (and space) may be implicated in coordination of being; the uses of being shall therefore be referred to as coordinate (or local) and global (or supra-coordinate)
It is in the nature of concepts that in deploying them in the Understanding (in the present case of all being,) their meaning shall continue to be revealed. Excepting final revelation of all things, meaning shall continue to shift and change
The actual situation is a little more complex – a number of concepts may be required. The entire meaning lies in a system or field of concepts whose understanding requires that all concepts be understood in interaction (since the aspects of the world are interwoven.) this is clearly seen in an axiomatic system even though it might not be so clear in common use because the sense of each common concept may seem to stand independently as a result of familiarity. Meaning is distributed non uniquely among the system (which is distinct from incomplete determination of a system in relation to understanding the world.) It is commonly thought that such revelation must be unending. However, that is not necessarily the case. That growth in understanding has not ended does not imply that it is unending. A point may come when the understanding is recognizably complete
[‘Meaning’ may be regarded as being specified by ‘sense’ and ‘reference.’ This was emphasized by the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (born 1848, Wismar, Germany.) The idea of sense (which is similar to connotation, intension) is conveyed by the intuitive grasp of its use and significance associated with a Concept; there are various ways in which the sense of a concept can be formalized but it is perhaps essential to have a fixed system of meaning. The idea of reference (similar to denotation, extension) is conveyed by the collection of ‘things’ to which the concept refers. In a given system, e.g. an axiomatic system, reference is sufficient to specify meaning. However, in an open system (‘real life’) sense is required to supplement reference. There are a number of sources in the change or shift in the sense of a concept in use and over time, some of which have to do with interest and fashion; a primary and essential source of change in meaning is the growth of knowledge or ‘shifting knowledge contexts.’ As knowledge grows, the meaning of a concept may expand or shift even though the idea remains the same (similar.) The sense of a concept is required to effectively use it in varying contexts of reference. As will be seen in the section ‘Logic,’ an interpretation of mathematics is one of certain structures that axiomatic systems attempt to represent or capture. There is no guarantee that the structure that is needed will be captured even if the axiomatic system captures some structure with elegance. Here, too, the intuition (and sense) of the concept is significant. There is a relation among intuition of Form, concept (language,) and world. As noted later, the forms are as if Platonic but there is no separate Platonic world. In the developments that follow, it is seen that the depiction of being in general is identical to the mathematical case except that the conceptual system is not always as neat as it is in mathematics. I.e. depiction of the world involves relations among form, intuition of form and concepts]
Above, the questions ‘What does it mean to exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were mentioned. These questions are equivalent to the question ‘What is the sense and reference of ‘to exist’ or ‘existence’?’
Relations between use and meaning are taken up later in the topic ‘Further analysis of being,’ below, and later in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
What they found is completion that is possible in some directions e.g. depth but perhaps not in other directions e.g. variety – i.e. completion is explicitly Possible with regard to depth but its possibility appears to be at most implicit with regard to variety
The idea of the concept itself has a variety of meanings. What is the significance of the concept? Start with an example. There are many wolves whose membership in the same class is recognized not because the individual has available a definition of the wolf but rather an intuitive concept of the wolf. In a world that contained just one wolf, would there be a concept of ‘wolf?’ There might not be a need for a distinct name but the concept would be possible as in ‘that animal is distinct from zebras, lions and so on and has characteristic that may be noted and recalled.’ Thus, in keeping with the discussion of the concept-object, a ‘wolf’ could be a concept even if there was only one actual wolf (or even if there were no wolves but it would be improbable that in the absence of wolves the imagination would produce the wolf in all detail.) One idea of the concept is that it is a mental content – perhaps a definite and recognizable one; this is another name for the concept-object. Generally, the named concepts are those that have significance. There are (at least) two kinds of significance in relation to concepts. The first is when the concept corresponds to many or common entities and the second is when there is only one entity (e.g. the universe) or few entities that have especial significance. Commonly when talking of concepts, concern is with the significant concept. The (significant) concept has the significance that it enables (is or encodes) recognition of patterns, repetition, significance, behavior and, so, makes organized perception and thought efficient. The significant concept is a common element of theories; however, recognition of facts also requires concepts and significance results in focus, attention and prominence. The mental content and the significant concept are not distinct in their fundamental kind
That (non human) animals recognize distinct entities shows first, that a percept is a concept and, second, that non human animals are capable of concepts
The system of concepts unfolds with the narrative. The reader who wishes to see the concepts collected together in one place may refer to the Index System of concepts
There is a classical theory of definition due to Aristotle that involves ‘genus’ and ‘difference’ and a variety of modern theories of definition that include definition as a part of the formalization of axiomatic systems
More illuminating to the present narrative is a concern with limits of clarity that may be achieved by definition
It is a common observation that things that are easy to recognize (except boundary cases) may be difficult to define satisfactorily – may lack any satisfactory definition altogether. Why is this?
The conceptual-perceptual apparatus of human and other animals is adapted (attuned) to their world. In consequence, the recognition of common natural and social objects is, typically, effortless – for familiar objects the recognition itself does not occur at a conscious level. This adaptation covers not only the entities but the frameworks of perception including space and Time. ‘Intuition’ (which has other shades of Meaning – the sense here is that of Immanuel Kant, born 1724, Königsberg, Prussia) is one name for these more or less automatic and pre-linguistic elements of cognition (which may require familiarization during development of the organism.) Translating the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted intuition into a linear definition in symbols (language) is expected to be difficult and incomplete. Here, then, is one source of the incompleteness of definition. It becomes clear, however, that in common use there is no compelling need to definition – except perhaps in boundary cases; but what boundary cases show is that tight distinctions do not always obtain and are therefore unnatural to maintain
The concept of intuition is developed in the later section ‘The Object’
The intuition of an object may be clear but if there are no similar or alternative terms available for comparison, definition may be difficult. An example is the concept of consciousness that is discussed in the later section ‘Mind.’ Consciousness is so central to human experience –it may be said to be experience of the world– that there is in moment-to-moment experience no question of its being and quality. However, it is difficult to explain what it is except to indicate its presence – it is not the world but it is (the quality of the) experience of the world. It is relatively easy to talk of the varieties of conscious experience – of pleasure and pain, of color, of taste and so on. However, consciousness itself, though central and familiar appears to be like nothing else. Hence it is possible to talk around it but difficult to address its nature directly. If, however, it were possible and reasonable to identify a primitive and elementary consciousness among e.g. the elements of matter, human or animal consciousness might then be defined as combinations of the primitive forms at a number of levels and degrees of focus. These thoughts will be developed further in the discussion of ‘Mind’
Another source of difficulty in definition is in the fact that relative to human experience, the world (universe) is an ‘open system.’ This is true of day-to-day experience and of science. In physics, for example, the concept of ‘force’ has been central. The concept has origins in animal and human experience and has been adapted to quantitative use in mechanics – the branch of physics concerned with motion and causes of motion of material objects. The history of the concept of force dates back (at least) to Greek times and received interpretation and reinterpretation in the modern era before Newton, by Newton himself, in the abstract formalizations of Newton’s system, in the field theories of electromagnetism, in the quantum theories and in the relativistic theories of space, time and gravitation. The precise character and significance of the concept of force changes according to the theoretical environment. The case is similar with other common, scientific (and theological and philosophical) concepts
That an intuition may develop regarding formal (e.g. scientific) concepts and systems makes re-conceptualizing and re-definition difficult
Although closed theoretical systems may give concepts precise meaning, the world is open and as long as its Understanding is incomplete, the meanings of concepts remain in-process and definitions remain tentative. After a closed system has been developed, definitions may be placed at the beginning. In the open case, definition and investigation remain in interaction
Seeing a system (a text, a life) as closed may result in an impression of a (definite) beginning and end. ‘Beginnings’ and ‘endings’ are, perhaps, no more than stopping points…
This strand of thought is taken up again under ‘Mathematics’ in the section ‘Logic’
Although this topic could be omitted without loss to the main development, it reveals some aspects of the conceptual character of being (existence.) The discussion permits some comments on analytic philosophy which has been a source of clarification of the concepts of this narrative. The discussion of analytic philosophy is continued in the later section, ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
[Analytically inclined thinkers have identified some problems with the idea of existence. Everything exists. But if everything exists then fictional characters such as unicorns exist. The source of the problem is that the same word may be used to refer to a thing and the idea or concept of the thing… and, in English at least, the grammatical form in which there is talk of unicorns need not indicate that a unicorn is fictional. A consistent use could be obtained by regarding existence as a property of a Concept or an idea. Then ‘x exists’ would mean ‘there is an actual thing to which the idea x refers’ and ‘x does not exist’ would mean ‘there is no actual thing to which the idea x corresponds.’ However, such a usage is not necessary for the analytic contradiction is easy to avoid and the example suggests that over-formalization of incompletely determined concepts may be misleading as to depth of understanding]
[A unicorn may be thought of as a ‘non existent’ Object (on the assumption that there are no unicorns.) Since, in common use, an object is something that does exist, what could ‘non existent object’ mean? Is not the idea self-contradictory? Objects are seen – but what is it that is seen? What is seen is not the actual thing-as-it-is for the impression that an individual has, though of the thing is also of the Mind. It is not a copy but perhaps a reconstruction. Picture the world. Of all the combinations of its elements only some can be seen as objects (in vision the inside of the mountain is not seen even though it could be seen with special techniques and is known conceptually.) Of all the possible visible objects only some are seen as such (two birds may be seen as two objects or as one object e.g. when flying in unison but the feather of a bird and a blade of grass are not usually seen as an object.) Thus object-as-seen partakes of a perceptual-conceptual character. This is the meaning of ‘object’ used in this paragraph. Further, until it is established that the object i.e. the concept-object corresponds faithfully to the external object it is the only significant meaning (if it were to be established that the correspondence were impossible, it would necessarily be the only meaning.) Here ‘non existent object’ means that there is no entity that corresponds to the idea or concept. There are, by usual definition and in typical geometries, no square circles. That is, a square circle is a self-contradictory concept. Can a square circle be considered to be a non existent object? In that the word-concept ‘square circle’ (an attempt to form a picture of a square circle would bend the imagination) refers to no object, it is not inconsistent to say that a square circle is a non existent object. Similarly a golden mountain is a non existent object. Whereas a square circle is necessarily non existent (everywhere except in unusual geometries,) a golden mountain is contingently non existent (e.g. non existent on earth but possibly existent.) The idea of non existent objects was introduced by the philosopher Alexius Meinong (born 1853, Lemberg, Austrian Empire) in attempting to clarify the relation between ideas and things. It was Meinong who first suggested and formulated the idea of concept-object introduced earlier in this paragraph. It appears that the concept of the non existent object makes the concept of object more symmetric but not necessarily deeper. The purposes to inclusion of these thoughts here are (1) they encourage abstract or ‘algebraic’ thought regarding being, (2) for possible post-narrative use in clarifying the meaning of the ‘Void’ (the term is introduced later) e.g. the void may be thought of as containing all non existent objects]
Note that unless reasonable care is taken it is likely that confusion among the various senses of object will occur. The common sense of object has not been shown to be tenable. These issues will receive further attention in the section, ‘The Object,’ where the object will be further analyzed and circumstances under which the concept-object and the common use of object coincide, at least as facsimiles, will be clarified
[An analytic approach to understanding the world is subject to a number of corrupting temptations. The first is to avoid the world itself, to assume or behave as though it is barred to talk of the world in any terms other than the formal and the critical. Thus the world of the analytic approach may be (and often is) impoverished and flat. The critical approach that bars talk of the world (of metaphysics) is itself based on models of knowledge (e.g. reducibility to or construction –supervenience– upon experience) and values (e.g. certainty.) In a critical perspective, the burden of proof should be on the metaphysician but the critical-analytic approach tends to disallow talk to begin. If there were an absolute impossibility proof then metaphysical talk would be futile. However, as noted, proofs of impossibility (due, e.g., to Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, born 1889, Vienna) are based on conceptions of knowledge (discussed e.g. in the later section ‘The Object’) and in order to address the possibility of metaphysics it may be desirable to develop a tentative metaphysics and to then subject it to criticism. The classic arguments against metaphysics appear reasonable but it will be seen that metaphysics by construction is Possible. The analyst turns the reasonable idea that thought cannot get outside itself into an absolute and must therefore focus ‘within’ e.g. on ‘use.’ This focus has tended, even while it enhances insight, to also allow under-conceptualizing to match a tendency to over-formalization. The resulting tendency to piecemeal analysis yields rings of concepts locked together in mutual error –each piece inherits and so absorbs and propagates errors of the other pieces– and shallowness but cloaked in sophistication]
Early, they turned to analytic philosophy for inspiration where they saw promise. Later, they found that the promise they had imagined was unrealized. They continued to value the principle of analysis but turned away from analysis as its own end; they became reflexively critical of the analytic criticism of other endeavors – the analysis of systems and of depth and the criticism of metaphysics based in restricted pictures and values of knowledge and in taking the self-indulgent metaphysical systems of the past as capturing the essence of any metaphysics of things (over experience)
Metaphysics is concerned with understanding the world. In one meaning, metaphysics is a study of the most general aspects of things – the way they are in virtue of their existence. The kinds of things may be an object, the universe, the real, or (in an unconventional interpretation) a method of demonstration. The Theory of Being as developed here is concerned not only with what there is in the local cosmological system but what there is in the entire universe: what is actual? The Theory of Being is concerned with depth (foundation, issues of substance) and variety or cosmology. It is found that what is possible is (in the global sense of ‘is’) realized in the universe i.e. the actual and the possible are identical. However what is possible in terms of the patterns of behavior of the local cosmological system has a far lesser variety than what is possible (without qualification i.e. in the universe.) What is locally possible is an example of the concept of the normal e.g. of normal behavior
They were able to show a picture of the Universe that is deeper than that of the tradition of ideas and of greater variety than that of science, Faith, myth and fiction. Their picture of depth (metaphysics and Logic) was explicitly ultimate. Their picture of variety (cosmology) was only implicitly ultimate but still explicitly infinitely greater than that of science, faith, myth and fiction
The five central concepts of their metaphysics were ‘being,’ ‘Universe,’ ‘Void,’ ‘Logos’ (or Logic,) and the ‘Normal’
They said that it is essential to understand the meanings that they attached to these terms and to exclude all other meanings in order to follow their development of the depth and variety of being (while remaining open to the suggestive power of variant meanings)
Being is that which exists or has existence. Being includes not just things but also laws, forms, and patterns. Typically, laws are thought to be read into things. However, the concept of the Universe is that of all being – the manifold of all being. There is nothing outside the Universe; therefore, laws, patterns, forms are not outside the universe: they are immanent in (all) being. (It will become clear that talk of distinct universes is without content.) Therefore, while laws, forms and patterns may be read, Laws, Forms, and Patterns are immanent in being. They did not need to further distinguish law from Law, form from Form… The Void is the absence of being and Logos is the law or form of all being
Perhaps the most basic fact or given is that there is being. If there were no being, these words would be neither written nor read; nor would there be an impression, delusion, illusion or hallucination of their being written or read
Consideration of the natures of being, Universe and Void make possible the development of a metaphysics or Theory of Being. The general aspects of the theory are treated in the present section, ‘Metaphysics: The Theory of Being’ and a variety of special concerns are taken up in ‘The Object,’ ‘Logic,’ ‘Mind,’ and ‘Cosmology.’ The sections ‘Human Being’ through ‘Faith’ include implications of the theory for the specific topics
As the complement of any entity relative to itself, or the complement of the universe relative to itself, the void exists. The void contains no pattern no law. Consider a description that if realized would be the description of a state of affairs. If from the void, that state was never realized that would constitute a law. Therefore every consistent description (or conception or picture of a state of affairs) must be realized. More accurately, the entire consistent system of descriptions must be realized (‘the entire consistent system…’ is a topic for further investigation.) The following assertions now follow immediately. Every element of being (entity) must interact with every other element of being. There is one universe (there are no isolated ‘universes.’) The void is equivalent to the Universe and to every entity. It makes no difference whether there are many voids or one; ‘they’ are equivalent to one. The manifest universe has ‘origins’ in the void. Any entity including the manifest universe may be annihilated by the void. The equivalence of the void and the universe is equivalent to complete indeterminism. Essential indeterminism necessarily results in structure. There is no universal determinism and whatever causation there may be is either not universal or vastly different (perhaps weaker and less regular but simultaneously longer in its reach) from the causation of common experience and science (classical or modern)
The fundamental principle of the Theory of Being, just shown to be true, is the assertion that the entire consistent system of descriptions must be realized
[There are thoughts in the writings of Leibniz (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, born July 1, 1646, Leipzig,) of David Hume (born May 7, 1711, Edinburgh, Scotland) and of Wittgenstein that have similarity to the theory being developed. Leibniz suggested that the only impossibilities were logical contradictions. However, it appears that Leibniz did not take this thought to its possible conclusion; he may, in fact have disagreed with the conclusions being made here – he wrote that ‘Nothing arises from nothing.’ In the subsequent section ‘Second proof of the ‘fundamental principle’ of the Theory of Being’’ a use is made of the idea of Hume and Wittgenstein that ‘from the truth of one atomic proposition the truth of another does not follow’ (the word ‘atomic’ does not occur in Hume’s version.) These writers, as well, did not take their thoughts to their possible conclusions; they were both anti-metaphysical; and the statement ‘from the truth…’ may have had among its intents to show a lack of metaphysical (causal) connections in the world]
Since the void is equivalent to all being, there is no substance and no explanatory need for substance. Being may be regarded as having (Necessary) origin in the void. Explanation terminates in the void without need for explanatory regress. (These assertions and their meaning are further shown and elaborated in what follows)
An alternate statement is that the void may be considered to be the substance and it may play that role in view of the complete indeterminism of the void. The purposes of classical substance theory include the explanation of complexity from simplicity – of the Form and Variety of the world in substance which is uniform (formless) and unchanging. The difficulties of the classical forms of substance theory arise on account of a tacit determinism being associated with substance. This tacit determinism is apparently consistent with the purpose to explain complexity from simplicity. However, given determinism it is not merely difficult to explain form, variety and change from uniform and unchanging substance but impossible
[It would be interesting to review the history of substance theories, the meaning of substance, the way in which successive substance theories arose in response to the problems identified with earlier ones, the increasing sophistication of substance theories. However this temptation is avoided in this version of the present narrative, whose intents include brevity, since all substance theories remain problematic and since it is here demonstrated that the primary objective of substance theory can be achieved without substance. It will be useful, however, to carefully define the problems of substance theories. It is often thought that philosophical explanation requires substance because it is essential to making sense of the world. A non relativist philosophical system is one whose system of explanation terminates at some definite point with some kind of entity taken as fundamental; the motive to such systems is that in the alternative relativist systems there is (can be) no foundation or terminating explanation. It is thought that non relativist philosophical system must acknowledge substances in the most generic sense of that term, for that is only acknowledges some fundamental entities in the system. A fundamental entity or a system of fundamental entities must be simpler than what is to be generated or explained for otherwise it or they would not be fundamental. This, combined with the tacit assumption of determinism (due either to this being the classic mode of explanation or to the thought that determinism is simpler than indeterminism and therefore inherent in substance) make generation or explanation of novel Variety and complexity in terms of simplicity impossible. There is thus a paradox of explanation. Relativist systems do not provide (non terminating) explanations and non relativist systems can not. The source of the paradox is the tacit assumption of determinism (and the tacit assumption that determinism is conceptually simpler than indeterminism.) If the requirement of determinism is lifted, non relativism is possible but does not require substance. Lifting of the requirement is necessary to non relativism and efficient in the production of the ultimates in depth and variety]
The concept of the Void is ultimate in simplicity; it is this simplicity that allows for its actual generative power – the ‘simplicity’ of classical substance is an illusion for it contains the constraint of determinism that the void lacks. Therefore regarding the classical sense of substance, it is proper to not regard the ontology based in the void as substance ontology
The system of explanation based in the void terminates in it. Further the existence and properties of the void are derived from the existence of the world. Thus this form of ontology provides explanation that terminates and posits no arbitrary fundamental substance or given – except the world (being) itself
The following concern may have occurred to the reader. What has been said so far may be stated in the simple form (omitting logical niceties) ‘anything is possible.’ How is this consistent with the experience of the world of laws and limits? To answer this question it is required to show how form and structure must arise out of the void in indeterministic process (the origin of form and structure in indeterministic process may seem to be counterintuitive if not paradoxical.) It may also be useful to provide a plausible or probabilistic explanation or suggestion that the universe is dominated by formed systems – or at least that such systems will dominate observation. These issues are addressed in what follows
That form and structure are conceivable (describable) implies that they must arise (chaos and indeterminism are distinct – absolute chaos i.e. the ruling out of form and structure is a form of determinism.) No mechanism is universally necessary. However it would appear that adaptation (origin) of near symmetric forms by relative stability (and durability) would dominate the population of the Universe. Such systems are ‘normal’ in that they have laws and limits, in that not all logical possibilities are allowed under normal or lawlike behavior. The emergence of normal systems is necessary. This emergence (as is the emergence of any system) is necessarily indeterministic; their durability is an expression of their ‘Form’ or ‘Forms’ which is another word for the net adaptation that arises out of their near symmetry and, therefore relative stability; this durability is a factor in the domination of the population of the universe by normal systems; perfect symmetry is ‘frozen’ and therefore does not arise but if it were to, would not, of itself, decay; their emergence in a single step is possible and therefore occasionally necessary but the likelihood of such emergence is infinitesimal; incremental emergence with net adaptation at each increment is much more likely and is therefore another factor in the population of the universe by normality; incremental emergence may therefore be called ‘normal’ emergence; since normal emergence is possible it necessarily occurs; normal emergence is the dominant but not universal form of emergence; however not all emergence is normal
While normal systems cannot be entirely deterministic or causal, deterministic-like and causal-like phases of behavior arise (an expression of their form i.e. relative stability. This (local) cosmological system is normal. The laws of a normal system apply with near necessity to its inhabitants. The necessity of the emergence of normal systems explains the emergence of ‘law-like’ cosmological systems in a universe that is (constitutively) devoid of law. The apparent ‘impossibilities’ of a normal system (except Logical impossibilities) are improbabilities; its limits are difficult for its inhabitants to transcend. Such improbabilities and limits are relative to states of knowledge. Therefore, the realization of every description may violate normal behavior from one perspective but not from all perspectives… There is no distinction between Possibility and actuality. The but limited usual use of the concept of possibility refers to a restricted domain and concerns what is actual in a similar domain (constitutively identical.) Necessity concerns constitutive form. (The realization of every description is Necessary.) The Theory of Being is ultimate with regard to depth
They saw that there were identities among Metaphysics, Logic and Cosmology; that there was arbitrariness to the distinctions. They saw that in metaphysics, the focus was being itself; in Logic, Form; and in cosmology, Variety. The developments of Logic and cosmology, below, are continuations of the development of the metaphysics. A Logos is in the process of revelation
Before derivation came constitution e.g. ‘Being includes not only entities but also Patterns, Forms, Laws and Logos (universal law. )Entities are Forms.’ The derivations or inferences are of a number of kinds that follow. (1) General logical derivations such as ‘The system of consistent descriptions is realized,’ ‘There is no distinction between possibility and actuality’ and so on. (2) Logical characterizations of particular concepts e.g. Power, Form and Number (below.) (3) Normal or probabilistic considerations e.g. the formations of domains by ‘normal mechanisms’ and with ‘normal behavior;’ it is not necessary that all domains be normal and be formed by normal mechanisms (incremental change and durability of relatively stable forms) but the normal domains dominate the population of being and their formation is dominated by normal mechanisms; it is necessary, however, that some normal domains be formed by normal mechanisms. (4) Finally there is interaction between the Theory and special topics as included e.g. in the sections ‘Human being’ and ‘Faith’ in which the particular topic is illuminated and enhanced by and provides elaboration of the Theory of Being
The ‘logical’ character of these developments may be limited by the precision and certainty of the particular topic. When the development is an enhancement of the foundation of the special topic, the previous limits of that topic are no longer applicable and certain of the resulting conclusions may be necessary. Examples of necessary special developments include that evolution must involve both indeterminism and selection for (adapted or relatively stable) Form; that there are necessities of the extension of the concept of Mind (below) to the root of being; that there must be both bound and free symbols; that there be symbols (and images) that have degrees of binding to action (emotion;) that constructive thought cannot be entirely deterministic. Other developments are not necessary; some developments are reasonable e.g. when what is normal and therefore extremely probable –an example being mechanisms of origins– is taken as obtaining in a specific and apparently normal domain; other developments may be more speculative e.g. in assuming that something that is necessary in some domain applies in a given normal domain (speculation is included when it seems useful.) There is no intent to exclude significant content. Rather, an objective is to make clear the degree of confidence (from certain to merely speculative) and significance of content
…
They recalled Plato’s suggestion that power (having an effect) is ‘the’ measure of being. They may have started with this idea but, instead, they found it more convenient to development of the understanding of being to start from the concept of being (and therefore the Void) itself. Thus it follows from the theory that there is power between every two entities power among any collection of entities. ‘Being is the measure of being.’ This is similar to the idea that knowability is essential to being (this is not the idea that being known gives or is being.) However, the idea seems suspect. Why would something have to be known to a particular individual in order to have being? That is not the claim – a better form of the claim might be that it must be knowable to some being (the Theory of Being then implies that it is known – Possibility is actuality.) Still, it seems suspect to suggest that some organism must (know or) be capable of knowing an entity for that entity to exist. That, again, is not the claim. The ‘causal’ order is reversed: if an entity exists it is known. Again, a question arises: if knowing is a mark of Mind why, when mind is a special kind or aspect of being, should being known be (in effect) a mark of being? The answer will be taken up in the discussion of mind below. They distinguished mind-as-they-experienced-it-at-first-hand from Mind in general. They showed that the concept of mind may be consistently extended to the root of being and that this extension was Necessary; i.e. without the extension, the ‘paradoxes’ of Mind and Matter would continually arise. They forestalled the objection e.g. of the materialist who would say that mind-at-the-root (pan-psychism) is absurd. They did this by identifying the nature of the doubt: it is a doubt that thinks that the claim is that the mind at the root is like animal or human mind – possessed of a variety of functions and elaborations, capable of understanding and so on. Instead, mind-at-the-root is shown to be coeval and equi-primitive with primal manifest being. There is a remaining doubt. What is it at or about the primitive level that allows identification with mind and where does (the concept of) matter fit into this scheme? In discussing mind (below) they were able to address this doubt as well
Being known (knowable) e.g. by human beings does not confer existence although it does show existence. However, existence necessitates knowability. This implies that there are no entities that are unknowable. This may appear to be an excessive claim. However, any claim to knowledge or knowability must be based on some concept of knowledge. In the following, the claim that existence necessitates knowability is investigated in terms of a number of conceptions of knowledge that start with the naïve case in which knowledge is thought to be knowledge-of the entity and proceeds to consider alternative conceptions of knowledge, the nature of truth and of the real
Here, the object is what is known – as known
The word ‘object’ has been used informally in earlier sections; it now takes on the meaning just specified
The problems of the object are (1) to analyze the relationship between object and being – this may be called the ‘dual problem of being and object’ (or being and knowledge,) and (2) to identify the nature of the real and to see what objects are real
It is important to see the issues of being and object as dual rather than independent
Phenomenalism is or includes the view that ‘appearance is reality’ i.e. that there is no real world behind appearances (naturally, ‘appearance’ must receive appropriate interpretation.) Here, however, being and object are distinct concepts. Are objects and beings necessarily distinct in a view that regards the concepts as distinct? I.e. although the sense of ‘being’ is different from that of ‘object’ is the reference distinct? This is a central subject of this section
The part of this section that is directly relevant to the narrative is the development of various objects –particular and abstract e.g. individual and identity, form and law and pattern– and Form and Law and Pattern, universe, and, of course, the Object itself… and the Real
The discussion of the nature and conditions of knowledge are peripheral to the primary ambition. This discussion, though interesting, and the question of universals could be omitted. However, the discussion does show support for the narrative in a traditional perspective
A first, naïve, concept of knowledge is knowledge as knowledge-of the entity
Here, ‘entity’ encompasses not only ‘things’ but also states of affairs
Although it is at first going to be seen that, naïvely, there is no knowledge-of the entity it will be seen to what extent this negative claim may be revised
Identity has the sense of ‘sameness’ and is different from even though related to the sense in the later topic ‘Identity’ that discusses the enduring identity of objects and the enduring sense of self-identity of individuals
Obviously, in the naïve sense, what is known is not identical to the thing. Therefore, replace identity by faithfulness. However, even faithfulness falls short of what might be meant by knowledge. The image of a mountain is clearly not the mountain but in measuring what the mountain is, all that is available is the image (including visual, tactile and other components.) (Even the well known metaphor of the hologram is lacking because the concern is not with the relation between a brain state and the world but with the image and the world)
The absence of naïve identity and faithfulness motivates a definition of the object as the concept-object. That is the object is the concept; which includes all aspects of cognition
In the case a concept occurs without the thing (e.g. a unicorn) the labels ‘fictional object’ or ‘non-existent object’ may apply. A unicorn is a contingently non-existent object (as far as is known, in the local cosmological system.) An apple that is fully red and fully not red is a necessarily non-existent object
However, even though naïve identity and faithfulness are lacking it is still true that (1) the different senses and may (or may not) corroborate one another and in cases where there is no disconfirmation either by cognition (perception and thought) or in (extended) action it may be said that there is sufficient faithfulness (2) in other words, adaptation of organism in the environment allows talk of sufficient faithfulness
If among all modes of cognition and action there is no disconfirmation, the object is real or existent or non-fictional. The label ‘real’ applies tentatively and will be analyzed further in what follows
Even though there is no mapping from the entity to the concept-object, there must be some at least rough correspondence (e.g. a net but without congruence or meaning to congruence.) Why?
