JOURNEY IN BEING
ANIL MITRA
COPYRIGHT © 2007, April 2008 VERSION
CONTENTS
Sketch… On publication… Reading the narrative… The audience. 15
Being… Metaphysics… Objects… Logic and meaning… Mind… Cosmology
Introduction… Human being… Social world… War and peace. 175… Civilization and history… The highest ideal… Faith
An individual journey… Ambition… Journey in being… Narrative
Introduction… Principles of thought and action… Philosophy and metaphysics… Problems in metaphysics… A system of human knowledge
Introduction… History of transformation… Basis and theory of transformation… System of experiments… Transformations so far and their further Design
Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation… Design… The way ahead
Since the present edition is in transition, a few thoughts regarding change in the style of the present paragraph are in included in the text
This section is in-process and therefore at present some sections are stems
The journey is an adventure whose aims include experience and knowledge (understanding) of the world. The approach includes ideas or concepts and transformation of individual identity
In the process of discovery and experiment, the idea or concept of being was found to be pivotal to the adventures in ideas and in transformation
This introduction describes origins, nature and scope of the journey. It then introduces the concept of being and its fundamental character
Emphasizes ideas and action
One of the connotations of being in the tradition of thought is that which is most fundamental to understanding the world or some aspect of the world
It is natural, then, that being should also be fundamental to transformation and action
This is the connotation of interest in selecting Being as the central concept in a system of thought that is fundamental to the journey and to thought and action
The idea that being is most fundamental… is an implicit and perhaps partial specification of the concept of being
The semantic or linguistic origin of the word being is the verb to be. Of course, this observation does not exhaust the concept of being. Additionally, there are subtleties to the use of the verb to be—not all uses of the verb connote be-ing. These concerns are taken up later
A connotation of ‘to be’ is ‘to exist.’ Can being be equated to existence? There is a line of thought in which existence is ‘the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things’ while being includes the connotation of independent or pure being or being-in-itself. Thus it is conceivable that existence and being are not identical. However, not every connotation corresponds to something actual. Therefore, distinctions in connotation do not necessarily correspond to actual distinctions. That the—apparently—distinct thoughts ‘being-in-interaction’ and ‘being-in-itself’ can be had does not imply that there is a corresponding actual or real distinction. Therefore, without further analysis, it cannot be concluded that being and existence are distinct
It will emerge later that being and existence are identical
Existence will found to be ‘objective’ but objectivity requires some kind of grounding
The grounding of existence, of being-in-itself and of being-in-interaction, of existing and knowing, will be in—the concept of—experience
These assertions require demonstration. The meanings of the terms being, to be, existence, experience require clarification. There are a number of problems and paradoxes, some well known, that are associated with the terms. These concerns deferred to Foundation where it will be seen that demonstration, meaning, resolution of problem and paradox are intimately related
It may be said that everything in the universe exists or has being. Thus existing or being does not distinguish one thing from another. In using being as fundamental the character of things is not referred to something more fundamental or simpler. In contrast, in substance theory which will be considered in detail later, the character of things is explained in terms of something simpler. For example in materialism there are explanations in terms of matter. For these reasons, it might appear that an explanation in terms of being might be trivially true but also unenlightening
However, in substance theory, things are explained in terms of something else, something that stands behind or under. This ‘something else’ cannot be truly outside the world but is something else in that it is not on the surface andor in that it is a part of the variety of things. Thus while substance theory may be powerful, it is also open to error—it is not given that the world will be explainable in terms of what is below the surface of phenomena or that the whole will be explainable in terms of a part of it. The nature of substance theory, its potential, and its ultimate untenability as the basis as an understanding of the world will be taken up later
On account of its trivial character, explanation in terms of being cannot be in error. Explanation in terms of being is, in effect, an explanation of the world in terms of itself. The idea to explain the world in its own terms may be seen as including the position that at the outset of study, of investigation, the nature of the world is regarded as unknown. Thus the approach from being is similar to the use and naming of the unknown in algebra and the approach from being has powers that are similar to those of the algebraic approach
It will emerge that, despite this trivial character, explanation via being is ultimately profound. First, such explanation cannot be in error. More importantly, however, the use of being encourages and permits the formulation of a system of understanding of the world in terms of its most general and universal of characteristics such as being, all being and absence of being which will be found to be capable being the basis of a powerful system of understanding (metaphysics, theory of being.) This system does not say anything about the particular and detailed aspects of our world. However, when used in interaction with detailed understanding, the general enhances and corrects understanding of the particular and the particular provides details and examples of the general. While the result is indeed profound and unexpected, what has been said so far is but a glimmer of the actual developments
The section Introduction to a new picture of the world below provides some account of these developments
The idea of a theory of being is explicitly mentioned in Aristotle’s work. In the particular sciences, things are studied in some aspect or other—material aspects in physics, the living aspect in biology. Aristotle’s idea, in metaphysics, was to study ‘things as such,’ i.e., that things as they are
In the history of thought, being has numerous connotations. Some of these will be excluded from the meaning of being developed in this narrative. This might lead to confusion that, however, may be avoided by attending to the meaning as developed here. The gain in suggestive power from the tradition is worth the care that is required. It is probably true that the every significant concept has a rich multiplicity connotations. Therefore careful attention to meaning is not necessary only to avoid confusion but also to productive and creative thought
The present section is excessively long. It will be shortened in two ways. The first is by simple excision of excess material: the objective is a brief and simple introduction to the picture and its significance. The second way is essential and depends on a new insight of April 2008 regarding the fundamental logic and the nature of logic. There are a number of new insights regarding logic since this version was written. In this version logic was conceived as follows and contains traditional logic. The first conception was to see Logic as the one law of the universe; a second was to see Logic as the theory of the entire system of consistent descriptions. ‘The entire system of consistent descriptions’ is conceptually awkward and the first insight of the 2008 edition is to regard the idea of the entire system as immanent in Logic; consequently it is not required to think of or generate any such system—even in principle. A second insight of 2008 is to show the equivalence of the following universes: the join of the empirical universes of all sentient or experiential beings, the Universe of all being, the universe of the possible, and the Universe of Logic. The insight of April 2008 is to see that Logic is encompassed in perception and conception; that Logic is the one law; that traditional (formal, symbolic) logic, the theory of descriptions—no relation to the idea of Russell—is not Logic but may be named para-logic as lying on the boundary of Logic and as needed only by a finite and limited being whose locutions may contain ‘logic’ errors because of limited powers of pre-conception, i.e. conception independently of the object, which includes pre-perception, i.e. imagery
It is unlikely that any picture or metaphysics will be entirely new—aspects of the view have been in a variety of traditions. However, the picture has, apparently, not been seen before as a dynamic whole, with a rational-empirical foundation, as a foundation that has no infinite regress and yet no substance, and with a breadth of scope such that all being is implicit in it, and with the breadth of application covered in the narrative
The narrative, especially Foundation, paints and grounds or justifies a picture of being—of the universe. This picture has been glimpsed in the history of ideas but has not previously given a foundation or developed and elaborated systematically. A reader who is not aware that a new picture is being developed—whose elements appear in Being and whose main development is in Metaphysics, may feel disoriented by the distance between the sense of being in this narrative and the common picture of being in the modern world. While the picture is grounded in Metaphysics, reference is made to it throughout the narrative and the following orientation to its context will be useful in understanding the picture and the narrative:
…The ‘picture’ is a formal metaphysics and its elaboration. However, it is pertinent that it has not been the primary goal of the journey to develop a picture—formal or otherwise. The remaining comments of this paragraph are intended to assist readers in negotiating the dual objectives that result from having more than one goal and therefore more than one set of criteria for Foundation. The first goal is transformation of being—of realization of ultimates or, at least, to have a vision of ultimates and to travel in that direction. Understanding and knowing are part of transformation and, therefore, development of the Foundation has been part of the journey. However, actual—physical and other—transformation is the overarching goal. In pursuit of this goal, the question, not new in the history of thought, has come to the forefront whether understanding can andor should be independent of transformation or action
Even though the ideas will be shown to have an ultimate character relative to ideas, they are, as ideas, necessarily an incomplete part of being. Yet, the idea—experience—is the place of appreciation of being and becoming
It is not been a goal to base the Foundation in some medium between the needs of understanding and knowledge on one hand and transformation on the other. Instead, there have been two rather parallel tracks of development. In one, it has been sought to keep the topics of Foundation as independent of its uses as possible
What of experience—of the empirical? In the development it will be seen that knowledge—knowing—the world and knowledge of knowing itself emerge as a unified subject and not as separate divisions of knowledge. In this process it will be seen that reason and analysis on the one hand are not distinct at root from perception and empirical process on the other hand. The analysis will require recognition of the root case of perception and its necessities
In the second, the needs of transformation and action have informed the developments within Foundation and attitudes toward it in particular and knowledge and understanding in general. This track is not a pragmatic system for it is not asserted that use is the final measure of validity of knowledge but that knowledge and use remain in interaction and are so interwoven that the notion of validity may have no universal application…
Platonism includes the view that a perfect system of understanding may be achieved—that knowledge need not ever be in a process of development, that it may be independent of action and context. This view, which is often tacitly assumed and tacitly encouraged by the concept of authority in education, has been held in critical light in the modern period of philosophy—especially, since Wittgenstein’s influence in analytic philosophy. However, it is difficult to overcome tacit habits of thought and modern and recent philosophy—especially analytic philosophy—remain, significantly, worlds unto themselves. One aspect of the ‘system’ of this narrative is that it should not remain a system unto itself
The picture of the universe developed and grounded is, if valid, one of an infinitely deeper truth and greater variety than is normally assigned to the universe, e.g., in religious, modern physical, or even metaphysical cosmologies. However, it is not the intent here to invalidate or, particularly, to validate those cosmologies. Instead, the new picture or cosmology locates the valid parts of the received cosmologies in within its boundaries. If the intent of a religious cosmology is to be metaphorical and the content of a physical cosmology is regarded as real, then, although those cosmologies have validity within certain imprecisely defined boundaries, the depth of their truth is an infinitesimal fraction of depth of Metaphysics and their domains of validity infinitesimal in relation to the ultimate domain revealed in Cosmology
The grounding of the picture of the universe developed here is a necessary or logical grounding. This grounding does not invalidate the received pictures or cosmologies but places them in a larger, ultimate context and helps to show the origins and limits of the systems they describe. The reader is invited to follow the arguments, to challenge them, to verify or disverify them to his or her satisfaction. The narrative itself raises challenges to its own arguments and the status of these challenges is taken up in the narrative
…for it requires a re-conception of logic that lies within the system of ideas (and being)
While the development required reconceptualization of ideas from the history of thought, the words used to refer to the reconceived ideas and even new ideas are usually older words. Therefore, careful attention to the meanings introduced in the narrative is essential to its understanding
The primitive concepts of the logical part of the metaphysics are being—whatever exists, universe or all being, the void or absence of being, and form. Being and Metaphysics develop the metaphysics around these ideas. Here, a suggestion of the power of the ideas may be illuminating; demonstration, elaboration and application, and development of meaning and significance is taken up in the body of the narrative
It is common, especially in scientific cosmology, for the word ‘universe’ to refer to the known universe and, perhaps, extrapolations from it. As all being, the present concept of the universe is rather different. The question of how it is possible to talk of and know the universe in its present conception is discussed in Being, Metaphysics and Objects
In the present conception of universe, there is nothing outside it. This implies, first, that everything—including all form, pattern and law—and not just every thing is in the universe and, second, that any foundation for secure knowledge of the universe must lie in it. Being has and can have no further foundation and, therefore, requires no further foundation; the universe has and can have no external creator
As corollary to the inclusion of all form, pattern and law in the universe, the void—whose existence is shown later—contains no form, pattern or law. Therefore, since the exclusion of a logical possibility would be a law of the void, the variety of being in the universe must contain every logical possibility and this fact is constitutive of the ultimate breadth of the metaphysics. Every form must have being and is immanent in being but there is and can be no Platonic world of forms outside the one universe. It also follows that the void may be regarded as the source of all being and, though this is a rough and incomplete statement of the truth and provides no more than a hint of its power, it is here that the ultimate depth of the metaphysics lies
…The metaphysics that grounds these developments is one of ultimate depth and breadth
The discussion above suggests that there is power in meaning. If meaning is convention, how is this possible? It must be that though meaning involves convention, meaning is not mere convention. Words and grammar have conventional aspects. However, they refer to the world. Although, to some extent, we receive the empirical content of meaning that does not make it any less empirical. To suggest that meaning is not empirical is to confuse the analytic with the explicit. Meaning has, at least, implicit empirical content. This of course does not meaning is above analysis or that it cannot benefit from analysis
The axiomatic approach suggests that at the root of any system of thought lies unproven propositions. This is deceiving. It is clear that not just any system of axioms should prove fruitful in understanding. What is it that makes the successful systems successful? The development of the system must mesh (logically) with other systems and empirically in, at least, providing a ground—as in mathematics—for realism if not realism itself—as in science
In Being and Metaphysics, it will be seen that the fundamental terms of the system will be based in (1) necessary aspects of experience—e.g. that there is experience and (2) logical consequences of the necessary aspects, e.g., that there is all experience and part of experience
This shows that absolute demonstration is possible—that some general propositions may be shown. It shows that not all proof is relative to axioms that have no foundation
The system to be developed will have ultimate power. Though fortuitous in its occasion, the development is necessary in its character. Of necessity, a necessary development of this kind has no external foundation. It is ‘its own’ foundation. The system shows the development of such foundation; and that it is not circular
Where does the local cosmology fit into the general metaphysics? (1) The infinite variety of the entire universe—all being—revealed in the metaphysics does not appear to be characteristic of this—local—world. I.e., the variety of being and behavior under the known / putative laws of this cosmos, is a—very small, even infinitesimal—subset of the total variety of being and behavior. According to the metaphysics, the behavior of the universe is not limited to that of this—local—cosmos and, further, there is, against the background of the entire universe, no distinction between the meaning or fact of ‘is not limited to’ and that of ‘is necessarily not limited to.’ The observed behavior of this cosmos is an example of normal behavior—within its context, deviant behavior, which would be impossible if the observed laws of the cosmos were the laws of the universe, are merely but highly improbable; and, within that context, it is merely but highly probable that the observed laws will describe all behavior. (2) Within the one universe, an event occurs or it does not; if it does it is possible; if it does not, there is no other comparison world where it could occur and, therefore, it is impossible. Therefore, the possible and the actual—over all time and space—are identical; from the previous paragraph, possibility is logical possibility—comparison with other meanings of possibility is taken up later. (3) The individual is immediately tied into the world via his or her experience; it may seem tenuous to suggest that experience is all that ties… however, experience is and will be shown to be a much more robust thing than is the flimsy notion that lies behind the idea of mere experience. These points and others will be discussed in demonstrative detail the body of the narrative. For now, they may be summarized by acknowledging that the concepts of the normal, of the identity of the actual and the possible, and of experience are among the concepts that reveal the place of the local cosmos in the universe
As a result of the development of the metaphysics, it has been possible to raise the understanding of substance and form, objects—particular or concrete and abstract—and identity, logic, meaning, mind, cosmology, human world, morals and ethics, faith, real possibilities in the transformations of being and identity, as well as a number topics of lesser significance or breadth to new levels relative to the history of thought. These levels are often ultimate in nature
These developments have derived inspiration from and employed analogy with many disciplines from the history of human knowledge—and, in turn, have implications for these disciplines which include not only the philosophical such as metaphysics and logic. The sources include the entire range of knowledge—the sciences including the sciences of physics, biology, and mind; the symbolic systems—language, logic, and mathematics; and art, history, faith and religion; the extent of study has not been uniform over these disciplines. It is relevant to understanding the development here that the exposure described constitutes a resource that has provided an intuitive background for the development that has made it possible to proceed without reference to or use of specific examples. While this does not at all constitute a formal deficiency of the developments, the reader who lacks the exposure may experience an absence of context and orientation in reading the narrative
The greater inspiration, however, is, directly from experience, and then from being
It should not be thought that the entire inspiration is from the history of thought. To think that thought as necessary would be to elevate our thought to a level of primacy over being. It is in the nature of novel, powerful and realist thought that transcends its roots
Regarding the metaphysics and the other topics, elaboration of its application and refinement of the levels continues
The beliefs of the present time may be regarded as roughly defined by science, religion, and secular humanism—the latter is a way of thinking based in human values that accepts scientific cosmology and is a modern replacement for religion. These beliefs do not form a coherent system and, where they intersect, may stand in conflict with regard to fact, significance and value. Assertions of the preceding kind are subject to lack in the definiteness of the meanings of the terms—science and so on. The present metaphysics allows a clarification of the ultimate possibilities of meaning of the terms. The ‘literal’ truth of present science need not be contested provided that it is seen as an infinitesimal faction of the truth. The apparent absurdity that may mark the religions is placed in context; except when the absurdity is actual, use of literal form to point to higher truth results in absurdity. Of course, there is no suggestion here that absurdity standing alone is any mark of truth or value. The figurative or evocative value of the forms of expression of spirituality, myth, and religion stand beyond their actual literal or factual form but, from the metaphysics, may be given literal interpretation
The metaphysics may be seen as standing above and giving context and significance to the factual and figurative expression of this and of any age, of any context. In so doing, the metaphysics may be seen as complementing such expression; contradiction should arise only in cases of literal interpretation of actual absurdity. In the direction of fact, there can be no greater complement. The figurative aspects of the expressions of the ages may be seen as intuition, perhaps only groping, of the metaphysics. If art points to truth, seeing truth eliminates—one—need for art, i.e., in this way, perception is greater than art (and religion and thought)
While careful definition is taken up later, cosmology and metaphysics may be seen as the study of the universe and its nature—and whether there are natures or essences. Epistemology may be seen as the study of the origin, justification, nature, and limits of human knowledge. There is a clear sense in which concern with knowledge cannot be more important than concern with the universe. However, in a world in which knowledge is regarded as problematic, epistemology may assume a greater importance than metaphysics and this has been the case in western philosophy—even the possibility of metaphysics has been in question—roughly since the time of Kant. Metaphysics provides logical construction of an ultimate metaphysics from firm empirical ground and, so, shows far more than the possibility of metaphysics
It is characteristic of these developments that, even though they may appear strange on account of their unfamiliarity and even though a reading of the narrative may be difficult because of the breadth of vision and knowledge encompassed, the core developments are essentially transparent and simple. The present development of the concept of being—and of existence—shows it to be shallow, superficial and trivial… and that it is precisely these characteristics that, along with diligent care in their consistent application and in the eradication of erroneous habits of earlier thought, enable the ultimate character of the metaphysics
Thus the developments show that epistemology may—and, as will be argued in the narrative, in the goal of realization of what is desirable and possible, should—once again take second place to metaphysics. However, the concerns of epistemology remain important. Such concerns are raised in Metaphysics and are addressed there and in subsequent topics, especially Objects and Faith. The concept of faith includes religious faith only as a special case and under the special circumstance that it has basis in reason or intuition but makes no incredulous or merely dogmatic appeal. If concern is with having secure knowledge then, since even in the heart of science and reason and logic there is no final certainty, and since—human—rationality has bounds, the application of knowledge must invariably involve faith even though that faith may be implicit. From another point of view, one that is perhaps revealed in animal behavior, faith-in-less-than-perfectly-secure-knowledge is an approximation to a mode-of-being-in-the-world that requires and can have no absolute certainty in the absolute presence of degrees of uncertainty. Parenthetically this may be set against Heidegger’s concept of Angst; which may be seen as being founded in a false concept of being-in-the-world that Heidegger’s thought retains even as it rejects substance ontology… of course, where Heidegger’s thought is and must be a groping—since, in allowing determinism, it cannot have completely eradicated substance thought—the present metaphysics is in a sense its own author rising above the ego and aspirations of its human author
In the analysis of the nature of being, of meaning, of what may be doubted and what may not—of empirical knowledge, and of logic, there is no other context to which Foundation may or need refer for justification. Still, various kinds of doubt—e.g. doubt regarding the logic of the metaphysics and doubt about how it may apply and its consequences in this world—are raised and addressed and what doubt remains may be seen as residing, not in limits, but in the nature of being. An at element of faith—even if only implicit—is and must be present in application Theory of Being, e.g. in undertaking transformation and, more immediately, in locating the ultimate objects of the metaphysics in the world of experience—that these objects can be located in experience of normal individuals may be seen to be a rather Wittgensteinian doubt. This is just as there is at least implicit faith in the application of or trust in any knowledge and which faith in explicit form is often suppressed perhaps to allow security and to promote function. The thought that in the contingent realm this is required or desirable to be or can be overcome is delusional and the cultivation of this view is a form of slavery, i.e., that there is some implicit authority or institution that owns the overcoming
Rock solid understanding is possible only in fluidity
Even though the variety revealed in the metaphysics is ultimate, the variety is implicit in the metaphysics. This leaves open infinite vistas and possibilities of discovery and transformation and suggests that variety is more interesting and basic than depth
A consequence of the metaphysics that is developed is a theory of identity that shows that an individual must experience all identities. Limits and law-like behavior—regarding but not limited to identity— within this cosmos are an example of what is termed ‘normal.’ The concept of the normal is developed in a way that shows that what is often thought to be contingently impossible is merely—extremely—improbable within a normal system and, similarly, what is thought to be contingently necessary is merely probable. The contingent necessities and impossibilities correspond to the laws of the normal system but are not logically necessary or logically impossible. It is shown that there must be infinitely many normal systems against a background of absolute indeterminism, that the variety is limited only by logical necessity, and that under absolute indeterminism, all logical possibilities including the normal systems must be realized. The experience of singular identity of the individual is normal behavior that is and must be transcended when the boundaries—e.g., in space and time—of this normal cosmos are not the limits of the domain of consideration. The possible and necessary experience of variety of identity is infinite and these identities are experienced in singular and integral form. It is unlikely and difficult though not impossible for an individual starting from normal circumstances to design and undertake the experience of universal identity. Death is a certain gate to the infinite
This section has overlap with the previous. However the intent here is to discuss significance. The two sections may be joined
…and action, process and relationship
The earlier sections present the nature but not a map of the journey. The present section is, tentatively, a sketch of the journey and an outline of the narrative
The narrative contains a deepening—in significant ways ultimate—of foundations of knowledge and being and may therefore present difficulties of understanding. Although some difficulties may be technical, a significant difficulty may lie in recognizing that a new picture of the world—a metaphysics—is painted and in grasping the logical foundation and quality of that picture and of the immense variety of being portrayed within and shown necessary by it. This difficulty may be especially acute for those immersed in the traditional pictures, e.g., from Western philosophy, metaphysics and science—i.e., for academics and experts
When a narrative is expected to present difficulties of understanding, it is helpful to the reader to have some acquaintance with the presence of the difficulties and their nature
The main suggestions are as follows. (1) Recognize that standard terms from the history of thought may be used with variant—new and often significantly deepened—meaning and therefore it is crucial to pay attention to meaning as specified here. (2) Since the narrative is not a compilation of ideas from the history of thought but is essentially new in the sense of an advance, even readers experienced with the territories under investigation may find themselves in unfamiliar terrain and. Therefore assimilation of the ideas and the relationships among them is unlikely to be a linear process. The ideas are not only new but may be experienced as strange in a number of ways of which one is that the view of the world or universe goes far beyond the standard views from the history of thought including modern day secular scientific humanism and modern day religion whether fundamentalist or liberal. Further, the ideas are not a speculative system but developed in cold logic. The modern reader conditioned to the notion of progress in all endeavors may be shocked to find that the view of the world is ultimate in a number of ways; that this is demonstrated; that logic and demonstration are not foreign to the system—are not as in standard developments studied and developed in separate and to some extent ad hoc endeavor—but are integral parts of it. Given that all this—and more—is new, the reader may even flounder in a first reading. Therefore, the narrative may be approached as an open journey rather than a trip with a preset itinerary. The reader may wish to stop, reflect, absorb, reread, integrate… If the narrative is worth this effort, and this is of course submitted to be the case, the reader will be rewarded with a new vision of the world. This vision will include at least many of the valid elements of all other visions including that of science and religion. In the end the reader will, it is hoped, be rewarded with a simplicity and unity of ultimate vision
The reader who is prepared to tentatively accept the foregoing claims may wonder if there is any adventure left in the world. The answer is that even though the vision is ultimate there is indeed adventure. The vision is ultimate in two ways. First, it is ultimate in depth; this means a foundation for the understanding of all being has been provided that has no primitive undefined terms, e.g. no substance, but despite this is not dependent on an infinite regress of definition or demonstration. For proof of this claim the reader must read at least complete the chapter Metaphysics. In the next writing the present and next section will outline a simpler and still more powerful (in the sense of grounding and clarity) demonstration. The ultimate in depth implies an ultimate in breadth. The ultimate in breadth is equivalent to the claim that every being in the universe—over all extension and duration—is implicit in the metaphysics. It is implicit in the sense that no sequence of descriptions or conceptions, finite or infinite, can contain a specification of all beings or entities in the universe. That is, for a finite being at least, there is an endless vista of discovery and adventure and, as will be seen, an endless world of becoming and transformation of individual form and identity
Instead of ‘I,’ which may suggest mere self-promotion and intrusion of ego, ‘they’ or, perhaps, fictional names may be used to encourage powers of self
The main units of the essay are ‘parts’ whose headings are bold and capitalized. Parts are divided into divisions (bold and Title Case) and then chapters (underlined, First letter capitalized.) Chapters may be divided into sections that are indicated by an italicized heading or by italicizing the first sentence of the section
Italics are used to refer to a unit from within the text; for example, the main parts are Foundation, Journey, and Map. Italics are also used to indicate emphasis
Words have variant and potential meaning. It is crucial to the logic and understanding of the essay that the meanings of fundamental words such as Being, Universe and Void should be defined explicitly and used and read consistently. Capitalization of the first letters of words indicates that a concept is being used as defined in the essay. However, it is not necessary to be compulsive about this convention
Competent language use is comfortable with conflating concepts with the objects to which they refer. However, the distinction is often crucial to clarity; capitalization is a reminder that the distinction may be significant
In a common convention, quotes are used to refer to a word or phrase. Thus, ‘tree’ refers to the word while tree refers to the object. This convention may be a reminder that word and object are being distinguished
There is an interest in the journey itself, its nature, its ways and means, its ambitions and goals
Interest is typically in the treatment of a specific topic or discipline from the point of view of the Journey—the Foundation or the ways of Transformation. The interest in the topic may be technical and for further study and research. Typical topics may be found in Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation
In Foundation, the focus is on ideas which are thought to have achieved some maturity. Transformation, which is in process, is taken up in the second part, Journey
Ideas are taken up first since they are fundamental to understanding the nature of the journey and to determining possibilities of—and approaches to—transformation
Although Foundation is not in the form of a journey, development of its ideas has been and remains a journey—a part of a larger journey in transformation of being. The ideas seek to be a contribution to thought. The first purpose of the ideas is to provide a vision of the world that will be critical and, as far as possible, ultimate. The vision will be a foundation for transformation and further developments in ideas and thought
This brief division talks of the nature of the journey. It makes a suggestion for reading the narrative. In the next version it is expanded
‘Journey in Being’ is an exploration in possibility. Its means and ends are in ideas or knowledge and in transformation—in transformation of individual and identity, of society, and, later, of the world—of being
Early goals were diffuse—to be adventurous, to experience mystery and retain wonder, and to make a fundamental contribution. Along the way, being emerged as a basic to a system of concepts that enabled ultimates in ideas and the possibility of ultimates in transformation—as well as approaches to transformation. A diligent use of the idea of Being over other concepts such as matter, mind and process enabled not only foundation and proof but also analysis of what foundation there may be
‘Journey’ refers, first, to an individual exploration that began in adventure and sense of mystery and, through study and reflection, grew into a journey of being
While the journey has a personal aspect, there is, also, along the way, exploration and discovery in ideas and foundations, of what foundation is possible, and in being and identity
Since doubt served the exploration well, since there remain questions about the foundation, and since the approaches to transformation remain experimental, the regard for the foundation is that it may be best thought of as what foundation has been found along the way
The narrative seeks to be a contribution to ideas in the topics—chapters—and their foundation, and to transformation
Although acceptance is determined in the course of a contribution in the stream of ideas and action, it is thought that the contribution includes an estimate of what directions in ideas are capable of ultimate foundation, that such ultimates have been sketched and proved, that knowledge has been pushed to a number of its boundaries, and that the envelope of transformation is traced and shown
In developing a new system of thought, new meaning is introduced. In the narrative, most new and altered concepts are designated by existing words that may already have a variety—sometimes a profusion—of general and specialized uses
In order to understand the narrative it is crucial to be aware of new meaning as it is introduced
This is the first of two divisions on ‘ideas’
It is the intent of any theory of being to be a framework to understand all things without reference to any special discipline such as physics or psychology or particular category such as mind or matter. The substance theorist may interject ‘but it is obvious beyond question that all things are this or that category,’ e.g., mind or matter or, for the dualist, mind and matter. The response is that the substance theorist’s contention is not at all obvious and certainly not necessary and, indeed, the contrary will be shown—there are and can be no universal substances. Further, even if substance theory is true the framework that begins without categories can only strengthen its argument
A theory of being is about being and not about particular beings, not even the collection of beings. A theory of being may abstract what is common to all beings; if this turns out to be the case it will fall out of investigation. The theory will, of course, illuminate the nature of particular beings
A valid theory of being may begin with some, perhaps elemental perhaps immediate, aspects of being as we know and experience it—material, animal, and or human and so on… However the theory, especially if complete, will not entirely flow from such considerations. But what lies outside individual experience? To get ‘outside’ individual experience it will be necessary to abstract from it and see if what is abstracted has universality. The chapter Being has a foundation in experience—it does not transcend experience or locate individual experience in (all) being. Metaphysics abstracts and finds what is universal. That is where Metaphysics begins; in the metaphysics, named metaphysics of immanence, an approach is developed from which it is able to demonstrate necessary and universal conclusions which are used to ground individual being in being, and to develop and elaborate a cosmology
The metaphysics of immanence thus transcends its beginnings in a preliminary analysis of being and experience. The metaphysics of immanence shows and gives meaning to the integral wholeness of the universe—of all being
A valid and complete theory of being must contain any other theory of being in its domain of validity; and it must be ultimate in depth of understanding and variety of being encompassed. Theory of Being develops and elaborates such a framework. It is hoped that Theory of Being is a contribution to thought
With Human World, Theory of Being denotes what foundation in ideas has arisen along the way—a framework for transformation. The topics for Theory of Being are Being, Metaphysics, Objects, Logic and meaning, Mind, and Cosmology; the topics for Human World are Human being, Social world, War and peace, Civilization and history, The highest ideal, and Faith
These topics constitute a complete cosmological—and logical—framework for all being, all aspiring, all process and becoming, and all experience
The primary objectives of this section are to lay out and motivate some basic ideas for a foundation / framework for an ultimate journey into understanding and transformation and to explain why, from among these, the idea of being is fundamental to the development. Here, understanding includes knowledge but is more than knowledge of the world—the universe—or even the nature of knowledge itself. Understanding includes a sense of the nature of being-in-the-world and what is important to it—or, at least, a recognition that this sense is significant together with an intent to develop the sense and a habit of being concerned with it
Concepts for a foundation. Development of the foundational framework
This chapter introduces ideas or concepts for a foundational framework for an ultimate journey into knowledge, understanding and transformation
The core of the framework is developed in Metaphysics and its elaboration continues in the remaining chapters of the division Theory of Being
The framework did not arise at once but is the result of an iteration of insight and criticism
Reasons and motives for adoption of some ideas and rejection are given. However, a fuller understanding of the concepts and reasons for retention or rejection of the concepts is developed subsequently in Theory of Being and especially in Metaphysics
Some basic concepts of the narrative are essence, substance, mind and matter, existence, concept and object, experience and forms of experience, being, meaning, sense and reference
The primary and foundational concepts are, perhaps, experience and being. Experience is fundamental in that it is immediate—that experience is immediate is, perhaps, an understatement for while the experience of an external object is different from the object—it is an experience, the experience of experience is an experience
In Heideggerian terms, experience refers to the essential skeleton—abstraction—of Da-sein that reveals the skeletal and so universal aspect of being… and as explained earlier, permits ultimate richness of the proximate being that is Heidegger’s Da-sein
Substance is not a central concept of the narrative but is important because it has been so significant in the tradition. Here, substance as foundational is rejected—it is found that substance must be rejected as a foundation for any ultimate understanding of the world and what is learned in seeing the necessity of this rejection is immense. Essence, mind, and matter have a similar ‘negative’ importance to the development
What now follows is an early stage of the systematic and precise development of the meaning and significance of the concepts. A more complete development occurs in the subsequent chapters of Theory of Being in which the concepts are developed and elaborated as the basis of a coherent system of understanding. The development follows in the subsequent divisions of the narrative, in which the system is further elaborated and is applied to topics of interest the goals of the journey
Essences. In attempting to provide a foundation the question of the essence of things—of the world—may arise. What is essence—or, since concepts do not arise in final form at once and for all time, what may it be? Is the essence of a thing distinct from the thing? Are there essences?
Substance. The history of the idea of substance—primarily in western thought—may be seen as an extended and varied investigation into essences
There are two broad uses of the word ‘substance’ in philosophy. The first is a general use in which substance is the ground, being, or essence of things. Thales of Miletus suggested that the fundamental substance was water and the idea of ‘stuff,’ of which water is a kind, is a primary instance of substance as the essence of all things. Thales, of course, did not anticipate that water would be found to be ‘made’ of even more basic entities. The second use of substance arises in asking, for example, what the essence of a particular thing may be, e.g., what is the essence of being a mountain. The two meanings of substance are, of course, connected and an adequate development of the first kind may, if it is possible to do so, found a development of the second kind. In developing the metaphysics of immanence it is it is primarily the first meaning of substance that is of interest—but as counterpoint for, as ground of all being, substance will, of necessity, be rejected altogether
There have been a variety of reasons for an interest in substance theory and, accordingly, substance has been held to have a variety of characteristics. Reasoned lists of such characteristics have occasionally been regarded as marking the criteria that any conception of substance should satisfy. This approach is rather ad hoc and is against the spirit of the idea of substance. It is, perhaps, only by accident that such an approach would result in a coherent concept of substance and a proper substance theory. Since substance is rejected, ‘proper substance theory’ is not a constituent concept of the present approach
If the idea of substance is to be significant in revealing the nature of the world, it will be a constituent concept of a coherent metaphysics that would stand or fall not only on the criteria of coherence but also on applicability. That is, the metaphysics would say something about the world, what it would say would be true and nothing that it said would be untrue; of course, as metaphysics, it would be required to speak of the entire world—the universe, all being. Would it say everything that can be said about the world? The extent of what can be said would be integral to the theory and not something outside it—just as Logic, although it has some origin in proof, is, as will be seen, not something separate from or pasted on to talk of what is real. As will be seen ‘world’ is also a concept whose meaning will be specified even if the specification is simple. The notion of substance and its nature will fall out of study and therefore the characteristics that mark substance must be variables—perhaps only implicitly—of the theory
A primary motivation to metaphysics—substance or otherwise—is to understand the world. If the terms of the metaphysics, explanatory or predictive, are more complex than the world itself, the metaphysics can hardly be regarded as understanding. Therefore, substance should be simple
From simplicity, it does not follow that substance will be known or even knowable. However, if substance were not even intelligible, e.g. through intuition andor conception, the resulting metaphysics would hardly count as understanding. So it was or may have been that Plato suggested that actual things are rough copies of forms that resided in a world whose ideal character made the forms intelligible or knowable even if not available to sense perception
The thought that sense perception constitutes evidence but not knowledge may be one motive to explaining knowledge in terms of an ideal world. However, though Plato’s theory is elegant, it introduces two kinds—the form and the thing even if it does not go so far as to introduce a separate world of ideal forms. Understanding would be better served if there were but one kind, one world, in terms of which the problem of knowability or intelligibility could be resolved. Therefore, another desirable characteristic of substance—of the terms of any satisfactory metaphysics—is that there should at most one kind which, since there are actual things, must be the actual kind. Another way of saying this is that substance should be of the one world
The desirable characteristics of substance, then, are simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness
The characteristics are not necessarily independent—worldliness may enhance, though not guarantee, intelligibility and simplicity. Their formal interdependence will vary according to metaphysics and, therefore, the true interdependence will depend on—what emerges as—true metaphysics
It is not clear that any metaphysics can satisfy all three characteristics—especially since a metaphysics that were not comprehensive over all things would hardly be a metaphysics. In the extreme of simplicity, it seems that there would be but one substance that would be uniform and unchanging. The world and its variety would come from that substance. However, the becoming itself should be simple or intelligible and, it is perhaps deterministic rather than indeterministic becoming that satisfies both simplicity and intelligibility
However, that variety and change should be the deterministic result of uniformity and stasis is incoherent
Although Heidegger’s insight into the untenable character of substance theory is intense, in neglecting to note that determinism is the implicit twin of substance, the rejection of substance as foundational remained incomplete. Despite the explicit rejection of substance, the habit of substance thinking was retained—although Da-sein may be at the beginning of metaphysics, not all metaphysics flows from the Heideggerian Da-sein. On account of the implicit determinism, a complete metaphysics cannot flow from Da-sein. Despite the fundamental character of Heidegger’s Da-sein, some of its most cherished characteristics have to be given up for it to be the full source of metaphysics. This is not a loss, for as has been seen in other—logical—terms, the skeletal version of Da-sein—the bare account of experience—permits all that is cherished in the full-bodied Da-sein and more, perhaps infinitely more
Is there a metaphysics that can replace substance thinking and still be counted as foundational—and simple, intelligible, and fully within the one world? The metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics satisfies these criteria. It rejects substance in any strict sense but is foundational—it will be seen that while foundations and rejection of substance have been traditionally regarded as incompatible, the alleged incompatibility is the result of an assumption of a deterministic universe and that a non-substance is possible and is developed as metaphysics of immanence in Metaphysics. The rejection of substance is not a hypothesis but the consequence of an empirically founded metaphysics which is therefore of the world. Although demonstration waits until Metaphysics, the idea of the universe as all being is empirical and this idea among other demonstrated empirical ideas results in a metaphysics that is ultimately simple, yet ultimate in depth. Further, the depth is a result of the simplicity
That no infinite regress of explanation is required is a consequence of the simultaneous and absolute empirical and rational foundation
The metaphysics of immanence retains the idea of form but not of form of being as a kind that is other than being or residing in another world; it is a metaphysics of immanent form—of form as being of what is formed. The metaphysics eliminates need for and—logical—possibility of substance of substratum and sortal kind, which are the two kinds noted earlier
In the metaphysics of immanence, the foundation of the world is the world itself. Thus it is not an idealism or materialism or any kind of restricted-ism. How such a metaphysics may—and does—count as metaphysics and how it is simple awaits Metaphysics
The demonstration that the metaphysics of immanence yields intelligibility while referring to—and only to—the one universe begins in Metaphysics and is completed in Objects
In Metaphysics it is shown that the idea of the—one—universe as all being is more than a definition in that there can be no part of all that there is that cannot interact with any other part
For further treatment of substance, see Substance, Journey in Being-New World, and the discussion of substance in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
In the foregoing, the notions of property, impression or sense data, and event as alternatives to substance or, in a loose interpretation, other kinds of substance, have not been taken up. However, as in the case of substance, it is preferable, as far as possible, to develop the metaphysics and see what falls out of it as fundamental rather than to set up a system of ad hoc even if reasonable explanation—including criteria for explanations—in advance. In the present time, philosophy is often taken to have the characteristic—perhaps among others—that its content is conceptual rather than merely empirical and the concepts and their subject have not yet become definite as, for example, in science. Therefore, there may not be the luxury of criteria that are more than ad hoc and reasonable, i.e., it is not given that a philosophy or a metaphysics may be systematic and realistic. It is remarkable, therefore, that the metaphysics of immanence is systematic and realistic and that its formulation and concepts permit its own evaluation as well as an evaluation of the concepts of substance—whether abstract or in the mode of ‘stuff,’ property, trope, impression, fact and event
In metaphysics of immanence these alternative interpretations of substance are shown to be unnecessary
The foregoing discussion suggests that mind and matter cannot be substances. In Metaphysics it is seen that in their common meanings mind and matter are too restricted and definite to serve as universal substances even though they may be substantial to this cosmological system. However, it will also be seen that if the common meanings of mind and matter are sufficiently loosened then either mind or matter may be foundational but to regard them as universal substances would also require a loosening of the concept of substance. Further, although these possibilities illuminate the character of the metaphysics, they do not particularly illuminate understanding of the world and might be confusing on account of the possibility of conflation of common and extended meanings
The treatment of the problem of substance is left to Metaphysics where, as noted, it is found that there are and can be no fundamental substances in the stricter meanings of substance. If there are no substances there remains the—potential—problem that there are no simple explanations. Of course, if this is the way things are then it is not a true problem. What, however, could function as a basis of explanation yet not be a simple substance?