While an explanation may lie evolution or adaptation, success (even if only partial) in negotiating the environment requires correspondence (if only rough and of not clearly known character.) The argument just employed is ‘transcendental’ in that it does not depend on knowing the inner details of the context but, instead, on knowing some general external features; the ‘external’ features are of a different kind than the ‘inner’ details. How is the (sufficient degree of) faithfulness that is now known to be guaranteed in principle known in fact? The question is significant when some estimate of degree of faithfulness is needed (or desired,) or when working with domains that lie outside normal experience (where there is no pre-adaptation.) One possibility is to appeal to a teacher – but to who do teachers and other ‘experts’ appeal? To whom would a transcendent being (God?) appeal? The idea of appeal is a good one; ultimately, however, there is no outside agency of appeal. The idea is this. If something –the height of the mountain– is known in one way e.g. by visual measurement, it may be found another way e.g. by physical measurement. When all perceptions, all conceptual formulations and all agents agree, there is corroboration or coherence (it is a practical coherence; however the value and disvalue of full coherence have been discussed above)
The foregoing suggests a meaning for ‘god’ based in immanence rather than transcendence
In the section, ‘Morals and society,’ the adequacy of ‘adequate faithfulness’ as faithfulness will receive further and necessary validation
Truth is correspondence but is known (corroborated) by coherence
A Logos has been revealed. The Theory of Being (the Void) is a Logos. Perhaps the Form of manifest Being is that there is being. The Logos of a domain is its constitution; the Laws are contingent in that for a Logos, alternative laws are necessarily realized in other domains of the same constitution. A logic is the Understanding of a logos. The most general Logos concerns presence versus absence; Logic and Metaphysics are the same in a way that parallels object and being
An absolute object is here said to be one regarding which the concept-object is entirely faithful
The argument so far makes it seem as though there are no absolute objects. However this is not the case
The concepts of universe, being, void are clearly absolute i.e. knowledge of them (in-themselves though not in their details which are distinct ‘objects’) is altogether faithful. The faithfulness in this case arises from the simple nature of the entities. There is no mistaking the fact of being
Another kind of absolute object is the abstract object. Examples of abstract object are Form, Law, Pattern, Number and so on. It may be questioned whether these are indeed objects and this question will be taken up shortly. Their absolute character follows from their abstract character which is also a kind of simplicity
Actual or concrete objects have being in virtue of their interactions (power) which is guaranteed by the theory. What of abstract objects such as form, Number and Identity of object and individual? Are they truly abstract in the sense of lacking being altogether? On the interpretation that they are read (by Mind) from among the entities, they are abstract. However, form and number populate being and as such they are among the bearers (seats) of causal efficacy while the concrete objects (including force) are the agents of cause (it has been seen that classical and even quantum causation cannot be universal.) It has been seen that Form is manifestation of adaptation; Form is dynamic, of this world; Forms of perfect symmetry are static, ‘ideal,’ neither coming into being nor (if they did become) decaying; perfect Form is unrealized but approximated by dynamic Form. The distinction between abstract and actual (concrete) breaks down. The objection to form and Number as concrete is consciously or otherwise based in the idea that only the simple actual (Matter) is real. However, the Theory of Being has shown that matter is neither ultimate nor the seat or focus of all being; that it is not necessary to be a ‘simple actual’ in order to be causally efficacious; and modern science shows that the concept of matter in its form and extension are in transition and therefore its final form is not known; that final kind, however, may equal but cannot exceed or displace the Void in what is most fundamental
The identity of an object or of an individual is the sense of continuity in change (stated this way, the identity of an object in time and personal identity can be given a uniform treatment. In the meaning just introduced, ‘identity’ is related to but not earlier to its earlier use as sameness.) If an individual experience sequential lives what could be the significance of the multiple lives given the normal experience of the self as finite – as delimited by birth and death (and the conditioning to think of the self as finite?) The Theory of Being shows that individual identity must participate in ‘higher identity.’ Thus individual human being and other finite being participate in the depth of being and in the Variety of being or Cosmology. In the limit the ‘individual’ participates in Brahman. Normal limits concern this life. Death is a gate to infinity. In the case of knowledge as other than knowledge-of, the identity of knowledge and known does not become possible; rather it becomes irrelevant. Such cases include the root at which knower and known remain in interaction and (near) identity; this is the ‘ground’ in which knowledge, action and known are bound and from which knowledge separates itself from the known
One aspect of the Journey in Being is that its goals include Understanding and realization of this identity; and experience of ways to identity whose roots are in the immediate
Being (becoming) is a journey whether it concerns individual being or all being. The ‘journeys’ merge in necessary and occasionally manifest identity. The infinite variety of actual being makes for the characteristics of a journey: wonder in the present; changing vistas of infinitesimal and infinite form; no final destination; goals and ambitions but no final goal – and yet moments of finality that are as if eternal; goal and perception in interaction; in the sense of significance, meaning is immanent in being though not always manifestly so
The transcendental argument shows that there are objects (in the sense of concept-object) that, under a criterion of sufficient faithfulness, may be regarded as faithful. Such objects are the common particular objects which include every day objects such as wolf, mountain, person and the objects of science
The object character of the abstract objects follows from their immanence in being (the argument follows in the later discussion of ‘The Real.’) However, it is not the abstract objects themselves that are immanent but approximations to them. According to the sufficient faithfulness interpretation, abstract objects are (given the argument in ‘The Real’) real objects. The discussion may be refined in observing that even though it is an approximation to the abstract object that is immanent, there may be a more refined abstract (but difficult to calculate) that lies in precise relation to what obtains
The purpose of the discussion is to show that in common situations (science, the day to day,) this is the ideal (best) case and full precision is undesirable
Examples of faithfulness of knowledge have been given. In the examples so far, faithfulness has derived from either generality or abstraction. Although ‘abstract,’ the examples have significance for they concern very general characteristics of Being – they constitute a Metaphysics. Traditionally, since Kant (Hegel and other idealists notwithstanding) metaphysics (as knowledge of the world itself) has held to be impossible – according to the following form of argument. The world is known ‘directly’ through percepts and indirectly by conceptual systems built upon perception. Given any percept e.g. a mountain there is an inner depth that is not perceived; the percept is at most a ‘net’ over the thing-in-itself (congruence of the net to the thing does not have meaning.) Kant argued that the features of perception e.g. space, Time, cause were necessary to being even though they were not of being; these features were the forms or categories of intuition. He further argued that from an assumed certainty of the sciences of the time (Euclidean Geometry, Newtonian Mechanics which were conceptual systems built out of the forms of intuition) that the sciences, too, were necessary. (Later it was recognized that neither the forms of intuition nor the sciences were necessary.) Kant concluded that the system of percepts and concepts constituted an idealist metaphysics i.e. a metaphysic of (human) ideas but not a metaphysics of being-as-such. However, in the present case the metaphysics has been constructed i.e. its existence has been shown and not merely demonstrated to be possible – in precisely those cases in which the perceptual content is certain: there is being, entities have Form. That the metaphysics (Theory of Being) is not empty follows from the variety of ‘derivations’ from it. What of our percepts? Are these object-faithful? If precision and completeness are relinquished, they may be regarded as faithful. The natural criticism is that they are then not altogether reliable. Earlier, the idea of knowledge as knowledge-of was mentioned. It is not clear that this is the (only) function of knowledge. It is reasonable to think that early in the history of perception (life) reactions followed upon sensation without building up of (more or less) faithful percepts (or reflection upon them) and that later, with complexity and memory, it became possible to regard knowledge as knowledge-of with some realism; this made possible the idea of knowledge which was given, reliable and reliably acted upon
Limits to practical reason show that (fully) reliable knowledge (in general, especially in detailed knowledge) is not realized or realizable (unless the details of all being are law-like in nature and this is shown by the Theory of Being to impossible except perhaps in occasional manifestations of being;) further, given a transitional nature of becoming, it is not even desirable. In those aspects in which the being is incomplete, recognition that the faithfulness of knowledge is partial is a virtue. In this sense i.e. since reliability is not a virtue i.e. even though reliability-in-process allows ‘failure’ it is what makes ‘success’ possible, the objects of perception may be regarded as faithful. Failure and success are duals. Is this all that can be said on the issue? The underlying ‘model’ is one of a conceptual system built upon a perceptual ground. In the ‘abstract’ case when the perceptual ground is minimal but certain, fully faithful knowledge (metaphysics) is possible. Some modern physicists have built a Theory of Being and knowledge founded upon quantum theory. This is similar to the construction of the Theory of Being; however, the quantum theory is at most a theory of this or of similar cosmological systems but not of less formed systems. To human form, faithfulness of percepts is incomplete; however, in terms of realization of possibility this reflects a virtue
It is not and cannot be desirable (e.g. for human being) to know what cannot be known (to human form.) It may be desirable to know what is thought to be unknowable. If a another kind of being can know and communicate to humans what humans cannot know through human instruments alone then human being is capable of that knowledge. It is within normal human experience that some (groups) know what others have considered impossible. According to the Theory of Identity there is no limit to human possibility even though this is not normally considered to be the case. In the previous sentences of this paragraph, ‘know’ may be replaced ‘transform to’
Both percept and concept are of the intuition in the sense of adaptation to the forms of the world. The percept captures (as partial and not altogether congruent net) structures of the world (non congruent is not altogether meaningful since its measure is its coherence even though adaptation implies correspondence.) The concept (thought) permits: formulation of the intuition, and therefore both reformulation and (with language and symbol) communication. There is a free element to conceptualization that permits discovery and enhances indeterministic but adapted becoming in an indeterministic but adapted world; in this latter aspect, thought captures the indeterministic essence of the world and is therefore also of intuition. In the limit where (as has been seen in the Theory of Being) thought is free of perception (except the basic but unquestionable form of being versus absence) thought is free of intuition and its truth is unconditional. Another way of saying this is that there is a limit in which intuition is free of its contingent and only partially faithful character
Consider an organism that is too primitive to have an image of the environment as a whole in the manner the visual images of animals with advanced vision. The primitive organism may move and feed by sense-response (often labeled stimulus-response but the word ‘stimulus’ suggests that the organism is passively stimulated which is likely not the case.) Although the organism does not have a picture of the world as a whole, the structure that enables the sense-response may be said to be knowledge of its immediate environment (and vision, too, sees the whole world only by its own measure.) However, as far as the moment to moment is concerned, the primitive organism proceeds in what is roughly sequential sense-response-sense-response
Human knowledge, too, is like that. In cases where knowledge has not separated out as being independently justified, knowledge and action lie in rough sequence knowledge-action-knowledge-action…
That this is or may be successful, is due to adaptation
It is only in special cases that knowledge has independent justification. In the case of the object that is not absolute, e.g. everyday particulars and science, independent justification may, on the view of a universe of infinite variety, ever remain incomplete
It is possible, now, to make assertions regarding ‘the Real.’ It is not possible to say anything about the real with confidence unless the sense of the real is given an explicit and appropriate meaning. The question ‘What is real?’ is really two questions, ‘What does it mean to be real?’ and ‘What things are real?’ Very often, the first question is suppressed and the question ‘What is real?’ is taken to be the question ‘What things real?’ However, the first question cannot be eliminated and therefore, if suppressed or ignored, it must surface, perhaps without full awareness, as a common-sense or default or paradigmatic position. Commonly, concrete or material objects e.g. a rock are regarded as real whereas there may be debate whether abstract objects such as Form, Number and Law are real. The often tacit and unstated (because paradigmatic) background to this more or less standard position is materialism: material objects are real and objects whose material status is in question are, likewise, questionably real (i.e. in materialism, abstract objects are not real.) The developments in the present narrative show that Matter is itself an indefinite concept and that the foundation of the real is not to be sought in matter. One possibility is that to exist and to be real are identical. Before the development of the Theory of Being, this assertion does not make sense. That theory places Existing entities on a common plane. The confusions regarding what is real, what truly exists, regard questions of substance and lacking clear answers there would always be doubt regarding what is real. The Theory of Being places concrete objects (those that seem to deserve the label ‘material’) and abstract objects e.g. Form, Number, pattern and law on a similar basis. From the Theory of Being, i.e. from the properties of the void, both the concrete or particular and the abstract objects have power. Before the development of a common foundation to all (kinds of) object, all that it would be possible to say regarding existence is e.g. that a rock exists as matter, ‘2’ exists as number, the shape of the Milky Way exists as a spatial pattern and so on. I.e. the pre-foundational concept of existence must be existence-as. However, the Theory of Being places all cases of existence-as (that have power) on the same plane. Every object exists since it has power as object; every existent (even if not familiar) is an object in that it has the ability to be known as an object (under the full conception of knowledge or knowability.) These thoughts show a way out of default positions regarding the real: what is real is what has power, what can be known. A single obstacle remains regarding the identification of existence and the real and that is the thought, noted earlier, that there are non existent objects. It may be recalled that, regarding the world as such the status of non existent objects lacks consequence; the non existent object is, perhaps, conceptually elegant but has no implication for being. (In the terms introduced earlier the non existent object exists as concept but not as entity. It is clear that there are potential confusions regarding the application of ‘exist’ that need only awareness of the application or reference to prevent actual confusion.) Therefore, excluding the non existent object, to be real is to exist i.e. to be an Object
In scholastic philosophy, a distinction between individuals and universals was made. Individuals were particular objects (e.g. a wolf) while universals were types (e.g. the type or species wolf or wolf-hood) which included properties (e.g. redness) and relations
In the later section, ‘Ethics and objectivity’ it will be argued that there are cases where it is necessary to act as though absolute knowledge (knowledge as though of an absolute object) obtains even when (absolute) justification is lacking but when, perhaps, the justification is (as far as known) at most contingent
The Theory of Being has been shown to be a metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth and implicitly ultimate in breadth. (It was seen that possible any theory of being to be explicitly ultimate in breadth and that it is therefore futile to seek explicitness in breadth or to seek a theory that permits it. If such a theory were developed it would, in addition to having or being inconsistencies, be sterile and flat.) It is natural, therefore, to expect that the metaphysics will have significant implications for the meaning and development of fundamental concepts in the understanding of the universe, knowledge of the universe and the place of individual (e.g. human) being and society in the universe. Since the metaphysics is ultimate with regard to depth, the implied understanding for the fundamental concepts may also be ultimate. (They recognized that working out of the implications is a process.) These fundamental concepts include: being itself, objects (knowledge) – considered above; and logic, cosmology (the Theory of Variety,) mind (and matter,) individual (human) being and language and society, ethics and morals, faith, journey, the nature and varieties of Understanding – especially philosophy and metaphysics (itself) and the systems of human understanding, identity and transformation of identity. The development continues here with Logic and in what follows with the remaining fundamental concepts
It will be useful to understanding to defer specifying the concept of Logic until some traditional aspects of logic (taken up for illustration and intrinsic interest) have been discussed
In its traditional meaning, logic is concerned with truth – especially with the establishment of truth
The ways to establishing truth may be regarded as two. First, and in one perspective most fundamental, is the establishment of truth about the world. These include facts and generalizations from facts or recognition of patterns and laws in systems of fact. Terms associated with the recognition of patterns in systems of fact are induction and science (i.e. the process of science.) The kind of logic involved in this first way of establishing truth has been labeled ‘induction.’ Induction may be described as ‘generalization,’ ‘interpolation,’ or ‘extrapolation,’ and, alternatively, as recognition of patterns… The second way to establish truth is to derive secondary truths (theorems, results) from established (or, in axiomatic systems, postulated) truths. This ‘way’ is labeled ‘deduction’
[Establishing simple facts is not usually considered to be a part of logic or of induction but logic may be implicated since (at least some) facts exist in relation to others which relation(s) may require demonstration of consistency and grounding. Induction is establishing (without certainty) laws and patterns from data. More generally, the processes of science include establishing both facts and patterns]
Deduction appears to be firm because consequences necessarily follow; induction is not always regarded to be as firm in its definiteness because there could be alternate generalizations or because alternate patterns could be ‘read.’ In teaching, logic is often called something like the ‘science of argument’ or the ‘analysis and criticism of thought.’ However in the recent (twentieth century on) literature ‘logic’ most often means deductive logic
There is a history of thought regarding induction. Induction has been regarded to be important because it is the ‘method’ by which e.g. scientific laws and theories are established. A foundation was sought in which induction would be as secure as deduction
There is a view in which there is no end to the development of scientific theory. In this view, the Universe is infinite and any theory captures only a part of it and is therefore susceptible of improvement (enlargement of the domain of application.) The view is encouraged by the recent (nineteenth and twentieth centuries) history of science which may be seen as a ‘revolutionary’ history. In (extreme) versions of this view, scientific theories are not really about the world but are working hypotheses subject to replacement when there is sufficient disconfirming evidence. However, there is an alternate way of looking at scientific theories. That science has developed so far without end (in sight) does not imply that it is unending; i.e. the revolutionary character of science so far is contingent rather than Necessary; i.e. it is itself a generalization – its necessary or inherent character is open to question. Scientific theories that have been replaced as fundamental theories of the world continue to be useful – Newtonian Mechanics is still used in much of engineering and astronomy. Newtonian Mechanics may be said to be about a domain of being (in which domain does not refer only to spatial or temporal domains but also e.g. to a range of sizes and energies)
A (scientific) Theory may be viewed as hypothetical knowledge about the entire Universe and subject to replacement or, alternatively, as actual knowledge of a domain of the universe
Even in science, ‘theory’ has a number of uses and the foregoing statement cannot be generalized to all uses of the word. The kinds of theory that it does refer to include the classical theories of physics e.g. mechanics and electromagnetism and the later quantum theories and relativistic theories of space, Time and gravitation; and the Darwinian theory of evolution
Some readers will object to the inclusion of Darwinian Theory; a discussion of the theory is therefore included for intrinsic interest but especially to illuminate ‘Fact’ and ‘theory.’ It should be noted that many of the objections to Darwinian Theory are based in misunderstanding. (The label ‘Darwinian’ is not altogether accurate since, in its original version, it was incomplete in a number of ways e.g. the seat of inheritance, detailed mechanisms of speciation. In its early form, the theory, though elegant and predictive, was widely criticized on account of its various limitations. It was only by work in responding to the criticisms and further development that resulted in the widely accepted ‘new evolutionary synthesis’ of the 1940’s. Subsequently, molecular biology, especially genetics added to the foundation of the theory.) First, there is a distinction between the fact and theory of evolution. The fact of evolution may be seen in the fossil record, in studies on certain species such as the fruit fly, and in the efforts of the animal and plant breeders. Some object to macro-evolution on the ground that the fossil record is incomplete; however the fossil record is expected to be incomplete since preservation even of vertebrates is not perfect. Proper questions to ask are, ‘Is the fossil record contradictory?’ and ‘Are there other sources of evidence?’ and the answers are ‘No!’ and ‘Yes!’ respectively. Recent treatments (e.g. textbooks) list a number of kinds of evidence for evolution that include the fossil record, structural similarities, embryonic development, biogeography, and molecular biology and show that these kinds are in agreement
The (Darwinian) theory of evolution is one of incremental evolution (including macro-evolution or speciation) by variation and selection. Origin of complexity may be explained by simultaneous evolution of Form and function (less complex eyes may not function as well but still function e.g. even a few heat or light sensitive cells provide for adaptive response; further, function is not always designated function and what now functions as a limb may have origin in a protective protuberance.) The question of chance versus design is addressed in terms of Necessity and probability. The origin of Form out of Formlessness necessarily requires indeterminism (deterministic explanation in terms of a designer pushes the problem back one step ‘Who designed the designer?’ I.e. Design is not an explanation of origins.) Regarding probability there are two issues. When there is evolution from an earlier state the later state is not determined; rather there are many possible formed outcomes; the probability of any one of those outcomes is much less than the likelihood of some outcome (which must intuitively be high and on the Theory of Being is Necessary.) Secondly, while a single step outcome may not be impossible its likelihood is very low; however as has just been seen the likelihood of incremental change resulting in large change is not at all low. Inability (or lack of or refusal) to understand nature is not a limitation on nature. Of course it is unreasonable to expect the theory to explain ‘everything’ including, for example, the (chemical) origins of life and cultural evolution (where, if there is explanation, alternative or supplement may be necessary.) A final point worth noting is that the facts of evolution and theory are not altogether independent in that the theory illuminates interpretation of the facts; however, this shows not limitation of the truth of the theory but limits, already noted, to its domain of application; alternate theories such as the Lamarckian or ‘Intelligent Design’ may be seen either as inconsistent with fact or application only to a very narrow, even infinitesimal, domain. Now, there will still be those who object to the Darwinian theory; however, most interested persons –at least in the West– will agree that the actual ‘theory’ of origins whether Darwinian or e.g. ‘Intelligent Design’ concerns not just mere theory but fact
Another way in which distinctions between Fact and theory break down arises in facts that are not necessary e.g. ‘an electron is a fundamental particle’ in that it has no known internal structure or size (c. 2006.) Now if this fact is universal it is also necessary. However the Theory of Being implies that it cannot be universal (there is no fundamental substance.) There must be interactions in which the electron will show up structure. The ‘fact’ is factual in virtue restriction to a particular domain of being
It was seen earlier that the perception of space and Time are intuitive (not analytic.) Space and time are fundamental to ‘being in the world’ and, especially, to physical geometry and other scientific theories. In such theories, space and time receive considerable formalization. Do these formalizations take science (specifically space and time) out of the realm of intuition? In other words can the Universe (or domain under consideration) be equivalent to the formalization (marks on paper?) The answer is not altogether clear and even if it were clearly ‘yes’ the significance of this would not be altogether clear. There is a human attitude that appreciates the expression of behavior of the universe in formal terms for it is in such terms that there appears to be clarity and objectivity and the psychology (perception-thought) of the individual, with all its ‘limitations’ is transcended; and it is to a significant degree that upon such transcendence the confidence in science and logic and their application, technology, are founded. It is a clean foundation that also results in material power. However, does it place the individual in the universe? This is far from clear and the best answer appears to be that it may give hope but that such hope is not realized yet and it is the intuition (as well as formal science and less formal myth, story and art) that place the individual. What has been seen appears to be summarized in the following two paragraphs
The greatest awareness of contingent facts and patterns (theories) requires all elements of psyche (including the formal.) However…
In addition to the theories that are factual when regarded to a specific domain there are Necessary theories. The Theory of Being has been shown to be necessary. The necessity follows from its reference to being and absence of being rather than any particular kind of being
[The apparent contradiction between the necessities of the theory and the facts of this cosmological system should be noted once again. ‘Somewhere’ in all being, Jesus Christ is risen from the dead; this alone does not imply its truth in this (normal) cosmological system. However, as has been seen, the Theory implies the Possibility on earth; and it implies that it is impossible to show that it is impossible. At most what may be read from the development of the theory is the improbability of any such (given) event in a given system]
Are there necessary facts? There is at least one – that there is being (if there were no being, this narrative would be neither written nor read)
The question about necessary facts is important because, then, ‘consequences’ may be deduced by logic alone (with the necessary fact or facts as premise; however since the premises are necessary so are the consequences)
Many necessary facts have been established earlier e.g. the fundamental principle that all consistent systems of descriptions are realized; the Theories of Being, Variety (cosmology,) and Identity. Relative to the entire Universe, these facts are necessary; relative to a normal cosmological system the ones that have meaning may (generally) be either true or false and are contingent; relative to a cosmos, its being is a necessary fact
What is the logic of the ‘induction’ of a scientific Theory? Is there a logic of induction? If such a logic would be a necessary inference from the ‘data’ to the theory it does not appear that there is or can be one (at least in the normal case.) A scientific law is an induction from a set of data or observations to e.g. a formula (pattern.) In general, though, there is no unique law that corresponds to a set of data (this observation, thought to originate with Hume, is a commonplace in the mathematics of interpolation i.e. of fitting some curve to a set of data.) In practice, it often seems that there is a necessity to a law but that is due to the law being simple or elegant or suggestive of further development but it is not a logical necessity. In a number of cases there are alternate but equivalent (same predictions) theoretical formulations a given range of phenomena. Some formulations are better suited to calculation, some to generalization to more comprehensive theories. Often, two or more theories are combined into a more comprehensive one. This may give an impression of necessity but the necessity is not a logical one. Although there may be the appearance of necessity to induction there is, in general, no necessity to it (there are various heuristic ‘principles’ but induction does not possess the necessity that induction seems to have)
Generally, arriving at a scientific law or theory is inductive while its application and testing is deductive (that these statements are general means that not every operation in arriving at a law is inductive nor is every operation in application deductive e.g. application may require a model to be built.) Once a law or theory is formulated its testing may be significantly deductive
Induction or discovery tends to be singular and private, testing or justification tends to be deductive and public. However, the divide between discovery and justification is not as sharp as has been thought by some philosophers e.g. Hans Reichenbach who insisted that the ‘logic’ of science is the logic of justification. This clearly reflects a Value regarding the use of science. It also reflects a habit of thought that favors the determinate or deterministic pattern of thought over the indeterministic even though the indeterministic (discovery) is essential; this habit was seen earlier in the idea that the relation between substance and Variety of being had to be deterministic which idea led to over two thousand years of interesting but unnecessary substance theory (it was seen that substance ontology can and must be replaced by a non substance ontology which is not, however, a relativist ontology and is final regarding depth)
Attention now turns to deduction. Since, given primitive terms, axioms and methods of proof, the theorems necessarily follow, deduction appears to be necessary. However, there are some ways in which this appearance is illusory
A primary application of deductive methods is in mathematics. Deductive logic is connected to mathematics in two ways. First, is the idea due to Russell and Whitehead that the theorems of mathematics may be reduced to logic; this reduction is not generally accepted and to expect the reduction is perhaps unreasonable in that mathematical systems have a structure that logic itself does not clearly possess. Second, deduction is the method of derivation of theorems in mathematics. While the theorems follow of Necessity, the application of mathematics does not possess the certainty of the theorems. Consider the question, regarding some domain of phenomena, ‘Are the phenomena captured by a discipline of mathematics?’ What is required is search for a structure! The mathematical expression of the structure involves basic ideas (undefined terms, rules of combination, axioms, and methods of proof) and theorems. That the theorems are, in principle, already contained in the basic ideas is expressed by saying that mathematics is tautology. Since the tautologies are not at all obvious and their proof may require great ingenuity, the fact of tautology does not make mathematical proof trivial. However, it may still be that the structure is not captured by the mathematics and this may require experiment with, modification of the basic ideas (the applicability of mathematics is often regarded as fortuitous.) This process, which is a mathematical process, is not at all deductive and is rather like induction. Thus the certainty of deduction is illusory and this illusory character lies in the gap between (mathematical) structure and (mathematical) expression of structure; and there is a similar gap between logical structure and logical system (even though in some cases there is no gap e.g. the propositional calculus captures ‘implication.’) Less important reasons for the uncertainty include the fact that the mathematics may not capture the essence of reality and the incompleteness of mathematical systems
The discovery and application of mathematics have inductive and deductive phases even though discovery emphasizes induction and application (including theorem proving) emphasizes, perhaps, deduction
[A note on definition. It becomes clear that even though, in formal work, definition may come at the beginning, the actual ‘Meaning’ of a Concept requires more than definition for its full specification. First, the various concepts must stand in relation and in relation to basic facts or axioms and it is the entire system that captures or fails to capture the target structure, is consistent or inconsistent. Second, the ‘final’ form of system and therefore of concepts and definitions are arrived at by adjustment to the world or, in the case of mathematics, to form. It is seductive to think that an entire formal or intellectual content can be invested in a formal system and that from then on the system will ‘do the work’ while human being is taken for a ride. Although seductive, an ultimate in the formalization (of Variety of form) would represent –if the ride were the objective– an end to being]
A distinction between structures (Forms) and their (mathematical or logical) expression has been made. The expression is the attempt to capture or represent. It is therefore clear that (at least in the normal case) there is no guarantee that mathematics represents form. I.e. even when there is clearly a mathematical form it may fall short of the Form itself. To use a famous metaphor, the mathematics (terms, formation, axiom, proof, theorem) is a scaffolding that is ‘thrown away’ when the building (Form) is realized. The scaffolding is not the building and the form of the scaffolding is a skeletal and at most approximately faithful representation. Therefore there is no surprise that the mathematics is (may be) incomplete; there is no surprise if a hidden paradox should be discovered; there should be no surprise if certain questions are not decidable within formalizations. Another analogy: the systems of trails up a mountain are not and do not represent the mountain; there may be inaccessible and invisible crevasses, hidden lakes, and secondary peaks. Even: the perception of the mountain is not the mountain
A Platonic view of being has been revealed but without appeal to a (separate) Platonic world; the Platonic (the Logos) and the (normally) known are of the one world (Universe)
[A very short digression on Platonism. The Greek philosopher Plato (born 427/428 BC, Athens) explained the physical order in terms of a realm of forms accessible only to the Mind of which the things in this world are imperfect copies. The highest Form is the Form of the Good. Aristotle (born 384, Stagira, Greece, attended the Athenian Academy of Plato,) dissatisfied with Platonic metaphysics introduced a theory of substances in which every kind in the world e.g. horse, is or has a substance. Aristotle’s theory implies a runaway infinity of substances and, as explaining Variety from simplicity, provides little satisfaction. As has been seen, the Metaphysics in this narrative requires no distinct Platonic realm and no substances and yet requires no infinite regress of foundation or explanation but is, in some of its aspects, similar to Platonic metaphysics and may be variously labeled ‘Theory of Being,’ ‘Metaphysics of Immanence,’ ‘Metaphysics of Absence or of the Void.’ (Species of voidism occur in Indian philosophy and Judaism.) Here, however, the forms are immanent in that they are self-adaptations whose explanation, given earlier, shows them to be near symmetric, relatively stable and dynamic]
Ask: is the world normally calculable as in a mathematical realism or is it as a poetic realism – felt but incalculable? Is being infinitely deep or are they lulled by reason’s charms into eternal sleep?
Is there a way in which induction can be reduced to deduction? The answer given so far is ‘No!’ Deduction occurs within a definite context. Induction (on the assumption of infinite context or Universe) occurs within an indefinite context. Therefore, in general induction cannot be reduced to deduction. However, it is possible that context can bring induction close to deduction. If, from among all forms of Law, there is a small fraction (subset) whose population (in the universe or context) must dominate all others and if the fraction can be defined in terms of (e.g. a small number of) parameters, then it is possible that a finite number of observations can imply a system of laws to a high degree of probability or even necessity. Similarly, if the set of (ideal) structures were limited the formulation of mathematical systems to capture such structures could also be close to deduction
That the Theory of Being shows that depth can be captured explicitly, it seems to follow that structures that refer to all being and absence of being can be captured. However, since Variety cannot be captured explicitly i.e. in a single picture, it would seem that logic and mathematics are ever open fields – except that, in normal domains, they may be closed to local intelligence
Recall that the Theory of Being developed the concept of Possibility. The fundamental assertions were first, whatever may be described (conceived, pictured) without contradiction is realized and, second, the Possible and the actual are identical. This suggests the following conceptions
Logic (Logic) is the Theory of Possibility (of the depth and variety of being;) logic is the theory of consistent systems of description
The principle of non contradiction – that an assertion cannot be both true and false must be essential to logic; without it ‘consistency’ would have no meaning or significance
[Logicians and mathematicians are willing to forego this law of logic in search of the possibilities of form – provided that the ‘virus’ of inconsistency may be isolated; however the purpose to the containment is to maintain the practical distinction of truth and falsity]
[A second principle of classical logic is the ‘principle of the excluded middle’ that an assertion must be either true or false (i.e. the possibilities for truth values are ‘true’ and ‘false’ and no other such as ‘null’ or ‘in between.’) The following interesting application arises. Consider a solar system with nine planets; one planet ‘earth’ is blue. Consider A = ‘Planet ten is yellow.’ Since there is no planet ten, A is not false; therefore it is true. Similarly, A' = ‘Planet ten is red,’ is also true; however, A' contradicts A (a.) Now consider B = ‘Planet ten is yellow and earth is blue.’ Since there is no planet ten, B is not false; therefore it is true. Similarly, B' = ‘Planet ten is red and earth is blue,’ is also true; however, B' contradicts B (b.) Now, (a) suggests that reference is necessary to avoid paradox while (b) suggests the improvement that complete reference is Necessary. Now consider C = ‘This statement is true.’ Is C either true or false? It is true if true and false if false. Assuming ‘excluded middle’ C is equivalent to ‘The truth value of this statement is ‘true’’ or ‘This statement has a truth value and that value is ‘true.’’ The referential character of C does not permit evaluation of a truth value: it makes reference to its truth value as though it is determinate but it is not so; there is no truth value. I.e. there is a paradox associated with C in a logic that accepts the principles of non contradiction and the excluded middle; the source of the paradox is the assumption that it has reference. The classic liar paradoxes ‘This statement is false,’ ‘I am lying’ can also be seen in this light. The assumption that the liar statement has a truth value already associates it with paradox. However there is the additional paradox that the liar statement is equivalent to ‘This statement has a truth value and that value is ‘false.’’ Think, also, of another famous paradox that arises in asking, ‘Who shaves the barber?’ of ‘There is a village in which a barber lives who shaves all except those who shave themselves.’ If such a village does not exist there is nothing further to say; but it is asserted to exist. If it does exist it then follows that the barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself. The source of the paradox is the assumption that (arbitrary sentence constructions have Meaning and reference and, specifically, that) the village exists (can exist) i.e. that the statement can have reference; the paradox indicates that it can not. In formal logic some paradoxes due to ill founded reference may be avoided by introducing rules of formation of sentences]
If paradox is of words but not the world, how can a precise or true description of the world contain paradox? What does this say about paradox? That it is an artifact of description e.g. of language? What does that say of language? That it is not completely bound to its objects? That it is experimental?
What is the distinction between the laws of science and Logic? A scientific theory e.g. Newtonian Mechanics sets up a ‘picture of being:’ point particles located in absolute space and Time which may be regarded as the specification of a context (Universe.) The laws that pertain to the context may be regarded as logical. The scientific picture is that the particles interact (forces) and that this (via equations of motion) determines the motion of the particles. The particles are part of the ‘logic’ and the forces of the ‘science.’ The distinction was made because there is a contingent character to the forces (e.g. gravitation) and the laws (connecting force and motion.) Clearly, however, there is an arbitrary character to the distinction. Given a scientific theory (formulated mathematically or conceptually,) the derivation of results (e.g. motion) is logical. Thus the theories of science may be regarded as special logics. Scientific theories may be seen as special cases within Logic. Within Logic, special contexts may be specified that define ‘logics.’ There is a distinction between science and Logic but the boundary is not definite. Necessary law and contingent law are not altogether distinct
Logic is the constitutive Form of being. A logic is the constitution of a context. A law of behavior e.g. a scientific law (within a context) is one of many possible laws (each contingent) that are mutually inconsistent but each consistent with constitution
As noted, the distinction between constitutive ‘law’ and contingent law is not precise (in the present formulation)
Every Consistent System of Descriptions is Realized i.e. is (where ‘is’ has the atemporal or global sense)
Preliminary: Necessary propositions are those that are true in every sub-manifold of the universe (i.e. true without reference i.e. true by tautology) while contingent or ‘material’ propositions are those that are realized only in some sub-manifolds (if a proposition is realized in no sub-manifolds its negation is Necessary so the truth of a contingent proposition in at least one sub-manifold is implicit in the definition.) Proof is simple. Here ‘Ù’ is ‘and’ and ‘~’ means ‘not.’ Let C be contingent i.e. sometimes true and sometimes false i.e. ~C must also be contingent. If ~C is always true then it is necessary; therefore ~C must be sometimes false i.e. C must be realized. I.e. every description (with reference) must be realized. Similarly, if A, B, C… are contingent and A Ù B Ù C Ù … is consistent, it is realized. Weakness of the proof: It is assumed that the Necessary propositions are not synthetic i.e. that they are true in virtue of not making material reference. It is conceivable that a synthetic proposition, e.g. the electron is indivisible, could be necessary. In this case, the negation does not appear to be a contradiction but would not be realized. The divisibility of the electron follows from the Theory of Being; however, the objective of a second proof is to not assume that theory. It appears that the fundamental principle cannot be deduced from logic alone and that considerations of being (and absence of being) may be necessary to proof. Is there a concept of Logic that would permit a logical proof? Perhaps that Logic can contain no contingent facts e.g. the fact regarding the structure of the electron. Observation: The importance of reference is revealed again. Also note: The proof idea is inherent in the notion of contingency: if A and B are contingent, then when A is true, B must sometimes be false or else B would follow logically from A. If A = N (the null proposition i.e. nothing is asserted) and B = ~C then ~C must be sometimes false or else it would follow from N. Therefore, every contingent proposition C must be sometimes true… The proof is related to Hume’s statement regarding Necessity ‘From the truth of one proposition, the truth of another does not follow’ (and Wittgenstein’s modification in which ‘proposition’ is replaced by ‘atomic proposition.’) The emphasis on another proposition indicates that the other proposition is distinct i.e. not logically contained in the former; in the case of logical containment the second proposition does follow but it is not strictly an other proposition (the explanation is not required in the case of atomic propositions for the concept of an atomic proposition requires that it be logically independent of all other atomic propositions)
Detailed treatment of logics awaits a later writing. However the following assertions may be made
The concepts of truth, of falsity and implication are central to logic. Implication is important as the bearer of truth by deduction
The law of non contradiction is fundamental. The law of the excluded middle has been seen to be questionable at least in that if arbitrary forms of proposition are accepted it is no longer true. If it is true, a variety of paradoxical forms of proposition arise (e.g. in that propositions that do not have a truth value are assumed to have one.) Thus the law of the excluded middle is also fundamental in that it excludes certain paradoxical forms; however, it is not clear that it is necessary in order to exclude those forms or that it excludes all forms
The Theory of Being has implications for Possibility, actuality and Necessity i.e. for ‘modal’ logic
From the ideas of Logic as constitutive Form, the suggestion follows that logics are constitutive forms of contexts
Some logics. The following are included as outlining some areas of later application. What is needed first is an approach to classifying logic – see e.g. Susan Haack’s Philosophy of Logics (1978.) Then, select some principle(s) of classification e.g. formal vs. informal (‘Theory of Rationality’ may be placed here;) meta-logic; then classical logic (2-valued sentence calculus, predicate calculi, identity theory for ‘=’, and immediate inference and the Aristotelian syllogistic on the categorical propositions) vs. ‘extended’ logics (modal, tense, deontic, epistemic, preference, imperative, and erotetic –interrogative– logics) vs. ‘deviant’ logics (many-valued, Intuitionist, quantum, and free logics) vs. ‘inductive’ logics; also consider ‘applied logics’
Since mind is implicit in some of the earlier discussions, it may have been appropriate to make an explicit introduction to the concept of mind earlier. However, it is helpful in terms of understanding to introduce mind here, before the discussions of ‘Cosmology’ and ‘Human being.’ General purposes to including a discussion of mind include self-understanding (for sentient beings) and developing a cosmology: the presence of mind in the universe is a fundamental fact. Understanding of mind is also fundamental to the ambitions expressed earlier in the narrative
One possibility regarding mind would be to not mention it explicitly at all. There would of course be implicit mention at a variety of places e.g. when talking of experience of objects or when discussing human or animal being. The purpose to avoiding explicit mention of mind would be to avoid habitual errors associated with the concept. The primary error is to suppose that mind and Matter are distinct and although this distinction is not subtle it is encouraged by subtle assumptions regarding mind e.g. mind is distinct from its various aspects – that after the aspects have been discussed, it remains to discuss mind itself. The idea that mind and matter are separate leads to the thought that they are categorially distinct and once this thought is in place it is logically impossible to understand the origin of mind in a material world or the presence of mind in material (human) bodies
It has been seen that substance theories are not possible. I.e. in the common senses of mind and matter, idealism (mind as the fundamental substance) and materialism are untenable. However the strength of the modern ontological commitment to matter is such that most modern western thinkers maintain at least an implicit materialism
One of the objectives to the present section is to attempt clarification of the metaphysical concerns regarding the issues of mind and matter
A problem (perhaps the problem) with the idea of matter is the confusion of the idea with theories of matter. The idea of matter is the idea that the world contains material things that can be felt and touched and so on. A theory of matter is much more precise than the idea of matter. In a Newtonian theory matter is made up of point particles that are devoid of internal structure; in the quantum theory there may be structure; the completion a theory occurs when the behavior of common material systems is explained (derived) from the properties of the particles. The concepts of mind play no role in the theories or the explanations. This is the source of paradox – if it is given that human bodies are made up of matter how is mind possible? The resolution is so simple as to often avoid notice. The theories make no reference to mind. It is quite reasonable to think that the Newtonian picture is devoid of mental characteristics. In the case of quantum theory it is not obvious that mind is not implicit. Whatever the case, there is no reason to think that the quantum theory is a final picture of matter. On the other hand, there is nothing in the idea of matter that should rule out mind. ‘Inert matter’ appears to be devoid of mind but this is perhaps a mere appearance – perhaps matter is not inert (and certainly modern physics confirms this even though it is silent on whether the non inertness entails mind – which silence is often confused with the position that mind is absent in matter.) Provided that the errors and their underlying assumptions are avoided, there need be no bar against talk of mind
The common concept of matter has been seen to be indefinite. It will be seen that there is a similar indefiniteness in common talk of mind
A crucial distinction regarding mind is mind-as-humans-and-other-animals-have-it versus mind in general. The central characteristic of high level (human and animal) mind is experience. ‘Experience’ has a variety of meanings. The meaning here is as follows. It is the color of the sunset, the feel of a cool breeze on a hot day, the color and fragrance of a rose, the feeling of joy, and the awareness of a scene. The philosopher Thomas Nagel explained the present meaning of experience in terms of the phrase ‘What it is like’ i.e. it is like something to experience the fragrance of a rose; what it is like is the quality of the fragrance. Without experience (at all in the entire manifold of being) there would be no ‘significance.’ This would mean that even if there were beings who behaved as though they felt joy there would be no joy, even if they behaved as though they had thoughts there would be no inner experience of having thoughts. Notice that the ‘definition’ of experience was by example and by similar ideas (feeling, awareness) that are not more fundamental than the idea (experience) being explained. This is because (it seems) that there is nothing that is more fundamental. A problem already stated now recurs. How is it that experience (e.g. feeling, awareness, consciousness) that does not occur in ‘mere’ actuality (matter) occurs in humans and animals? There are but two alternatives. First, Matter is devoid of mind altogether. On this alternative, explanation of mind is condemned to eternal logical paradox. Second, matter is not devoid of mind. This alternative may strain the imagination –surely the elementary particles of matter, e.g. electrons and quarks, do not have thoughts or emotions– but entails no logical paradox. There are two lines of offense against the second alternative. One is the position, already dismissed as logically absurd, that matter is altogether devoid of mind. The second is the common objection that it is absurd to suggest that atoms have thoughts and emotions (and so on.) However, this is not entailed by the idea that matter is not devoid of mind. A brick or a statue is made of matter; this does not imply that atoms are like little bricks or little statues. Similarly, that matter is not devoid of mind does not mean that at the level of atoms (and so on) there are thoughts and emotions. Rather it means that there are primitive elements of mind (they could be called primitive feeling –the effect of one element in another– but even ‘feeling’ might suggest something too removed from the primitive level) among the primitive elements of matter
[Another objection to this extension of mind to the primal case has to do with the observation that (human) experience is often about something. An individual sees a sunset; his experience is about the sunset. This quality of aboutness, labeled ‘intentionality’ by the German philosopher Franz Brentano (born 1838, Marienberg, Germany,) is clearly significant to mind for it is crucial that mental content be about the world. Intentionality is regarded today (c. 2006) as important in itself and as central in any explanation of mind in material terms. Since intentionality is not central to the present narrative it is not discussed extensively; there are, however, a few remarks on the topic in subsequent sections. The objection regarding intentionality is that if the elementary particles of matter and so on do not have intentionality, how can it be that the particles in aggregate (brains) have intentionality? (The problem is an aspect of the mind-matter problem.) A resolution to the problem of intentionality is discussed in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’ of the next division]
From the extension of the concept of mind to the primal case, it is possible to explain (in principle) macro-level material form and behavior as well as macro-level mental Experience and its forms without categorial paradox and without any need to confront any of the other classical mind-matter paradoxes e.g. mental causation which is the ability of ‘mind’ to have effect in the ‘material world.’ The ‘problem’ of mental causation does not arise on the present account because it contains no split of the world into mind and matter but, instead, its only true distinction is verbal whereas its ‘material’ distinction is (like) one of thing (matter) and relation (e.g. effect e.g. force i.e. mind.) Without the extension to the primal root, paradox arises. With the extension (which has no inherent inconsistencies and which may be done so as to avoid the absurdities mentioned earlier) the various paradoxes of mind and matter no longer occur and a uniform theory of being, i.e. one in which the division into duals e.g. that of mind and matter, is obtained. There is of course a real problem and that is of explaining the varieties of mental experience and behavior from the primitive; this is of course more a possibility or challenge than a fundamental problem and it concerns, should it prove to be feasible, scientific explanation, and not the resolution of a logical divide
The explanation given in the previous paragraphs has it that the primitive forms of being may be regarded as having modes that may be described as or labeled ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ and that although the descriptions may be separated the thing being described knows no such separation. It is superficially open to the criticism that the concept of mind whose empirical origin is observation of the animal domain (some might add plants) is extended without warrant to the depth of being. However this is not the precisely case. Two distinct concepts have been identified – mind-as-manifest-in-the-animal-domain and mind (without restriction;) it is the unrestricted version that is applied to the depth. The explanation is necessary in that it is one of two possibilities and that the alternative explanation results in logical contradiction. The explanation eliminates rather than resolves the paradoxes of the presence of mind in material bodies (the mind-paradox) and the paradox of mental causation; it has no inherent contradiction; it undercuts the potential absurdity that there are thoughts, emotions and so on at the level of elementary particles. In principle the explanation of elaborations of mind in humans is via combinations and layering of the primitive mental elements. This is very much the way in which an in principle explanation in terms of material elements (also adequately extended) would be given. This is expected since the ‘material’ and ‘mental’ (and explanations based in them) are not distinct. The explanation has the advantage that it explicitly eliminates what is thought to be the gap between mind and matter. I.e. the explanation of higher (human and animal) mind does not face the logical paradox or divide associated with explaining how mind is manifest in (what is thought to be mindless) matter. A uniform explanation of sentient being has been given in which it is not necessary to explicitly refer to mind and matter (there would of course be reference under some name to mental and material objects)
How is this explanation affected by the cosmological picture of the universe that was considered before the discussion of mind? It remains consistent to regard the ephemera from the void as capable of ‘mental’ and ‘material’ description. It may be likely that life and mind as-humans-and-other animals-have-it occur only in normal cosmological systems. It appears possible that a system that is devoid of recognizable mind (as-humans-other-animals-have-it) may acquire infusions of life and mind from other systems or, perhaps, the background universe
It is possible to make some general remarks on originality or innovation in ideas or thought. Think of originality as composed of novel (re) arrangements of ideas and new ideas. Some writers suggest that there are no new ideas. Regarding the entire manifold of being as a whole, there is, of course, nothing new. Further, if knowledge is discovery there is no creation of knowledge. However, the genesis and path of development of a normal domain (cosmological system) is not given at the outset or at any stage. Its further development starting at any time (including any initial or near initial state) is not determined by its state at that time. In this sense the forms and structures of the domain are new. The words (and language) used by human beings is new in this sense; they were not (explicitly) there at the beginning. The generation of words cannot have been entirely genetic. Language can be seen as a property of the individual and the selection of genes occurred in part by success in generating useful novel forms (originality is real.) Now consider (re) arrangements of ideas that correspond to the world. Although the world may be relatively fixed over the origin of language or the origin of descriptions of some of its features, the word combinations are novel. If the number of possible rearrangements of ideas exceeds computational ability, originality is required to see the viable ones
The foregoing considerations apply to discovery in the world – including science. If a branch of mathematics is formulated axiomatically, its system of theorems forms a tautology. In any significant branch of mathematics the number of well formed statements far exceeds the number of theorems and so seeing significant theorems and generating proofs requires originality. Additionally, development and adjustment of axiomatic systems and the recognition of useful or productive domains of mathematics is not reducible to a system of tautology (is not an algorithmic process) and requires originality. While every life, every culture, every world are given in the manifold of being, their origin and continuation requires forms that are novel to their conditions and, in the case of human mind, thought that is original to its conditions. Regeneration is the sustenance of being
In the section on ‘Human being,’ below, there are some further thoughts on originality
The discussion of Mind so far may be adapted to illuminate a variety of questions regarding consciousness – a topic that has seen a resurgence in interest for the last thirty or so years (it is now 2006.) In the present meaning (perhaps the primary meaning in recent writing) consciousness is precisely Experience as used earlier. From the earlier discussion, in human-or-animal-experience and primal experience, ‘experience’ may be replaced by ‘consciousness’ (the connotations of ‘consciousness’ may make it undesirable to bring the phrase ‘primal consciousness’ into common use.) The philosophical problem of consciousness, i.e. of explaining its presence in material bodies, is precisely the mind-matter problem of which a resolution (by elimination) was given in the previous paragraphs. Awareness is used in a meaning that is similar to that of consciousness and in another meaning in which the individual has access to the information without consciousness of it. This may appear to be paradoxical but the phenomenon of access without awareness has been observed in brain injured patients (who, in certain experiments, have behaved as if aware of an object in the visual field, without being able to report awareness of the object.) Some writers have said that for consciousness, awareness of awareness is necessary and others write that language is necessary for consciousness. It seems however that awareness of awareness is one factor that may make for focusing of attention and that language makes it possible to describe consciousness and to talk about it and that to be able to report awareness, awareness of awareness would be necessary – simple awareness would not be enough (in this sentence, ‘awareness’ may be replaced by ‘consciousness.’) Therefore the fact that an individual is unable to report awareness does not mean that he or she was not conscious of the relevant information. This is consistent with the necessary conceptual extension of Mind to the root of being