Reflections on the nature of philosophy and metaphysics in the later chapters, Philosophy and metaphysics and Problems in metaphysics, show that while it is natural that metaphysics encompasses philosophy and that while there should be domains within it that are not characterized by the nature or definiteness of science, the thought that all metaphysics and all areas within philosophy should lack such definiteness cannot obtain
The discussion so far has considered substance, the idea that, despite or because of the desirable characteristics of simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness, the world is something other than what it is. In the best of substance scenarios, the world is a part of itself—perhaps an unchanging part. Putting aside the logical difficulty of determinism, while this has the attraction of simplicity, it has also the character that the world is rather less than its richness and variety. In a substance scenario of somewhat lower grade, the world is other than what it is even if that other has the purity of uniformity and changelessness
The idea of substance has logical impossibility and an aspect of a lesser aesthetic
Perhaps, then, we might look at the idea of the world as just the world—neither more nor less than that which it is. This is immediately obvious, even tautologous and trivial. The charge is granted for it is precisely these aspects of triviality that, as will be seen, lead to ultimate depth and breadth. That the assertion is valid, how it may be shown, and the character of the resulting depth and breadth are not at all obvious; they are the result of a journey in ideas
Perhaps the most immediate and basic character of things is that they are—that they exist, i.e., that they are or have being. It is not at all clear, however, that existence—being—can form the basis of a simple system of explanation. The possibility is shown and realized in Metaphysics. Here, it will be appropriate to discuss existence and to consider some problems that have been associated with the concept of existence and its possibility as the basis of an explanatory system
To say something exists is to say that it is there. To say that something ‘is there’ appears to suggest that it exists in space. However the use of ‘there’ in ‘there is a mountain called Everest’ is not spatial but is used to avoid the awkward construction ‘is a mountain called Everest.’ Allowing some awkwardness of construction, to say ‘Mt. Everest exists’ is to say ‘Mt. Everest is’
In the previous paragraph it is not of course being said that Mt. Everest is not in space but, instead, that the idea of existence does not a priori entail existence in space
Although it may seem that everything that exists must exist in space—and time—this is not necessarily the case. For example one apple exists in space but where does the number one exist? Does it exist? The machinery with which to answer these questions is developed in Metaphysics and Objects and therefore question of whether there are non-spatial objects is deferred to those chapters. However, it may be important to keep the possibility of non-spatial existence open at this point in the narrative because objects that exist in a non-spatial framework and objects that exist but in no framework at all have not been ruled out. Therefore, the grammatical form ‘X is’ is important to indicate, first, existence and, second, to indicate the possibility of existence in non-spatial frameworks
Therefore, existence is a very simple and immediate concept. It is associated with one of the most primitive of language constructs, the verb to be one of whose forms is ‘is’
Before proceeding further with the analysis of existence it is useful to mention the local and global modes of description. The freedom to talk in both local and global terms introduces a great efficiency into the discussion
The history of the universe may be viewed as having a trajectory through time or as being a trajectory over time. In the first view, the history is seen as a ‘motion;’ in the second view it is seen as an object. Spatial description is implicit in the term trajectory—the trajectory is that of a spatial distribution. It is convenient to switch among the coordinate or spatio-temporal description and the non-coordinate description in which the history of the universe is seen as an object. An immediate concern with this thought is that it is not clear that spatio-temporal description is possible for every part of the universe or that space and time are the only possible coordinates of description. From the coordinate point of view, the universe could be seen as different patches. From the non-coordinate view, the universe would be the collection of patches. In view of the indeterminacy and possible incompleteness of description in terms of space and time, the terms coordinate and non- or supra-coordinate may be replaced by the terms local and global, respectively. The global mode allows for objects or domains that are not and, perhaps, cannot be coordinated in terms of—other—objects
In the above most primitive use, ‘is’ indicates nothing other than existence. Other uses are less primitive. In saying, the mountain is its atoms, it is meant that the mountain is ‘made’ of its atoms—that the atoms constitute the mountain. In saying that the mountain is tall, ‘is’ functions to connect the mountain to its property of tallness. The less primitive uses may be regarded as asserting existence and something else, e.g., constitution or having a property. The uses are related—they may seen as having a common stem-use, that of being. In ‘X is itself’ the constitutive use reduces to the stem. Bundle theory is the view, attributed to the philosopher David Hume but not adopted here, that an object is precisely its collection of properties; on this view, ‘X is its properties,’ e.g., the mountain is its mass and its shape and its color… It is clear that there is a difference between the kinds of property—mass is thought to inhere in the object but an object has color only in interaction and, if it were the intent to discuss or argue bundle theory, it would be necessary to make this distinction
As noted, the use of ‘is’ that indicates being or existence is—perhaps—its most primitive use. That existence has the meaning of the most primitive use of a most primitive linguistic construct points to the primitive character of existence, i.e., of being. The depth of the concept of existence or being lies, not in remoteness or esotericism, but in this primitive and immediate character
It is not being said that the grammatical form, ‘X is,’ implies existence but that it expresses the linguistic meaning of the concept of existence
That existence is simple and immediate does not imply that it will be easy to explain its meaning. What does it mean that something should exist? It is the very immediacy of existence that makes it hard to explain. There are—perhaps—no simpler and more immediate concepts in terms of which it can be explained. Many fundamental ideas are like that. They can be known—it seems—but not explained and therefore knowledge of them is doubted. Often, however, the reason for the difficulty with explanation or definition is that there is nothing more fundamental in terms of which to explain or define the idea. This upturns the order of things. What is less immediate is thought to be known or understood because it can be defined. What is most immediately known is thought to be difficult to know because it is hard to define. Existence is like that. It ought to be sufficient to say that ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means ‘Mt. Everest is’
That is not to say that there are no issues or concerns regarding the concept of existence
Since ‘everything exists’ it has been argued that existence is not a concept—it says nothing. This concern is addressed below under the topic concepts and objects
Another concern is that though existence may be a concept it is trivial. In a sense it is trivial—everything exists—existence makes no distinctions as, for example does redness: some things are red, others are not. Existence is profoundly trivial and profoundly shallow and it is seen in Metaphysics that this triviality is the source of its depth—that makes it suitable as foundational for a metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth
In a sense, existence is essence but this essence is one that is immanent, that is not separate from things
In saying that something is rather than seems to be, it is suggested that it exists independently of being perceived or known. This is implicit in the idea of existence but the discussion of concept and object below will clarify the idea and make it more explicit. Immediately the question arises, does anything that is seen exist as it is seen? This is the problem of appearance and reality which is taken up in the topic concept and object below but whose treatment continues through Objects
This question is distinct from the issue of whether anything exists as it is known. To doubt all existence as an intrinsic dimension of the psyche may be a neurotic condition
Of course there is existence—or else, for example, these words would be neither written nor read. Even if it is thought that the perception of the world is an illusion, the illusion exists. The fact of existence is empirical. It is not required to further check existence—it is in the meaning of existence that the existence of perception, whether ‘real’ or ‘illusion,’ is given
However, the philosophical contemplation of the question whether anything exists—and related questions, especially—will be seen to contribute to, first, clarification of the nature of knowledge and of existence and, second, to the development of powerful tools of analysis
The question has at least two aspects—may be seen to contain two questions
In asking whether Mt Everest exists, it is being questioned whether there is a concrete—particular—thing named ‘Mt. Everest.’ An important aspect of this question is the sub-question ‘What does it mean to say or know that Mt. Everest exists.’ Earlier, it was suggested that existence may not be analyzable. However, an analysis is taken up in the discussion below of concepts and objects. The discussion will show that the question whether something exists, at least for particular or concrete things, is primarily a question of the meaning of ‘existence.’ That Mt. Everest is ‘made’ of various elementary particles is a clarification of the nature of material things but does not typically confirm existence
The second question concerns the existence of such non-particular, non-concrete or non-material ‘things’ such as number and morals. Where is the number ‘one?’ Where is the value ‘justice’ or the color ‘red?’ It might appear that these abstract things do not exist in space—but if they do not exist in space, do they exist at all or are they merely ideas? The meaning of the question is not yet clear—what could it mean that something does not exist in space but may exist as an idea? There is a vagueness behind these issues. The machinery of concept and object whose discussion begins shortly is instrumental in the analysis of abstract objects but real clarification awaits Objects
It is perhaps useful to note that in pondering the existence of abstract objects it is possible to begin a chain of reasoning that covers ‘worlds of ideas,’ ‘mental space,’ whether something that exists must be material… It will turn out that such reflections might take the thinker into much vagueness without satisfactory resolution. Such speculation will not be indulged here because it is unnecessary. In Objects, the nature of abstract objects—and whether they reside in space, whether they have material nature—will be resolved. ‘Worlds of ideas’ and ‘mental space,’ could be given meaning but this will not be done as the ideas are not particularly significant or useful. What is significant is that while some elucidation of the nature of particular—concrete—objects is relatively simple, the treatment of abstract objects must await the development, in Metaphysics, of the metaphysics of immanence. The outcome, however, may be stated simply enough—the distinction between particular and abstract objects is not one of kind but is according to whether the object is—most conveniently—studied empirically or conceptually
Note: reference to ‘elementary particles’ simply acknowledges modern physics but generally makes no further use of it. Occasionally, reference may be made to the indeterminism of quantum theory. Elsewhere, deeper references to modern science are made. It should be noted, however, that the metaphysics has no logical dependence on science even though science has provided a number of points of inspiration
In the history of thought the following distinctions have been made. Existence is the mode of being in interaction, e.g., in being known. Essence or ens is the mode of being of a thing in itself—of being without qualification. To be clear about these meanings and their distinctions it would be necessary to clarify ‘being’ without reference to either existence or essence. The line of thought leads to what may be experienced as freely morphing meanings that have no final stability. In the absence of a picture of the world, a metaphysics, nothing more can be expected; and for any ‘something more’ to be certainly grounded—valid—the metaphysics would have to be necessary. In the metaphysics of immanence, which, with its necessary and ultimate character, are developed in Metaphysics, the distinction of existence and essence is seen to vanish
‘Being’ is derived from the verb to be, i.e., being is, roughly, that which is or which exists. The word ‘roughly’ was used because the source of a word does not necessarily indicate the range of uses that a word may come to have. Since being is a core term of the metaphysics that will be developed in the next chapter, what it shall signify in this narrative is at least as much a result of the development as it may be of what is received from the history of use. Roughly, however, it may be said that the ideas of existence and being have near identity. This identity implies that what has been said about existence carries over to being. However, it will be convenient to discuss concepts, objects and experience before introduction of being
The philosophical contemplation of the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ ‘What has being?’ is be taken up in the discussions, below, of concepts and objects, and of experience and continued throughout the narrative. The ideas of the concept and of experience are related and the term ‘experience’ will be used informally in discussing concepts before its more formal consideration
Among meanings of concept are the following two. (1) Something conceived in the mind, i.e., mental content. (2) An idea that may be more or less abstract and that may either refer to a genera in being generalized from particular instances andor specialized by differences among entities of a group or class or, (2a) a single significant entity
While these families of meaning are well established, the traditional versions above have significant augmentations
In the first meaning ‘mental content’ is a term often used in modern cognitive science and its inclusion here emphasizes that concepts include what is very basic—the most primitive experience is conceptual; this is important in that if talk of concepts is to be a basis of experience and meaning, the concept should, at root, be primitive and inclusive
In the second meaning the phrase ‘significant single entity’ has been added to the traditional generic idea because, e.g., the idea of ‘universe,’ which is crucial to the present narrative, is not generalized from instances (it may be seen as abstracted from the sense-feeling of all things or, specifically, all-things-as-one.) It is the second meaning that includes the significant ideas from the history of thought—including the idea of concept of the concept itself
The primary connotation of (1) may be iconic conception and that of (2) may be symbolic. However, these connotations are not necessary. Therefore, (2) is a case of (1)
The significance of the inclusion is that the significant and the esoteric are not seen as essentially distinct from the primitive and the immediate. Significant concepts may be seen as articulated systems of primitive concepts
‘Concept’ has the occasional connotation of intentional concept. Intentionality is an important modern term that characterizes the way in which a mental state has reference to—an object in—the external world. A concept is intentional when it is about something. In the immediately following discussion it is taken for granted that there are things regarding which there can be a mental aboutness, i.e., it is taken as given that there is an external world. The existence of the external world is taken up later—as is usual for such concerns the doubt is not a serious practical doubt but, rather, one that has or may have important conceptual andor methodological conclusions and clarifications that may in turn have practical consequences of great moment—but, here, it is taken as given. Also, for the present, perfect faithfulness of the intentional concept is not a concern; it is enough that there is some degree and kind of faithfulness which must, of course, follow from the fact that concepts have some efficacy in negotiation of the world
In recent philosophy there have been a number of areas of disagreement about intentionality. One issue is whether intentionality is especially mental—whether it can or cannot be recognized in matter or, perhaps more precisely, in material descriptions. Although these concerns are not of primary interest to this narrative, subsequent reflections, especially in Mind, may provide some resolution. There appears to be a natural if sometimes unreflective tendency to assign various kinds of special status to mind that is a consequence of characteristics such as having subjectivity and making intentional reference that, it appears, mental states have but material ones do not. The argument that material states cannot have aboutness appears to stem from the thought that the primitive material elements, the elementary particles of today’s physics, do not have aboutness in their relations with one another. It is, however, not at all clear that the interaction between two electrons is not an aboutness for is it not possible that their relation is a result of mutual creation, intrinsic, rather than abstract and imposed. All that can be said is that, obviously, any such elementary aboutness is much simpler than aboutness at the level of animal-human thought
From the natural tendency as well as from the explanatory efficacy of such assignments—‘material states do not have an aboutness about them,’ it does not follow that there are no alternative, valid, descriptions that do not invoke any special status to mind, e.g., that are neutral with regard to any mind / matter distinction. Particularly, whether intentionality can be understood in material terms depends on what conception of matter is used and what powers of analysis are available. If there is some future final conception of matter, i.e. one that at least implicitly contains a description of the universe, it would have to contain account, perhaps implicit, of intentionality. It is not clear, though, whether today’s—quantum—physics is anywhere close to a final physical theory or, at least, one that contains intentionality or whether the ‘matter’ of such physical theories would be recognizable as matter in today’s terms. Related concerns will be further discussed in Mind
Since there have been proposals that mind is, effectively, a computer program or algorithm running in the brain, a question discussed in the recent literature is whether a—running—computer program is capable of intentionality or even consciousness. Since the set of states of a computer that are implicated in the implementation of a program are a minute fraction of the physical states of the machine, the thesis that mind is a computer program appears to imply that mental states are a very superficial function of material states—the ‘mental’ states of a computer would be a superficial function its material states and the mental states of an animal would be a superficial of its brain—body—states. It seems, however, that the mental states in the brain / body of an animal are far deeper in terms of layering, far more varied with regard to mode, and far closer to detailed physical structure than are the differences in physical state of a computer that define a running algorithm
This argues that machine implementation of algorithms are at most minimally mental in nature and that, it seems likely, the ‘actual’ mental content is far from identical to the assigned mental content. In other words, while the positions taken in the literature appear to be that mind is / is not a computer program, the proper ascription of mental states to material states may, in addition to complexity, depend on the factors of layering, depth, variation and there may also be thresholds below which it might be said ‘there is no recognizable mind here.’ Simply, if computer programs are minds—mental—they are massively primitive minds-as-minds, disconnected from environment and one or minimally dimensional
A corollary to this conclusion is that real minds—those that are instrumental in negotiating and being creative in a complex environment—have deep embedding in or are high level manifestations of a complex material organization, e.g., a brain. Additionally, real or intrinsic intentionality grows out of the organism in evolution and in growth and is not imposed or built in by an external agent. These thoughts regarding embedding, here illustrative and without proof, has resonances and proofs in Mind where it will be seen that the apparent polar opposites—mind is / is not a computer programs and computer programs do / do not have deep embedding—are points on a continuum
In relation to concepts, the present concern with intentionality is that some but not all concepts have intentionality, i.e. intrinsic reference to objects. Pre-conception is conception evoked in mind or marked on some medium from past experience, i.e., from memory and that is be intended or hoped to have future reference to an object—is thought to have potential reference (and therefore potential efficacy as an instrument of understanding and negotiation of the world.) Preconception is also conception but is not intentional. What may be called free conception, e.g. pure expression without a present or future intentional object, is also conception. Intentional conception, preconception, and pure expression all fall under conception and their distinctions are, in fact, neither precise nor eternal, e.g. what is conceived freely may become a pre-concept and a pre-concept may become intentional
These becomings may be experienced as andor thought to be intrinsic when they have arisen in evolution or primordial thought; they may be thought of as constructed when the transition from free to preconception or the transition from preconception to conception is not hidden from view
The instruments of knowledge have been regarded as perception and reason (thought) and these have an interpretation in the modes of concept and their interplay. It has sometimes been thought that knowledge may be constructed from primitive perception and thought. Here primitive perception is regarded as perception of parts rather than wholes; a building is made of walls, floors and so on; a wall has an inside and an outside surface and a body; a surface has a color, a texture and a shape; and if the shape is anything other than flat it may have very many parts. On the primitive account, even flatness is made up of may parts that stand in a certain relation. On this account, knowledge, if at all possible, would be immensely primitive; for human—animal—knowledge they require placement within a biological framework of that enables perception of and reason about the forms of the world. This framework has been called intuition
A percept is a concept. While not all concepts are percepts, the recollection of past experience is, perhaps, part of all conception; and perhaps, all conception, is an elaboration of immediate perception, recollection and perceptual reconstruction. When past experience—concepts including perceptions—are laid down in memory, they are not laid down invariably as wholes or parts but in gradations of such. There are wholes but not all wholes are indivisible, and therefore constructed concepts may contain combinations of parts of a number of ‘experiences.’ Although perception is instigated by present experience including internal experience or free conception, past experience—memory—may be and probably usually is involved in the production of the percept as exemplified by the forms of perception which are acquired in growth and by the perception of wholes from data that is partial (most data is partial)
In both meanings—items 1 and 2 above—concepts shall here refer primarily to mental content and secondarily to marks, iconic or symbolic, on other ‘media’ such as paper, canvas, dirt, and computer memory or screen. While the first meaning evokes the fact of mental content or of marks on recording media, the second meaning evokes the structure of the mental content or marks
It may be said, initially, that mental content is the true concept while the marks on other media are aids of various kinds—memory aids, evocative aids, aids to communication, aids to ‘computation.’ Here, though, aid to computation simply means that the marks may be moved around the non-mental media to envisage new possibilities in the world or new conceptual possibilities; the mathematical text is a special case of such computation. Perhaps, however, the true concept may be seen as the entire system of body (mind) and artifact
The first meaning, that of mental content is the meaning emphasized here but, because of the inclusion, the discussion also applies to the second meaning. However, the present discussion is not especially about significant concepts
The discussion of concepts and what they refer to—objects—is important to the analysis of meaning which is significant to understanding the present narrative because of the empirical foundation of meaning, the fluidity of meaning and the interrelatedness of individual meanings and, as a result of the wholeness of the world, a certain wholeness of meaning as a system that is not entirely constructed out of individual meanings. While there are a few novel terms, many terms of the present narrative are words taken from common use—everyday and philosophical—that take on enhanced andor altered meaning. Much of the power of the narrative lies in the recognition of the empirical character of meaning and in the enhancement and alteration, in the recombination, and in the interrelatedness of meaning. The discussion is also important because it contributes to the idea of meaning which has a formal place in Metaphysics. However, the discussion is introduced at the present point because it is pivotal in clarifying the concept of existence and in clarifying the meaning of and, then, addressing the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’
What does it mean to say ‘Mt. Everest exists?’