That extension may similarly explain at least some aspects of the ‘unconscious’ as actually conscious but without (sufficient) awareness of the fact of consciousness so that e.g. after the experience was over it would not be registered in memory. (Other aspects of the unconscious may be of stored experience that are not currently recalled and that have varying degrees of remoteness which may be due to weakening of memory associations, perhaps to ‘defenses,’ and due to what is stored being the form of the information i.e. the intuition and its laying down should be in either direct experience or in evolution)
Some writers have described a concept that they label ‘access consciousness’ and refer to consciousness as used here as ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ They justify this move by arguing that it is precisely access to information without (phenomenal) consciousness that is what they call access consciousness. The arguments here, however, have shown that access consciousness – the ability to act on information without being able to report it does not imply lack of (phenomenal) consciousness. There is no argument here that the phenomena that are labeled access consciousness do not occur but that such labeling gains nothing and introduces confused terminology and reflects misinterpretation of the data regarding inability to report consciousness in cases of awareness (or, if not misinterpretation, then a manipulation of it.) Consciousness has been said to be on-off in that one appears to be either conscious of something or not but that consciousness does not ‘dim’ gradually into unawareness. An explanation that preserves the seeming on-off character without requiring it in fact may be that it is consciousness of consciousness that is on-off
A final concern regarding consciousness is to understand how or why it arose in evolution. Given that elements of experience have always been present the appropriate concern is how the elaborate, intense or focal forms of consciousness arose. The answer to this question is, in principle, very simple. It is that the elaborations correspond to the forms of the world, the intense forms correspond to what is important for adaptation (survival,) and (some of) the focal forms correspond to the ability of an organism attend to elements of novelty and originality while other focal forms are more directly related to day-to-day adaptation. Thus it is not the primitive elements of consciousness (feeling) that arise in evolution but the elaborate, intense, varied and focal forms of it that arise as combinations of the elements, recording of experience (memory,) specialization of the combinations, layering and self-reference. It is not fully accurate to think that, as some have written, that ‘consciousness is evolution become aware of itself.’ Rather, acute animal consciousness is a concentration of primal consciousness or awareness (in the organism… It is appropriate to use the phrase ‘primal consciousness’ provided that the idea is not thought to refer to higher forms in miniature i.e. there is no logical problem in this use.) These brief remarks have been made as an illustration of the extension of the concept of mind but are not intended to illustrate the variety of recent thought on consciousness
The section, ‘Human being,’ below, continues the discussion of mind in terms that are more specific to human including animal mind and are, therefore, more concrete, detailed and structured
The previous section may have been labeled ‘Mind and metaphysics.’ A similar section on morals or ethics could be placed here; however, Ethics will not be only about morals but will also be an occasion to integrate considerations of metaphysics, knowledge, and value. In this capacity, it will be more effective to defer discussion of Ethics till after the discussion of ‘Human being’
In its exclusive or ‘pure’ sense, metaphysics is, it has been seen, the Theory of (the Depth) of Being. Cosmology is the Theory of Variety. Metaphysics founds cosmology. In a broader (inclusive) sense, metaphysics includes cosmology; if both metaphysics and cosmology are broadened then they are identical
The objectives of this section include (1) to see what the Theory of Being implies for cosmology and to build up a cosmological picture, (2) to interpret or reinterpret a range of objects (and phenomena) of the local cosmological system in terms of the general cosmological picture – including the nature of the local cosmology; these include reiteration of the implicit Variety of the Theory of Being, mechanism and indeterminism, evolutionary biology, annihilation and its likelihood, recurrence, ‘fact is more varied than fiction,’ scripture and truth, the nature of death and personal Identity, the nature and possibilities of creation and God, universal interaction, ghosts and ghost universes, Time and space and manifold, modern theoretical physics, mind, substance, atomism, divides in the origin of animal and Human being
General cosmology and cosmology are identical. I.e. in general cosmology there is no restriction of domain or kind of being. For purposes of the present discussion of ‘general cosmology’ it will be abbreviated to ‘cosmology’
The Void is an element of the cosmology
The principle that ‘generates’ the Variety of being is the ‘Fundamental Principle of the Theory of Being’ i.e. the principle that every consistent system of descriptions is realized
I.e. not only are all entities realized but also all arrangements of entities, all laws, all patterns, all mechanisms of generation
The ‘original’ mechanism of generation is variations (required by indeterminism) from an initial state and selection i.e. relative duration of Existence i.e. relative stability of those variations that are self-adapted i.e. near symmetric. That is the mechanism is that of variations and selection of relatively stable states. Perfect symmetry is infinitely unlikely i.e. is not arrived at but if it were realized it would be ‘frozen’ i.e. would remain unchanged (except for the ‘intervention’ of indeterministic elements from without e.g. the Void – which is not truly without.) The initial state could be the void, the ‘first’ state of manifest being, a normal cosmological system (defined earlier and explained further below,) earth just before the origin of life, life at any point in its history, living forms just before the advent of consciousness (as will been seen in the discussion ‘Mind,’ it is more accurate to say ‘just before the emergence of acute consciousness,’) life with imagery just before free imagery and the latter just before the origin of the free symbol (defined later under ‘Human being’)
As described, the generic mechanism is identical in the foregoing cases. On account of the differing initial states, the details of the mechanism vary. For example, in the case of life, genetic structure and replication are involved and in the case of sexual species, reproduction is involved as well
The justification of the generic mechanism is as for the outline of the justification in the case of life that was given earlier in ‘Logic.’ The mechanism of indeterministic variation and selection is necessary when the ‘end’ result too complex to originate deterministically from the initial state
The argument for Necessity does not specify whether the path from initial to end is in a single step, in large steps or incremental. The argument was that incremental change is (perhaps in most circumstances) colossally more likely than single or large steps. Even though the normal mechanism is, in any instance, only more likely, there must be instances of its occurrence (this follows from the fundamental principle of the Theory of Being and, similarly, even though single step change to a more complex state is unlikely, that it occurs is also necessary.)
The ‘normal mechanism’ is implicated in all the examples stated above e.g. from the Void to first manifest being, from early manifest being (which has at least some normal characteristics if relatively stable i.e. if more stable than the Necessary ephemera that emanate from the void) to normal cosmological systems and so on
Some properties of the Universe as a whole follow from the natures (properties) of ‘being,’ ‘Void,’ ‘universe.’ Any entity including the manifest universe or a normal cosmological system is capable of annihilation at any time. In the normal case the annihilator system evolves from the void and since it must match the nature of the system to be annihilated, annihilation is unlikely: it may be said that, roughly, the odds of annihilation are that of a one step origin of the system (which is much less than the odds of incremental origin.) The more complex the system the more unlikely is annihilation
Every event, every normal system, every realization of a consistent description, recurs infinitely in Time and space i.e. and more accurately over the manifold of being (subject to the requirement that a description of the recurrence should also be consistent.) Such recurrence may in certain cases be interpreted as karma
Every individual recurs. As was seen in discussing Identity, such recurrence has significance only when the discrete consciousness (the consciousness of the discrete individual) merges in a more comprehensive consciousness. ‘Jesus Christ is risen from the dead’ occurs in countless cosmological systems (excepting evidence to the contrary this means that the possibility on this earth is Necessary but not that the occurrence was necessary, probable, or given)
The laws of science, the articles of religion, the depictions of art and literature including fiction, the extreme fantasies of imagination are realized (except for logical contradiction.) Every possible (i.e. non contradictory description of a) state (of affairs) is realized i.e. the Universe is one of unending variety that infinitely exceeds any given description or imagination – any science or art or fiction; it includes the unimagined though not (perhaps) the unimaginable
The story of the Bible is realized in one domain, the Koran in another (what is realized in each instance is some consistent account of the scripture.) Thus the contradictions of Bible and Koran are actual only if literally applied to the same domain e.g. this world. While this gives support to literal interpretations it does not justify application to this world or cosmos. The ‘moral’ significance of the scriptures must be other than literal – even though the literal interpretations are realized in some domain of the manifold of manifest being. Jesus Christ is risen and rising from the dead in countless sub-domains; this necessary fact lends no credence to rising from the dead on this earth except that it is not impossible or its negation is not certain. The Theory of Being is implicitly ultimate with regard to breadth; however, even its explicit breadth is infinitely greater than is that of the traditional understanding of science, Faith, myth, art and fiction
The ‘Jesus Christ is risen from the dead’ is fundamental to Christian Faith. Some interpreters assign non-literal meanings to the articles of religion; one assigned significance has been that the rising from the dead points to human ignorance of the nature of death. From recurrence, every individual recurs infinitely in the manifold of being. From the Theory of Identity, meaning is given to the individual recurrences as they merge into an Identity that spans the otherwise isolated occurrences
If a creator is external to the creation, the Universe (all being) has no creator. The origin of manifest being from the void may be described as a process of creation but it is one without an original or external creator. One part of the manifest universe may ‘create’ another part. However, it is reasonably clear that creation of a formed cosmos is much less likely than ‘intrinsic’ formation by mechanisms (variation and selection.) It is likely, however, that one part of the manifest universe may condition the creation of another. ‘God’ is part of the universe and may be implicated in the creation of another part e.g. a cosmos but there is no god outside the universe and the entire universe was not created by any god
Every entity or element of being interacts with every other element; the strengths of interaction vary by colossal amounts so that (at least in some normal systems) there are only, in effect, a ‘few’ major interactions. If by ‘ghost’ is meant something that has no interactions, there are no ghosts; however, if a ‘ghost’ is something that interacts with a given entity only weakly then there are and must be ghosts and ghost universes (i.e. ghost cosmological systems.) If there were non-interacting systems, they might be called distinct universes (even though one ‘universe’ could never know another.) However, because of universal interaction, there cannot be distinct universes only one universe i.e. the earlier definition that the universe is all being is a good definition in the sense that the universe is fully self-interactive
Time is involved in duration i.e. in origination even from the Void; space is involved in distinction, extension or separation. A kind of space and Time occur in the origin of first manifest being from the void. It is clearly that space and time may not be altogether independent; but developing a description is likely a matter of intricacy (see the section ‘Topics for investigation,’ below.) Relative to a more stable, durable cosmological system with quasi-determinism and quasi-causation (that must occur) it is possible to talk of the ‘origin of time and space’ for the ‘origin of time’ is an origin of a more coherent, coordinated, dominant time; and the origin of space is e.g. as conceived in singularity (big-bang) theories. It should be clear then, that it is not possible on account of the Theory of Being or general cosmology to decide whether the local space-time should be absolute or relative in character: both are possible and each occurs in some systems
It is possible, therefore necessarily occurs, that two normal cosmological systems whose structures are maintained by their local dynamics, have interactions that are much weaker than the local forces. Thus, one cosmos could pass through another as a ‘whisper.’ Each cosmos would have its own Time but detection of the time of the other cosmos would be possible with sufficiently delicate instruments. The weak interactions between the two cosmoses could strengthen and the two could become one. It is further possible that the two times could come into coherence i.e. become one. All ‘coulds’ and ‘possibilities’ of the previous few sentences must be realized in the Universe
In the local cosmos, the individual particles may be each regarded having its own time. The phenomenon of a single dominant time may have resulted from the particles being brought into coherence or from an initial or near-initial coherence that resulted from the conditions of formation. ‘Light-speed’ would then appear to be a local constant and its constancy would appear, even locally, to be contingent; there could, however, be no universal speed of propagation of the interactions
The foregoing also indicates how the Theory of Mechanisms of formation may provide a foundation for modern quantum theories and Einstein’s relativistic theory of gravitation (the parallel between the properties of the void, discussed earlier, and the quantum vacuum is interesting and suggestive as is the dual character of extension and duration in the ‘origin’ of manifest being.) Obviously, these theories will not emerge of necessity from the Theory of Being (the Void) but some further facts of the local cosmology will be required. These thoughts provide material for the later section ‘Further investigation.’
In the section, ‘Mind,’ above, it was seen that (with justified and necessary extension in meaning) mind is found among the primal elements of Being and that mind-as-manifest-in-higher-organisms (e.g. animals) is an elaboration and layering of primal mind (it is shown that this assertion is necessary to avoid classical and more recent paradoxes of mind, that it is sufficient to resolve those paradoxes, and that, provided the nature of ‘primal mind’ is appropriately understood, the paradoxes and absurdities that have been associated with ‘pan-psychism’ are avoided)
It may therefore be said, considering the entire Universe, that mind extends to the root i.e. to the primal elements of being
What is the case regarding the source or origin of mind in a cosmological system e.g. the local cosmological system? Since mind extends to the root, there is no actual origin in the cosmos. However, it appears that infusions are possible. In parallel with earlier reasoning it is concluded that occasions of infusion are much more likely than continual guidance of the local development of mind. What form would or might an instance of infusion take? Very early in the history of the cosmos there might be an influence on the formation of the elementary particles that makes them capable of higher forms of organization. Later, there might be infusions of complex molecules. It seems that the latter is more appropriate to infusion from one part of the cosmos to another. Such considerations are of interest in tracking the history of life, of mind in the cosmos but are not fundamental i.e. they would not be resolutions (resolutions are not needed since, in this narrative, the issues are already resolved by far more fundamental approaches but the consideration is of interest since they have been proposed as resolutions by some writers) of questions regarding origins (of life) and substance (what is mind?)
As has been seen there is neither substance nor need for explanation based in substance. However, relative to any cosmos, there may be kinds that play a local and practical role of substance. In the local cosmos these may, perhaps, be taken to be the elementary particles and forces (of modern physics.) For that assertion to be valid two requirements must be satisfied, (1) that cosmos (aspects labeled Mind and aspects labeled Matter) has required no infusion for its formation and history and (2) the understanding that the elements (particles and forces) are equally (primal) matter and (primal) mind. It would then follow that life and animal-mind would be combinations, layers of combination and elaboration
In the original meaning (about 500 BC) atoms (Greek atoma: things that cannot be cut) were indivisible fundamental particles introduced as alternatives to earlier substance theories to understand the Variety of the world in simple terms. To be ultimate in simplicity, an atom should have no internal structure. However, if there is no internal structure, there can be no explanation of interactions between atoms (e.g. a force field associated with an atom is either an unexplained substance or requires structure.) Atomic explanation has the deficiency that ‘stuff’ theories of substance (Thales’ water, or Mind or Matter or mind and matter…) also have: explanation terminates in the unexplained. If there were no alternative, that would be, perhaps, be the best possible explanation even if not entirely satisfactory. However, in the Metaphysics developed earlier that establishes the existence and character of the Void there is an explanation that terminates and requires no even more fundamental unexplained substance or entity. Metaphysical atomism faces a further problem. It postulates novelty but is incapable of explaining further true novelty. The metaphysics of the present narrative does not face these problems: it does not overcome them; instead, as shown earlier, it shows them to be artifacts of a kind of explanation based in (invalid) assumptions regarding ‘simplicity’
The atoms, elementary particles and fundamental forces of modern physics are not intended to take on the role of metaphysical substance and (except when they are proposed as such) in their role as nothing more than the best available explanation need not address the issues of substance. The basic objects of modern physics are locally and practically fundamental (at least regarding material objects)
Earlier in this section on cosmology a number of divides were noted. These included the ‘first’ state of manifest being, the origin of a normal cosmological system and so on
Of these, two stand out as especially significant. (1) Origins of a cosmological system: a coherent sub-manifold of the Universe, and (2) Origin of the free symbolic capability
These divides, the first that marks the local cosmological system (often called ‘the universe’ in common use) and the second that marks the origin of an especially human form of adaptability are significant in what follows
In continuing to build the Cosmology, there are a number of places to start: comprehensively (in the concept of universe,) microscopically (from the elements of being,) and from self-knowledge. Therefore, regardless intrinsic importance, to a human being, knowledge of human being (self-knowledge) is important in building a picture of the cosmology
To organisms capable of it, self-knowledge has intrinsic interest
The growth of the individual (and of society and civilization) provide initial direction in an endeavor to know and experience all being
Given the interest and the intent that this narrative be brief, there is no intent, here, to write comprehensively of human being. Instead the intent is to be comprehensive with regard to concepts that are and may be useful to the general purposes of the narrative – present and later
In the following, separation of ‘organism’ (mostly biology) and ‘character’ which includes psyche is not intended to imply that organism and psyche are distinct
The Greek word ‘psyche’ referred to Mind, soul and self. The connotation of psyche here is that it is more particular than mind: it possesses structure and organization, it is subject to integration and disintegration, its integration includes what is (experienced as) the self
Life and evolution. Human being squarely in that process; this is good for it puts (some) possibility in human hands
Relation between microscopic elements of nature and life; significance of the separation in physical size; significance of the possibility of a large amount of genetic information stored in a small space – in (near) every cell. More generally, what does the manifest Variety in the world imply for the size and variety of the elements? (Which in the local cosmological system appear to be the elementary particles and forces)
Degrees of autonomy and centralization. Organization of the brain – the ‘triune’ structure makes possible autonomous function; and, relative to organism and environment, binding and freedom, both described below. Modular and integrated function, compensation
Language appears to be rooted in specific areas of the brain. This strengthens the thought, encouraged by language itself, that language is a ‘modular’ function and is, perhaps rooted in specific organs or areas of the brain. However, as will be seen, this conclusion is not necessary
Life and mind. It is not unexpected that the elaborate instances of mind that are possessed of bright consciousness and self-consciousness are found in animal organisms
Extended infancy (neoteny) and childhood: the possibility of enculturation (language, social roles, freedom in creation of the elements of culture, importance of family and of Education and educational institutions) and therefore the possibility of extensive culture and determination by culture
Bipedalism, manual dexterity; size of brain, language, memory of instances – not just of generic situations, and culture which is enhanced by written language; adaptability as a form of adaptation; ‘hairless’ and, therefore, perhaps adaptable to varying climates; color vision
Disease and well being. Well being as norm; disease as exception; classes of disease – incomplete and improper formation, invasion e.g. trauma and microbes, degeneration. Healing, medicine, psychosomatic aspects of well being and healing
Human beings know that they are more than mere being and that they are not (manifestly) ultimate. The effect on human awareness of self and on human commitments (higher motives and projects) is not deterministic (i.e. not univalent) – it may result in feelings of insignificance especially if the individual’s self-perception is that of an alien in the universe; alternatively it may result in centering or a sense of place. The effect on commitments is manifold but what is significant is that there is a fundamental effect e.g. in the building of monuments (whether of ideas or of stone,) in religion and Faith, in the affirmation of the present, in searching for ultimates
Human freedom – there is a long history of debate regarding ‘freedom of the will.’ It is probably efficient to attempt to understand what the freedom of the will is (including the question of how much freedom there is,) its possible sources, how it may manifest and how it may be cultivated (again on the assumption that there is freedom) in parallel with asking whether there is freedom of the will. Why? A misunderstanding of human freedoms may well lead to a complete rejection of the idea. For example, in considering the Theory of Being it was shown that any consistent system of descriptions is realizable; this obviously implies that human being is unlimited (recall that transformation of Identity is required.) However, that is not part of normal human experience. The word ‘normal’ is critical. It was not implied that transcending normal limits is feasible – the improbability may be colossal. (One implication, however, was that contemplation of the infeasible including the impossible –except the logically impossible– is not only reasonable but desirable)
One of the objectives to this section on human being is to provide initial directions for ‘transcendence.’ Is human being necessarily free? Yes; in the creation of new ideas, new ways of being in culture, new technology, in the ability to create and make choices. Why is freedom necessary? As far as earth is concerned, five billion years ago there were no ideas and so on. Therefore, the ideas must have come from without or within; it is improbable that they came entirely from without (though less improbable earlier) and most likely that the source is both without and within. In the life of a culture, there are new ideas (e.g. science.) Even if ideas are Platonic, the realization of an idea must have some original component (somewhere in human-cultural evolution.) Thus it is clear that human beings can create, recognize and exercise choice. It is nowhere implied that such choice (especially significant choice) is easy
Freud thought of human development and personality as deterministic i.e. that the individual and his or her choices are largely determined by biology and development and that the individual is subject to unconscious influences. However, if there were no choice whatsoever there would be little point to research in psychology (except perhaps as entertainment) for it seems unreasonable that a psychology of a deterministic organism could have application by that organism (the case of natural science is different.) In the absence of choice there would be no point to psychoanalysis or any psychotherapy
A number of later psychoanalysts broke of from Freud’s circle because of their disagreements with Freud; Jung, in particular, had a greater notion (though not necessarily a more realistic one) of human possibility. Apparently human personality is plastic under duress. What Freud may be thought to have shown is that choice may be extremely difficult first in recognizing the possibility and then in executing options (incrementally and interactively.) As will be seen, the existence of choice is what makes for a moral animal and, further ‘moral’ does not mean ‘morally Good’ but capable of moral choice and therefore capable of right | wrong
When issues are closer to the core of the individual, recognition and execution of options will be difficult, the likelihood of success may be less, the time required greater. This may be experienced as determinism. In pathological cases choice and change may be extremely difficult. The remoteness of the core of self-knowledge and awareness of option may be a mark of (certain kinds of) pathology
The following topics (through ‘Exceptional Achievement and Disorder’) continue the discussion of ‘the nature of Human being’
Although the character of the aspects of mental function are different, it is convenient to use ‘feeling’ to cover the variety of elements; in doing so, ‘feeling’ is used in sense that is distinct from its usual senses (inner feelings, feeling of touch and so on; the present sense may include these)
Primitives. Feeling, then, is primitive. Feeling has a variety of distinctions. The following distinctions are included for their general or present significance: quality, intensity, internal-external or body-environment, direction i.e. afference-efference, focus-background, and free-bound. The distinctions among external sensory modalities are included in quality. The ‘internal’ include pleasure, pain, basic drives, primitive emotions, and the kinesthetic. Perhaps focus-background may be reduced to degree of intensity. The nature of afference (input) and efference and relation to attitude (the aboutness quality of some Experience) and action is subtle (here their understanding is incomplete but this lack is not –yet– significant in the present endeavor.) The free-bound distinction is most important. ‘Bound’ means ‘bound to’ an object; for example, the sensation of color is strongly bound to the properties of the Object (which includes lighting.) Thus, perception is usually bound (unbound perception is hallucination.) Primitive emotions and basic drives are bound (usually) to the state of the organism (when unbound there may be some dysfunction.) ‘Free’ means not bound or, perhaps, weakly bound. Free feelings arise in the stimulation of memory (perhaps by association.) Thoughts (here regarded as symbolic or linguistic and imagistic) are free; ‘higher’ emotions and drives have a free component. It is natural that bound sensations should be more intense (otherwise e.g. thought would dominate attention to environment; inversion of intensity however is not invariably dysfunction e.g. in originality and in dreaming.) Bound thought, bound higher emotion and higher drive, inversion of the relative intensities of bound and free sensation may indicate dysfunction. (As will be elaborated, what sometimes appears as dysfunction may otherwise be functional)
Originality is understood in the generic sense may be understood: it lies at the intersection of the ‘determined’ (e.g. so far) and the indeterministic component of (the brain or mind of) the organism. The specific physical locations(s) and process (‘occasion’ is perhaps a better term) of originality remain (they thought) undetermined. The occasion in ‘conceptual space’ may be hypothesized to include the situation where determinate thought does not quite mesh with experience and | or other determinate thought and a novel but elementary idea permits adjustment. Such adjustments may occur frequently in day to day affairs and need not have great significance but are in fact true cases of originality. Significant originality occurs, for example, in the continued application of elementary cases in building systems of determinate thought; the application of the elementary case likely occurs in multiple levels and regions and not in simple linear sequence
Integration. Functions are not primitive but are integral forms of primitive feelings. Integrations include shape and size of objects. There are interesting problems of integration. If the perception of an Object is a bundle of feelings (sensations) how is it that objects are perceived as wholes (this is called the binding problem.) A detailed answer is complex but a simple answer lies in unconscious and intuitive (Kantian) action of the brain; or in adaptation – objects come as objects, therefore perception is attuned to objects; or in evolution – a source of adaptation (culture is another for what is perceived as an object in one culture is not in another.) Another problem of integration is ‘object constancy;’ imagine viewing an Object getting closer or rotating; its size and shape do not appear to change. Why? The response is similar to the case of binding. The ‘Unity of Consciousness’ is similarly explained though enhancement by focus and memory are likely necessary. Perception is integrated bound external sensation. Thought is integrated free sensation. Higher emotion is (hypothetically) a mutually conditioned mix of primitive emotion and thought
Since binding is a function of memory, and since memory associations may fade or be strengthened – and altered, it is not theoretically correct to think that emotional responses are fixed. This is also observed in fact. Since emotional response does change (reconditioning, interpretation, weakening of general response e.g. with stress, illness and age,) change may be cultivated. Joy cannot (may not) be willed in the instant but may be cultivated over a period of time (and misery may be cultivated e.g. for secondary gain)
Of especial interest is the integration of the psyche – of perception, thought and emotion. There is no full integration – nor, due to freedom, can or need there be. However there is some integration and integrability – and disintegrability. However, adequate integration is essential – at all levels. The principle is the appropriate integration of freedom and binding. At a basic level the binding of emotion and perception connects individual to environment and others; without such binding perception and, especially, emotion ‘freewheel’ and there is no connection (perhaps there is a relation of these somewhat hypothetical thoughts to autism and Asperger’s syndrome.) At a higher level emotion provides binding to others and to commitments (possible explanation of the non contributory lives of individuals with antisocial personality; and possible explanation of the importance of integrity of the psyche in adjustment, commitment and contribution – in addition to, perhaps over and above, the importance of raw ability)
The categories of intuition, below, are integral forms
All of these integral functions as well as those of personality fall under Identity, treated earlier (that treatment considered personal identity and the of identity of objects as such and in time as similar)
The unconscious. Memory (relative strength of association) and focus-background are implicated in the unconscious. Additionally, lack of integration or splitting is also implicated (this concern is significant in ‘neuroses’ and disintegration or disorder of personality.) The unconscious enters also as the Form of intuition which conditions perception and conception but is not itself seen
‘Intentionality,’ the aboutness character of (some) experience is not presently discussed in detail because, despite its importance in understanding mind, it is not presently important to the narrative (intentionality was briefly discussed above under ‘Mind’ and the problem of intentionality on a materialist account is discussed in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’ of the next division)
In the modern and recent literature ‘experience,’ ‘attitude,’ and ‘action’ have been said to be the marks of mind. The tri-polar continuum marked by experience, attitude and action is a practical classification of things mental but is it fundamental? Experience (feeling) has been extended to the primal root and must be the sole theoretical mark of the mental while attitude and action, which also involve experience but not necessarily the recognition of experience, are practical marks. However, to set experience on the same level as and yet apart from attitude and action is to introduce an implicit or tacit Cartesian divide. It is therefore necessary to reject attitude and action as independent markers of mind; given experience, however, they may be regarded as markers of a certain (advanced in comparison to the primal case) level of mind. Therefore, at the human or animal level, it is reasonable (practical) to regard experience, attitude, and action as three poles in the continuum of mental phenomena
An example of a category of intuition is perception in spatial terms. It is easy to imagine that without the special brain organization – partly genetic and partly developmental – that makes perception of the world as spatial, such perception would be impossible. However, spatial perception, if not present in human infants, is well if not fully, developed by the time the individual begins to walk. Spatial perception is an example of (Kantian) intuition. The concept of intuition was discussed earlier; here will be listed some categories that are an enhancement over the traditional ones (and which vary according to author)
The following are categories of intuition in the Kantian sense that they are characteristic modes of perception, thought and emotion – of the psyche. However, the actual categories deviate significantly from Kant
Existential: Being, (Becoming, Being-in, …) Humor (the intuition of indeterminism and chaos.) Physical: Space, Time, Causation, Indeterminism. Biological: Life Forms. Psychological or Psychosocial: Image-Concept, Icon-Symbol, Emotion, Humor, Communication, Value, Identity…
They recognized ‘impediments’ to realization. These included normal impediments e.g. constraints of intelligence, time, affection, resources… They recognized the lack of (at least initial) definition of goals – this, however, was essential to the endeavor. However, they also recognized characteristic styles of self-perception, relations to life – including others and environment and ambitions, how they accommodated criticism and success and failure – how they conceived success and failure… These overlap ‘personality’
Classic approaches to personality (these perhaps straddle a number of cultures) include factors and dynamics. A preliminary organization of factors is according to freedom and constraint (in which biology is significant.) These include affective and cognitive style. Dynamics pertains to the interactions among these factors and to action and choice. Here, dynamics further pertains to fixity, flexibility of dynamics, recognition of the factors (including the unconscious,) cultivation, and reflexivity applied to change
What determines personality? It is reasonable to think that personality is a function of overall integration of psyche (the statement is almost a tautology.) It is also reasonable to think that the overall integration is a result of the interaction of experience and the functional system (including the categories of intuition.) Therefore, a clue to classification (to be synthesized with observation and experience) should be the varieties of integration – the differential development of the different functions and their interactions (e.g. and roughly, prominence of emotion would mark a different kind than would prominence of cognition)
These issues remain an ongoing concern
They observed that, roughly, growth follows an (overlapping) sequence of development: natural, social, psychological, universal
Cultivation of self is important; compensation (in addition to change) but not overcompensation (which requires recognition) is also significant
Charisma may, perhaps, be cultivated
Is there an end of growth? In the normal theories of growth, death is an ultimate limit
The Theory of Being shows that death cannot be such a limit and, in discussing Identity it was shown that individual Identity merges (must merge) in an higher (more comprehensive) identity
Atman is the Experience of Brahman in the individual
First set up some characteristics of language proceeding intuitively and informally (‘definition’ will come later.)
Language is symbolic i.e. although its roots may be iconic, particular icons (sounds, images) come to have a significance that is over and above the iconic content; perhaps simultaneously there are simplifications to the icons. How it comes about in the spoken stage (it is assumed that, initially, language is spoken language) is not clear (origins will be addressed below.) It seems that first written language is (mostly) iconic. The origin, in temporal sequence, with causes identified, of word (and Meaning) and syntax and of alphabet and word construction is not clear. However, it may be reasonably assumed that the end (and intermediate) results have adaptive characteristics; however, the idiosyncrasies of (and freedoms in) cultivation must be among factors that make it erroneous to expect that all characteristics of languages are determined by optimality (in any sense) and or adaptation
Syntax arises perhaps because facts have a standardized form – the ‘subject-predicate’ form. This would be adaptive and would also be consistent with the variations in syntactic form that correspond to the subject-predicate form (in some languages ‘They went home’ is rendered ‘They home went.’) However, it may be that adoption of subject-predicate form is a limitation on the kinds of Fact that may be expressed (perhaps one mark against rigid rules of syntax. What came first, ‘natural’ syntax or rules?)
[It is not being suggested that all uses of language concern factual or propositional expression –of states of affairs– and its variants: assertion or question, and the variations – direction, commission, expression and declaration regarding which there is a standard analysis that purports to show that these variations exhaust the variations on communication of states of affairs. It is not suggested that these exhaust language – or that language is exhaustible; however, further ‘uses’ will be taken up, perhaps in future editions of this narrative, as they become of interest to the endeavor]
Whereas thought is iconic at root (and has the dimensionality of the associated sensory mode,) in the case of a linguistic animal, thought (in language) is highly symbolic and linear. Literal spoken language is necessarily linear; therefore, written language is (typically) linear since, perhaps, it might be inefficient or even burdensome for common spoken and written language to be distinct. Especially spoken language is not altogether linear since it is accompanied with what may be called ‘dramatic effect’ i.e. volume, pitch (and overtone,) rate, cadence and inflection, variability in form or syntax including poetry and ‘non language’ factors such as gesture, posture and affect. Still, both spoken language and written language are highly linear and symbolic whereas the environment of language is highly iconic and contextual. Thus in producing language there is a reduction in the ‘physical information content.’ Speech provides some context through drama; written language by elaboration and poetry. That the speaker and listener may be in the same room (not the case of media) or culture provides some context; writers and readers in the same language are likely to have some common context
However, it is also a characteristic of language that it expresses and evokes context; and, although this expression and evocation must suffer attenuation of context, this characteristic is among the factors that make language an instrument of human communication i.e. that language may communicate, even if incompletely, degrees and modes of information that exceed the literal information content (perhaps made possible as a result of standardized contexts.) Perhaps it is standardization of context (e.g. human species, culture) that makes expression-evocation possible. Perhaps language is some roughly optimal mean adaptation to the multiple requirements of thought, communication, and (in story and written form) preservation. As a result of linear form, language also provides the following ‘adaptation.’ It is well adaptable to the requirements of precise expression and processing (thought) – especially in precisely defined contexts (strictly syntactic, logics, mathematics, and science.) Language does not attain the precision of such contexts outside them; nor need it: precision in communication or reflection is not a universal Value over all (conscious) mental process
Although thought and language (thought in language) do not appear to be identical, there does not appear to be a (distinct or root) ‘language of thought’
[However, many persons act as though precision of being –know yourself– and of communication –being known to others– is the end of being. Note of course that these ends are not said to lack value; and that there are settings where some degree of precision must be inherent. There are also contexts where precision must be relaxed as the constitution of that context. Two such contexts are the intimate or personal relationship that stands between friends and the context of discovery. ‘Contexts of discovery’ are typically associated with science but are also pertinent to most reasoning including logic and mathematics. Additionally, if someone had an insight that there may be forms of language better adapted to processing, communication and preservation it would at first be necessary to relax the standard forms. This appears to routinely happen in poetry, a variety of prose forms, in mathematics and science. Although the scientific view has been criticized when it pretends to model being, it provides significant analogy and metaphor. It is first necessary to say what is meant by ‘scientific view.’ The basis of their metaphorical approach from science has origins in the ‘great’ theories of physics and evolutionary biology. There is a view from physics in which the Universe is seen as an interconnected system moving in space, through time in mutual interaction. Darwinian Theory supports such a view applied to life but also adds the mechanism of incremental variation and selection. These views entered their thought as metaphor; but not as exclusive metaphor; this metaphor and reflection on its necessities or otherwise and alternatives led to the Theory of Being of ultimate depth. They experienced to some degree what seemed as though it were a private language – perhaps a language with private elements. Is there a language of metaphor – and is it more than a few new symbols or a few new forms e.g. poetry? The expression of multi-dimensional intuition in linear form –even if affect is excluded– appears to involve omission and distortion of information. Omission is compensated by context and distortion by adaptation. However such compensation is, in the normal case, incomplete and in-process. Language appears to have a metaphorical character at its root]
It is now appropriate to ask ‘What is language?’ ‘Definition’ can be restrictive or expansive. Human being arrives at a stage – the present stage. ‘Language’ has been a particularly human instrument and in language, ‘language’ is recognized. ‘Language’ has variations – the ‘languages’ of the world with their syntactic forms and uses; formal ‘languages’ and so on. ‘Language’ then is distinct from iconic thought (that ‘iconic thought’ has a degree of remove from the ‘thing,’ provides an approach to seeing thought in language and thought in images as lying on a spectrum.) This appears to be a fact of human existence and thought; yet it also becomes a theory of human existence as soon as, beyond thought and expression, someone says that is language, this is the correct usage of language (even if adaptation and cultivation play a role in what has come about.) The situation is complex as it is the academic who tends to reflect on language, whose notions enter into school curricula; but the nature of ‘language’ is also determined in human transaction, law and politics. The line of argument here is informal; a way is being felt. Relaxation of the idea of language (e.g. by distinguishing thought and communication, linear speech and drama) might result in less precision but greater content (value – in intimate, formal and political contexts.) Persecution of linguistic groups might end or diminish (this is of course a dreamy speculation, ‘Language as it is known is constitutive of Human being,’ comes a response. Yet, even the improbable –when seen even vaguely to have significance– deserves consideration)
Among the general topics considered in the earlier discussion of ‘Mind’ are attention, consciousness, awareness, aspects of the unconscious, and focus. The topics on mind in the section ‘Human being’ include an ‘existential’ component – the self-knowledge that human being is not ultimate but is more than mere being; human freedom; feeling as element of mind; elements of function – perception, thought, emotion and, briefly, drives (basic and higher;) psyche as integrated or integrable and disintegrable; the nature and significance of the integrations for Object perception and thought; the significance of the integration of cognition and emotion; the categories of intuition (in its Kantian meaning –the characteristic modes of perception, thought and emotion– of the psyche, also seen as modes of integration;) contexts of Necessity of and of freedom from the intuitions; growth, personality, commitment, and charisma (effect on the other based in the person rather than in institutions;) language; morals are taken up later. Some topics pertinent to ‘disorder’ such as learning, and a variety of concerns such as sex and sleep that have a ‘mental component’ have not been considered (as lacking immediate interest to the narrative)
The foregoing list may be regarded as ‘aspects of mind’ and as such is relatively complete. It is natural to expect that the varieties of disorder of the psyche will correspond to the various modes of psyche (elementary or integrated.) Thus what are considered to be the major mental illnesses (in psychiatry, 2006) may be read off a simple list of functions: perception, thought, emotion. The major mental illnesses are dysfunctions of cognition (psychoses including schizophrenia,) and emotion (mood disorders – depressive and manic depressive, anxiety disorders…) That the list from which these disorders has been read is very simple implies, of course, that ‘psychosis’ and ‘mood’ contains numerous variations, subtleties and interactions and is very incomplete. The intent here is not completeness but to see that dysfunction correlates with function. Among the disorders of modern psychiatry are the ‘personality disorders.’ There is no intent to effect a classification. However, it is possible to see aspects of disorder in dysregulation of affect (emotion) and other in dysregulation of cognition (the following examples are undoubtedly simplistic.) For example, dysregulation of affect in relation to self might, in cases of excess, result in behavior that is highly chaotic; dysregulation of affect in relation to others might, in cases of deficit, result in uncaring, callous attitudes and cruelty
A significant question regards the relative roles of biology and development in the formation of personality disorders. In addition to the intrinsic interest, the question is significant for treatment and as illustration of the body-mind (and nature-nurture) issue. While, in any instance, the differential roles of biology versus environment may be difficult to discern, it is necessary (with near certainty) that the extremes of human behavior will be a joint product of extremes of biology (e.g. affective instability) and of environment. I.e. the population of individuals with a given personality disorder will include a range of contributing proportions from ‘innate’ and environmental factors. There is a temptation to assert that these conclusions are logically necessary; however, it is necessary to stop short of ‘logic’ and assert relative certainty. (The considerations may seem to omit choices made by the individual however such choices also lie in the range of innate and environmental)
[Note that the modern clinical concept of disorder avoids reference to what is ‘normal.’ ‘Definitions’ are set up so that recognition of a disorder is integral with practice rather than driven by definition. Referring to an earlier discussion of the nature and significance of definition it was seen that, even in highly formal fields, definition is practice driven to a significant degree. Therefore, while definitions have importance, they are evolving elements of disciplines and practices. The idea of definition driving as the driving element may be attributed to the practice of Education]
Disorders and culture – it is not altogether clear whether the it is the disorders or their manifestations that are distinct or their manifestations. Different behaviors are differentially encouraged or discouraged, tolerated, interpreted and amplified. Perhaps there is a core set of disorders (with variant manifestations) on which are superposed cultural variations
There is an asymmetry between exceptional achievement and disorder. Although exceptional achievement is dependent on ability it is perhaps more dependent on circumstance and nurturing than is disorder. Whereas disorder is typically dependent on simple but severe disintegration, ability is typically dependent on more than simple integration and on crossing thresholds (of degree and integration.) Some thoughts on the cultivation of ability are found in ‘Principles of Thought’ below
The savant syndrome is perhaps atypical in that a specific talent is extraordinarily realized while most abilities are under-realized. It may not be altogether clear whether the talent of the savant is a compensation for a general lack of ability or whether the lack of most abilities frees the one special ability (or whether the savant has a fortuitous combination of one talent and a general deficiency.) Experiments suggest that ‘normal’ individuals may develop savant-like abilities under the proper circumstances. Thus, perhaps, one manifestation of the savant is due to release. More interestingly, talent may be generally latent and require conditions of release (already innately satisfied in ‘talented’ individuals)
There are relations among disorder, talent and achievement. Such relations are perhaps both ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ or causal and correlative. Given individuals of equal ‘innate’ mathematical talent a paranoid individual may realize the talent due to isolation (and obsession) whereas the ‘adjusted’ individual may lack these external motivations. In this example the relationship is correlative or (perhaps) indirectly causal (if talent is its own driving force, the example may also be atypical.) The contribution of mania to the achievement of a talented individual –or to talent itself– is directly causal. If ‘mania’ is abundant energy then it is not a disorder; however since abundant energy requires a spectrum, the outer range of the spectrum may be energy to excess or dysfunction. Abundant energy, the lesser relative of mania, is contributory to achievement. However, biographical and anecdotal evidence appears to show that achievement may involve struggle between productivity and uncontainable energy. Similarly, compensation for depression may be a spur to originality. It is thus that threads of originality and affective problems (disorders) tend to run in parallel in certain families
In small (hunter-gatherer) societies, ‘shamans’ have been (it is said) the diviners of ‘truth’ and protectors of psychic and social integrity. The (true) shaman appears to be a psychically sensitive individual who is initiated e.g. by crisis into and completes a journey of discovery into other worlds (which may be interpreted as a journey into the self.) The initiation is disintegration and distrust and fear, the completion is reintegration into trust of being-as-it-is i.e. trust even amid the real chaos of the world (which is its natural condition.) It has been suggested that schizophrenics are shamans in the making whose journey is terminate by ‘treatment.’ It has also been suggested that the psychotic experience has alternative origins in exceptional sensitivity (under crisis or stress) and in the (sometimes) degenerative effect (character) of schizophrenia and that the shaman i.e. the source of the Real is the sensitive individual but not the degenerative psychoses
It is pertinent to ask whether the future ‘inspiration’ of the modern world lies only in institution, patriarchy and normalcy or whether it may lie also in charisma (whose roots may lie in sensitivity and ability)
Discussion of Human being and society continues in the following sections terminating with ‘Faith’
The narrative thread now enters into consideration of the individual in the world and, particularly, in society. A (more inclusive than usual) conception of ethics, i.e. Ethics, weaves together the particular threads. The objective is to be inclusive of human-social concerns; however, the discussion is not uniform in its degrees of elaboration or definitiveness. One purpose is to see the various topics in a new light under the Theory of Being and the approach that avoids a priori commitments – of allowing the ‘commitments’ to emerge in reflection. Another aims at contribution. An overriding goal is to continue to build up a complete picture of the Metaphysics, and within it of the human-social world. This is, it is hoped, a contribution to the general foundation of Understanding. More particularly, in locating the individual within culture and society, in civilization and history (as well as nature,) it is hoped that there is initial grounding and direction for the discovery and realization (‘the journey’) of being (with both roots and goal in Being as revealed by the Theory of Being i.e. the metaphysics.) These are among the concerns that informed the selection of topics regarding human being
The concern with morals finds occasional expression in seriousness of attitude, preoccupation with moral concerns, adherence to given morals, preaching, preoccupation with an avoidance of dissipation and, occasionally an angry outlook on the world
They preferred lightheartedness of approach, enjoyment even to occasional dissipation, humor. Where lies the balance in attitude? This question, as well, can be taken with seriousness to excess. Intuition and flow are perhaps fundamental and require only occasional supplement. Silence and mental quiet (in what might be serious concerns) are a virtue
Why do human societies have morals and moral codes? So much has been written on morals and ethics there is a valid question whether that literature is useful. Surely, in questioning value, it is valid to question the value of the academic interest in value. They saw that there is value to brevity in expression whose roots are in careful thought – generally and especially for morals
Are morals a human invention? Consider ‘Who invented the modern automobile?’ An automobile has various subsystems. The invention of a key subsystem, the four stroke internal combustion engine, is associated with N. A. Otto, a German engineer who constructed such an engine in 1876. However, the wheel dates back to antiquity. The integration of the various subsystems is ongoing. Adaptation to ‘needs’ is a factor in selection; some aspects of automobile design have little relation to designated function. No particular individual is ‘the’ inventor of the automobile nor may any group of individuals over time be said to have invented the automobile. Rather, the source of the ‘invention’ is the creative contribution of all those individuals in interaction with ‘necessity’
Undoubtedly there are some elements of moral intuition present in animals. Perhaps too little is understood about non human animals to know whether the individual animal is morally creative. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that moral systems emerged and developed over time, with creative input and with adaptation to changing contexts; and, perhaps, that there is some continuity of moral intuition between non human and human
Morals are made Possible and are ‘required’ by the same facet of human nature – the freedom in behavior and thought. It is assumed to be obvious that Human beings (except in pathology) have instincts that, even if the label ‘moral’ does not apply, are conducive to moral behavior. However, the freedom includes an attenuation of the degree of psychological necessity of the ‘instincts.’ Simultaneously, greater freedom in thought, especially thought in language, makes a moral vocabulary and moral systems possible. It is unlikely that what are today recognized as moral traditions sprung up at once. Rather, it is likely that morals went through a variety of phases, each having an adaptation appropriate to its cultural context. Freedom (free will, originality) has been debated in theology and philosophy (and in more specific contexts such as crime and punishment;) the essence of the argument for freedom is in the earlier discussion of originality. Is originality in morals a relatively new invention or is it coeval with the form of human being and human groups? Negative evidence from study of small scale groups is necessarily inconclusive because they lack institutionalized systems of morality. However they do possess the ‘institution’ of language that is a medium of moral expression. Studies of small groups suggest that, for them, morals are more negotiable and less ends in themselves; their function appears to be the enhancement of personal relationships. In modern society, morals tend to be ends: they are less negotiable; personal relationships are less important – stability derives from institutionalization of various functions. This suggests the opposite of what might be expected from the existence of moral traditions (east and west) associated first with the religious traditions and then with reflective or philosophical ethics. The expectation might be that modern individuals are more creative in morals. Instead, the generation and negotiation of morals is a day to day affair in smaller and groups (prior to the larger societies made possible e.g. by agriculture)
Freedom of will and originality follow from Necessity. They reflected that what is more interesting and valuable than debates on free will and so on might be an illumination of the nature of the freedom. There is no implication that it is the ‘highest of values’ even though it is what makes Value possible and needed. There is no implication that the freedom means that the individual can do, even within reason, ‘whatever he or she wants to do.’ There is no implication that the individual is not subject to forces of the psyche that are difficult to surmount – even when it is desirable to do so. The freedom involves two (interactive) parts. First, is the recognition of what may be of worth while and second an attempt to realize what has worth. The parts are interactive in that an attempt at realization provides, simultaneously, insight into feasibility and ‘failure’ may suggest, through reflection, alternatives and ‘success’ may suggest additional possibilities that build upon what is achieved. The process is reflective, constructive and cumulative. In parallel with the process described, the individual faces questions of ability, resources, value, and doubt – originating in criticism by self or others, human imperatives. In facing these concerns, initiative is at least as important as fortitude. Expression of freedom is not at all one without personal cost, not at all one that is ever natural, or one that stands above all else. However, it is possible, has value, and may be nurtured and cultivated
Morals are prescriptive (and proscriptive) in the form of e.g. general codes, guiding principles or rules (prescriptions) for conduct or rules for special situations; morals cover virtue e.g. the desirable characteristics of a moral individual; and morals may be constructive. Constructive morality is commitment to building contributions over a period of time e.g. a lifetime. ‘Building’ refers to the thought that the nature of the goals, the understanding of what Value is and what constitutes a valuable contribution and what may be feasible develop in parallel with the contribution itself (even while values at the most general level such as an intent to contribute or a search for what is of high value may remain unchanged)
They found, as a principle of thought, that open specification at the outset of an investigation is productive of creative and realistic thought. They observed that often in the history of thought discovery has been marred by premature commitments (which has not prevented creative thought and has even occasioned it in attempts to work around the conceptually unnecessary commitment.) A primary explicit example of this principle occurred earlier in saying that ‘being is that which exists.’ Since the meaning of existence (what it is, what things exist, commitment to matter or Mind or substance at all as fundamental) was unspecified at outset it remained open to discovery (and originality.) Similarly, though not as explicitly, the idea of mind was not identified as mind-as-humans-and-animals-have-it (especially at first blush.) This too was productive of originality. They adopted this approach to the development of the idea of ethics. The approach appeared to be unconventional at first but was found to effectively connect to the traditions of ethics – and more: it was productive of binding or integration among the traditions and to binding among morals and the other elements of society (the institutions of social form, culture including knowledge and art and religion, economics, and politics which they thought to include law
Now, Ethics will be conceived the system of relations among the elements of (human) freedom; the primary elements of freedom are values, action and knowledge. It seems that values and action should complete elements of freedom. Why is knowledge included? First, although being is given, the Object (what is known) is not. Some objects appear constant but others are in a process of creation (e.g. what is ethics?) Second, while knowledge (Metaphysics) should obviously have power in determining the nature and contents of ethics, Value (as has been seen) is implicated in considering what shall be knowledge. This seems to imply that ethics and knowledge are relative. If they are taken individually, this may be the case; if they are taken as a totality, there is no necessary relativism. ‘Knowledge’ includes metaphysics (the Theory of Being) and may be generalized to all elements of culture (mentioned in the previous paragraph) that constitute knowledge in some way