If a person is looking at the mountain and has an image of it then ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind and some degree of likeness to the image or concept
The individual may have seen Mt. Everest or read about it and seen pictures of it. Then the idea or concept of Mt. Everest is a recall of its image or picture. When the mountain is not in view, saying ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind and some degree of likeness to the idea or concept
To say that an object ‘X’ exists is to say that there is a concept ‘x’ and there is an object ‘X’ that corresponds to and has some kind and degree of likeness to ‘x’
In day to day affairs it is typically unnecessary to distinguish concept and object—and instead of using X and x, it is typical to use one sign, ‘X’ to refer to both concept and object or, even one sign to refer to a symbol whose constituents are word or name and concept and object. In fact, the conflation of word, concept and object is common and usually results in economy of thought and communication. Occasionally, the same word may refer to distinct concepts and, therefore, distinct objects and, while this may be confusing, it is an aspect of language competency to normally straddle such potential confusions. However, there are confusions and paradoxes that arise when the distinction of word and object or concept and object is not made
Paradox of the concept of non-existence
Paradox of faithfulness
Paradox of the logical possibility of non-existence of an external world, i.e., solipsism
The unicorn is a mythological animal referred to in the myths of many cultures. Since there are some people who believe in unicorns it should be noted that for the purpose of this discussion unicorns are taken to be non-existent. Now consider the statement ‘unicorns do not exist.’ An obvious response is ‘precisely what is it that is asserted to not exist?’ In other words, since there are no unicorns, ‘unicorn’ appears to have no meaning and therefore ‘unicorns do not exist’ also appears to have no meaning. This is the paradox of non-existence that is frequently raised in discussions of the concept of existence. It should be noted that, regarding any hypothetical creature, X, the assertions ‘X does not exist’ and ‘X exists’ are equally paradoxical—equal in meaning or lack of meaning status. Even if a creature X is actual, ‘X exists,’ on these terms, though not paradoxical, appears to be meaningless because ‘X exists’ seems to be saying some equivalent of ‘an object, X, that exists, exists.’ The paradox, which for non-existence is one of absurdity and for existence is one of triviality of meaning, is resolved quite easily in terms of the concepts of concept and object. The meaning of ‘X exists’ is that there is an object ‘X’ that corresponds to the concept ‘X’—the same symbol is used for concept and object in a convenient but occasionally misleading conflation. Similarly, the meaning of ‘X does not exist’ is that there is no object ‘X’ that corresponds to the concept ‘X’
Except on the view that there is no external world the concept is not the object. A problem that then arises is whether concepts are faithful to objects. Since the concept is not the object, i.e., since there is no identity of concept and object, every attempt to verify faithfulness is and must be in terms of some further concept which is or includes some enhanced concept of the object but whose faithfulness must also be in question. It therefore appears that—even if there is faithfulness—faithfulness of concepts to objects cannot be established or known
It may be unnecessary to observe that concept and external object are or may be different in kind. Therefore the question of the meaning of faithfulness of concept to object arises. This is the reason for the phrase ‘some kind and some degree of likeness’ of external object to concept used a few paragraphs earlier. However our recollection of ‘the object’ is in fact the concept. The concept stands for the object. This is the subjective reason that, even without drawing and photographs, we think we know the likeness of the object (we will see better reasons)
One resolution to this question was given by Alexius Meinong who argued from the absence of faithfulness that there is no object in the world of sense experience even though objects have properties. Thus the concept was identified by Meinong as the object and labeled the concept-object. This is also suggested by the fact that we permit the concept to stand for the object. What was thought to be the object is in fact the noumenon of Kant which does not exist in sense experience
Meinong’s explanation is appealing. In making a conflation of concept and object, the problem of faithfulness is eliminated. However, unless it is necessary to resort to this explanation to confront the problem of faithfulness, it cannot be the most satisfactory resolution
Kant’s earlier resolution to the problem—discussed in greater detail in Objects—suggests the line of approach adopted here. Kant’s solution may have been suggested by the thought that, in attempting to verify faithfulness, it is impossible to get ‘outside’ concepts. Yet, the individual is able to negotiate and be creative in the world via concepts and, therefore, there must be some intrinsic adaptation of cognition—and, perhaps, of emotion and of any other function of psyche—to the world. From the vast and precise success of the mechanics and the geometry of his day, Kant assumed that Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics had encapsulated the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Further, since the individual perceives the world in these terms, Kant thought that the intrinsic adaptation of perception is a precise intuition of the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Then, the sciences of geometry and mechanics were developed in logical terms, which are also a capability, from the intuition
It is known, today, that the mechanics and geometry of the world are only approximated by the science of Kant’s time and, therefore, the intuition is only approximate. However, the interpretation of this approximate character as a limit can be turned around. First, it may be recognized, from the non-identity of concept and object, that no absolute faithfulness can be guaranteed. However, even though an absolute faithfulness of knowledge has been an ideal of human knowledge perhaps since a time before history, it is neither to be expected nor in any way necessary. Therefore, especially on account of the gap between concept and object, faithfulness seems to be a near impossible ideal and what is impossible cannot be an ideal
Although the ideal appears to be impossible, it makes for the possibility that knowledge may have advance and, depending on perspective, this reflect a nicer world than one in which knowledge is already ideal
Thus while Kant overstated the abilities of cognition, the actual lesser ability may be seen as positive—it is an embedding in the world rather than an absolute capability from a vantage point that is experienced as external to the world
Use of terms ‘lesser’ and ‘greater ability’ have a value driven component that has irrelevance to the individual / society-in-the-world
Although there may be no absolute faithfulness to the object, there is a practical and sufficient faithfulness. In saying this, it may be noted that, even in practical terms, there is an arbitrariness to the question ‘what is the object?’ It is typical to think of two mountains as two objects. However, cannot two mountains not be thought of as a single object? This freedom exists and depending on circumstances, many ‘objects’ can be regarded, even seen, as one or one as many; this freedom is itself a form of practical and useful faithfulness that may, according to perspective, be seen as lack of faithfulness or a kind of adaptable faithfulness. Perhaps one half of one mountain and one half of the other can be seen as a single object. The possibility exists but appears to lack utility. There is in fact a theoretical arbitrariness to the identity of the object that, however, is resolved by adaptability in the actual situation. If flying between two close near vertical walls, it may be useful to see them as one canyon. In entering a very unfamiliar situation it may be required to negotiate the new environment, to experiment with it, before the arbitrary combinations resolve into definiteness of objects—the process of resolution is adaptation of cognition in process and the theoretical arbitrariness of objects may be seen as a feature of the world which has no intrinsic value but which is deployed to cognitive advantage
The embedding of the organism in the world addresses the questions of the meaning of faithfulness and accuracy
It remains true, though, that there is, in general, a necessary and absolute gap between concept and object. Are there any objects that exist as conceived? It will be shown below that there are necessary—and significant—objects whose being conforms to their conception. The practical faithfulness of concepts—of experience—and the necessary faithfulness of concepts of the necessary objects provide reasons for not adopting Meinong’s concept-object to the problem of faithfulness and for not limiting metaphysics, as did Kant and Wittgenstein, to a metaphysic of experience
Kant’s noumenon can be conceived but not, according to Kant, experienced and is therefore, as far as is known, lacking in differentiation—some thinkers have taken this to imply that the noumenon itself is lacking in differentiation. In Metaphysics, it will be possible to go beyond this degree of knowledge of the noumenon. The essential point to this possibility is that in experiencing there is experience of the noumenon. This claim appears to be paradoxical for what has been said above amounts to experience being phenomenal and not noumenal. The error in the paradox is that while it holds for detail, it does not hold for what is general, i.e., what is necessary in experience, i.e., in experiencing a world, the phenomenon and noumenon are identical
I.e., in this way, experience transcends the concept
Solipsism is the position that the entire world is the mental space of the individual—that this position is logically possible. That is, if the reader were a solipsist he or she would think, ‘there are no things as such, there are no other minds, there is just my experience.’ (If the solipsist’s position were true, it is not clear how or ‘where’ he or she would arrive at the concept ‘mind,’ ‘other mind,’ ‘my mind,’ ‘me’…) To be consistent, that reader would not think ‘I have a body’ but ‘there is an experience of a body that is an experience labeled ‘this body’;’ he or she would not think ‘there are others who have bodies and minds’ but ‘other and others' minds and bodies are but points in experience’—it would be invalid to think ‘points in my experience’ as factual the phrase would refer, merely, to certain regions of experience. In fact the solipsist would think ‘what is labeled the world is the set of points in experience’ and ‘what is labeled the external world is a subset of points in experience.’ I.e. the solipsist is committed to the non-existence of an external world. To be solipsist in fact, would be a psychopathological condition; however, to entertain solipsism is useful as a challenge to realism as belief in a world independent of mind and, in addressing this challenge, to be an occasion to sharpen the concept of realism and commitment to it as well as occasion to develop powers and tools of analysis. Solipsism is taken up in Metaphysics where it is seen that solipsism may be consistent with the properties of very simple worlds, immensely improbable in this world—but logically impossible only if certain properties of this world are taken as given
…
The comments on meaning in this chapter are preliminary. However, a primary concern here is that an understanding of meaning is important to understanding of the way in which words and concepts are used in the narrative. As an example, the importance of paying attention to meaning was evident above in discussing existence
Another objective of the discussion is to set up the later formal treatment of meaning in Logic and meaning—and, therefore, the discussion is more complete than it would need to be in order to guide a reader through the narrative. In the later treatment, meaning is given a place in the metaphysics
‘Meaning’ itself has a number of meanings as in ‘I have been meaning to tell you how much I value your friendship,’ ‘The meaning of a human life is a function of human freedoms, especially the freedoms of choice, action, and symbolic thought,’ and ‘Specifying the meaning of the word existence is difficult even though we feel we know intuitively what it is for something to exist.’ The meaning of ‘meaning’ is its use in the last of these examples, i.e., word or, more generally, linguistic meaning. In this discussion meaning centers around linguistic meaning but, as will be seen later, in order to specify linguistic meaning it will be necessary but not sufficient to focus on language
A problem encountered in setting up a system of thought is that elements of the system are interdependent and it may be necessary to raise the level of understanding of each element iteratively. This particular concern would not be resolved by a formal axiomatic development for as long as development is ongoing, an axiomatic expression might require iterative modification
It may be natural to place some preliminary observations on meaning immediately after discussing concepts and objects for the relations between concepts and objects is one of meaning. However, what is said immediately below on meaning learns from the development of the system of ideas of the narrative and the reader will find confirmation of the comments on meaning in the subsequent developments. However, although these comments may depend, in part, on the subsequent developments for their inspiration, the validity of the comments stands independently
The placement of the discussion of concepts and objects is necessary in order to avoid conflict that may otherwise arise in the use of the important terms, especially ‘experience,’ ‘existence,’ ‘being,’ ‘universe’ and so on. One significance of this point is that it is essential to be aware of the meanings of terms as used here in order to understand the development and appreciate its power and significance
When may it be said that a concept is understood? Even though a concept refers to an object—a class of objects may be regarded as a complex object and so the singular term ‘object’ is appropriate—it has sense. Roughly, sense is what the concept connotes to the conceiver. Although the sense may seem to be different from the object, perhaps sense is nothing other than the intuition that is built up in using the concept in formal and informal contexts. E.g., in reflecting what sense the sense of a particular concept may be the individual may have a variety of mental pictures that contribute to the sense. In Logic and meaning, sense will come to mean potential or possible reference; however, at present the idea of sense is left with the foregoing intuitive specification. The meaning of a concept is often regarded as sense as just described. However, in the present specification, sense is open ended and clearly not definite. The meaning of the meaning of a concept would become definite if the class of objects to which it refers were specified. Thus it was Frege’s thought that meaning should be as a combination of sense and reference
This specification of meaning may appear to be an awkward combination of different kinds. However, as noted, the kinds are not different if sense means potential or possible reference and, so, sense and reference need not be understood as different kinds
Some observations on meaning now follow
In any context meaning resides in the system of concepts and in their possibilities of combination, i.e., grammar
…For example, since a context in which there are only actions or processes is imaginable, the grammar of ‘verbs’ must surely depend on the language in which it occurs
…In a language in which there are things and processes, the possibilities of meaning must depend on the kinds of relation that thing and process are allowed
…Although it is a mistake to think that system meaning implies all rules of grammar—since the same content has different forms in different languages—there must, for stability and faithfulness, be some invariants of grammatical form
…The residence of meaning in a system of concepts is perhaps most evident in axiomatic systems in logic and mathematics and in scientific theories
…Is the meaning of the term ‘Mt. Everest’ dependent on the environment? Ask, ‘is the peak of Mt. Everest white?’ If the peak appears pink at sunset, is it a fact or a convention that the peak should be regarded as white—if it is so regarded. And, is its color part of the concept of ‘Mt. Everest?’ Although the example is trivial, cosmology suggests that the properties of local objects may depend on the structure and extent of the cosmological system but, as long the effect is relatively constant, the local objects will appear to be constant in their fundamental physical properties
…Therefore, individual concepts are not completely understood in isolation
…However, metaphorically, meaning may be focused in the concepts while it also resides in the system
…That meaning is focused in the concepts is effective and may be a result of selection of perceivers and perception within a selected environment. There may also be selection or experimentation in the formation of free concepts
…There is no implication that in having a system of meaning, ‘perfection’ has been achieved or has significance
There are different contexts of meaning. The same word in different contexts has a different meaning. It might be more accurate to say that the different contextual meanings of the ‘same’ word have no basis of comparison
…If the contexts overlap, it may be possible to formulate a basis of comparison of meanings in the different contexts
As a context changes or moves, meaning shifts. The change in context may be a ‘lateral drift,’ or, perhaps, a broadening of context
…As contexts change, old terms take on new though perhaps ‘similar’ meaning. New terms with previously unrecognized meaning may be introduced as a result of introduction of new objects of reference andor experiment with sense
…There is a variety of ways in which contexts ‘change.’ A community that is subject to new circumstances beyond or in their control may face conditions that require new concepts or the shift of old ones. As Wittgenstein pointed out, language has a multiplicity of contextual uses that he referred to as ‘language games.’ Wittgenstein was especially interested in non-propositional uses of language. This emphasis may have mislead some recent thinkers into believing that the propositional use is altogether unstable; this contrasts with the present discussion in which this use is seen as having stabilities-within-a-context-of-flux. Wittgenstein’s interest in non-propositional use may also have lead some thinkers into marginalizing the proposition and the fact; however, this marginalization is not entailed by an emphasis on the other uses—it is, of course, not being asserted that there are no issues with the idea of the proposition or its ‘standard’ forms and this concern receives some attention in later discussions of language in this narrative
…In acquiring new domains of knowledge, context is significantly extended. Contexts ‘change’ from individual to individual and from one occasion or time in the life of an individual to another. Naturally, these differing contexts, except in the case of fracture or extreme shift, must have an effective similarity that permits stable communication and stable identity. However, the variability, which may be at least partially driven by the individual, may be a source of adaptation to new contexts whether imposed or created
…It may be thought in the extension it is only the range of known reference of the concept that changes. However, potential reference also changes—in Objects and in Logic and meaning it is seen that sense may be identified with potential reference. It could be argued that, once a concept is established, its potential reference, especially against the background of any ultimate metaphysics, is fixed. However, a distinction may be made between potential reference that is merely possible and having a grasp of the possibilities and range of possibilities of reference
…Net meaning, i.e., system meaning shifts
…Thus meaning has a fluid aspect but must also have stability in order to be usable
…It appears that there are times of stability in meaning and times of rapid change whether the context is limited or ‘general.’ A study of the occasions and factors of change may be interesting but—except for suggestions that may be implicit in the discussion—will not be taken up here
…Generally, etymology, provides no more than clues to meaning. This is true, perhaps, even of ‘dictionaries.’ Though dictionaries are useful and etymology may be enlightening, they may be misleading if employed as definitive
The word ‘progress’ may refer to cases in which a new context includes an old one
…In progress, the context of reference grows
Even in its valid context, the old system is not the same as the new. However, in that context, the two systems may have equivalence. By taking into account the characteristics of the old context, the new may ‘reduce’ to the old in the old context
…Scientific theories are a prime example of such progress. The domain of application of relativistic mechanics is broader than that of classical mechanics and the classical theory is the low velocity limit of the relativistic theory. Although the meaning of the basic terms (concepts) of the mechanics are not identical in the classical and relativistic theories, the reduction provides some basis of comparison. This stands against Thomas Kuhn’s thought that successive theories of science are incommensurable—what may be the case is that the new theories have a sense of incomprehensibility to some scientists who were educated under the older paradigm
…From the reduction of a new scientific theory to an older one, it does not follow that such reduction is possible for all expansions of context and even if possible, the reduction in one case may not show how the reduction is to be accomplished in another
If one context includes another, the meaning of the contained system may be derived from the containing system. However, if there is no containing system, there is no other system in terms of which meaning may be derived. That is, without a containing system, meaning cannot be specified lexically
…In absence of a containing system, meaning is implicit in use which must mean application or deployment
…Application anchors meaning and is its source of stability
…However, even though there is no containing system for the given context, the context may be capable of growth and therefore, stability of meaning does not imply finality of meaning
…Since a metaphysics intends to be a system that has no present containing system, these thoughts definitely apply to metaphysics
…Even in the common arena of meaning, there is change. This may be seen most clearly in small communities that must continually adapt to changing contexts and in the origin of pidgin dialects
…Given an isolated community, there is no, larger, containing or inclusive community. The agents of linguistic change are the members of the community and their experience
…In the modern world, all individuals have the potential to participate in change, even though change may be concentrated in a few individuals and in institutions
…Explicit rules of language—e.g. grammar—must have come after language even though they may be implicitly present at the ‘beginning’ of language in—non-uniquely—expressing necessities of meaning. Formal rules may be necessary to stabilize meaning in large societies where context is isolated from necessity and in order to standardize communication. However, the value of standardization may be an illusion. Further, standardization may be an impediment to growth and change, and may encourage stagnation and degeneration and a mechanical view of meaning
The stability of meaning-as-reference is confused by meaning-as-power, i.e., by appropriation of meaning to political ends that include influence by one individual or group over another
It was earlier seen that the concept of substance cannot be the basis of a foundation of a framework for an ultimate understanding of things and the idea of existence was suggested as an alternative. Existence is recommended, not only by its inclusion of what is immediate but also by its lack of distinction of the immediate and the remote, the esoteric and the mundane—i.e., by its shallow or trivial character. An appeal to existence is, in effect, an explanation of things in terms of the things themselves—i.e., of the universe in terms of itself. It is trivially clear that this explanation will be successful—every thing is itself. It seems equally clear that this explanation should be uninformative; however, it has been noted that existence can form the basis of a metaphysics of ultimate depth and breadth. While there are some thoughts toward the development of the metaphysics in this chapter, especially in what follows, the systematic development is deferred to Metaphysics
The questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were pointed out as significant but have not yet been fully addressed. It was suggested that perception of things is a form of existence even if the ‘thing’ perceived is a hallucination or there is an illusion involved in the perception for the percept itself exists regardless whether it is real or illusory or hallucinatory
The concept of experience will be used to strengthen and elaborate the earlier argument. In their primitive meanings, experience and concept are near identical. However, the idea of ‘concept’ is used to suggest that there may be an object that corresponds to the concept but experience focuses on the concept itself, on what is sometimes called the subjective side of knowing
The discussion will first focus on experience itself—on what it is. Then, even though there appears to be no doubt that there is experience, that doubt will be raised—for two reasons. The primary reason is that expressing and resolving doubt takes the argument further from the level of the ad hoc and into reason and so improves confidence in the argument itself and reinforces demonstrative tools—the analysis of meaning and what is given and the use of proof. The analysis of meaning and of what is given is especially important for, while it is often neglected or assumed without question, focus on it will, in the present discussion, show clearly what may be regarded as given and will resolve ‘foundation’ in showing it is not limited to the alternatives of substance that is not capable of further analysis and infinite regress, i.e., in going toward showing a foundation without substance but that terminates without regress. The second reason to raise the doubt regarding the existence of experience—of consciousness—is that the doubt has been raised in the recent literature on the philosophy of mind and that resolution of the doubt will need to analyze the reasons for the doubt and, in this discussion, resolve those reasons and show the doubt regarding experience to based in confusion of the nature of matter—i.e. that what is not seen or not explicit in theory must be absent
The discussion will show that there is experience, i.e., that something does indeed exist. Then, experience will be used to address the question ‘What things exist?’ At this point, the existence of experience itself will have been established but, except for experience itself, the existence of the seeming objects of experience will not have been established. The idea of the forms of experience will be used to investigate ‘what exists.’ It will be seen to be possible to properly class the forms as two kinds—the necessary forms of experience and the contingent forms. It will be shown in the discussion that the necessary forms do and must correspond faithfully to objects that may be labeled ‘necessary’ objects. One of these forms is experience itself; some others are the universe—all that exists—and the void or absence of existence. The study of the necessary forms and their consequences is developed at length in Metaphysics. The contingent forms concern the external world—the world that exists independently of its being experienced but that exists, roughly, as experienced—and its variety of things or objects. In Metaphysics it is shown that although the contingent forms of experience do not invariably have corresponding intentional objects, there must, provided that no inconsistency is entailed, be ‘corresponding’ objects somewhere in the universe. The existence of objects that correspond to the contingent forms is taken up in Objects where it is argued that it is normal—i.e., roughly speaking, immensely probable—for the contingent forms to be practically faithful to objects
The external world is not experience but includes it, e.g. in regarding one’s own mind as an object or in other minds—the question of ‘other minds’ and their existence as instrumental in removing doubt and in sharpening demonstrative tools is introduced above and discussed further in Metaphysics and Objects. It was just said that the external world is not experience. However, in metaphysical idealism, perhaps the significant alternative to materialism in the history of thought, mind is thought to be a more fundamental feature of the universe than is matter—e.g. everything is mind and that ‘matter’ is one of its forms. Idealism and its denial, e.g. that the world is not experience, are not meaningful unless the nature of matter and mind are carefully specified. There is a common concept of matter as in modern physical science and a common concept of mind as in the seat of mental content or experience. In the common concepts, it is frequently thought that it is difficult to see how mind could be a form of matter because mind is so seemingly immaterial. However, it is not unreasonable to think that if sufficient powers of calculation were available that mind could fit into a quantum mechanical framework and that the subjective or apparently immaterial aspect of mind is an implicit aspect that framework—subjectivity is not excluded in the material description but its absence is often taken as exclusion. If mind cannot fit into the present quantum theoretical framework, there must be some extended framework—it does not follow that normal human powers are sufficient to its discovery—that does; this follows from the necessity of the existence of experience / mind that is addressed in this chapter. In Mind it will be seen that, although in its common concept, experience is only a part of being, there is and must be an extended concept of experience or mind that extends to the root of being, that includes all being including matter and its forms. In the dual extension to the root of both mind and matter the two concepts are—will be—seen as identical, the extension of meanings results in neither true idealism—or pan-psychism—nor true materialism. Instead, what is revealed is that there is no more fundamental character of things than the things themselves which, as noted earlier, will be seen, perhaps against expectation and common sense, to be the basis of an ultimate metaphysics
In Mind, experience is seen to be fundamental to the nature of mind. Independently, it will be seen below to be fundamental to clarifying the nature of existence and therefore of being. Since it is in mind that things and therefore existence is perceived, the connection to experience is not unexpected
The connotation of the word ‘experience’ in this narrative is introduced immediately below. Here, experience is a simple function of mind. However, in the present connotation, experience is an aspect of—at least—every conscious function of mind. It is therefore easy to mistake one or more of these other, more complex functions, for experience. There is a use of experience in which it connotes familiarity with a field that is the result of repeated exposure and practice. This connotation is marginally related to the present one
Experience is fundamental to the development and it is therefore essential to understand the present meaning of experience and to differentiate it from the more complex functions of mind. Therefore, after introducing the present meaning of experience it will be further clarified
It is often the case that it is difficult to explain the meaning of a fundamental concept. This is because there no other concepts in terms of which it is to be explained. This leads to the erroneous conclusions that the derived concepts are more precisely known than the fundamental ones. The partial resolution of the point is that, at least in the case of experience, its meaning is given by use or in intuition which are somewhat beyond words especially as a result of its fundamental nature. The clarification of this point in what follows should assist the reader in realizing that despite difficulties of verbal precision, the understanding of experience is not imprecise provided the effort has been put in to see precisely the mental function to which reference is being made (similar remarks may apply to the understanding of other fundamental concepts)