Here are some implications of these thoughts on ethics – this conceptualization of Ethics (it is not at all necessary for a ‘new’ conceptualization to be ‘consistent’ with the past; it is reasonable to expect there to be continuities in meaning – as there are; however, as far as the logic of a new system of ideas is concerned what is necessary is self-consistency and truth or correspondence to the world)
The system of (human) freedoms is Ethics; ethics is the study – perception and conception – of Ethics
As understood in ‘Western Ethics,’ ethics is often seen as including or overlapping aesthetics (since both concern value, this is natural.) The present conception of Ethics goes beyond this. What are the dimensions of (human) freedom? Knowledge may be extended to ‘culture’ (in the sense of Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1871) and action whose arenas include the individual, society and civilization. The dimensions of Ethics, then, may be identified as values including Morals, traditional ethics and aesthetics; culture including knowledge and its traditions and institutions e.g. the academic institutions; information including media, publishing; art, literature, music, myth… and religion;) action and its arenas (ethics, aesthetics which are repeated and economics – especially feasibility, politics – here regarded as including law, and change –dynamics– and institutions of social form)
In its traditional meaning, ethics is moral philosophy (the study of morality) and morality – morals and systems of morals whether specified in ‘codes’ e.g. the code Hammurabi (moral codes may be expressed in law,) religious systems (Buddhism, Christianity…,) or philosophical systems (natural law, deontology, consequentialism…) Metaethics is the study of ethics – the nature of ethics, ethical argument, the objectivity and foundation of ethical judgment. In its present conception, Ethics includes metaethics
Ethics is Real; ethics, naturally, has elements of subjectivity (a goal in ethics is the elimination of avoidable, unnecessary or mere subjectivity)
Learning from the Theory of Being. Primal origins of being include (1) ‘Random’ elements in origins and selection for self-adaptation, (2) Conditioning of further change by current state or configuration, (3) Indeterminism which remains a source of form (formation) and decay
Ethical contexts. (1) The seat of morals in psycho-social integration (of which integration of the psyche – a special case seen earlier;) which implies that the moral sense and natural (relatively unselfconscious) is unlikely to be effectively replaced by moral systems (the traditions and, then, reflective or philosophical ethics.) Mere replacement or the moral sense (which can only happen on paper) would undoubtedly lead to an unmooring of morals. A supplement to moral sense, however, has degrees of appropriateness and necessity; necessity arises on two accounts. First that morals have a social dimension (this is obvious) and constitute the individual in interaction with moral systems. Second, in the ‘breakdown’ of any social system, there is occasion and some necessity for reflection and its expression in further system or changes in system (traditional and or reflective.) This process is a continuation of the transformation from non human to human animal. There remains some question about the utility of the traditional systems (e.g. Buddhist, Christian morals) and philosophical ethics. Certainly these do not result in a ‘perfect’ world or even perfect clarity regarding morals; perfection has no meaning except as an ideal. Change builds upon what is given. Perfection is not either possible or desirable. The possibility of ‘error’ and of adaptation to circumstance and possibility have the same root and are essential to being (in becoming)
A second ethical context involves, (2) The supplement of the moral sense by moral system is incomplete. It is true that in transformation from a traditional world to new contexts made possible by new social freedoms and new technologies, the individual moral sense and even traditional systems may be not merely inadequate but even say nothing. However, a more complete integration of psyche (the bound moral sense and the ‘free’ elements of system especially the expression of reason in reflective ethics) may provide improvement over mere ‘supplement.’ Modern philosophical ethics aims at (or seems to aim at) a rational foundation for choice. However, a choice between its systems (e.g. deontology vs. consequentialism) cannot always be clearly made (debate continues.) In metaethics some reflexive clarification is possible but does not (has not) removed the issue of conflicting and incomplete determination. It is not clear, from the complexity and Variety of the world and of moral contexts that complete rational determination is possible. It is precisely here that integration of the psyche and its instruments appears to be essential. Real contexts are unique in the sense that no logic of morals established in other contexts (theoretical, invented example, or real) are guaranteed to be applicable. Moral determination in real (and new) contexts may be enhanced by ‘system’ but system is insufficient; binding to the moral sense is necessary. In simple terms, individual and integrity remain essential
Finally, (3) Ethical contexts display the dynamic characteristics of and arise out of primal being. Ethics is ‘Real’ but must adapt (change) to different situations and scales and incorporate considerations of feasibility (economics) and group concerns (politics.) Despite realism (what may be labeled ‘theoretical objectivity’) the system remains in interactive change and therefore requires balances among the theoretical tendencies e.g. deontology and consequentialism that may not be calculable and ‘must’ be supplemented by psycho-social integration and ‘experiment.’ It is ‘realism in process.’ From a practical perspective there is no absolute control or absolute moral knowledge – which in any case are undesirable given the nature of being since ‘absolutes’ would be frozen and though the actual world has danger (‘evil’) it also has great promise (‘Good;’ what is Real must be –or be part of– what is good)
Since this topic is significant to transmission of the goals of the narrative its inclusion is necessary. Since it is peripheral to the present concerns of the narrative it must be essentially brief. A more complete discussion may be taken up in later editions or in a supplementary narrative
It is natural that education should concern ‘the elements of and relations among the elements of (human) freedom.’ These concerns include the established (stable) elements of society and culture
Therefore, the needs of education include both tradition (established knowledge, institutions and other cultural elements) and the cultivation of the ‘freedoms’ – originality in various endeavors mentioned above in ‘Ethics as elements of and relations among the elements of (human) freedom’
Political process is the process of group decision. Political institutions are the institutions of political process. Politics is constituted of the process and its institutions. Political theory is the empirical study of politics; and extensions by correlation, causal relation and other extrapolation; and the use of theory in relating institutions to (political and other) ends. Political philosophy includes the study of and (original) reflection regarding (1) The nature of politics and political theory, (2) Kinds of institutions and their intrinsic values, (3) Relations among institutions and other considerations – Morals, economics, (4) The nature of political philosophy
Economics is the study of feasibility (especially in human affairs.) It is implicit in the conceptualization of Ethics (here) that Economics ‘impacts’ Ethics (and Politics; the aspects of the social world are interactive.) Feasibility, desirability (Value,) and metaphysics interact at the ‘highest’ of levels. Metaphysics shows what is Possible. Feasibility shows what is reasonably possible. However, among what is feasible there is a range of feasibilities. At the low end there are ‘feasibilities’ that are sufficiently remote that they might normally be regarded as unworthy of effort (and other resources.) However if they are sufficiently desirable, e.g. realization of All Being (and even lesser objectives,) the value of the outcome may make them worthy of attention (if a fraction of resources or an individual’s ‘personal’ time are deployed there is no detraction from more immediate needs – in fact, in some perspectives, there is a potential enhancement of immediate needs since the understanding of being and of possibility illuminates individual lives.) Practically, considerations of feasibility show various ‘ideal’ political and moral goals (that are otherwise commendable) to require (at least) reconsideration. In large societies with otherwise unheard of levels of resources it is easy to forget or not see that resources are finite; even among worthwhile goals (in any perspective) there is ‘competition’ for the finite resources
Consider the following interactions among morals, economics and politics. Political arrangements have (or may be seen as having) intrinsic moral Value. It is a mistake to think that the moment an individual enters the political arena he or she is no longer an individual; and (the opposite extreme) to think that a political institution has no intrinsic worth. In small societies the institutions of politics are also the expressions of the individual. While it is true that in large societies there is a separation of the realms, that separation is not necessary; and even its practical manifestations are only necessary on certain political arrangements. Some arrangements have intrinsic moral value because they are (may be) a form of universal individual expression (possible in a small community; requiring, perhaps, careful arrangement in a large one.) Perhaps, the political arrangement that is a ‘high’ form of individual expression detracts from other moral values; this is, then, simply an example of the ‘competition’ of different moral values for ‘resources.’ It is therefore, an economic concern. Within medicine, more resources applied to technology result in fewer resources available for human concerns (technology and human concerns have only partial overlap.) At a higher level, more resources applied to tighter international borders result in less resources available within the borders (and, questionably since tightening of borders cannot be altogether effective, perhaps more internal resources in the long term.) (The variety of concerns is basic even when their labels are specialized; the continued use of the vocabulary is justified in a number of ways. First, in that in the most basic meanings the specific concerns are interactive; and, second, even in their most specialized meanings there is interaction among compartmentalized concerns.) Specialization allows (even promotes) the development of intellectual machinery whose precision is made possible by the very specialization. In a simple vocabulary, individual, group, and resource concerns are interactive
A criticism of the line of argument of the previous paragraph is that no fundamental principle in terms of which competing alternatives may be evaluated. An example of such a principle may be that the individual is the final measure of all group (political) and economic arrangements. However, such principles are not free of their own difficulties. First, precisely what aspects of the individual are to be taken as ‘measures’ (since, as measure, ‘the individual’ is vague.) Second, what is an individual? Is an individual a hermetically sealed bundle of sentience? Or, alternatively, are the system of relations and ties that bind the individual to the world part of the individual? May a married couple be considered to be an individual (ontologically and not merely for political or economic purposes?) In some ways it might seem that, if there is a join of the sentient system of the two persons, then a couple may be an ontological individual (this seems to violate the discrete character of individuation but the this discrete aspect has already been seen to be ‘relative’ i.e. discrete-for-certain-purposes in earlier discussions of identity.) Then: what is true of partnership in marriage may also be true of larger groups. Another question regarding ‘ultimate value residing in the individual’ is whether the natural world has intrinsic value i.e. do the values of oceans, continents, forests and non human animals always refer back to human individuals? A practical system of values might suggest that the non human should be assigned value; however, the question here regards intrinsic value. The discussion of life forms, since they have sentience, may be based on a consideration of the non living forms modified to account for sentience
Therefore, the argument will address only the (apparently) non sentient forms: deserts, lakes, rivers, trees, forests, continents… earth. These entities are not normally regarded as sentient and it has been argued that all Value resides in sentience. A non sentient Universe may contain no value; however, the universe contains sentience. From the Theory of Being, there is one universe and it must contain sentience (the Theory argues that even what is not normally regarded to be sentient has, in fact, primal sentience but the present argument will not refer to that fact and will depend only on sentience-as-recognized-by-human-being.) Given normal sentience, then, it appears that the assignment of value is made by sentient beings. However, this does not mean that only those capable of assigning values have value. If value is objective, perhaps assignment is recognition. It has been seen that values have an objective character. Subjective-value is assigned value; objective-value is value that promotes well being; adaptation implies that there must be some identity of the objective and subjective. Here, of course the question arises ‘What is well being?’ It may be noted that every attempt to assign question of value to something more fundamental will crumble for the mistake that is being made is to think that there is something fundamental outside of moral intuition that will make value definite and objective. However, this is not the case. It is not necessary for value to be definite. There may always be question and debate and this is part of the evolution and assignment of value and it is seen once again that value cannot be divorced from the intuition and that any ‘theory’ of value shall not stand independently of the intuition but shall stand in integration with it each enhancing and modifying the other. Allowing indefiniteness, allowing process is one approach to objectivity
It is now possible to develop some objective assessment of the question of ‘political realism.’ Is it proper for nations to disregard individual interest in questions regarding national ‘interest’ e.g. survival and dominance? It is clear from the foregoing that both individual and nation have Value. Therefore, both political and ‘individual realism’ are in error (if individual is regarded narrowly.) Further, reflection will reveal, that there is no calculation of values that may replace moral intuition and debate among persons and groups even though ‘calculation’ may enter into process
It follows that Morals at an individual level do not arbitrarily generalize to e.g. a national level. Simultaneously, at the more comprehensive level the values concerning the individual (in opposition to political realism) should be taken into account
It may be argued that the argument opens the way for abuse. It may be shown, however, that it is logically impossible to apply all values at all levels (as an algorithmic) and, again, moral (Ethical) intuition and dialog cannot be circumvented in any reasonable approach to morals (Ethics)
Ethics has been identified earlier as the system of (human) freedoms – value, action and knowledge (culture.) A connection between knowledge and action was noted earlier. While, in domains where, due to local adaptation, specialization is reasonably possible, knowledge may be separated from its ties to the world, this is not generally possible. That it seems that this is generally possible is due to the fact that typical domains of action are (naturally) limited to domains of (specialized) knowledge. Generally, however, knowledge does not separate itself from objects or from action. Various ways in which objects are possible have been seen. Some of these are precise; others are approximate (which has been seen to be positive relative to the possibilities of knowledge.) An alternative (underlying) view is one in which knowing, action, and world remain in intimate contact; at this level there is no separation or need for separation of knowledge and action; at this level, knowledge is not knowledge-of but knowledge-in-interaction-with-action-or-outcome. The relevance of Ethics, here, is to note that knowledge-in-interaction is neither ‘superior’ nor ‘inferior’ to knowledge-of, to discrete and concrete knowledge and lies at its base
An important modern ‘ethical concern’ is that of war and peace. The concern is broader than the stated one for war and peace are related to questions of aggression and of terrorism. An adequate treatment of war and peace requires examination of the ‘causes’ of war and the probable prerequisites of peace which include the human psyche (aggression) and social behavior (especially politics,) population, and resources (especially energy.) Thus, in considering war and peace a variety of ethical and other concerns will be taken up. The discussion will attempt to illustrate ‘ethical principle,’ relations among the different aspects of Ethics and relations among individual and group Morals (in the question of translation of individual attitudes into action) and among realism (in the question of definition below) and circumstance
Access to resources is one (not always stated) cause of war and growth of populations results in a greater need for resources. In the long term, avoiding war will be promoted by conservation and reducing growth in population. Appropriate energy (and other resources including food) is also important. Energy research is probably vital – expenditures, however, are a fraction of the cost of access to oil (‘access’ includes war and occupation.) There is a variety of lines that energy research may take. Renewable energy (solar, wind, small scale hydropower) is generally cleaner energy. A number of parts of the world have large coal reserves; research into making the use of coal clean is important (at least) because as oil becomes scarce, nations will face economic pressure to use coal. Research in using energy reserves (oil, coal, nuclear…) to produce clean fuels is important (free hydrogen is not naturally occurring and requires energy to produce it.) Research in controlled nuclear fusion should receive greater emphasis. Energy access indirectly affects population. While a large amount of attention is paid to oil rich nations, other nations that face a variety of severe problems including internal war (and genocide) are ignored and even apart from the obvious ethical issue, ongoing poverty may be destabilizing to politics and population
What is war? What is terrorism? What is genocide? These all come under the heading of wide spread aggression and it is not clear that definitions are necessary (and, in any case, definitions can be used to put ethical concerns aside e.g. torture has been justified by claiming that alleged terrorists are not prisoners of war.) Regarding war, there is a point of view called ‘political realism’ according to which morals that apply to individuals do not apply to nations and that the responsibility of a government is to further national self-interest at all costs. What justifies a war of aggression – for whatever reason? Is there a valid point of view according to which even self-defense is unethical? Is a war to eliminate an abusive regime or a terrorist base in another nation justified? What is the moral authority of the ‘nation?’ (Why should the people of West Bengal, in eastern India be more responsible to the people of Maharashtra in the west than to the people of Bangladesh which is adjacent to West Bengal? What has been established naturally carries weight but should this be absolute and constitutional?) Does international sanction make such a war morally right – or just more diplomatic? If a nation is suspected of harboring ‘terrorist groups’ or stockpiling instruments of war and destruction, must evidence invariably be required for invasion? When does evidence justify invasion? It must be asked that since moral concerns seem to be routinely ignored, what the Value of moral considerations may be. A proper response includes that the presence of morals cannot be expected to be altogether effective but have some direct effect (on decisions) and indirect effect (on the intent to do Good.) In the absence of a moral sense (or in its exclusion by apathy, by disregarding the humanity of certain populations, or by routine denial of human rights concerns in government) formal considerations of morals are likely to have little effect
The following are, then, morally important. First, cultivating and sustaining moral intuition – and addressing institutions that suppress or side-step it. Moral intuition should be cultivated so as to include questions of feasibility. Second, translation of individual attitudes into (large scale) group attitudes and action. A necessary preliminary to action is the careful and open acquisition and examination of situation-specific information. Action itself should (generally) begin with diplomacy and the least harmful means. ‘Sanctions’ are not intrinsically clean and cause enormous but often invisible hardship and suffering. These are causally prior (to the specific moral concerns) and their cultivation is likely to encourage ethical Understanding and attention to the specific concerns
Related thoughts appear in the later section ‘Faith’
The meaning of objectivity: of the Object (not possession of the object.)
Realism introduces objectivity but reason lays open its own inadequacies
Objectivity is reintroduced in special symbolic cases (Theory of Being;) or by relinquishing full faithfulness
But why should faithfulness not be full? It never is! And it would not be worth much if required universally (its utility otherwise is not questioned)
Realization, not faithfulness is the way of being (faithfulness is a means)
Objectivity is reintroduced by introducing Value (alternatively process)
But how can knowledge be determined by value? Either knowledge is not what it is normally considered to be or it does not have what is normally considered to be its worth
Under Ethics, knowledge attains objectivity
Value, process, discovery are not outside or imposed on being. In discovering a value or an instance of a value it is justified. If it is not justified, its discovery is not complete (what does this say about discovery and justification – perhaps that justification does not stand outside and is not imposed on being)
Consider the immense consequences of the Theory of Being, of Identity, of the Cosmologies developed… In reflection, they felt as though encountering a New World. And even though this vision was bound in necessity, they could not (altogether) escape doubt. There was further doubt regarding their ability to apply this vision to the ambition: the realization of the ultimate in (from) the present. Doubt, they reflected has many manifestations. Among these is ‘essential doubt.’ Essential doubt is integral to (sentient) being as part its being; its source is the essential indeterminism at the root of being. Pushed to an extreme in emotion it is neurotic doubt; to an extreme in an attempt to uncover unassailable principles it is rational, even radical doubt (which, too, may have a neurotic component if it becomes the attempt of a being to found itself in its discrete manifestation. If permanently disengaged from knowledge and its process, doubt becomes absurd.) Even essential doubt, however, is not static. It fluctuates and must fluctuate since realization is not constant; even apparent stasis is founded on equilibrium between non static elements. What is it then that can ‘justify’ Faith? Faith has some justification in Understanding but also in Morals. The individual believes (perhaps hopes) in some vision; that it has (possible) value is also its ‘justification.’ This is no justification for any particular faith; the faith in question should have withstood criticism with regard to truth, feasibility and value. However, as has been seen truth, feasibility and value are Ethical dimensions
In this section, the following topic is covered: charisma, society and translation of individual attitudes to group attitudes and action. Other topics relevant to society are taken up in earlier considerations of economics; politics; ethics and society; and following topics through the discussion of faith
‘Change’ satisfies a diverse group of ‘constraints’ and ‘forces’ that may be labeled Ethical – or, more specifically, moral, economic and political. In the following paragraphs regarding action, concern is with the powers that are available as agents of design
Those who regard themselves as effecting ends rather than affecting directions will most likely experience insignificance if not frustration. Perhaps there is some (varying) balance between effect and affect
The resources available to an individual or group in affecting (and reviewing) ‘ends’ may be labeled ‘patriarchal’ and ‘charismatic.’ The former are the resources that are built into or available in society and whose precise nature depends on the form of society: they will vary according to e.g. political system. However, having a voice, being part of a group, attempting to persuade are (almost) always available. ‘Charismatic’ resources are (dynamic) qualities of an individual. They include the powers of vision (required when patriarchy falters) and of persuasion. The powers of charisma have been said to be innate. The degree to which this is true is not altogether clear for circumstance and opportunity are likely often among the ‘causes’ that are assigned to charisma. Additionally, it is often the case that an individual will not know what powers he or she may have until the powers have been cultivated and brought into the open (requiring perhaps an appreciation of both power and weakness)
These thoughts on Charisma owe a debt to the writings of Max Weber (born 1864, Erfurt, Prussia (Germany))
The value attached to being ‘civilized’ may have reached its apex in the nineteenth century; it was an idea in which humankind was seen as set apart from nature, higher and unique. However the idea of civilization used here is one in which the human world as inseparable from the stream of being
There is a classical view of humankind as special and great in which the greatness is given and derives from being apart from the mundane world – especially animal being; such kinds or conceptions of greatness are, naturally, extremely fragile and, likely, more a defense against fear than a love of (one’s own) being. In such views the world is essentially alien and hostile. The views of the special character of Human being and the alien character of the world, ingrained in certain cultures, sustain one another…
The idea of civilization here is not defined by advanced culture or technology but is one of a connected view of the human world that is inseparable from and not apart from or above or below the stream of being. A view of human greatness, if ‘greatness’ is indeed the word that is sought, is that it involves the use of human ability, unique or common, in the broadest experience of the stream… A society is ‘civilized’ when connected to the stream
Civilization may involve those elements of culture and technology that make such a view with some degree of realism possible. Although the idea is, by intent, realistic its expression may be invested in art and myth. The present attitude commits to seeing the human world in the stream of being – not necessarily as entirely homogeneous with it but perhaps as an island or a chain of islands (or for those who abhor any suggestion of superiority a line of ocean trenches; for others who love or fear individuation a range of mountain peaks thrust above clouds.) The idea of civilization does not commit to an ideal of social uniformity or cultural homogeneity; and there is no intent to suppress horror and antagonism; yet it sees and finds realism in seeing threads of continuity with common Morals and with roots in the animal world, among continents and nature, in all being
History is a (reconstructed) story in which civilization acquires life and a sense of realism. This does not imply that the best attempt at realism in history is unnecessary for realism is, regardless of virtue, a prime source of the sense of realism – but history is also a story and being a story is another source of a sense of realism
There is a tradition in ethics that concerns discussion and establishment of higher (human) values. The question arises, ‘What is the highest ideal or system of ideals?’ It is not clear that this question has meaning – let alone an answer. Various possibilities have been suggested – the Real as the Good, the integration of the psyche, the integration of psyche and social systems. Classical systems have been mentioned but their values have not been prominent (or even mentioned.) Truth has been mentioned but its character as a value remains implicit. Values not mentioned (so far) include justice, equality, liberty (in the search for and expression of Value,) beauty, self-determination and sharing… These values are not as important in the modern world as they may have been in the past. The death and decay of ‘old’ moral systems makes it seem as though values are lost. What is the meaning of justice in a world where there is no ground of values and all individual values are thought to be in material comfort or achievement? The concept of human value independent of external measure may be reestablished by regarding the highest value as including a search for the highest Value
The highest value combines a search for the highest value and a tentative acceptance and evaluation of the inherited values (truth, equality, liberty, justice, beauty, self-determination, caring, sharing…)
Another name for the highest value may be Morals (not morals)
What may be learned about the highest Value from the Theory of Being? First, that a search for the highest value is a search in the Universe i.e. a search in the Real. Second that the search does not reveal the ideal in a moment – it is a process that starts in the present and involves transformation in Identity. There for the elements of psyche (e.g. cognitive-affective) that yield information about ideals in this normal cosmological system and that moral information do not, of necessity, extrapolate to the high limit. In the limit morals and (perhaps a sub-domain of) the Real coincide; in this world there may be a gap between moral information and morals; therefore, there is an even greater gap between present moral information (the outcome of cognition-affect) and Morals. However, both morals and Morals are Real
Summary of the discussion of Ethics. A conception of Ethics shows the integration of ethics, action and Metaphysics (details above.) Ethics is contained within metaphysics but if metaphysics is considered merely as knowledge without significance then Ethics spills over the boundary walls of metaphysics and requires its redefinition (as discussed earlier regarding objects where it was seen that as far as Value is concerned incomplete faithfulness may be constitutive of an Object.) The conception of Ethics entails, for complete understanding of the scope of (human) freedoms, action, metaphysics and society
The discussion of faith is brief. Its purpose is to understand the nature of faith, its possibilities, reasons for endurance in the modern world despite Nietzsche’s announcement over one hundred and twenty five years ago that ‘God is dead’ i.e. despite the expectation that reason and science might displace faith. If faith is belief without complete reasons then one of its clear sources or bases is that, in much that is significant, complete reasons do not exist; and that there is no final ‘foundation’ for human affairs in complete reason. Faith persists because it has it is significant in a number of ways. As far as belief is concerned a function of faith has always been to doubt the limitations of ‘common sense’ (which includes science) and to provide alternatives. This is true of common and special faith and of private and public faith. The modern alternative to faith is secularism; both faith and secularism suffer abuses. What resolutions may there be?