The approach through use or intuition to the clarification of the meaning of fundamental terms was labeled partial. This is because the clarification of meaning in general by pointing to the objects of the world including intuition (this has been called ostensive definition) or by reduction to other terms is itself partial. In axiomatic systems the various terms stand in relation to one another and these relationships are constitutive of the meaning. However the verification of such meaning occurs, in a sense, in the success of the axiomatic system. The case of common meaning is not different. The various words of our common vocabulary stand in relation to one another. The success, perhaps a partial and ongoing endeavor, of language as a system is verified by the success of language as an instrument. The preceding statement requires modification. In day to day use we do not think of the ‘success’ of language; that is the function of the classroom and the student of language. In the world, language and its use or application evolve together and this occurs (perhaps) without conscious thought of correctness or success; it is perhaps the case that the student of language—the linguist and the teacher—come after language rather than before it. That too may have only a degree of truth for it has been suggested that in the small community the origin and use of language is marked simultaneously by use and by reflection on use even though, perhaps, the reflection is primarily done by individuals who are gifted in language
In Mind, the meaning of experience will be extended and further clarified
A prototype of experience is the experience of an object. In seeing a rose one has experience of its shape, its color, its fragrance—and these constitute the experience of the rose. Experience is the qualitative, or subjective or feeling side of things. It should be noted, though, that, here, ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ or ‘quality’ and ‘definite form’ or ‘mathematical form’ are not in the least exclusive—exclusion arises from the use of a distinct if related meaning of ‘quality.’ Experience is equally present in emotion, e.g. the feeling of happiness, in the perception of things both small—a rose—and grand, e.g. a sunset over the ocean, and in the sense of a presence, e.g., awe or wonder at the mystery and power of the universe. In the previous sentence ‘feeling’ is used in a common meaning; later, feeling will be used in a more inclusive sense in which perception also involves feeling, i.e., feeling will be used as nearly identical in sense to the present use of experience—the distinction will be that feeling will connote elementary experience; therefore, experience will—may—be thought of as integrated feeling. Experience is immediate but, perhaps, that is an understatement for experience is not what is most immediately known, it is the form and mode of knowing
As noted earlier, experience and concept have near identity except that the concept is typically associated intentionally with an object but, in its meaning or sense, experience has no intended association with an object. Experience is not something that is other than the concept—it is part / mode of concept. However, just as a concept may have intentional correspondence to an object, may lack actual correspondence but may have potential correspondence to an object, may have no intentional correspondence actual or potential, may be a perception, a recall, a reconstruction from recall—iconic as in imagery or symbolic as in thought or compound as in symbolic-imagistic thought—experience may also be all these things
It is possible to talk of concepts from an objective point of view as, e.g. a structure in the body—brain—of an organism and, experience seems to not lend itself to this kind of description and there is thus an apparent gulf between experience and this way of seeing concepts; however, this apparent distinction will be dissolved in the subsequent narrative, especially in Mind
In attempting to explain what experience is the terms employed are terms of experience—experience itself, perception, feeling, the subjective side… This is because experience is so fundamental that there is no more fundamental thing in terms of which to define it; and, experience does not seem to be like the objects of the external world and, so, it seemingly cannot be defined in terms of external objects. Some things can be defined in terms of experience—given experience, it may be possible to define kinds of experience such as the experience of sadness, of warmth, of color and so on. As a result, in the paradigm of definition in linguistic terms, sadness, warmth, color and so on may seem to be clearer in their nature than experience itself. Although we know what experience is it is difficult to define
The case is similar for many fundamental concepts—the fundamental concept is difficult to define because there is nothing other or more fundamental in terms of which to define it and so, while the more ‘advanced’ concepts may be defined the fundamental concepts are difficult to define. When thinking analytically, then, there may be vagueness attached to what is fundamental. In fact, however, to think this way is to be deceived by the clarity of analytic thought: whatever is vague about the fundamental concept is also vague about the derived concepts but, because they may be defined analytically, it may be thought that they are clearly understood. The habit of analytic thought upturns the order of clarity and makes the perception of the particular seem clearer than the form of perception which is so immediate that it escapes notice
This is perhaps most extreme for experience for which there are alternative terms, feeling and so on, but no terms that are more fundamental and therefore it is not merely difficult to define experience analytically, it is perhaps, as a result of its most immediate character, impossible to define it analytically—and while this may result, under the analytic paradigm, in a feeling of vagueness about its character and questions about its existence, this feeling is misplaced: among all ‘things’ experience is most immediate, most clear, most real
It may be thought that existence of things is being made to depend on being experienced. That, however, is not the case. Experience is identified as a fundamental mode of existence, though not the only mode. For a sentient being, experience is the way of knowing existence but not as the condition of existence of objects; and experience will be the basis of demonstration of the existence of necessary and contingent objects—below in discussing the forms of experience—but not the condition of their existence. The argument has concerned, not the dependence of existence on being experienced, but the reality of experience itself
In saying that experience is not the whole of existence, i.e., that there is also the object of experience—the external world, it is not being said that the external world is devoid of experience for, other individuals have experience and, when the individual experiences his or her own experience of the external world, the experience itself becomes or is part of the external world. It is also not being said that there is no extended concept of experience and, perhaps, no extended understanding of the world as object, in which experience and object become identical, or, at least, different modes of description of the universe
The reality of experience is emphasized by the fact that while the experience or concept of an object is in a different category than the object, experience and experience of experience are in the same category. Or, since experience of experience is experience but is also experience of an object, when experience is the object, experience and object are not in different categories
Thus it is in the meaning of experience and existence that experience exists—the meanings of experience and existence are intertwined though, of course, they are not identical for it is not being suggested that experience is the only thing that exists. (If experience were all, the meanings of experience and existence would be intertwined; which shows that while there is some similarity to their senses, the reference of ‘experience’ lies within the range of reference of ‘existence.’). In a sense, the fact of experience demonstrates its existence—i.e., that something exists. The demonstration is, of course, not a proof from premise to conclusion but in the analysis of what is most immediate—given—and of meaning, i.e., there is an analytic component to the demonstration that, however, lies in the analysis of a linguistic meaning and not in the construction of one
The content of the previous paragraph may be stated formally. It was seen that the meaning of ‘X exists’ where X is a concept is that there is an object X to which the concept is faithful. So far only the practical faithfulness of concepts to objects has been established and this faithfulness obtains when the concepts have a certain usefulness. However, experience is conceptual and thus the concept of experience is of the same kind as experience and thus in conceiving experience there is no absolute gap between concept and object as there is between concept and external object
Thus, although, on account of its apparently immaterial nature, and on account of a natural tendency to doubt the subjective, it may be natural to doubt that there is experience, this doubt is now revealed as unreasonable. Experience is the fundamental case of definite existence and this fact is not capable of further analysis although, of course, it is capable of illumination
That is, experience is itself, the first necessary concept and the first necessary object
Still, for the reasons stated earlier, the existence of experience will be subject to doubt
Demonstration of the existence of experience has been given. Therefore, to address doubt all that is necessary is to allay it—this will be accomplished by identifying doubts and refuting them
A first reason for doubt is, as stated above, the apparently immaterial nature of experience, of feeling. The question may arise ‘Where does experience exist?’ This question may be elaborated ‘The brain occupies certain states and undergoes certain processes in having a concept but where is the experience itself?’ Materialism itself has not been established and, as will be shown, it cannot be established—except erroneously—and, therefore, the immaterial nature of experience, whether apparent or real, is not an argument against the existence of experience; this point is elaborated in Mind. The resolution of any paradox regarding objects that do not have location or clear location is left to Objects, and the question of the location of experience itself is left to Mind
There is, therefore, no principled objection to the existence of experience from the apparently immaterial character of experience
A second set of reasons to doubt the existence of experience comes from scientific materialism. (In talking of scientific materialism, it is not asserted that a commitment to science is a commitment to materialism even though the majority of scientists are, perhaps, materialists. In fact, the commitment of persons is not a logical factor at all but the point is mentioned here because it is often treated as though it is)
From the fact that certain features of mind have no demonstrated explanation in terms of modern theoretical physics it is often assumed that they cannot fit into a materialist framework and therefore they do not exist or, perhaps, even if they exist, have little significance in the working of the world. Such features include intentionality, the causal efficacy of mind, and experience—mind itself. This objection has been addressed above and is treated and defused in greater depth and detail in Mind. I.e., the objection from scientific materialism do not hold. A part of the argument will be that experience is not other than brain / body process and there is therefore no logical argument from materialism to non-existence or insignificance of the features of mind
It appears to be the case that human beings vary significantly in the richness and variety of their inner lives. Perhaps it is not that some persons have a necessary poverty of experience but that they attach less significance to it. It is not clear how the truth of the claim might be demonstrated but it has been suggested as an explanation of the quickness with which some thinkers are persuaded by the materialist argument to deny experience. There is an argument from power to the denial of experience and it is not clear how the power motive might be distinguished from poverty of experience. Perhaps power is a substitute for poverty of experience—an aspect of the introvert / extravert continuum. Perhaps the power motive may overcome richness of experience. The point being made in the present paragraph is not a logical one but is an attempt to explain the puzzling aspects of the denials by some of something that seems to others to be central to human being—and, it may be noted, those who deny experience and consciousness have explanations as to why others might entertain such beliefs. The logical point to this paragraph, then, is that psychological analysis of belief does not—generally—prove or disprove the belief and has no place in logical argument even though it may be used as an instrument of persuasion
Having dealt with objections to the existence of experience, it no longer remains to demonstrate existence for demonstration has already been given. However, there may be ways to further secure and illuminate the demonstration. The fundamental principle of metaphysics from Metaphysics, shows the necessity of experience since it is possible and the concept of the normal from the same chapter shows that it is immensely likely that human and other animals have experience. As proof, this approach is empirically less secure but rationally more so than the demonstration given above; however, it clearly and definitely defuses any disproof of experience on materialist / scientific grounds; further, it may be useful as a source for further reflection / demonstration
Concepts include percepts whether real of illusory, and recollected images whether whole or part or reconstructed, whether iconic or symbolic, i.e. imagery and thought, and whether real, potential or delusional. Concepts may be simple as in a sensation in a single sensory mode, complex as in percepts and thought, and compound as in hypotheses and theories and, even, entire narratives, even the entire tradition of thought. Thus it is typical—illusions and delusions being exceptional—that concepts correspond intentionally to an object whether actual or potential. Experience and concept are identical except, first, that experience emphasizes the concept without particular reference to an object and, second, that in talking of experience the subjective aspect is emphasized where as in talking of the concept there is no preference for the subjective or first person aspect or the objective or third person point of view. The forms of experience are the contents of experience or concepts regarded in their experiential aspect. That is, in talking of the forms of experience reference is being made to mental content, to concepts, but without regard to whether the concepts in question have any kind of reference to something else—to an object. That is, the forms of experience are regarded in themselves and as of interest in themselves
The forms of experience may therefore be regarded as a form of play, a theatre, in which the constraint of ‘reality,’ if present at all, is not in the foreground. The variety of the forms of experience is at least as rich as the sum of human knowledge and imagination. The first significance of the forms of experience is that they are, as play, a source of creation. I.e., the forms of experience are pre-critical. However, if all forms of mental content are to be included, criticism itself is included but, primarily, as play. Figuratively, criticism is permitted among the forms of experience but it does not typically wear a stern face—to yield to a temptation to say that criticism is never stern when regarded as a form of experience would, perhaps, be rather stern. This process of equivocation could be unending but judgment intervenes at some point and finds that other avenues of play with the forms of experience may be more productive. Thus, criticism is never altogether absent and this raises an interesting question whether it is possible to be altogether uncritical
The present idea of the forms of experience is similar to Husserl’s insight that the study of foundations must or should begin with an analysis of experience. At present, the forms of experience are not, however, sufficiently developed to be regarded as a ground for metaphysics but may, instead, be regarded as a source. It is interesting that the idea of the forms of experience occurred independently of any recollection of Husserl’s thought and this suggests that there is convergence in realistic thought that stems from the real itself, from intuition of the real and from immersion in traditional thought
The present narrative has many points of contact with the tradition—some of whose representatives are Kant, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger—that attempts to straddle the empiricism / rationalism dichotomy. A number of these points of contact may be found in the concept and variety of the forms of experience
The forms of experience may be classed, at outset, as necessary versus contingent versus impossible. The following contains a preliminary discussion of necessary and contingent forms of experience; the impossible forms are discussed in Metaphysics and in Objects which continue the discussion of necessary and contingent forms. Cosmology emphasizes necessary forms—general cosmology—as well as contingent forms—local or physical cosmology and Human World emphasizes the interaction of the necessary / universal forms with the contingent forms of the human world
The necessary forms of experience are those whose intentional correspondence to an object follows from the form itself. I.e. the correspondence to an object is determined by logic where logic is understood to include necessary analysis of meaning. The objects to which the necessary forms of experience correspond necessarily exist and are therefore called necessary objects. Since the necessary form of experience—necessarily—corresponds to a necessary object, it suffices to use the word ‘necessary’ to refer to both form and object. As has been seen it is in the meanings of experience and existence that there is experience and experience is necessary; similarly, existence is necessary. It is not being said that there must be existence (being—see the discussion of being below) but the necessity of existence (being)—i.e., there cannot be eternities of nothing—will be demonstrated in Metaphysics. The other primary necessary forms include the following. From existence (being) it follows that there is the universe, i.e., all existence (all being;) from the experience of difference and change it follows that there are difference and change which must be necessary; the necessity of extension / duration follows from the necessity of difference / change; from difference, it follows that domains are necessary and from domains, it follows that domains necessarily have complements, i.e. all that is not in the domain
The necessity of the void or absence of existence (being) may now be demonstrated. (i) Since the universe is all being it must contain all objects—all Form, Pattern and Law which, from the concept of the universe, cannot lie outside it. (ii) Define the void as the complement of the universe. (iii) If the void exists it contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law. (iv) The universe is a domain and therefore it has a complement which must exist. Since, from item ii, the complement of the universe is the void, the void exists. Combining this with item iii, it follows that The Void Exists and Contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law
It will be seen in Metaphysics that there is a necessary character to the contingent forms in that even though they may not reside in any particular world—domain of the universe—they must, of logical necessity, reside somewhere and when in the universe
(A) There is experience of ‘I’ or ‘this’ center of experience. However, it does not follow from the experience of ‘I’ that there is an ‘I.’ More generally, it does not follow from the existence of an external world that there is an external world. Doubting the existence of an—the—external world or an ‘I’ is not a practical doubt but serves to clarify the concept of the external world, the nature of domains in which there must (practically) / need not be an external world, and to develop tools of demonstration and analysis. In Objects, identity—personal and general—will be developed as an object in a way that reveals the merging of individual identity in higher / universal identity without relinquishing individual identity
(B) Concepts of particular entities whether particular—concrete—entities or things such as rocks or abstract such as number and other mathematical objects. The nature of the particular object has been introduced above and it is further clarified in Metaphysics and in Objects. Particular or concrete objects include not only ‘things’ but also relative intangibles such as air, parts and collections-as-entities. Events, processes and facts are also particular. While there are some preliminary considerations of the particular / abstract distinction in this chapter and in Metaphysics, the distinction is taken up and a number of issues regarding the abstract object resolved in Objects. It will be seen that the distinction is more one of convenience of study rather than, as is usually thought, one of kind. As will be seen the approaches to study of facts, Forms, Patterns and Laws straddle the particular / abstract distinction
The developments will also take up the identity of entities
The form of experience include (C) sense and feeling, percept and concept, intuition (in the sense of Kant) and explicit knowledge, acquaintance and description (due to Russell,) iconic and symbolic (including verbal) knowledge. These forms are pertinent to questions of epistemology. In Human being, the forms of intuition are extended to include symbol, reason and humor. As the capacity to respond to what is unknown and what may be unexpected, humor is especially significant for it is a form of transcendence of the limits of reason and encompasses all being in potential / principle though not in fact / detail. Humor includes the idea that if encompassing all being in fact and in detail is logically inaccessible to a mode of being then encompassing all being in fact and in detail cannot be desirable to that mode of being. Death ‘makes sense’ in a variety of ways; in humor death is accepted without its making sense; alternatively, in humor, death makes sense without there being explicit sense
Also recognized among the forms of experience are those that are significant in science and that arise in consideration of (D) ‘this’ cosmological system. As will be subsequently seen, this cosmos is a highly localized and specific form of being relative to the universe (all being.) Therefore the objects of science—as well as those of common knowledge from which science stems by experiment and criticism, and by discovery and concept and law formation—are contingent objects and the questions of their being and nature are both theoretical and practical
Another local form of experience, (E) may be called ‘the human condition.’ In addition to the detailed particulars, the phrase sometimes connotes the affective rather than the cognitive side, the limits rather than the possibilities, frailty rather than strength, context over time and history… Such connotations are included but their contrary forms are not excluded. The representation of D and like forms and E is found not only in the sciences but also in the humanities—in philosophy, in history, in art, in literature, in drama and music. Exploration, adventure and transformation are expressions of the form E. Aesthetics and ethics, in human being, as well as in the human comprehension of any ultimate form to aesthetics and ethics, are contained in the form E. In Objects, it will be seen how value may be understood to be an object
The animal condition
Included for completeness. Includes the human condition
Archetypes
If the archetypes were to be used directly to make inferences regarding being, it would appear that only those archetypal elements that appear in consciousness should be used. However, since consciousness is the place of all discussion, this limitation is not severe
For other purposes, e.g. as an instrument of experiment, the limit to consciousness would be unnecessary—would be contrary to the nature and uses of the archetype. However, as will be seen in the discussion of consciousness in Mind, the limit to consciousness is not a significant limit
The archetypes are also known as collective forms… these are the universal ‘Jungian’ archetypes or motifs and since they are universal they cannot, according to the Jungian argument, arise from individual experience. Jung was concerned with symbols, especially mythic symbols for these are symbols at least common to a community and if trans-communal or trans-cultural and even found across hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists—including modern civilization—they are collective over the human race. There may also be symbols common to various collections from the species to the class of animals
In the Transformation phase of the journey, use may be made of the idea of the archetype and may therefore be useful to discuss the idea
Are there archetypes? And since they reside in the unconscious, do they or may they count as forms of experience?
From the arguments in Mind and in Human being, below, the conscious-unconscious dimension is best seen as a continuum of acuity, intensity and other factors rather than a polarity of opposites. Therefore, if there are archetypes, they are forms of experience. What is more, by the arguments cited, these forms go down, not only to the animal kingdom, but also to plants and lower ‘substrates’
The categories discussed in Human being, count as archetypal. For example, the animal capacity for spatio-temporal perception is not the product of individual experience alone
Therefore, the issue that remains to be addressed is whether there are Jungian archetypes. At present, this narrative has no contribution to this issue over and above Jung’s powerful arguments in, for example, The Structure of the Psyche~1927, Instinct and the Unconscious~1919, and The Concept of the Collective Unconscious~1936
Since the concept of the archetype and the collective unconscious may be regarded in a mystical light, it is important to pay attention to Jung’s definition of the archetype and the collective unconscious and to his arguments for their existence—and significance to human being and society
Two further ‘kinds’ may be mentioned—their explicit definition and elaboration as forms or experience… and related conclusions will be taken up later. These kinds are (F) inference and (G) category as in, e.g., Kant, Schopenhauer and the present narrative; while these topics have been taken up in themselves it is their elaboration as forms of experience and any related conclusions that are left for further reflection. Regarding G, since there are facts beyond assumption—as will be seen, existence cannot be eternally non-manifest—it will be interesting to see whether there are rules of inference beyond assumption
(H) Judgment is a form of experience that may be instrumental in a transition between experience as play and experience that would have an intentional object
Being is that which exists—in its entirety, or has existence—in its entirety
The phrase ‘in its entirety’ is important on account of the fact that objects are known via concepts
The phrase ‘in its entirety’ is used so that a compound concept will not be granted existential status under the definition when only some of its parts exist. The need to not have any ‘dangling non-reference’ will be further explained in Logic
Given that existence is entire, there is no distinction between existing and having existence—between being and having being
Although there is an identity between existence and being as used here, it was desirable, before revealing the identity: to discuss and resolve some problems of existence; to introduce the symbol triad of word, concept and object; to introduce experience; and to introduce the necessary forms of experience
The following topics, discussed earlier, are pertinent to discussion of being and could be placed here: the verb to be including ‘is’ and its uses—existential, constitutive, and connective; that the character of existence—being—may be regarded as primitive to meaning and that the form ‘X is’ or ‘X is / has being’ do not imply existence but express the linguistic meaning of existence / being which, on account of their necessity, require no further semantic regress; the possibility of spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal existence, of particular or concrete and abstract objects—later, in Objects, the question of ‘where’ abstract objects reside and whether they are indeed non-spatial andor non-temporal will be taken up and resolved; local and global modes of description; the immediacy of existence; that the deep character of existence / being lies in its immediate / trivial character and not in any esoteric sense—being / existence is not esoteric but must contain whatever may be esoteric, i.e., being makes no distinction between the esoteric and the mundane; introductions to the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ and their significance; existence versus essence; concepts and objects—and symbols; meaning, sense and reference; the paradoxes regarding the concept of existence; experience, the forms of experience and the necessary forms of experience
The preliminary discussions enable a first answer but a full—more complete—answer continues through Metaphysics, Objects, Logic and Meaning, Mind, and Cosmology
While experience (concept) and object are generally different kinds, in the case of experience of experience the kind is the same. Affirmation of experience and denial of experience are both experiences. Experience is the condition of argument, of discussion, of being-in. It is, therefore, indubitable that there is Experience which is a form of being—therefore:
There is Being—therefore:
There is All Being… the Universe that contains all Form, Pattern, and Law
There is Experience of difference. Without difference, there cannot be experience of difference. Therefore:
There is Difference. Therefore:
There are Domains. I.e. domains exist
Define the complement of a domain A, relative to a domain B, as what is in B but not in A. The unqualified complement or, simply, the complement of A is the complement of A relative to the universe
I.e., the complement of a domain is the part of the universe that is not part of the domain. Therefore:
Every domain has a complement that exists. I.e. if a domain exists, its Complement exists. Now:
(1) Define the void as the complement of the universe
(2) Since the universe contains all Form, Pattern and Law, if the void exists, it contains no Form pattern or Law
The universe is a domain and therefore it has a complement that exists. Since, from item (1), the complement of the universe is the void, the Void exists. Combining this with item (2), it follows that:
The void exists and contains no Form, Pattern or Law
Or, in terms of
the idea— introduced later—i.e., of the Object
the void contains no Object
Note than the proof existence and properties of the void could be done in terms of arbitrary domains A and B and this approach might be less transparent but more instructive
Observe that experience, being, universe, experience of difference, difference, domain, complement, and void necessarily exist. In the sense of ‘object’, to be introduced later, they are Necessary Objects. Form, pattern and law will also be shown to be necessary objects
Also observe that the existence of these necessary objects is empirical. First note that their conceptual character is not at all a mark of existence—this issue has been resolved earlier in discussing concept and object and the paradoxes of the concept of existence. Second, whereas the empirical character of objects in general may be in question, the empirical character of the necessary objects follows from experience—and experience itself is empirical even though its intentional objects need not be. Prior to the analysis it might, as is often the case, be thought that the source of the—alleged—empirical character of the objects of the world must be uniform; however, the analysis shows that the empirical character of the necessary objects lies in their meaning
Are the objects listed in this first collection the only necessary objects?
Note that while the notion of object has not been clearly specified yet, the existence of the first set of necessary objects—above—is necessary. These objects are so abstracted—though not abstract—from immediate experience that it is not necessary to be careful about the concept of objecthood in order to know their objecthood
Any object derived logically, i.e. in terms of consistent definition, from the first list of necessary objects will also be necessary. It may be useful, in contemplating this thought, to recall that the ‘first list’ is not at all an ad hoc list but starts with fundamental aspects of experience—experience itself whose fundamental character as a mode of being has been shown, then all being, difference and so on…
A far greater variety of necessarily existing objects will be shown in Metaphysics. One characterization of this variety is that the one universe of all being cannot have greater variety than the actual variety. This could be construed to mean that the universe of all being is limited to the empirically known variety, perhaps with extensions that are roughly ‘more of the same.’ The actual significance, as will turn out, is that Logic is the only limit to actual being. The reader may wonder at something as sparse as Logic in the qualitative-human dimension should define the limit of being—does not that make for poverty of being… as if the limit of being was defined by a stern and austere God?
The response is Logic defines ‘what does not have being’ and it is what is excluded that is sparse—implying that what is included is rich in variety. Secondly, the ideas involved define rather than derive from Logic and the notion of Logic employed here is not the logic of Aristotle or of mathematical or symbolic logic or of the textbooks and therefore Logic is indeed rich. Instead of constantly seeking new words to escape the negative burden of prior thought it may be of greater advantage to educate our thinking rather than our vocabulary
At once a host of concerns arises. Are the common (not logical) necessities of our world, its regularities, not necessary after all? Hume argued that case and his argument has of course become commonplace. The developments in Metaphysics will leave Hume’s argument intact but will up end the conclusions that are typically drawn from it. Instead of concluding a poverty of laws, the conclusion will be an infinite richness of Law, of which the apparently contingent physical law of this cosmos will be but one example out of an infinity. Various logical and scientific objections may be entertained. If Logic is the only limit, what is the status of science? What is the real characterization, then, of the variety of being? What are the relations among being, metaphysics, logic, objects, and cosmology?
The appreciation and address of these and other concerns is many-faceted and must await the various discussions of this division, Theory of being
The necessary existence of an infinite variety of objects—including objects such as those that appear to exist in this cosmological system—will be shown in Metaphysics. Of course, not all appearances will correspond to immediate realities. Knowledge of objects and the question of appearance and reality is further taken up in Objects. Objects and Cosmology will complete the discussion of the variety of objects
That is, why does the metaphysics to be developed take being as its core concept? A number of ‘reasons’ may be given. Some justification of the choice of being has been given. Being is the most intimate, most grounded of concepts; additionally, Being connects to the tradition—of course, in drawing from the strength of traditions, care is required to avoid pitfalls
But, in the end, while pre-justification is important, post-justification is perhaps more important
However, it is important to note that, at least at a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts, it is the development of the metaphysics—the possibility of the metaphysics, its ultimate yet empirical character—that, over and above extra-metaphysical reasons, that justifies adoption of being and gives final elucidation to its character. While the idea of being is fundamental since it is at the core of our presence in the world, what is put into its elaboration and clarification, e.g. the elimination of substance and determinism and clear thinking about its nature and the ideas of all and absence of being, is as important as the received fundamental character of being
In the previous paragraph, reference was made to ‘a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts’ because there is a pre-theoretical level at which the organism that is immersed in being has an experience of being and, necessarily of all-being, without recourse to symbolic concepts. If that organism does not possess the symbolic capability, it has no need for the symbolic-conceptual level. If it does possess symbolic capability, it should have no compulsory need for the symbolic-conceptual level to have and experience being-in-the-world-of-all-being
It is significant that while there is a certain pre-theoretical power to the idea of being, that power alone is not the source of the metaphysics. Rather, it is a variety of areas of diligence in imagination and criticism that are especially instrumental in the development of the metaphysics. These include imagination and criticism, in seeing the various aspects of the metaphysics—suggested, perhaps, by the history of thought and by paradigms from science; in bringing various divisions of knowledge into the fold of the metaphysics; in seeing that the metaphysics reveals limits of other and not only prior divisions of thought and knowledge but also agrees with those domains within their limits; and in eradicating pre-judicial and limiting habits of thought such as substance thinking and determinism and other kinds of essentialism with regard to common categories of thought such as the nature of the object versus the property and the subject-predicate form and its implied distinctions
Thus, in Metaphysics, the metaphysics of immanence, follows, first from experience and its forms, to the existence of certain necessary objects—especially being, the universe, the void and the domain—and their characteristics, and from these, by logic, to the develop of the ‘pure’ aspects of the metaphysics. The pure metaphysics that reveals a universe with far greater variety than might otherwise be even reasonably imagined or hypothesized—which in turn has implications for the nature of actuality, possibility and necessity and for the causal versus non-causal and deterministic versus indeterministic character of the universe. In parallel with development of the pure side there has been a study of the pure metaphysics in interaction with specific domains of knowledge such as physical cosmology, the theory of evolution, and the nature of human being. In the interactive study or ‘applied’ metaphysics, the specific domains of study suggest but are not instrumental in demonstration of the pure metaphysics while the pure metaphysics has implications for foundation and content of the specific domains
The ultimate character of the present development is evident, then, in its having an empirical and a logical side that are marked by certain characteristics. In beginning with experience, the empirical side does not require the existence of an external object for its foundation and, therefore, there is no room for empirical error. The characteristic of the logical side is not merely that the development is derived logically from the empirical foundation but that it founds a new concept of Logic as the one law of the universe—of which the traditional concept of logic is an interpretation and the different logics chapters. A question that may arise and that is addressed in the narrative is the apparent circularity that it must be some kind of logic that lies at the root of the metaphysics that the metaphysics founds Logic
The recognition that the fundamental concepts are dually empirical and logical lies at the core of the success of the metaphysics
The discussion, here, talks around the ultimate character of the metaphysics. This ultimate character of the metaphysics is manifest in Metaphysics and Objects
The metaphysics has been brought to an ultimate level—one that has been glimpsed in the history of thought e.g. by Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein who saw some aspect of it but provided neither demonstration nor systematic development of a whole system nor development of a system of implications. Some aspects of the system have been imagined in Indian Philosophy, especially in Vedanta, but, here too, what has been seen is similarly though not identically deficient
It turns out that although the metaphysics implies the existence of an immense variety of objects, the pure side is empty with regard to the intentional location of the objects with respect to an individual perceiver. This intentional location is one of the topics of Objects. The metaphysics demonstrates the necessity of such location but not with regard to every individual—thus the metaphysics is partially instrumental in addressing topics on which it is initially silent. Another topic addressed by Objects is the question of the nature and differences between particular and abstract objects. Here, the metaphysics is instrumental in a definitive and rather surprising resolution to the nature of the particular versus the abstract and the ultimate character of the metaphysics is essential to this development, i.e., while the result may be imagined or conceived independently, it cannot be demonstrated without the metaphysics or an equivalent
Thus in bringing the metaphysics to an ultimate level, the theory of objects, has, in consequence, been brought to a level that exceeds its status in the history of thought
If these claims are true, and it is the intent of the narrative that the truth of the claims should be manifest in it, then not only is the metaphysics ultimate but, since they have been raised to the same level, there must also be an ultimate character to the present study of Objects, of Logic and Meaning, of Mind, and of Cosmology—and other lesser but significant topics
The topics of Logic and meaning, Mind, Cosmology, Human World, and Method, have, in fundamental directions, also been brought to levels that exceed their prior status. The level achieved is ultimate in certain directions and these developments include conceptualizations or re-conceptualizations of Logic, Mind, Cosmos, Human being—especially the nature of freedom, and Method that have an ultimate character and incorporate and validate the valid aspects of older conceptions
Thus, while being—being-in-the-world as well as the received concept—have power, being, as developed in this narrative, is also a receptacle for diligent and critical imagination regarding the universe and its variety
It is interesting to inquire about the sources of the ideas adopted in the narrative
A fundamental source—perhaps the original one—is, of course, the common traditions—those of everyday use and the history of ideas and thought. However, the meanings to be established here are not—and, as will be seen, cannot be—precisely those of the traditions. The question about the origin of the present forms of the ideas can be sharpened to a question about the entire selection of ideas—what is included, what is excluded, what is new—and about the arrangement, the meshing and the unfolding of the ideas
The simple answer is that what has been arrived at is the result of experiment and tinkering with ideas, reading and reflection, putting ideas together as interactive systems, attempting to understand and resolve both peripheral and central issues of philosophy and other disciplines, attempting to come up with a comprehensive system of understanding. Ideas and systems have come, some gone, some remained. The character of the ‘system’ has morphed through several incarnations or perspectives or world views. There have been experiments with materialism, evolutionism, idealism, and a vague absolutism, each worked out systematically. There has been tinkering with lesser ‘isms’ from the tradition. Each development has been rejected, not so much as wrong but as slanted andor inadequate. The present view which may be seen, in some ways, as amounting to the idea that foundations are not hidden or remote required the establishment of an conceptual apparatus that allowed the world as its own foundation to be ultimately simple—while allowing complexity. It is not impossible, of course, that the present development should suffer the fate of the previous ones; however, its necessity is—or appears to be—manifest in the development itself and not referred to something else or to some unfounded foundation
This present perspective may therefore be described as an anti-perspective—the world, not something else, is foundation—and has gone through roughly seven versions in which, along with new insights and applications, the entire system of ideas has gone through incremental and interactive revision that entailed bringing the level of precision and depth of each of the major topics up to the level of the fundamental metaphysical core
The question of the power in the received concept of being is now addressed
It may be noted that there is no precise distinction between what is received and what has been developed; the following characteristics are contained in the idea of being but, typically, become manifest only after dedicated reflection
Because of the lack of intrinsic distinction, being plays the role of unknown in the metaphysics. That is, the role of being in metaphysics is analogous to the role of the unknown in algebra, i.e. being permits talk of the unknown without having to trace the perimeter of the unknown. The power in the idea of being includes that it enables an analytic or symbolic treatment of metaphysics over a merely iconic treatment
Whereas in algebra the kind of the unknown is generally known; in metaphysics, even the kind is not known. This concern is resolved in transcending kinds
Being does not distinguish between immediate and ultimate or between appearance and reality, or between categories such as process and state or the particular and the abstract
Because being makes no distinction of mode or category, it encourages and makes possible transcendence of mere perspective at the core of the metaphysics
Therefore, being is not a dedicated concept in the way that—the common conceptions of—mind and matter are categorially dedicated
While the idea of being has been criticized as being flat, shallow or trivial, it is the very triviality that is a source of its depth and its inclusive character
The depth lies, at least in part, in that the world is not referred, for its understanding, to a part of the world or to something other than the world. That reference to itself—which is not self-referentiality of a concept—should permit the development of the metaphysics of ultimate simplicity that emerges in Metaphysics may be surprising
However, it is not surprising in that reference to something else already necessitates infinite regress of explanation for explanation without dissatisfaction. It may also be surprising that, as will be seen in Metaphysics, that reference to all being is instrumental in the development of the power of the metaphysics. However, as has already been seen, this reference is empirical. Even though the empirical character is innate, its recognition required diligent reflection on the meaning of being and of all being
In its superficiality, the metaphysics of immanence is similar to the thought in analytic philosophy that it is desirable to seek explanations in superficial terms—and not necessarily, as in some parts of science, in terms of ‘depth.’ However, in developing metaphysics of immanence it will be seen that what is superficial is not necessarily obvious. That what is not obvious may be superficial has already been seen to be implicit in the idea of being
The dissimilarity with analytic thought is that the latter remains—largely—exclusively analytical and therefore has not seen the join of analysis with experience and the ultimate lack of distinction among proximate categories. These issues may be described as the remoteness of language from fact and, in analysis’ own terms, the often-time preoccupation with piecemeal analysis
In the present deployment, it is superficiality that is deep while extreme depth—in the sense of distance—of explanation, even when it confers power and provides understanding of an aspect of being, is remote from being-as-being and from the core of human-being
Although it is sometimes regarded as esoteric, being is in fact both conceptual and empirical. I.e., being is a low level concept and the empirical / low level character together with its lack of distinction that make for its power
The idea is simultaneously symbolic and embedding. That is, being is instrumental in seeing human being as in and of the world rather than alien to or remote from the world in its mundane and esoteric aspects. Use of the idea of being, rather than the ideas of mind or matter, is a return to robust being-in-the-world—a return to a robust view of the real that contrasts what has been called the hypothetico-deductive character of science without rejecting what is powerful in science
Finally, use of the word ‘being’ encourages adoption or adaptation of what may be seen as valuable from the tradition of thought on the real nature of things that falls under the idea of being
In the developments, connection with Western and Eastern traditions will be made and pointed out
Metaphysics is core to the system of ideas and partial foundation for the other significant concepts from Theory of Being and Human World. These concepts also provide partial foundation for and suggest approaches to transformation
The metaphysics that is here developed is thought—and argued—to be significantly deeper and broader, in certain senses, than prior thought on the subject as revealed in the published literature. In fact the present metaphysics is argued to have ultimate depth and breadth. Although it learns from prior thought it is not at all a mere recapitulation; although there is some commentary on the thought of others, such commentary is not intended to be comprehensive. The present metaphysics is shown to be an actual metaphysics and not just a metaphysic of experience; and it is shown to be both systematic and empirical. Therefore, in addition to its pivotal role in the ideas and the journey, the metaphysics also seeks to be a contribution to thought
A common conception is that metaphysics is the study of the real nature of things. What separates the nature of a thing from the thing itself? Is the nature of one entity completely separable from that of other entities—of the universe? Answers to these questions may depend on the study of the nature of things and of the universe. It is therefore probably mistaken to attempt a precise characterization of metaphysics at the outset of study. At outset a tentative characterization such as study of the real nature of things may be adequate. It may later be possible, as a result of study, to characterize metaphysics with precision
In order to connect to the tradition it will be useful to mention some prior conceptions of metaphysics
Various conceptions of metaphysics have been suggested in the history of ideas—it is an inquiry into what exists, it is the study of what exists insofar as it exists, it is the study of what is real rather than what is merely apparent, it is the study of the world or universe as a whole, it is the study of first principles or ultimate and irrefutable truths. That these ideas are likely to be related is clear—it is also reasonably clear that the ideas are not exclusive—however, the actual relations may become clear only after study; and, if this is true, it may also be true that an actual evaluation will be possible only after metaphysics is complete
It is also clear that the related ideas may define impossible projects—it is not given that it is possible to ‘know’ the real nature of things. There is, however, a common mistake regarding—knowledge of—the real nature of things: it is to suppose that such knowledge is—roughly—uniformly possible or uniformly impossible for most if not all things and kinds of thing. It has already been seen that the universe as a whole—i.e. all being as all-being without regard to detail—may be known; the void as void may be conceived and this conception will turn out to count as knowing the void; the fact of experience may be known—is known even when it is not recognized that it is known; domain and complement may be known… Whatever other things may be known shall or may fall out of study and this study which begins in this chapter is formally completed in Objects with details taken up in later chapters. The various conceptions of metaphysics from history may be suggestive and may—or may not—be eclectically incorporated into any final notion of metaphysics
Whatever metaphysics may turn out to be, it is perhaps clear, however, that it should not be the study of what is remote or esoteric for what is most real should, at least in some way, not distinguish immediate from remote. The most basic aspects of things will not—at outset—make distinctions such as near or remote, physical or spiritual, hidden or immediate. This suggests that metaphysics begin as a study of what is insofar as it is—what exists insofar as it exists or being-as-being
Perhaps being as being may be too broad a category to be the subject of productive study. Here, however, it will be seen that that is not at all the case. Recall the necessary objects or aspects of being—experience and its forms or concepts, being, universe, change, difference and domain, complement and void. Logical development from the necessary objects and their properties will be seen to result in a metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth and implicitly ultimate in breadth or variety—the meanings of italicized the terms in this sentence will be clarified in what follows. Since, as seen in Being, the universe contains all form, pattern and law as immanent in being, the metaphysics is called metaphysics of immanence. This metaphysical development, together with whatever further concepts are faithful to objects, may be labeled ‘pure metaphysics.’ Pure metaphysics, then, is the part of the theory of being that is the result of demonstration, i.e., showing by recognition, by analysis of meaning and by proof (while proof is relative to premises, demonstration is absolute and this is possible, as seen in Being, for those premises that are capable of necessary empirical confirmation)
Further information is needed to situate this world in the world revealed in the pure metaphysics. That the concepts or forms of experience are necessary objects does not imply that there are objects that correspond even roughly to the concepts even though it may be reasonable to suppose that in an adapted world there should be some objects that roughly conform to some concepts. Note that in the previous sentence, (rough) correspondence does not mean that somewhere there is object that has some match with the concept but has the stronger sense that there is a lock between concept and object, e.g. a causal link between an actual mountain and the perception of the mountain. Taking the various forms of experience—the variety of concepts—as corresponding, perhaps only approximately, to objects results in a picture of this world whose foundation is not as purely logical as the pure metaphysics. However, the pure metaphysics is instrumental in situating this world—and perhaps other kinds of sub-domain—in the universe via the concept of the normal introduced later. It may of course be necessary to be selective with regard to what forms are ‘realistic’ and here, the most basic forms such as self and other and the objects of science may be suggested but not accepted without further scrutiny
There is or shall be, perhaps, no absolute distinction of pure metaphysics from other studies. As the study of the variety of being, cosmology intersects not only normal behavior and domains but also the entities encountered in pure metaphysics. Whatever is true in science, religion, myth, literature, drama, art, history and imagination must fall under metaphysics even though the study may be specialized. In the present meaning, metaphysics includes what is most immediate
There is another meaning of ‘metaphysics,’ that emphasizes an interest in the ‘occult arts.’ This other—perhaps derivative—meaning is foreign to the present one. However, if the occult arts contain truth, they may intersect metaphysics in its present meaning. The present metaphysics is neutral with respect to the idea of metaphysics-as-occult-art
Plato suggested power—having an effect—as central to the concept of being. Plato’s suggestion is eminently reasonable—it is via effect that there is awareness of things and things without any direct or indirect effect may be conceived but their being has no effect on or in this world. A discovery of the present metaphysics is that its study may be approached via logic—as is seen in the present chapter and in Logic, it may be expected that this results from and implies a new conception of logic. It will be seen that there is no separate part of the universe without an effect on this part—or any other part. The present approach, then, is to start from logic and to then connect to the concept of power
1. To develop the metaphysics of immanence
2. As part of and in light of this development, to provide foundation for and to refine the ideas from Being though Faith; to set up subsequent developments through Faith; and to provide partial foundation for transformation
3. To review and clarify the conceptions of philosophy and metaphysics and their relation to the history of ideas; and to catalog, clarify and set forth resolutions to the classic and modern problems of metaphysics. The review, deferred to the sections Philosophy and metaphysics and Problems in metaphysics is made possible by the metaphysics of immanence which enables an ultimate conception of philosophy and metaphysics and clarification / resolution of a number of central problems of metaphysics
The essential concepts of the metaphysics shall be seen to be, first, the pre-metaphysical concepts—experience and concept or forms of experience which include experience itself and the fact of experience and, second, the metaphysical concepts—being, universe, void, logos or logic or form or object, and post-metaphysical concept of the normal. The terms ‘pre-’ and ‘post-metaphysical’ do not have the connotation ‘have no implicit or explicit location within the metaphysics.’ The pre-metaphysical concepts are those that provide foundation for the metaphysics in this world / experience. The normal is post-metaphysical in that it is instrumental in locating this world in the universe as revealed in the metaphysics
There are restrictive and expansive senses of metaphysics and cosmology. All metaphysical concepts fall under the expansive meaning of cosmology. However, since it distinguishes varieties of behavior, unlike the other metaphysical concepts above, the normal may be seen falling under cosmology in its restrictive sense. The remarks of this paragraph will be clarified later in the narrative
To follow the narrative, it is essential to be aware of the present meanings as defined in the development and to avoid distraction by other meanings—either common or specialized. This injunction should not be taken to imply that other meanings and shades of meaning should not be considered for their suggestive power or for improvement of the developments
The metaphysics is developed as ten topics arranged in three sets of reflections
The first set of reflections is the core of the pure metaphysics that concerns necessary conclusions about and deriving from the necessary objects. The conclusions are organized, roughly according to the object on which they are based, as the following topics. (1) Demonstration—by recognition and naming, analysis of meaning and use, and proof—of the existence of the generic necessary objects: experience, being, universe, void, domain and so on. (2) Conclusions regarding and from the existence and properties of the universe. (3) Conclusions from the existence and properties of the void. (4) Conclusions from the existence of domains and their complements. (5) Development of the concept of the normal and its relation to the probable
It is often thought that metaphysics as theory of being is not and cannot be empirical. However, empirical content is built into the forms of experience—i.e. that forms of experience have being is undeniable. This does not mean that all the forms—concepts—have corresponding objects. However, as has been seen, the very general concepts such as experience itself, being, the universe—all being—and so on have objects and this may be seen in a way that is empirical e.g. the experience of all being. That such assertions are empirical lies in their meaning, e.g. given experience there is a world—at least of experience. The existence of experience and the general forms as objects is given but not necessarily as external objects. I.e., the existence of an external world does not follow from experience and its forms. While infinitesimal doubt exists regarding the existence of an external world, there is doubt. The point to such doubt in this narrative is a sharpening of tools of analysis and improved understanding of the world. I.e., such doubt is not laid out as a system of positive knowledge. This doubt is addressed by what will be subsequently labeled the fundamental principle of—the theory of—being or of the metaphysics of immanence. The claim regarding absence of empirical content may of course—at least in common sense terms—be true regarding a statement such as ‘there is distant a world that is beyond the present limit of measurement even when extended by scientific theory that is similar to this world.’ This claim—and other similar claims—cannot, of course, be empirical since the phrasing of the claim rules out the possibility of its being empirical. One of the aims of the metaphysics of immanence is to examine whether the existence of such worlds—and other ‘non-empirical’ objects—can be established by non-empirical means. The fundamental principle shows the possibility and necessity of the existence an immensely broad range of non-empirical objects. Further, the demonstration of the fundamental principle has both empirical and rational—logical—elements and is, therefore, partially empirical in character