As a part of their development in understanding and, so, in transformation, they questioned the nature of faith and Religion and their place in the world. Even in the face of the spread of reason, faith has not withered. Faith remains a presence – perhaps unexpected given the spread of ‘reason.’ The factors are complex. Faith exists in the presence of limits to reason. Negotiation of the (unknown) is optimal with a mix of doubt of faith. ‘Faith’ is social bonding and mutual support. Faith has literal significance – demonstrated by the Theory of Being. Even though the literal aspect appears (but is not necessarily) absurd – it is the absurdity that is a source of appeal, of bonding of suggestion that the world according to reason is incomplete. Faith has non literal significance ‘rising from the dead’ speaks to a limit to the common understanding of the nature of death; but, even though the literal implications may be unlikely, without possibility there would be no metaphorical significance. There are non Meaning functions e.g. bonding; resistance to the tyrant (in the world war of 1939-1945 persons of simple faith harbored the persecuted.) Although there are criticisms of ‘faith,’ secularism (despite its proclamations) perpetuates even more abuse; and ‘faith’ has vision where secularism has none (traditional faith stands in the shadow of being and is therefore incomplete as is secularism)
Very few individuals are truly ‘agnostic’ with regard to working beliefs. One attitude of the ‘rational’ person is that if something is not contained by reason then it does not exist (positivism) or, at least, should remain unspoken (implicit positivism.) Now –at least superficially– this is not at all rational; it may, however, be natural though not necessary for a rational individual to think that the essence of the Universe has been seen in reason or in science. Further, (implicit) positivism may be productive in science and reason and may be the rationalist’s defense against ‘absurdity.’ The rational person may go further and find loneliness and therefore heroism in his or her view. While it is possible for scientists and others to be agnostic toward the absolute character of science the typical responses, even of scientists, are a mix of doubt and faith. Thus even ‘rationalism’ is complex in its ways. (An analysis of the psychology of belief is neither proof nor disproof – there may be ‘illicit’ reasons for believing what is true and for disbelieving what is not. One point to psychological analysis of belief is to show that, commonly, what is held as true is held reasonably i.e. it is assumed that proof exists even though the individual has not seen proof or worked through the multifaceted details of foundation; and that what is held as untrue has a similar status
In general, then, while belief is held to be a matter of rationality, it is in fact subscription to common belief –to paradigm– but lacks proof. ‘Everyone’ believes in a proof that, it is thought, is demonstrated somewhere but, in fact, is demonstrated nowhere.) What is the hold of religious faith? Is its apparent hold magnified due to the vocal and militant character of ‘followers?’ What is the ‘meaning’ of faith? The literal meaning often strains the imagination – not ‘the sun rises in the East’ but ‘Christ is risen from the dead!’ A psychological significance is the suggestion that truth, the nature of the Universe, our nature exceeds the common or secular view. It is the fact that the imagination is strained, that there is a suggestion of the absurd that gives the article of faith its significance. The figurative Meaning depends on the burden that literal meaning places on belief. This is also a source of group bonding – ‘the sun rises in the East’ is hardly a source of cohesion or group identity but ‘Christ is risen from the dead!’ is. This discussion has been in the way of Understanding but not of proof – although theologians may seek proof and though proofs may be given, proof is not the essence of faith
They found the following concerns regarding faith to be significant. (1) The suggestion that an approach to knowledge and transformation is not in construction alone or criticism alone but in their interaction. In discovery and becoming, there are combinations; there is ebb and flow of doubt and faith that is efficacious. (2) Regardless of doubts regarding religious faith, it appears to be here to stay. Religion provides a positive force in various ways but is also seen as negative. Should there be a secular response and what might that response be? (Whether there ‘should’ be some response will depend on what responses might be imagined.) The secular response is easily polarized – ‘We are pure; they are evil!’ Some limits of ‘secularism’ – as a way of life and in government have been seen earlier. A first step is to accept both self and other; to embrace rather than divide – remembering, of course, that it is not given that any principle (even the golden rule and its philosophical variants) shall be universal. (3) Is there a place in the world for religion? What is that place?
A thought – Religion is the negotiation of all Being by the entire being of the individual (and community.) What directions might a ‘new religion’ take? A common form of religion is to provide a Metaphysics, an ethics, and a way of life – the paths; and the style is a mix of story and prescription. A Religion might begin with the knowledge that ‘There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in a philosophy.’ It is natural to hesitate in suggesting that there is possibility or value to the idea of a new religion; there are particular doubts – is not the common modern ‘secular pluralism’ (secularism and the present system of faiths) enough, what form might a religion take, is not the time of religion past; and general doubts – to suggest ‘religion’ may be to suggest a ‘solution’ from the past to concerns of the present, and doubts regarding the nature and desirability of change or attempted change that originates in an idea. What might an individual journey contribute? They wondered whether there were aspects of a journey that might be useful
‘Limits’ have been seen – to faith and to secularism, to modern science and to modern philosophy. These limits are not entirely inherent in the endeavors but in the attitudes of Human beings that then become invested in the endeavors. Faith is set against faith; secular society against secular society; and faith against secularism. One characterization of the attitudes is that they tend to become polarized into concern with the immediate and crawling and the ultimate without grounding. The tendency to polarization may not be universal but it is sufficient to create a culture of impoverishment. A challenge becomes apparent – to depolarize the attitudes, to join them that faiths and secularism coexist, so that the immediate grounds the ultimate, the ultimate lifts the immediate out of mere crawling
These thoughts are both general and ideal. The ‘world’ may perhaps be capable of improvement but it may be that problem and opportunity are essentially bound together
Given these thoughts it seems that an approach is to join ideals with realism – to live well and to begin to build bridges while guided by ideals and accepting but not being ruled by practical limits
‘Journey’ includes exploration and has these connotations – no fixed or given destination, destinations change as terrain is revealed; exploration is as important as destinations; adventure and commitment to discovery; care and abandon; enjoyment of small things and revelation of continents; side excursions, many unplanned, that, build a store of experience; stopping and living at places for periods out of interest or enjoyment; irreversibility – what is seen and known cannot be un-seen; the explorer learns how to travel, to experience, to find; later experience and choice is conditioned by the earlier. Here, there is commitment to: exploration of possibility and actuality – all ideas, entities and kinds; to realization: virtual (as idea and Understanding) and actual (experience and as transformation of body and Identity;) to ‘process’ – every individual (society, civilization) is (re) creation; (re) creation is necessary to (a sense of) being alive
Their learning and experience was in many areas – much out of and for pure enjoyment. Learning and experience for ‘its own sake’ i.e. for enjoyment stimulated and was stimulated by learning and experience directed by purposes and goals. They endeavored to experience a variety of traditions (of and within those of the West, of India, and in re-construction of pre-history) of ideas and transformation. Within the traditions they sought depth; and variety sufficient to acquire both ideas and perspectives. They sought not only acquisition but Understanding and further development of the ideas; they sought not only importation but also originality; not only further development of ideas but, as far as they would, development to the limit; not only the world of the esoteric and the (rather sheltered academic) world of learning and the esoteric but also broad experience of a variety of paths and levels in life; not only life in the ‘civilized world’ but also life in nature – under the sun and stars, in the shadows of hills and mountains. They experienced, especially in nature, inspiration and integration of ideas – over and over. They sought (strove) also to maintain the edge of originality even amid the ‘cauldron’ of everyday life and work. An outcome was a store of ideas and approaches – but not merely a store; there was also intuition, familiarity, fluidity, integration, and perspective. I.e. the ideas were not experienced as fixed and static disciplines but as fluid, dynamic and adaptable elements of understanding
When the ‘fluid mode’ had been experienced and recognized, it became possible to cultivate it
If in the static mode the manifestation of the forms of an idea is chain of islands, the fluid mode is one in which the islands become seen as connected under the ocean and even evolving in geologic time
They experienced attachment to their thought – to their originality which then occasionally became a burden in their endeavor. They sometimes thought that each idea should have significance. Shedding of the burden was sought. They would experience life as light. They found that writing out a system of their thought and experience, especially amid ‘chaos’ instead of in an orderly and serene setting, enabled a shedding of what was inessential and a vision of the essence of their ‘system’ as a Form – as a dynamic entity
Their search lead through first perception, then acquisition and finally development of a number of ‘paradigms of thought’ – the early ones were experienced as natural in their assumption; the later, made possible by earlier experience, were sought to fill a feeling of incompleteness of the earlier. The first paradigm could be described as ‘modern,’ seeing the world in terms of an Education in modern science and humanities. The second was evolutionary – understanding in terms of origins and process and requiring a study of process in nature. Along the way they experienced incompleteness in the modern and the evolutionary – especially in the perspectives and values of the modern world. In the third paradigm, they sought a complement to process, to the particular; this first manifested as search for an idea to complement process; the ideas of ‘absolute,’ ‘idealism’ (as ontology,) were developed and abandoned. Basis in nature and natural science was sought – and, though also abandoned, resulted in useful metaphor. Their attention turned to the ideas of ‘all’ (that exists) and to ‘Void’ (absence of being.) A two year period of (occasional) intuitive reflection on ‘all’ and its probable (on intuitive grounds with support from modern physics) equivalence to the void culminated in a formal proof that the void is equivalent to all being
Perhaps they had outgrown paradigm and perspective
Perhaps this outgrowth into the universal stood in relation to the conditions of their (human and animal) being
The early approach was focus on ‘all’ i.e. the Universe – and showing its equivalence to the void. The transition from intuition without proof (showing) to showing (proof of) intuition occurred when they saw one morning in the shadow of Mountains that the ‘way’ was in focusing attention on the Void (and being instead of only on the available instances of being)
The discovery (of the significance and depth of the Void) required reformulation of their entire system of thought (covering metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, mind, Human being and other areas.) The discovery also stimulated and made possible development in those topics and consolidated focus on being – precisely because the idea knows no discrimination (introductory paragraphs to the narrative) and subsumes process (becoming) and absolute, idea (Mind) and Matter… A final paradigm of Understanding had origin in their earlier study of evolution where knowledge (k) and action (a) were seen as duals with a monistic origin in being and, despite specialization, remained in interaction: … a ® k ® a ® k … The distinction between this point of view and ‘pragmatism’ is that here what is sought is understanding rather than justification. A final extension of the concept of knowledge involved introduction of a moral dimension regarding the nature of Knowledge (discussed in the earlier sections ‘Morals and society’ and ‘Ethics and objectivity.’) At root knowledge and action remain bound; in the esoteric complete unbinding seems to occur but when it does, knowledge is revealed as identical to (or within) being
After, and in combination with understanding, came transformation (detail below.) The narration here occurs in the midst of a transition from the phase of understanding to a phase of emphasis transformation. ‘Transformation,’ they thought, is a final way in their travel
The logic of this statement is the Theory of Identity, outlined earlier
They reflected on the ‘personal’ voice in literature. Suppression of the personal voice sacrifices individual interest, ego for the sake of the universal; this is a strength of the impersonal voice
The personal may reveal discovery, show insight into originality. The personal reveals life and in revealing the individual also reveals the universal. In the personal, there may be expression of every life as a recreation. The personal is both sharing and invitation
They sought a degree and mode of personal voice that would be revelatory. They sought a means to avoid mere self-expression – expression without content
In their travels in knowledge, they discovered certain ‘principles’ that led to originality of thought (and thought of a comprehensive character.) They were inspired no doubt by the tradition of logic and reason
It is not a purpose of the inclusion of ‘principles’ to review what the traditions have to say. The purposes include demonstration (1) of some principles that have made possible the advances in the understanding of being, object, and Value; (2) that ‘principles’ arise in the activity (thought) and are not (altogether) separated or separable from it (nor should they be)
The inclusion of principles here are intended to illustrate and point to the value of their explicit recognition; it is not intended to be complete
Logic is a principle; however, the intent here is to illustrate constructive rather than merely critical principles. An appeal of formal logic is its at least apparently deterministic character: deduction is definite. However, the formation of realistic thought is not deterministic; in the formation of a new idea, the process of thought is indeterministic. Critical principles are (indirectly) constructive; the (intuitive) habit of criticism encourages realistic construction. Without criticism, construction is empty; without construction, criticism is sterile
Some attitudes encourage criticism and others encourage construction. In isolation, these attitudes are empty. That they are productive results from their mutual correction. I.e. even the critically oriented cannot live without construction (and vice versa.) Some combination (not constant but in ebb and flow) of construction and criticism, whether in the individual or in society, tends to an optimum (such optima are required to be estimated in process and perhaps at most roughly; the concept behind the optima is definite)
Criticism and construction are both intuitive and have formal enhancements. Perhaps the following is true: in criticism, formal enhancement is (more) important; in construction, intuitive enhancement is important
Some principles. They collected together their experience under the following topics (1) Principle of reflexivity, (2) Paying careful attention to concept Meaning (and use,) (3) Acknowledging and cultivating essential integration the psyche – of feeling, intuition and cognition, and (4) Balancing thought (reason and imagination) and action
A primitive version of reflexivity is that a critical theory should satisfy its own criteria. This is not invariably necessary or relevant for a critical theory may apply to e.g. assertions of a certain kind but the assertions of the theory may be of another kind. However the idea of reflexivity is significant for, often, the critic is not reflexive. There is a generalization of the principle that is extremely productive of useful (valid and comprehensive) thought: that in an entire system of both critical and constructive principles all have mutual application. A first application is the earlier observation that without criticism, construction is empty; without construction, criticism is sterile. Another application is the mutual correction of the attitudes of perception (ever open to new information) and judgment (impatience in inference)
Here are some further applications. (A) Thought and principles of thought grow in interaction, (B) The approach in which ‘definition’ follows analysis: instead of defining ideas at outset, investigating first and then identifying (rather than defining) – by pointing and saying ‘That is philosophy,’ ‘that is being…’ This is the approach that has been so useful in establishing a metaphysics of depth, in systematically revealing ‘problems’ (of philosophy) as being artifacts of definition without trivializing the essential concerns e.g. the Possibility of Metaphysics, (C) Transcendental methods in which, instead of inferring ‘theory’ from data the necessary inference is from given ‘Theory’ to structure of data, (D) Criticism or doubt regarding what has been thought to be impossible (impossibility of evolution, matter cannot give rise to attitudes (intentionality,) the Void cannot give rise to being) leading to revaluation of ‘Possibility’ and to incisive resolution of such classic issues, (E) The fact that science has not come to an end does not imply that it is not unending, (F) Sharing, tradition and broad experience are a source of the cultivation of reflexive thought, (G) Rationality is not isolated and its factors include: patience, perseverance, idleness, analysis and synthesis i.e. atomism and holism, diversion, rest, exhaustion, reserve, boldness, dreaming, concrete and abstract thought, living out one’s dreams – or the dreams of a civilization… Abstraction is pivotal in transcending the removed quality of perception and in moving toward ‘objectivity’
The developments of the ideas of ‘Being,’ ‘Void,’ ‘Logos,’ and ‘Universe’ are examples that show that (1) Attention to meaning clears up ‘metaphysical confusions’ (this is well understood in analytic thought,) but (2) Elucidation of meaning is not devoid of content for meaning incorporates experience and may be further tested on the individual’s body of experience (with or without actual experiment) and, therefore, (3) That Metaphysics that is rich in content may originate in analysis of ‘mere’ meaning, and, finally, (4) That meaning resides in systems of concepts and therefore, while there is freedom in meaning, there is another freedom that is not freedom as such but mutual adjustment of meaning. A full analysis of meanings requires attention to systems of concepts in interrelation
The following considerations regarding integration of the psyche are significant to principles of thought because, first, they are constitutive (in part) of integrity of thought and because they may (to varying extents) be cultivated. The integration of feeling (emotion) and cognition and the nature of ‘intuition’ have been discussed under ‘Human being.’ Realistic thought is not merely thought that is bound to its objects; it consists in degrees of binding (from complete binding to freedom) that are appropriate to situation and kind of thought. It was seen that realism is not possible without integration of emotion and cognition. Intuition, in the sense used here, is the structure of psyche that is attuned to the forms of being. Without this intuition, realistic perception (of the immediate forms of the world) and cognition (of pattern and possibility) are practically impossible. I.e. feeling and intuition make realistic knowledge and Understanding. More accurately, they (feeling and intuition) are constitutive of realistic perception. Realistic perception is not merely seeing a fixed world but adapting to a world in flux; and stability in the adequate adaptation of flux to flux. Without feeling and intuition there may be experience of perception and cognition but these would (likely) be random and chaotic with no integration as a world, no connection of Identity to world. These factors of integration affect realistic thought but how may they be regarded as being among the principles of thought? Since they affect realistic thought, they may be regarded as being among principles if they can be affected. They can be affected and some modes of affect are group or social while others are individual
There are clear implications for the ‘fractured psyche’ of schizophrenia, dislocations of mood, and of social and self relations i.e. dislocations of personality; and for relations, taken up earlier, between fracture and enhancement of psyche
There is a classical ideal in which thought is realization of being. This is limited in two ways. In the first limitation, as has been seen, thought is not capable in all dimensions of producing realization; becoming is Necessary. In the second, at least in the normal sense, thought not sufficient for transformation of identity and body. (Note, though, that distinction between thought and being is not absolute.) The variety of relations among thought and action has been considered earlier. Where is the principle of thought? It lies in the recognition that thought of its own has a variety of limits whose constitution lies in the separation of thought from action and that their resolution or defusion lies in their integration with action and in transformation of individual and Identity
Early they thought without thinking that the realization of their ambition would be through knowledge and Understanding; in this mode they thought their identity would be unchanged. Later, they realized that transformation of (body and) Identity would also be essential; and that understanding is also a mode of transformation (of body and identity – according to their new conception of Identity.) Understanding is contained within and continuous with transformation; transformation through identity is complete, transformation through understanding is partial. Transformation builds on understanding but understanding is not always necessary; however, sentience is necessary to significance. In an older way of thinking, understanding and knowing may be referred to as ‘virtual’ transformation while transformation of identity is ‘Real’ or ‘actual’
The developments in Being, The Object, Identity, Mind, Morals and other sections earlier are an apex of Understanding. The apical character was shown: the depth of being is known explicitly, and the Variety implicitly. An explicit showing of variety is not possible and its implicit character necessary (and to seek otherwise is undesirable;) Time and meaning (significance) reside in the unending realization of variety within implicit unity
There was a path to the apex of understanding; it lay in many fields. These included experience and study of traditions; in reflection and integration; in waiting – in holding questions to be equal in significance to answers; some details of the path were recounted earlier in discussing ‘Principles of Thought’
Some elements of this path are shown later in reviewing ‘Limits to faith and reason,’ and the discussions, ‘Metaphysics and Philosophy,’ and ‘A System of Understanding’
Understanding is continuous with and contained in transformation
In their travel, Understanding is complete (depth) while transformation is underway
The thread of transformation is taken up after ‘A System of Understanding’
The name ‘philosophy’ originated with the Greeks and is, therefore, a Western term. I.e. the meaning of ‘philosophy’ is bound together with the development of the discipline in the West. It is not suggested that philosophy is and has not been done in the East but there is an element of foreignness in applying the term to those endeavors of the East that are similar to the philosophy of the West. However, even in the West there is no single sense of ‘philosophy’ and there is no altogether universal agreement as to what subject matters and what methods may be called philosophical
In its origins, philosophy had perhaps two defining characteristics. With regard to subject matter it concerned the most general characteristics of the world. With regard to method, concern was not so much with methodology (such concerns came later) but with how the world was understood. Very early, Thales of Miletus (born c. 600 BC) suggested that water was the essence of matter. Here, in the beginning of (recorded) philosophical thought is one characteristic of philosophy (and science) – the explanation (reduction) of Variety in terms of (unchanging, undifferentiated) simplicity
The general character of philosophy includes that it is reflexive. The questions ‘What is philosophy?’ and ‘What is physics?’ are questions of philosophy. ‘What is physics?’ is not a question of physics. (If physics were complete –which should include that the universe is physical, and that physics is calculable, and capable of full interpretation– it would contain the questions of philosophy)
Later, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with ‘method’ i.e. with criticism as a means of valid thought. Aristotle emphasized the importance of being as being i.e. not in terms of reduction to the definite sciences
In the modern era, philosophy gained momentum from developments in science. It was thought that, in analogy to science (it may be remembered that the great success of Newton’s system led it to be regarded as Necessary) philosophy could have basis in pure reason. However, reason turned inward and brought itself to scrutiny and was found wanting. The critique of reason had a culmination in Kant who (as noted earlier, based in a conception of the nature of knowledge and in an assumption the Necessity of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian science) showed that the structure of experience (ideas, intuition) is the structure of the world; it is this that makes knowledge and it is this, according to Kant that made the thing-in-itself thinkable but not knowable
Later, it was realized that neither Euclidean Geometry nor Newtonian Mechanics captured the nature of the world. However, Kant’s understanding of intuition as mirroring the local (approximate) nature of the world (-in-experience) and his reasoning remain intense insights. Much later they recognized that Kant’s picture (perhaps the dominant paradigm) of knowledge was incomplete and were able to show knowledge of being
Kant was perhaps a turning point in the relations between science and philosophy. Before Kant, science was (a part of) philosophy. Kant showed that the foundation of science does not lie in philosophy (reason;) meanwhile, the sciences began to acquire independent status as disciplines and in importance. Thus began the separation of science and philosophy
Later, perhaps with Wittgenstein, it came to pass that if philosophy is not science and if it does not found science then it is perhaps an analysis of the meaning of the (primitive and undefined) terms of science. This is, of course, too severe a restriction and the idea became established that the concern of philosophy is with meaning (and therefore with language)
Most recently it has been recognized that the concern with language is perhaps too narrow and that the focus of philosophy with regard to method is ‘analysis.’ The precise meaning of analysis in the literature is defined more by a set of approaches and tools that has arisen in practice rather than by a single principle (except analysis as careful thought.) One tool is the analysis of use as a key to meaning. An assumption that tends to go along with the emphasis of use is a separation of use and analysis. While some thinkers such as G. E. Moore made the assumption explicit, it has entered implicitly and in practice into much of (analytic) philosophy
At this point it should be clear that the discussion has come to concern not philosophy as a whole but analytic philosophy – the dominant mode of philosophy as practiced in the English speaking countries (and Scandinavia.) While the guiding principle of analytic philosophy may be said to be analysis or careful thought, its actual conduct is also defined by a set of norms that have arisen in practice. These include the following. (1) Philosophy is distinct from science in its subject matter and in its methods. (2) It does not seek depth (as in science) but ‘lateral analysis’ i.e. laying bare meaning – or systems of meaning. (3) Meaning is not analyzed by reflection but by use. Use is distinct from reflection on and creation of meaning. (4) Philosophy speaks of meaning and not (directly) of the world. (5) Metaphysics as knowledge of Being is eschewed (a natural consequence of other norms.) Therefore, analysis tends to be piecemeal and, further, analysis, it is often thought, cannot be more than piecemeal… Note, of course, that these norms are tendencies; they are neither universal nor (always) explicitly prescribed. They are not altogether independent and, in significant degree, stand together
This discussion has two objectives. First, an evaluation of philosophy relative to the needs of the present narrative. Early, in their search they turned to analytic philosophy for inspiration. While much was found that would be useful, there was a general sense of disappointment in analysis i.e. as practiced by the majority of analytic philosophers. The disappointment is not merely that what had been sought was not found but that analytic philosophy (as has been shown in the narrative) fell far short of the potential of philosophy. Reflection on the first objective leads into the second – assessment of the nature of philosophy. The discussion first takes up some critiques of analytic philosophy (and, briefly, of continental philosophy)
Analytic philosophy inherits and stands in the tradition of critical philosophy that may be thought to have begun with Hume and peaked with Kant and Wittgenstein. This critical tradition may be labeled the ‘post-enlightenment critical attitude.’ If Metaphysics (i.e. not merely metaphysics of experience; and philosophy in it original meaning in the West) is Possible, then a function of criticism must be to secure that possibility. Here, a metaphysics has been shown. The critical view that metaphysics is not possible is based in a picture of the nature of knowledge; which picture has, here, been shown to be limited
Analysis of use taken to the extreme has the following limitation. Use is separated from reflection on the possibilities of meaning (which has here been shown to be essential.) Therefore, contingent limits on use (including those stemming from current paradigms) are or tend to be taken as Necessary limits