The necessary conclusions are followed by normal or, roughly, probable conclusions about the nature of particular domains—especially this cosmological system and its sentient forms. Here concern is with those forms of experience—concepts—the existence of whose objects is in doubt for a variety of reasons and the proof of existence is not as directly forthcoming as in the case of the necessary objects. The first doubt is that if the concept is not the object, whether the object exists. Again, the doubt is infinitesimal but there is learning to be derived from entertaining the doubt; the doubt is not—typically—put forward as a system of positive knowledge. The second doubt is that of faithfulness. These conclusions are, roughly, probable—often to a degree such that exceptions are extremely unlikely over times of interest. The exceptions to normal behavior, significant over longer periods, are essential in universal perspectives. The topics are as follows. (6) Conclusions from and about specific empirical forms. (a) The fact and form of experience or sentience. (b) The form and existence of particular domains, especially this cosmological system
Whereas the first two sets of reflections are reflections on the world—the universe in its general features—the third set is a collection of reflections on the metaphysics itself—and on its development. These reflections include doubts and counterarguments regarding the metaphysics, and skepticism and faith which concerns attitudes toward doubt (since neither skepticism nor faith need be absolute, one term—either skepticism or faith—may suffice,) considerations on method or approach, and, finally an assessment of the status of the metaphysics so far. The topics follow immediately
(7) Objections and counterarguments that arise in reflecting on the development of the metaphysics. (8) Faith and affirmation—versus unlimited rationality. (9) Method or approach. ‘Method’ concerns the approach to development of the metaphysics. Two preliminary observations are pertinent. First, method does not—a priori—stand over study of objects but arises in study. Second, while study of necessary objects has a necessary character, the study of normal objects has necessary and contingent aspects. The necessary character of normal objects occurs in that they exemplify necessary objects and the contingent character arises from the particular details overlaid on the necessary. (10) The status of the metaphysics so far
The development of the metaphysics of immanence, having begun in Being, now continues in three sets of reflections labeled The core of the pure metaphysics, The metaphysics of normal objects, and Reflections on the metaphysics and its development. Developments from Being may be repeated in full or abbreviated form and with or without proofs
1. Demonstration—by recognition and naming, analysis of meaning and use, and proof—of the existence of the generic necessary objects
The demonstration is in Being which has clarification of the nature of ‘demonstration’ and further details
The existence of the following necessary objects was demonstrated in Being: experience and its forms; being; the universe or all being and which contains all objects, especially all form, pattern and law; difference, domain and complement which exists when the domain exists; change and before and now and after; and the void or absence of being which contains no object—especially no form, no pattern and no law
It is possible to raise an objection that what was identified in Being as experience is not, in fact, experience or, even, that it does not exist. It is hard to know precisely what to say to someone who asserts that, in fact, experience does not exist. The first counter may be ‘What is it that does not exist?’ The objection appeared to agree that experience has meaning but to then assert that experience does not exist. Perhaps the objection is that experience is immaterial or insignificant—the response to this would be that the material character of experience is not relevant to the development here even though the development has implications for its material or immaterial character… and that significance cannot be addressed without some framework such as the present framework. I.e., a free-floating objection ‘experience is insignificant’ lacks meaning. What of the objection that experience-as-in-this-narrative is not experience? One meaning of this objection may be that experience-as-in-this-narrative does not exist: in this meaning the objection has already been addressed. Another meaning is that what is here called experience should not be so called or is a trivial meaning. Again, this objection may be addressed in human terms or in relation to a framework. If the objection is that experience is irrelevant to human being, the first answer is that it is certainly relevant and important to this human being—and to many others. A second answer is that experience is important in terms of what can be done with the concept—and this will also be the answer in terms of a framework or system of ideas. This answer, of course, lies in the development of the metaphysics and it is for this reason that it has been relevant to raise the issue at this point
2. Conclusions from the existence and properties of the universe
Recall that the universe is all being and contains all objects: all things or entities and processes, all Form, Pattern and Law—this is the first source of the name ‘metaphysics of immanence.’ The thought to use that name includes the idea that that things of the ‘mind,’ which are often assigned a secondary existential status or perhaps even a non-existential status, are, after all, real. The forms of experience or sentience and all of its constituent and related ideas such as percept, concept, feeling, awareness, idea, thought, image, are in the universe. Thus far, the existence of Form, Pattern and Law outside has not been shown—this demonstration will be given in ‘conclusions from the properties of the void.’ What is clear, here, is that if there are Forms outside experience, then those Forms along with forms of experience are equally real and are—immanent—in the universe
Clearly, on the existence of an external world—an existence that does not depend on experience for its existence—experience need not go to the root of being. Whether there is an external world and, then, whether a valid extension of the concept of experience is co-extensive with being will be taken up in discussing conclusions from the existence of the void
It is important to be clear about the meaning of immanence. That Forms are immanent in being does not mean that there is some external object or idea that is attached to or enmeshed with being. It means that Form is of being: since there is nothing and not just no-thing outside the universe—outside being—it cannot be otherwise
If an event (thing) is described but never occurs (exists,) it cannot be possible. If it occurs or exists, it is possible
I.e. actuality and possibility are identical in their reference even though apparently distinct with regard to sense
Since actuality and possibility are identical, they must both be identical to necessity. That is, what is cannot not be otherwise—it might be if the universe was otherwise but the universe is not and cannot be otherwise. The meaning of necessity so introduced—and its relation to other meanings of necessity that have arisen without benefit of the metaphysics under development—is analyzed in Logic
Absolute possibility
In fact a definite concept of possibility has been introduced. This concept of possibility, which refers to possibility of occurrence in the universe, is absolute possibility
It may be thought that some other notion of possibility may be retained, but since there is nothing outside the universe, the sense of absolute or universal possibility must be identical to the sense of actuality—even though there may be an expectation of a different sense. I.e. a different sense could be deployed before reflection but it would have to be modified to the new sense—else it would be sense-less
Relative possibility
Relative or contextual possibility refers to occurrence in a similar context. Relative to the universe, there is no ‘other’ context. When the context is the universe, relative possibility is absolute possibility
Remarks on absolute and relative possibility
Absolute possibility will be seen to be logical possibility
Physical possibility is a form of relative possibility. The prototype of physical possibility is consistency with the laws of physics
The common or naïve concept of possibility is a kind of relative possibility
Absolute possibility should not be confused with the common concept—it is easy to fall into this confusion
The identity of the possible and the necessary and the varieties of ‘necessity’ are taken up in discussion of ‘conclusions from the existence and properties of the void’
3. Conclusions regarding and from the existence and properties of the void
Existence and fundamental properties of the void
That the void contains no Object, no Form, no Pattern or Law and that it exists has been shown earlier in Being. Because the existence of the void is essential to development of the metaphysics, (a) some alternate proofs are given in the next paragraph, and (b) it is important entertain doubts about the validity of the demonstrations. General objections and counterarguments are taken up later in this chapter
Doubts about the existence of the void
First, repeat the proof of existence of the void given so far. As the complement of the universe relative to itself or the complement of any element of being relative to itself, the void exists. A variant proof. The complement of a part exists. As the part approaches the whole, the complement exists at every stage of the approach and its limit is the void
An objection to the proof of existence of the void
The idea of ‘part’ is conceptual and the content of a concept should not imply anything about the world. Counterargument—if existence is merely recognition of variety, part is not merely conceptual (if part is defined by a conceptual property, the particular part may be merely conceptual)
An objection to the proof that the void contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law
The discussion in this paragraph may anticipate some later developments and the phrase ‘as noted’ may refer to later developments. The universe was defined as all being and it was therefore concluded that, since there can be nothing outside the universe, it must contain all Objects etc. However, that the universe contains all actual objects does not imply that it contains all logically possible objects. Therefore, the proof that the void contains no objects is a proof that it contains no actual objects and it may contain other logically possible objects. Counterargument—the premise of the object is valid but the conclusion is simply incorrect: the void contains no objects whatsoever… and this property of the void is seen, below, to imply that the universe must contain all logically possible objects. Observation—the objection may, however, appear to show that the identification of the possible and the actual is incorrect. This, however, is also incorrect since, regarding all being, there can be nothing that is possible but not actual—the idea of possibility encompassing more than actuality is valid only for a context that is not all being, i.e., as noted, there are different senses of possibility: unqualified possibility, which as noted is logical possibility, and contextual possibility which includes unqualified possibility—when the context has no limits—and physical possibility, i.e., ‘universes’ or cosmologies that may be different from this one but that obey the physical laws of this one. It is interesting that since, as noted, the universe is seamless, the concept of physical possibility may be a rough one or, at least, require further clarification or investigation
Alternate proofs of the existence of the void
As a result of doubt, alternate proofs of the existence of the void may be useful. The alternate proofs now follow
1. That the void exists is not intrinsically paradoxical. The existence of the void should be equivalent to its non-existence; therefore the void may be taken to exist
2. Attaching the void to an entity makes no difference to the constitution of the entity; therefore the void may be taken to exist
3. In physics the zero force may be said to exist; it is the force that does not change uniform motion; this of course is not a proof of the existence of the void but shows that existence may be assigned to a quantity of zero magnitude
A clarification
If the universe has a non-manifest phase, that phase will be the void; of course this final item does not at all prove existence of the void but provides one way to see how it may be real rather than merely a conceptual fiction
An inductive ‘proof’ of the existence of the void
In science the ‘proof’ of a law or theory from data is a generalization. Of course, the generalization is not a mere generalization for there is some attempt to discern a pattern or symmetry—perhaps of the object, perhaps of the laws or theory developed so far—and the generalization or modification—expresses the discerned patterns. However since alternative patterns may be possible, the scientific laws and theories retain an hypothetical nature. This kind of inference has been called induction and is considered further in Logic. The study of inductive inference has included attempts to make induction more secure. An empiricist program sometimes called positivism attempted—primarily in the first half of the twentieth century—to show how theoretical inference necessarily follows from the data but the flaw of the approach is already visible in the nature of induction; positivism is no longer thought to be viable. Alternative approaches stressed simplicity and beauty—and probabilistic inference. After the failure of positivism, some approaches of the twentieth century stressed the hypothetical character of science but emphasized the idea that theories become accepted as more and more confirming data and successful applications build up. Thus even though being open to disconfirmation, scientific theories become accepted on account of their success—and such features as simplicity, beauty, symmetry, the existence of conservation laws, and probabilistic inference when possible add to the confidence in the theories. It is key, then, in this line of twentieth century thought that while there is confidence and realism in scientific theories, there is openness to revision, the realism is a limited realism and there is an inevitable hypothetical character to scientific theories. One way of looking at this situation is that at any given time, the received theories have validity in a limited domain. As theory and improved measurement makes new realms of phenomena possible, data from new domains—the microscopic realm, remote regions in space and time, objects of higher energy, spectra of higher or lower frequency—becomes visible and may put the current theories in doubt; and new theory may arise that subsumes both new and old data and reveals the older theory to be a special case. This view of the progression of science may be called hypothetical-progressive or revolutionary. In Logic, an alternative though not contradictory view of the nature of theory will be argued but here the revolutionary view will be used to argue for proof of the existence of the void—the absence of being—and, more generally, to argue the metaphysics of immanence
Regard the existence of the void and the metaphysics of immanence as being introduced hypothetically as an attempt to bring coherence into the split between empirical observation that even when enhanced by scientific theory can only see so far and the fact that there is no reason in either science or reason to assume that the boundary of the empirical world is the boundary of the actual world. First, note that the metaphysics does not contradict science or valid common sense in their domains—of course both science and the metaphysics do necessary violence to a variety of aspects of common sense. In fact, as will become evident, the metaphysics provides immense illumination of the nature and the theories of science. Second, the metaphysics recognizes and reveals the empirical character of a number of concepts that might seem metaphysical in the esoteric sense but are not so. An example is the universe as all being; the concept is esoteric if by ‘universe’ reference is made to remote detail; however, if reference is made only to the fact that there is both immediate and remote detail that both lie within the universe but reference is not made to the distinctions implied by the concept of detail then ‘universe’ is empirical. Whereas empirical science—which includes its theories—does not manifestly recognize the universe—as all being—the metaphysics does and does so empirically and without inconsistency. Third, the metaphysics has a host of predictions, developed throughout the narrative, and that are open to being disconfirmed. The parallel of the void to the quantum vacuum is a qualitative confirmation—even though the void and the quantum vacuum are not identical; this lack of identity might be a disconfirmation of either metaphysics of immanence or quantum theory if the other were given. Note that although the claim has been made that the proof of the metaphysics is a logical proof, since the objective here is to give an inductive argument the logical proof is set aside. Finally, the metaphysics introduces vast symmetry from the identities of metaphysics and logic, to logic as the law of being, to the equivalence of all states of the universe, to details of logic as developed in Logic
The fundamental principle of metaphysics
The fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence also called the fundamental principle of the theory of being, the fundamental principle of metaphysics, or, simply, the fundamental principle—if a concept, picture or description has no internal or external contradiction, it must be realized from the void. This has the obvious and immediate generalization—if a concept, picture or description has no internal or external contradiction, it must be realized from any state. And—every non-contradictory state is realized. Demonstration of the principle: the non-realization of a non-contradictory concept would be a Law of the void; however the void contains no Law; therefore every non-contradictory concept must be and is realized. The principle is the cornerstone of the metaphysics and, therefore, it is crucial to take up Objections and counterarguments and this is done below
In the statement of the fundamental principle, ‘having no internal or external contradiction’ is roughly equivalent to ‘being logical.’ To replace the first phrase in quotes by the second would seem to be circular for the question then arises as to what it means to be logical. That it is not circular may be seen that while the substitution suggests a notion of—an aspect of—logic, the discovery of the principles of logic is empirical in that the discovery involves trial and error. Further, of the fundamental principles of logic—identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle—the principle of identity is near tautology, the principle of the excluded middle is questionable, and, therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is, perhaps, the essential principle of logic
The non-circular character of the idea of ‘being logical’ may be explained by appeal to adaptation of description, grammar and so on. Such explanations which are not proofs but may be reasons for belief have been labeled ‘transcendental’
The fundamental principle has the following trivial consequences
A restatement of the principle
Any consistent class of concepts, pictures or descriptions is and must be realized—this is a restatement of the principle
Care is needed in considering what is consistent and therefore actual. Consider ‘There is an individual who knows everything!’ Although the claim may seem absurd, there is no explicit logical impossibility. However, depending on what ‘know everything’ is taken to mean, there may be a logical impossibility relative to that meaning. Additionally assuming a fine grained structure such as that of this cosmological system it may be contingently impossible—impossible relative to the assumed structure—for organisms to know all facts of the universe or even of the cosmos
Properties of the void
Any void generates every void. It is irrelevant whether the number of voids is taken to be infinite, finite but greater than one, or just one. The number of voids may be taken to be one
From every state, including the void state, every other state is accessible i.e. no state is inaccessible—an exception to accessibility might be the contradictory ‘states’ which need not be mentioned since they need not be regarded as states
The universe is equivalent to the void
The universe enters—and leaves—a state of being the void
The fundamental problem of metaphysics
When in the void state, the universe must leave it for a manifest state—this resolves the classic problem ‘why there is anything at all’ or ‘why there is something rather than nothing’ that Heidegger—and others—regarded as the fundamental problem of metaphysics
There is an improvement to this resolution to the fundamental problem as follows. Either there is something or not. In the latter case, the void exists—and it follows from the fundamental principle that something did and will exist. Temporally, it is not necessary that there is an eternal state of manifest being—as seen above, the universe must phase in and out of the manifest state
Fact is stranger than fiction
The fundamental principle, just shown to be true, is the assertion that the entire system of consistent descriptions is—must be—realized; that is, the only universal fictions are the logical contradictions—fact is stranger than fiction
From science, religion, myth, literature, drama, art, history and imagination, whatever system of concepts, descriptions and pictures hold without contradiction is and must be realized—the universe contains all mystery
On Logic
Since the possible and the actual are identical, all possible states are realized. It will be seen that Logic may be taken to be theory of possibility or, equivalently, the theory of descriptions of—all—actual states and, further, that Logic is the—one—law of the Universe—of all being without exception
A metaphysics that is ultimate in breadth
If a metaphysics is thought to be an attempt to encompass all that exists, the metaphysics revealed by the fundamental principle is a successful metaphysics. Other successful metaphysical systems can be no broader—and, as will be seen, no deeper
The metaphysics is ultimate in breadth in that it encompasses the variety of being
The breadth is the highest consistent order of infinity
What is conceivable is of the highest consistent order of infinity. What is explicitly describable—in linear language—is of a lower order of infinity. Therefore, the variety of being cannot be encompassed by a linear sequence of descriptions
While the metaphysics does not provide a scheme to describe all states, it encompasses them and, so, the breadth is implicit
Discovery without end
In other words, the discovery of the variety of being is without end. This may be seen as good
Resolution of the apparent violation of common sense—and science
The fundamental principle and its consequences clearly seem to violate common sense and science. The resolution of any apparent contradiction or paradox is taken up below in discussing the concept of the normal. Apparent violations of common sense and science are also addressed below in the discussion of Objections and counterarguments
Discussion consequences of the fundamental principle continues immediately and in the chapters Objects through Cosmology and the divisions Human World through Transformation
Further properties of the void
The void exists and contains no thing, Form, Pattern or Law; i.e., since, as will be seen in Objects thing and form fall under object, the void contains no object—this has merely repeated the definition and properties of the void already established
The void is simple. The simplicity of the void is ultimate—this thought is taken up below in the discussion of substance and determinism. Since all states may be seen as coming from—equivalent to—the void, the simplicity of the void may be seen as conceptual rather than factual
The void may be regarded as containing all non-existent and only non-existent objects. This thought, logically nice but perhaps without practical significance, becomes transparent in Objects
The number of voids may be taken to be one—or, when convenient, finitely or infinitely many
Every element of being, including the void and the universe, may be regarded as being associated with ‘its own’ void. Every element of being—including the universe in a manifest state—may experience annihilation at any time. Although stated in terms of the void so as to bring out its properties, annihilation and creation—next paragraph—may be established directly from the fundamental principle of the metaphysics
A void need not be regarded as being attached to any manifest element—this implies spontaneous creation anywhere and anytime. These thoughts on creation and annihilation have a cosmological nature
Sources of focus on the void
In Being, it was noted that selection of the idea of being as fundamental was experimental. The experimentation with ideas involved not one but a number of concepts including those of void, universe, substance and determinism
Initially there were a variety of intuitions that suggested the significance of the void. In the heart of a forest there was an experience of identity with all being and—perhaps therefore—absence of being. Focus on being suggests focus on absence of being. From theoretical physics, the creation of a—manifest phase of the—universe from a non-manifest phase need not violate conservation of energy. Therefore, it seemed that the transformations and possibilities of being might be understood by seeing all being as equivalent to the void. This might show how to see changelessness behind change (Parmenides)
The final inspiration in the shadow of mountains—an inspiration to focus on the void rather than on this cosmological system. This thought permitted transition from suggestion and intuition to logic
There are varieties of voidism in Indian and Judaic thought. Sartre and Heidegger felt nothingness to be important. Wittgenstein, Hume and Leibniz implicitly skirt the idea of the void in their suggestions that the only impossibilities are logical. Leibniz says this explicitly; Hume and Wittgenstein say something equivalent—i.e., ‘from the truth of one atomic proposition the truth of another does not follow.’ Hume’s form omitted the word ‘atomic’
On substance, determinism and absolute indeterminism
The concept of absolute indeterminism is that no state shall be inaccessible—that from any state, no state shall be unaccessed. From the fundamental principle, the universe and the void are absolutely indeterministic
It might seem that, under absolute indeterminism, structure would be impossible and, in particular, this cosmological system would be impossible. However, since no state is inaccessible, structure is necessary—and the existence of this cosmological system is necessary. These logical conclusions provide no explanation: explanations will be given later in discussing. However, there is also the following logical point
If the universe is absolutely indeterministic in that no state shall be unaccessed, it must also be absolutely deterministic in that all states shall be accessed—this shows the logical necessity of structure and of this cosmos
The kind of determinism of the previous paragraph is atemporal and is distinct from temporal determinism in which the state of the universe at any time determines its state at all times
Under temporal determinism, the future of the universe is determined by the present. However, since every point in time is or was or will be a present point in time, under determinism, the history of the universe is determined by its present. Since the present cannot be otherwise, the history of the universe is determined. This odd conclusion under determinism is contradicted by the metaphysics of immanence
A classical substance is a uniform and unchanging thing or object from which all variety and change manifest. The idea of classical substance arises, perhaps, from a desire to explain the complex from the simple—e.g., to explain the origin of a formed cosmological system