One motive to piecemeal analysis is a general move away from the unitary, speculative systems (typified by Hegel’s thought) of the past. The criticisms of such systems are twofold. There is the contingent criticism that they are (in large degree) merely speculative. The system of the present narrative, however, is not speculative in the old sense but is based in Necessity founded in the most basic of facts. The second criticism is necessary in that knowledge of being itself has been shown (e.g. by Kant) to be impossible. Here, however, such demonstrations have been shown to be based in views of knowledge that are not necessary and as complete views are unfounded and replaceable more realistic alternatives (founded in the nature of being.) Therefore any philosophy of piecemeal analysis is unfounded. Piecemeal analysis has a further limit: in so far as everyone analyses a small portion of the world, everyone assumes the conceptual limits of all other investigations i.e., in particular, the paradigmatic assumptions such as materialism, impossibility of metaphysics (systematic or otherwise) escape scrutiny
The joint limitations of ‘use’ and ‘piecemeal’ analysis are crippling of thought: the former results (in practice though not of necessity) in severely limited concepts, the latter permits the limits to escape scrutiny. Piecemeal analysis permits, even encourages, avoidance of mutual analysis; and as noted, this results in certain errors ever coming to the surface
[A well recognized example of these limitations occurs in the Education of the modern analytic philosopher in the philosophy of Mind. The example is not a mere example for ‘philosophy of mind’ has been regarded as central in analytic philosophy and, further, the example concerns education in a style of thought. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1994, Samuel Guttenplan, editor and author, may be used as illustration. A central theme of Guttenplan’s introductory essay to the Companion is the difficulty of locating (understanding the phenomenon of) mind in a materialist perspective (which perspective is the ‘default’ and common position in the academic circles of analytic philosophy c. 2006.) Now there must be some subtlety to an accommodation of mind within materialism; however, Guttenplan deploys a number of (now) traditional artifices to raise the accommodation from needing care to the level of categorial chasm. Among these are the identification, by analysis, of difficulty without pushing the analysis far enough toward resolution of difficulty. This is done repeatedly so that the reader (student) is left with a ring of interlocking ‘problems’ that becomes his or her paradigmatic intellectual foundation. Since the student is the future teacher, the process is self-perpetuating. What is the ring of issues? There is the now common analytic map of mind as the tri-polar continuum: Experience, attitude, and action i.e. placement of experience as distinct from (an implicit or tacit Cartesian divide) yet on the same categorial level as attitude and action. A second set of issues concerns the analysis of each of the three poles. In each case, traditional ‘difficulties’ are introduced and analyzed sufficiently to establish the issues but not analyzed further or analyzed in terms of standard ‘solutions’ that are themselves not pushed to limits. Here, part of the ring is set up without demonstrating any necessity to it]
[Finally, Guttenplan addresses the material base of mind. Here are two standard ‘problems’ from the account that traverses a number of problems and standard solution attempts. The first example is the over-determination that is thought to arise in thinking that actions are caused by attitude and material or brain processes. Assuming a distinction between the mental and the material (rather than seeing them as aspects or, better, descriptive modes of the individual) leads to the thought that actions are over-determined. Having introduced a difficulty which it is assumed exists, Guttenplan is now faced with the necessity of solving an artificial problem; the traditional solutions – identity, functionalist and eliminative ‘theories.’ These are all bound to inadequacy or failure since they are trying to solve a problem that is a problem of the introduction by definition of a divide or gulf that does not exist and whose solution approaches assume the problem. The second example is the problem of intentionality: how can mental states in which an individual has a thought about something (intentionality is precisely ‘aboutness’) be realized from Matter which is (assumed to be) constitutively devoid of aboutness. The doubt about the ability of matter, even in complex organization, to have intentionality makes sense, perhaps, in certain pictures such as the Newtonian picture but not, however, in the quantum (and even in the latter case a demonstration of a negative result would not be conclusive since it might be due to a limitation on quantum theory.) The doubt regarding intentionality, therefore, equates paucity in imagination or computation with a (lack of) property of ‘matter.’ It is entirely analogous with the fundamentalist (creationist) argument regarding the theory of evolution: ‘I cannot imagine how complexity can emerge from the variation and selection of material process, therefore complexity cannot so arise’]
The problems of the system are exaggerated by specialization of and within academic philosophy and by the modern emphasis of publication
An obligation of all salaried academics is to justify the ways of their society. This not unreasonable obligation may become the end of the academic enterprise
They realized that anyone who would be heard may suffer a similar fate
Lateral analysis of Meaning, the impossibility of metaphysics and the divorce of philosophy from science stand together. Together they result in rejection of metaphysics, and provide an alternative. It is clear that (e.g. with Wittgenstein) the approach may result into much insight into ‘the world as found.’ It is unnecessary, here, to criticize the necessity of the approach since it has been shown to be founded in apparently reasonable but ultimately untenable critical assumptions. A metaphysics has been shown (not merely shown to be possible.) And the Necessity of that metaphysics has been shown. Lateral analysis as the necessary method of philosophy would make this development impossible
Some further confusions of analytic philosophy are exemplified by ‘ordinary language analysis,’ a movement, no longer as influential as it had been, within analytic philosophy largely the result of the influence Wittgenstein and Moore in the early twentieth century. ‘Ordinary language analysis’ has a number of connotations (even when a movement may be thought abandoned, it may carry on in habits of thought.) Perhaps the most significant is that analysis of how language is used is a key to meaning (the language philosophers may have replaced the phrase ‘a key’ with ‘the key.’) Criticisms include (1) That there is an absolute distinction between use and formulation, between the academic or philosopher and the common individual… that use of language and talk of language are distinct. Use analysis is important in insight and in showing that meaning cannot be (generally) fixed. However, talk of use is not distinct from use. It is therefore a particularly miserly conception of use that is often taken as defining meaning. (2) That every use of a word has significance for its meaning in every setting – including philosophical ones; although not a necessary criticism, confusion of meanings do arise on account of neglect of the idea
Clearly, philosophy and science are not identical. However valuable the ‘methods’ of philosophy may be, there is no necessity to exclusion of the subject matters and methods of science. (Where science employs experiment, philosophy employs experience – at least because experience is encoded in meaning but also in the action oriented philosopher’s search for action and experience)
The tendency to all exclusion of science may be exaggerated by disciplinary specialization
Analytic philosophy labors also in the shadows of science and an unrealistic attitude to and valuation of knowledge
[In the present narrative, science provides metaphor and analogy. However, the arguments are not in any way dependent on science]
Their criticisms of and reactions to modern philosophy shows more than disappointment. It shows, in fact, a significant indebtedness – what has no worth is not worth criticizing
A discussion of continental philosophy would go further from the center of this narrative than is presently desirable. A criticism of continental philosophy is its focus on the ‘human predicament.’ (Even Heidegger, in parallel to the analytic emphasis on use, would exalt the particularly human as conceived by and as distinct from the philosopher in his re-introduction of Being to the center of philosophy.) In fact a criticism would be that it sees the state Human being as that of a predicament (and that that predicament is a particularly European one.) And another criticism: is Heidegger’s carpenter incapable of reflection; and are would his or her reflections be distinct from his or her daily practice? There is no objection to reflection and focus on human being. However, early continental philosophy tended to focus on human being as a problem and recent continental philosophy tends to be nihilistic with regard to values, politics and knowledge. Why? Perhaps these nihilisms occur in the shadow of past preoccupations with glory, unrealistic (glorious) conceptions of the nature of knowledge, and the juggernaut of science
It is peculiar to modern thought that it reflects a polarization between an ideal of human being and an interpretation of actual human nature
What is philosophy? In order to answer such questions it is necessary but not sufficient to reflect on what ‘philosophers do’ (which includes reflections on philosophy) but to return reflection (as far as possible) to its root i.e. to primitive or underlying principles. The limits as prescribed in analytic philosophy have a variety of sources that include the impossibility of an old ideal (knowledge of being,) separation of science from philosophy, and on use as arbiter of meaning. However, these limits have been shown in the present narrative to follow only upon certain pictures of knowledge; therefore, they are not necessary. Further, the Theory of Being and related topics of the narrative go beyond the ‘limits’ to ultimates (explicitly in depth, implicitly in breadth) in being and knowing (that the ultimate in breadth is implicit leaves a ‘universe’ open to discovery and realization.) As seen earlier, concepts are often taken as given in advance of investigation; this is not necessarily due to unawareness on the part of the investigator but may be due to accepting the burden of tradition or paradigm. As has been seen over and over, this condemns analysis to eternal paradox and limitation. An alternative approach is to name whatever is fundamental and leave its Concept (or system of concepts) open to discovery – and, in this narrative, this approach has led to the ultimates just described and to resolution of classical paradoxes
This approach is not new for it is precisely what is done in developing axiomatic systems: a body of knowledge is formulated as an axiomatic system whose consequences (theorems) show up inadequacies whose resolution may involve redefining the concepts (and methods.) Aristotle placed Being at the outset of an investigation into what is most fundamental. What is perhaps new in the present analysis is the extent to which the fundamental concepts (while naturally inheriting some sense from previous thought) are regarded as being unknown at the outset of investigation. The approach may be described as the algebraic approach applied to conceptual systems (philosophy.) The same approach may be deployed to the concept of philosophy. Instead of saying ‘Philosophy is…’ at outset, review the system of ideas (knowledge) and at the end of review, say ‘That is philosophy…’ Guided by these thoughts and by the traditions (West, East and origins) it is possible to suggest
Philosophy is the discipline whose limits are the outer limits of being
Although the justification of this position has been conceptual, it may also be ‘justified’ on grounds that knowledge and action are inseparable and on ethical grounds (these modes of justification have been considered earlier)
It has been seen that it is not necessary to make restriction to the ‘outer limits of Understanding.’ However, for explicitness, it may be practical to make the extension
The tradition of philosophy includes numerous inner disciplines that include metaphysics, logic and ethics. In the tradition, epistemology has been included among the foregoing but epistemology which has been seen since the enlightenment as the ‘queen of philosophy’ has here been seen as relegated to an aspect of metaphysics. It is perhaps an aberration to think that ‘how one thinks’ is above ‘what one thinks’ (let alone ‘what is.’) Additionally modern philosophy has various special disciplines such as ‘philosophical psychology,’ and cross-disciplines such as ‘philosophy of science,’ that have been considered in this narrative (without mentioning names)
As the Theory of Possibility and Theory of Depth of Being, Logic and Metaphysics are identical
Metaphysics, in a more inclusive meaning, has been regarded as the discipline whose concern is the entire range of being. In this sense, Metaphysics and Philosophy are identical. Although the concern of Ethics is ‘freedom’ in general, without freedom there is no being; Ethics is the entire significant aspect of Metaphysics; the Ethical is the origin of the Metaphysical
In another extension of meaning, the idea that knowledge (and therefore metaphysics) are continuous with action
That this is an extension of the concept of metaphysics. That this extension is contained within metaphysics (when properly understood and realized) as an academic discipline
The Possibility of metaphysics. The ultimate character of the possibility: explicit with regard to depth and implicit for breadth. The nature of being and knowledge (objects.) The ‘fundamental problem’ of metaphysics, i.e. why absence of being must result in being (‘Why there is something rather than nothing.’) The nature and destiny of the individual (in the Theory of Identity;) and the identity of the individual and all being. The Mind-Matter problem i.e. that there is (after fundamentals have been addressed) no mind-matter problem; and, more generally, that there are no ultimate substances. The problem of substance – there are no ultimate (deterministic) uniform and unchanging substances; there is, at root, only the (indeterministic) Void (absence of being) whose uniformity and constancy or otherwise are not part of but derived from its constitution. The void is the source of all being; the concept of the void founds explanation of all being that terminates without regress, eliminates substance, permits non relativist philosophy without substance. The nature of consciousness. The nature of Ethics and its relation to Metaphysics. The necessity of Metaphysics on Ethical grounds (rejection of Metaphysics on Ethical grounds is also conceivable; however, the argument here is for necessity and, further, to the idea that rejection and necessity are ethically equivalent is to miss the essence of the argument.) The Real nature Ethical concerns i.e. that issues of freedom are not peripheral but central to being. That the concepts of Knowledge and Ethics (Morals) are not distinct – that knowledge is other than usually conceived or that it is of lesser value than usually conceived (though not devoid of value altogether)
The purpose to the following lists is to show that the problems from the history of metaphysics have received either trivialization or solution in this narrative (some of the more specialized concerns require, in this version, that the reader works out the details.) Mention of types of metaphysical theory is included to show (so that the reader can see) that the types receive ‘placement’ or ‘context’ within the Theory of Being
Classical: being, substance, space, time, nature of metaphysics, forms, categories, atomism, change and constancy. Scholastic: universals and particulars, free will, existence of and nature of God, soul and body. Modern: nature of the Real; mind and matter; identity, substance, ontology; identity over time, personal identity; modality and counterfactuals; causation and laws; causation, regularity and counterfactuals; probabilistic causation; laws of nature; Matter, space and time; objects as substances vs. mere bundles of properties; conception of spirit; nature and existence of the external world, what is Real – reality of material things, organizing principles of nature. Recent: identity and necessity, Kripke – identity statements are necessary but knowable only a posteriori. Being as journey or becoming; becoming as being. Indian metaphysics: there are points of contact between Indian thought and the Theory of Being. As a whole, Indian Philosophy recognizes the greatness of being (Brahman, the Real) and identity of the self (Atman, soul) with it; it stresses the immediate in karma (work) and moksa (salvation;) these ideas focus on what may be important to the individual and to transformation; in ‘A History of Transformation’ below there is consideration of some schools of Indian thought that focus on these concerns
Types of metaphysical theory: Platonism relationship between the ideal and the immediate; Aristotelianism – metaphysics is immanent; Thomism – reflection on everyday things and the everyday world reveals it as pointing beyond itself to God as its sustaining cause. Cartesianism – the main problem of Descartes was the divide between the determinate world of matter then being revealed by science and the world of mind that was free of material constraint… that were brought together by Design as the sign of God; Idealism; Materialism – two modern responses to the problem of Cartesianism. Argument in Metaphysics: metaphysics as an a priori science… and as an empirical science; metaphysical arguments – logical Form of metaphysical arguments; transcendental arguments, Form and example, q = knowledge is possible only if p = the world is according to the forms of intuition and q therefore p
The discoveries in Metaphysics of this essay make possible the following (a significant enhancement of the system of the fifteenth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.) An intent to cover all topics would be out of place in this narrative (they thought it valuable to the endeavor in understanding (all being) and transformation to acquire some acquaintance with most topics.) Rather, the intent is to reveal how the Theory of Being and related topics make the enhancements possible
A. Symbols and Knowledge 10a. Symbols and signs; semiotics – the study of signs and sign behavior. Symbolic Systems including language, logic, and mathematics. 10b. (These elements are included to provide continuity with Britannica; their study in the system of this essay falls under a variety of topics.) The Humanities and Philosophy; Study of Science and History. B. The Universe 1a. Metaphysics and general cosmology, nature and varieties of being, which includes Logic, Value or ethics and aesthetics, epistemology; nature and varieties of Knowledge, where, note, Belief is fundamental and the varieties of belief include Faith as (primarily) Belief-Action, Knowledge as Belief-Justification; 1b. Physical science, nature, behavior and varieties of material object including physics, physical cosmology, and chemistry; 2. Geology; 3. Biology, life – its nature and variety and origins of life and variety; Medicine; 4. Mind as the study of psyche in its integration and its ‘functions;’ nature of mind; 5. Society, nature, institutions (groups) and change… and aspects including culture (institution of knowledge,) economics, political science and philosophy (and Law;) and 6. History. C. Artifact 7. Art, nature and varieties of (literature, music, painting…;) 8. Technology (elements = energy, tools and machines… and fields = agriculture, transportation, information, earth and space exploration…; Engineering; and 9. Faith, literal and nature and varieties of non literal meaning and non meaning functions including religion, its nature and varieties: the religions of the world throughout history
Western ideas including the Greek ideal, Freudian and other conceptualizations of growth; mystics and saints. Shamanism; other systems that date back to prehistory. The shamanic or journey-quest: its original and later variations as approaches to states of insight including hallucination and to transformation of personality. Indian systems – Samkhya, Yoga, Bhagavad-Gita and its four yogic systems (Raja, Gñana, Karma, Bhakti,) Vedanta; the voice of the Vedas and the Upanishads; Buddha…
Nature and types of state and characteristics including dreams and hypnotic states, visions and other forms of psychic awareness whether arising from the psyche or the world. Sources, methods and cultivation e.g. focusing dreams and their integration in awareness and cultivation of other states in the present and over time; cultivation, idiosyncrasy and opportunity. Kinds of method or approach including meditation and isolation of the psyche, suspension of judgment, exposure to archetypes through symbol-art-myth-Faith – and consequent cognitive-emotive integration, contemplation and focusing of psyche, induction of states in groups and or by, variously, shaman, priest or pontifex and… Enhancing or inducing factors such as physical isolations and deprivations, physiological alterations of state from exposure, shock or trauma, pain, fear, crisis, anxiety – imposed or volitional and purposive, exertion and exhaustion, march, rhythm and dance, inaction, fasting and diet (Ayurvedic medicine does not distinguish food, drink, medicine, drug) alteration of or extreme environment. Uses of such states in awareness and discovery, transformation of self, personality and in e.g. healing of the person i.e. of psyche-soma (kinds and examples) and, methodologically and opportunistically, through concepts of growth enhanced by the Theory of Being in transformation of being; cultivation of perception. Sensitive individuals, relation to disturbance – that any relations are not necessary; personality or disposition and state. Individual and group approaches to transformation of personality; splitting; social action and transformation (of self and society.) Savant, modes and theories, relation to developmental deficiency – that any relations are not necessary; relation to states and dispositions to states of psychic sensitivity; experimental inductions of the savant syndrome in normal individuals; possibility of cultivation
At outset it is significant to note that not all transformations, virtual or actual, appear to have bases. There is, however, no significance to changes that are not (ever) registered in experience. Therefore, the apparently baseless transformations must have bases in intuition or the unconscious. These forms exist, may be recognized and cultivated
A first source of transformations is the History of Transformation, above
Understanding of function and growth (biological – of the organism, of Mind – psychology and personality, of the unconscious, of human Possibility, and of language, morals, faith, society, civilization and history) provide grounding in the immediate world
These considerations may channel initial direction. The following may provide goals or destinations
The theories of being, object, identity, logic, cosmology, feasibility, morals, and Faith provide possibility, ambition, goals, and means (dynamics) for transformation
‘Dynamics of being’ is an approach to transformation in which, with bases in the foregoing, the following steps are repeated or iterated (1) experiments are undertaken, (2) outcomes are interpreted and modified (enhanced) experiments are conceived and undertaken
The intent is to specify a complete, minimal set. (A complete set is one that, by extrapolation, would ‘cover’ all being.) As far as realization is concerned their intent was to begin the process and to take it as far as they could
Universal knowledge including the special case Atman = Brahman, through both analysis and perception
Theoretical understanding, design and construction of machines with Mind, life, being. Technological and logical design, simulation, and enhancement of actual organisms including those known through experience and through theory
Transformation of being; alterations of the body and influence on the whole being: Mind, body, potential
Journey; multi-cultural experiments; variety of institutions
Influencing, building society at all levels including the being of nations – charismatic and patriarchal action and influence, group action
Emphasizes emphasizing the dynamics but using all and any tools… within reason, feasibility and moral concerns
Includes the special case Atman = Brahman, through both analysis and perception. Analysis is complete as in the Theories of Being and of Identity. They have had success in perception of Identity through extended exertion and rhythm in natural environments. Plans. In the next step, they would continue experiments in perception through the means described above
They had some success in transformation of personality through cultivation of ends and Morals over time. Social influence was perhaps their weakest area. Plans. Possibilities include work and general action. In work: design for influence; risk and dynamics. In general action: moral design for influence; cultivation of charisma; sharing; risk (action for influence) and dynamics; shared formal commitment in the form of a group project or institute
Assessment: the foregoing includes an implicit assessment and plans; the goal is known, the territory is partially laid out in the ideas above. Plans: Thus there are three open doors to the ultimate: being-in-the-ultimate, being-in-knowledge-of-the-ultimate, and death. The task: undertake the arching-journey, discover, and open other doors
The following research topics are of interest in the application and development of the ideas of the essay
Every topic is capable of refinement, elaboration and improved relations – to the whole and to the other topics. The system of fundamental topics is capable of further coherence and, perhaps, of depth
Space, Time (and manifest being)
Modern physics – quantum theory and the relativistic theory of gravitation
Logic and logics. Further analysis of the concept of Logic
Human being – elaboration of the study of life; elaboration of the treatment of mental functions; treatment of personality and social theory; cultivation of personality and charisma; Faith – further depth, living it, elaboration
Transformation – for investigation and action
They held two objectives for the future
This will include criticism and improvements of the ideas and foundation – the Theory of Being and related developments. It would emphasize transformation, inviting others to share in the process, and ‘application’ (social; and, perhaps, a development of ideas or theory and practice in manifestation of life and intelligent beings)
Although they had thought, ‘transformation will be the final way,’ they felt something further, perhaps an admission of finitude (if only in this form,) perhaps an expression of the infinite in the finite
Experience, perhaps, of the infinite in the finite
The following collects together the important concepts of the narrative. In the print version, the system is replaced by an index
foundationalism
concept; coordinate; definition; existence; feasible; global; Good; identity; meaning; Real
actual; adaptation; Atman; being, theory of; Brahman; contingent; depth; descriptions, system of consistent; dynamic form; fiction; form; fundamental principle of the Theory of Being; impossibility; Logos; metaphysics; modal; necessary; possible; power; proof; showing; substance; universe; void
abstract object; actual object; adaptation; concept; concept-object; faithfulness; identity (object, personal); identity (sameness); object; percept; precision; Real; truth
consistency; constitution; context; deduction; excluded middle, principle of; fact; fundamental principle of the Theory of Being, second proof; hypothesis; induction; law, logic and; Logic; logics; mathematics; non contradiction, principle of; paradox; Platonic view; reference and paradox; science; tautology; theory; truth
adaptation; atomism; cause; cosmology; determinism; divide; form; incremental change, probability of; indeterminism, necessity of; mechanism; space; stability; substance; symmetry; time; time, dominant; time, multiple; variety; variety, cosmological
awareness; consciousness; consciousness, apparent on-off character of; consciousness, awareness of awareness and; consciousness, language and; experience; intentionality; matter; memory; mental causation; mind; mind and matter, indefiniteness of the common concepts of; mind, manifest; mind, primal; mind-matter problem; originality; unconscious, the; what it is like
achievement, exceptional; action; ambition; Atman, human being as; attitude; binding problem, the; bound icon and symbol; choice; cognition; drive; emotion; emotion, higher; feeling as elements of function; free feeling, memory and; free icon and symbol; freedom of will; Freudian determinism, human being and; function; greater than mere being; growth; growth, extrapolation to the ultimate; history, sense of; human being ; human being, nature of; icon; integration; knowledge of self; language; less than ultimate; life; manifest mind and life; micro and macroscopic elements of life; neoteny; object constancy; personality; psyche; symbol; unconscious, the; unity of consciousness
aesthetics; choice; civilization; constraint; economics; ethics; freedom and constraint; human; good, the; highest ideal, the; history; knowledge; morals; objectivity; political realism; politics; Real, the; value; war and peace
bonding; bridging; doubt; exclusion; faith; faith and doubt; function; group function; literal; meaning function; non-literal; polarization; religion; secularism; sharing; significance
action; actual; adventure; ambition; charisma; commitment; experiment; formal commitment; group project; influence; journey; limit; outer limit; paradigm; perspective; philosophy; shared commitment; sharing; social commitment; system of complete and minimal experiment; thought, principles of; transformation; understanding; virtual
Aristotle; Descartes; Gottlob Frege; David Hume; Immanuel Kant; Alexius Meinong; G. E. Moore; Isaac Newton; Plato; Bertrand Arthur William Russell; Edward Burnett Tylor; Alfred North Whitehead; Ludwig Wittgenstein
Lives
Northern California, near the Pacific Ocean, amid redwood trees and frequent mist
Loves
Carissa Leigh – daughter, Austin, Texas; Robin and Susan – brother and sister-in-law, London
Ideas, poetry, music, experience, writing, travel – India, Britain, US, Canada, Mexico
Nature – under stars, amid peaks shrouded in cloud, hiking and climbing, black bear in canyon, hot days at the Trinity River
Places – Barranca del Cobre, Chihuahua, Mexico; Trinity Alps, Northern California
Life
Born in India, lived in West Bengal, Bihar, UK, US – Delaware, New York, Texas, California
Education | research | teaching – mathematics, computation, theoretical physics, applied mechanics, engineering: Indian Institute of Technology (Kharagpur,) University of Delaware, Rochester Institute of Technology (New York,) University of Texas (Austin,) Humboldt State University (California.) Ph.D. in Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering from the University of Delaware
Living. All phases of a restaurant for Indian food – 1989. Psychiatric care – 1990. Medical software – 2002
© Anil Mitra, 2006