Relation to Heidegger’s thought
In repudiating substance, Heidegger went, roughly, one third of the way to an ultimate metaphysics. The remaining steps are the overcoming of determinism—as well as common causation—and related habits of thought; and replacing intuition by logic or, perhaps, seeing identity of intuition and logic. Thus, though Heidegger saw the importance of eliminating substance, he did not succeed in eliminating it
Monism
Monism is the theory that there is one substance. However, a concern immediately arises. How would monism explain variety and change? Where in the realm of the uniform is the varied, where in the realm of the unchanging is the changing? The problems of monism are one source of dualism
Dualism
Dualism is the theory that there are two or more categorially distinct substances. However, dualism runs into the same problem of explanation because the variety in the world is infinite. A theory with infinitely many substances is no longer simple and explanation of change may require reference to shifting combinations and illusion. How do shifting combinations occur if the substances are unchanging? How do they combine if they are without structure and categorially distinct? Illusion may explain change and variety but this explanation is illicit for the perceiver, too, must be of substance
The problem of substance theory is the problem of determinism
Why is substance theory unable to explain the complex in terms of the simple? It is because there is a—perhaps implicit—requirement that the explanation be deterministic i.e. that the properties of the complex explicitly fall out of—even if not seen in—the simple. The apparent simplicity of determinism is consistent with the original desire for simplicity in substance
Metaphysics of substance and metaphysics of determinism are duals
It is the tacit assumption of determinism that makes substance theory untenable, that requires the proliferation of substances that still provides no relief. The establishment of formation from the void and the recognition of the absolutely indeterministic character of the universe shows that substance theory is untenable and unnecessary
Determinism is the forgotten twin of substance theory
There is a connection between determinism and determinate form
The Void and the elimination of substance
The void may assume some aspects of the role of substance but is not a true substance—as has been seen, the void may be taken to be the basis of explanation that was sought in substance
However, since the void is not deterministic, it would be improper to refer to the void as a substance. The void is not a true substance. There is another reason for not regarding the void as a substance. This reason, already noted, is that although the void may be thought of a ‘base’ state relative to which formation and origins occur, under absolute indeterminism the role of base state may be played by any state of the universe. It is equally valid to regard any state of the universe—including that of the void—as the sub-stance of all being
Yet another reason for not regarding the void as substance is that though ‘voidism’ may have been regarded as a substance theory in certain developments of the past, here voidism is not the foundation—the metaphysics does not start with the void and there is nowhere any assumption of the fundamental character of a category or entity of being as in materialism, idealism and so on. Instead, the ‘foundation’ is that there is being—which is neither assumed nor proved but may be seen as a restatement or certain recognition of the given character of experience and which requires no further clarification but may be seen as empirical fact. The existence and characteristics of the void—and the universe and other necessary objects—and the metaphysical consequences are all derived from this foundation
Simplicity of the void. The void is ultimate in simplicity
The void and its absolute indeterminism are simpler than substance and its determinism
The void is ultimately simple. The void and absolute indeterminism are absolutely simple because they place no explanatory requirements on the elements of being. The simplicity of substance is a defined simplicity—i.e., via a stated uniform, unchanging and deterministic character a simplicity is built into the concept of substance. The simplicity of the void is different in nature—it is not defined or built in. The universe is all being and the void is the absence of being and it follows from the definitions that the void contains no objects—i.e., no form, pattern or law. The simplicity of the void is a conceptual simplicity—less is said about the character of the void than must be said about the character of substance. This gives the void what may be called a creative freedom that substance cannot have
Another motive to substance theory, perhaps related to the motive to explaining the complex from the simple, is that under determinism and without substances, there is no explanation of being that terminates at some definite place, that explanation is either incomplete or (andor) non-terminating i.e. without end
From the void there may be both finite and infinite chains of explanation. The generic explanation of being is finite
Metaphysics of immanence is non-relativist philosophy without substance
A relativist philosophy or metaphysics is one that has no foundation at which its system of explanation terminates and, therefore, does need to employ substances in its explanatory scheme—if there is one. The relativist systems of explanation must either terminate at a point that is not foundational and therefore not regarded as secure or have infinite regress; such systems may be unsatisfying but the discomfort may be endured on the grounds of intellectual honesty. A non-relativist philosophy or metaphysics is one whose system of explanation does terminate in some foundation that is regarded as secure. It is commonly thought that a non-relativist system must acknowledge substance or substances—at least in the most generic sense of the term in which a substance need not be modeled after physical or mental substance and so on, i.e., ‘enduring particulars’ but could be events, processes, or facts. It is further commonly held that in order to make sense of the world, there must be a substance in the narrower sense of individual substance such as mind or matter. However, it has here been shown that the only explanation required to make sense of the world is that there is a world; i.e., that there is being. In fact, it is beginning and continues in this narrative to emerge that the measure of being is being—and not something else or more particular—and that this makes infinitely more sense than either substance or abandonment of the comfort for the insecurity of relativist thought
Explanation from the void terminates at the void. The resulting metaphysics is not a substance theory of any kind (whether material or mental like or in the form of facts or propositions…) but is not a relativist philosophy. It is non-relativist, i.e. it provides a foundation although not a determinist one; the error in thinking that non-relativist explanation requires substance is the thought world must come deterministically from some substance
If a determinist foundation is not possible it cannot be truly desirable. Conversely, if an—absolutely—indeterministic foundation is necessary it cannot be other than desirable
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth
As the entire manifest universe in all its phases comes from and goes to the void state, explanation of the universe has foundation in the void—i.e. in being itself—without need for further regress or foundation. It has been seen that the metaphysics is also ultimate in breadth: the variety of being is harbored in its system—as cannot be the case for mind and matter in their dedicated senses. If the metaphysics were not ultimate in either depth or breadth, it could not be ultimate with regard to the other
While the metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth in that it provides a non-relativist foundation in the void, the equivalence any two states of being, noted above, shows that the metaphysics is also ultimately apparent—shallow, trivial and transparent—in that any state of being including the present state provide a non-relativist foundation
As noted earlier, the power of the metaphysics may be seen as lying in its immediacy, shallowness and triviality
Substance continued—mind and matter
Yet another appeal to substance in the form of dualism had been the absolute separation of mind and matter. Regardless of the philosophical, theological and scientific motivations for this separation, it should be clear by now that as distinct substances mind and matter could never interact and as absolute but dedicated, e.g. within this cosmos, even if indeterministic, are failed explanatory experiments
Later, it will be seen that if mind and matter are released from their local and historical moorings, they may be realized as nothing but other words for being
On account of the pre-judicial character of the ideas of mind and matter it would be confusing to substitute them for being
This opens up the resolution, in Mind and in Human being, by what is essentially the theory of formation from the void, i.e. from absolute indeterminism, of the mind-matter paradox and to an understanding of the nature of mind and its grounding and many aspects thereof
Given concepts of mind and of matter that are not other terms for being, if it is specified that mind and matter are distinct substances, there can be no causation from one to the other, no origin of one in the other
On the condition that they are substantially distinct, at least one of mind and matter cannot be a substance
Regarding matter as the fundamental element of this cosmos (i.e. as generalized to include energy and the other elements of theoretical physics,) matter can be a local and effective substance but not a true substance
Mind and matter are not substances. I.e. if they are regarded in their common senses and as substantial in nature, neither can function as a metaphysical or universal substance
Anthropomorphism and ‘cosmomorphism’
An anthropomorphic view sees being as having human nature. In an anthropocentric view, human being is—at the—the center of the universe. A modern sentiment fostered by four centuries of science and by liberalism is to de-anthropomorphize thought about non-human being e.g. other entities and the universe as a whole
However, anthropomorphism is difficult to escape. Even when explicitly shed, it may remain in the weak form of cosmomorphism—modeling the universe on the local cosmological system e.g. taking the laws of physics to be the laws or at least a blueprint for the laws of the entire universe
Cosmomorphism is the building into a metaphysics or world picture the contingent characteristics of this cosmos or, perhaps, these cosmological systems. Cosmomorphism is shed when only the most fundamental or necessary characteristics are retained—e.g., that there is being, that there is one universe
Cosmomorphism is difficult to escape. There can be no issue with a liberal cosmomorphism, i.e. one which takes the contingent empirical characteristics of modern physical cosmology, perhaps as extended by theoretical physical cosmology, not as absolute but, rather, as having some practical application in this world. A conservative cosmomorphism would be one in which the contingent characteristics are regarded as applying without exception to all being—to the entire universe, i.e., even to those parts of the universe that may lie beyond the empirical and theoretical limits of modern cosmology. Retention of a conservative cosmomorphism—mythic, religious, scientific, or philosophical-metaphysical—is infinitely restrictive of vision. Since physical cosmology defines its own limits, it cannot know what lies beyond those limits and it therefore allows that conservative cosmomorphism may be infinitely restrictive regarding the variety and extent of the universe. It will be seen in developing the metaphysics, that the word ‘may’ of the previous sentence may be replaced by ‘is’
Upon positively shedding all shreds of cosmomorphism, a vast ‘universe’ of possibility immediately appears
The result is a metaphysics of infinite and ultimate depth and breadth
A guiding principle for the metaphysician
A guiding principle for the metaphysician is to obtain conceptual distance from the immediate world without relinquishing relations to it, without relinquishing intent to return to the immediate. The immediate is essential as is home; and is useful for its suggestive power, inspiration and as test. The principle is to develop a ‘perspective’ in which the immediate and the remote, the frank and the occult are not distinguished. It is an anti-perspective
This guiding principle opens up a path to an adequate and proper conceptual relation to (understanding, knowledge of) the entire universe
As will be seen in Mind, Cosmology and Human World, the principle is also available to the study of particular aspects of the immediate world. It is helpful, for example, in the study of—human—mind. First, in recognizing the conceptual nature of mental categories and therefore seeing that neuroanatomy and neurophysiology… are at most half of the picture that is sought. Second, in the recognition that perception, thought, emotion, intuition and so on are conceptual and therefore not given as immediately experienced or conceived a play is allowed that permits movement toward a proper understanding and foundation of these categories and their relations
Some reflections on and consequences from the ‘guiding principle’
For an inhabitant of this cosmological system, knowledge of the entire universe must be of a general or abstract character. However, such knowledge is intensely and perhaps surprisingly illuminating of human knowledge and, particularly, knowledge of the immediate world
If the metaphysics of immanence is seen as remote, its implications are immediate—and momentous
It is clearly seen in the metaphysics and later in Objects and Cosmology, especially in the theory of identity—which could be developed here but whose development is perhaps more natural in Cosmology—human being—every human individual—stands at the center of being. This, however, is not the exclusive case—all entities and creatures stand at center. It is then perhaps more than a value judgment to think that human being stands neither above nor below the other forms of life. What may be lost in thinking of human being as special—which may be seen as based in insecurity fostered by a false view of being—is gained in identity: in being centered among the elements of being
Home is not a fixed place. This stands in addition to and not in opposition to the idea of a familiar and loved home. It suggests the possibility of feeling accepted everywhere
The idea that human—animal—being is a lonely accident at the edge of an vast and alien cosmos in which human—animal—being has no significance is not a fact. It is a feeling or emotion that may become attached to some contingent information
It may be undoubtedly true that any individual may be normally subject to suffering and alienation. It is a mistake—even if difficult to avoid—to elevate the normal to the universal and the necessary… just as it is a mistake to think that the normal is without meaning or significance
To suppress what is normal and to think that the universal will inevitably and routinely alleviate the normal condition are, of course, also mistaken ideas. However, it is most normal, even if rare and difficult, to seek, and to occasionally achieve a medium between these extremes; and it is also normal, even if rarer, to occasionally transcend the normal in its immediate sense
Form and the nature of Form
Since all manifest being may be regarded as coming from the void, the Forms of being are—may be regarded as—immanent in being
Form may be regarded as coming out of the void
All structure may be regarded as that of Form
Form is immanent in being i.e. it is of being rather than imposed on being
Some Forms are more durable than others
The distinction between the Forms of lesser and greater durability is not one of kind
Practically, the Forms of lesser durability may be called transients and those of greater durability may be called, simply, Forms
Actual Forms are dynamic
A Form of infinite duration—a static Form—is not a realized Form and is not capable of decay or annihilation or of interaction. I.e. static Forms have no origins—cannot come into being—and if one were to have being it would have no un-becoming or end. A static Form has no significance. The existence and non-existence of static Forms are without distinction
The existence of a static Form capable of interaction—dynamics—would be characterized by inherent contradiction and would also constitute a Law of the void. The being of a static form is logically impossible. The existence of such static Form would be a violation of any Logic immanent in being—this statement anticipates but is not used at all to found the concept of Logic of the present narrative
All Forms are dynamic
There are, as has been seen, no static forms. Forms have origins and ends
Mechanism
Mechanisms are discussed below, in this chapter, and are considered further in Cosmology
Sentient form
Also see the later discussions of sentience and sentient form and of logos and logic
Symmetry. Platonic aspects of the character of Form
The condition of durability may also be called stability and the characteristic of stable forms—the one that ‘makes’ them stable—may be called Symmetry. From modern theoretical physics, it would appear that Symmetric includes but is not limited to geometric symmetry and from now on, the single term, symmetry, will be used. Because there are no eternally durable forms, there are no absolutely stable and perfectly symmetric forms. The durable forms are relatively stable and near symmetric
An absolutely stable or perfectly symmetric form would be static—and have neither beginning nor—were it to be—end
Since all structure is Form and since there are no absolute substances, the view of being that emerges has Platonic characteristics
It has been noted that Form is immanent in being. Form is not imposed. Nor is the immanence that of a foreign kind. Form is of being, of entities as much as is being-hood
The idea of Form as foreign or imposed has probable origin in that Form is experienced as form, i.e. as perceived and therefore ascribed the vague status of an object residing in ‘mental space’ or ‘conceptual space’ but not in actual space
(There may be a conceptual space but such a space would be a domain resident in actual space)
Perfection—symmetry—of form is never attained, is logically impossible and is therefore not desirable
It cannot be desirable
A metaphysics of form
The metaphysics of immanence is a metaphysics in which the structure in the world has characteristics of Form rather than substance
There is no separate Platonic world
However, there is no separate Platonic world or universe. All actual worlds are in the one universe. Forms reside in this world—in the one universe
On power
At the outset of the discussion of being, a promise was made to connect to the concept of power—the ability to have an effect. The fundamental principle shows that being must have power, i.e., effect. Knowability is a form of power. Must being be knowable? In the common meaning of knowledge, the answer is ‘no.’ However there is a necessary and consistent extension of knowledge to the root, just as and because mind and experience extend to the root, which (1) shows that being must be knowable and (2) stands as a reminder that the special status—an immateriality, a not of this worldliness—that is often assigned to mental content is mistaken
4. Conclusions from the existence of domains and their complements
The idea of domains has been used occasionally above but it is useful to gather some specific conclusions from the existence of domains and complements together in order to benefit from systematic use
If a creator is external to what is created, the universe can have no creator. One part of the universe may create another part. That is logically possible. However, origins in terms of a normal incremental mechanism of random variation and selection of relatively stable states—elaborated below and in Cosmology—may be far more likely
The form of one cosmological system may be ‘informed’ by that of another or of the background universe. It is perhaps typical that complexity and intelligence are self-formed while formation from the outside occurs for at most initial conditions. This is because, with exceptions, a formative system must require a much greater complexity that a formed one—causal formation is far more complex than spontaneous origin in terms of a normal mechanism
As an explanation of origin form, omnipotence—God—is seriously deficient. The idea of explanation requires explanation of to be of the complex in terms of the simple and the evident. However, omnipotence is infinitely more complex and far less apparent than the manifest world. Which is not to say that there is no external effect in the formation of, e.g., a cosmological system but that the likelihood of an external cause being the entire cause—that origins should be entirely causal—is extremely unlikely. Arguments regarding external formation and its extent should take place on a case by case basis
In the sense of cause as determining, the void is not and cannot be a causal creator of manifest being. Although the manifest universe may be seen as coming out of the void, it is a stretch of meaning to say that the void created the manifest universe
However, the following are true. Given the universe in a void state, the universe will enter a manifest state; and, a manifest state is followed by the void. From some visitations to the void state, myriad cosmological systems will emerge before the next void state
Whether the void may be regarded as a causal agent depends on the meaning of causation. There is a project to investigate the meanings of cause according to which the void may be said to cause manifestation and according to which one domain may be said to cause or create another
Although the depth and power of the metaphysics of immanence has become clear, what is presented so far is a beginning. This beginning is taken forward, elaborated and applied in the remainder of the narrative, especially in the part Foundation and Journey in being. The developments so far have clear metaphysical content and significance. The concern that certain ‘objects’ have been shown to exist but the question of knowledge of the objects—beyond existence—has not been addressed is taken up in Objects. Further developments continue below. The concept of the normal addresses the apparent violence done to ‘common sense’ and science by the metaphysics. Here and in subsequent chapters—especially Mind, Logic and Meaning, Cosmology and the chapters of Human World—there that elaborates the interaction of the metaphysics and various topics from the particular to a level of generality or abstraction that is close to that of the metaphysics itself. The use of the developments of Theory of Being and Human World in the transformation of being is the subject of the—second—part of the narrative labeled Journey
5. Development of the concept of the normal and its relation to the probable
It has been seen that the metaphysics of immanence does apparent violence to common sense and to science and philosophy as usually understood to reveal the nature of the universe. Whereas common sense suggests that the given forms, stabilities and facts of this world define broad features of the universe, the metaphysics shows an infinitely greater variety of fact and form and an underlying universe of stabilities amid transience. Where science reveals broad features of this cosmological system and its laws and the broad features of the story of life on this earth, the metaphysics reveals these as but an infinitesimal element of being. Where it is almost invariably thought that a non-relativist metaphysics must be based in a substance at some finite depth, the metaphysic of immanence is non-relativist but requires and can have no substance
Since the metaphysics of immanence can be seen as a foundation in absolute indeterminism, the question of the possibility of structure arises
There is a trivial response to the violence of common sense and the possibility of structure. It is that what is actual is not only possible but must be necessary. A less trivial response is to appeal to the fundamental principle—every consistent state must be realized and further, every actual state must be consistent
The forms of cosmological systems—such as this one—that are very special in relation to the necessary infinity of form in the universe are labeled normal
What is normal is necessary—no explanation of the normal is necessary
Regarding formation from the void as origin, the fundamental principle shows that formation may occur in a single step, a few steps, or gradually and incrementally in a process in which every step—most steps—are incremental variations from one relatively stable state to another. It is reasonable to expect that incremental origins are far more likely than large step origins. Incremental origins by indeterministic variation from relatively stable to relatively stable state may be labeled a normal mechanism and the corresponding explanation a normal explanation
While normal mechanisms usually prevail, it is necessary that there shall be situations in which the likely mechanism does not fit the normal mold as described above
What constitutes normal behavior is not of one mold
The standard concepts of the typical objects of this cosmos may be labeled normal concepts
It is proper to talk about normal objects since the conclusions, even for normal objects, here, are necessary. While the metaphysics of immanence determines that there shall be—normal—correspondences between normal concepts and normal objects, it does not follow from the metaphysics that the normal concepts of this world correspond to normal and external objects
The generic explanation of the relation between normal concepts and objects is that a lock between a normal concept and a normal external object is far more likely than a free floating concept that lock does not occur in every instance of the normal concept
Details of the explanation are deferred to Objects
6. Conclusions from and about specific empirical forms. (a) Conclusions from and about the fact and form of experience or sentience which includes experience of the fact of experience, experience of the external object, experience of self and other—including the idea of ‘you’ as explicitly similar to ‘I.’ (b) Conclusions from and about the form and existence of particular domains, especially this cosmological system
General conclusions and observations
That the empirical forms are highly specific, detailed and—apparently—immediate should not result in the deception that the necessary forms are not empirical and immediate. As an example, in talking of the—entire—universe the term universe could have a number of senses of which two are all being with reference to all its details and all being as a single entity without any reference to distinction or detail. While the former sense has non-empirical content, the latter is empirical and only empirical for all that is necessary to know that there is all being in the latter sense is that there is being which follows from the fact of experience
The specific domains of empirical knowledge as being of this cosmological system are of intrinsic interest. The domains include large domains of human knowledge—the sciences including psychology, history, significant portions of mathematics, philosophy, and, even, religion
Conclusions of and about the metaphysics from the empirical domains
Even if what is known empirically is regarded as hypothetical, it provides raw material for possible content and suggests methods and mechanisms. As an example of content, that the cosmos is conveniently described in terms of space and time—space-time—provokes a fruitful analysis of space and time in terms of the metaphysics. As an example of mechanism, the idea of variation and selection from evolutionary biology is ever suggestive. It is important to recognize, however, that the existence of content and mechanism is not taken as proof; questions of proof—as they arise—are taken up independently of sources of ideas
Conclusions from the metaphysics regarding empirical knowledge
It has been seen that certain empirical objects such as experience, being-itself, and all-being require are necessary consequences of the fact of our being. In fact, ‘necessary consequence’ and ‘fact of being’ are understatements. Those objects are the fabric of our being; our being is no mere fact but the place or ground of fact. Facts may be questioned but only because there is a place of questioning… The empirical objects in question are coeval with metaphysics
Does the metaphysics found post-metaphysical empirical knowledge by showing the existence of what seem to be external objects as actual external objects? Not quite. If the system of empirical knowledge is consistent, there must be corresponding external objects somewhere in the universe. That does not imply that a given concept is locked in to an actual external object; rather the locking is, perhaps, made more likely—talk of probability may require hypotheses about fine-grained structure. Philosophers have no agreement on what proofs show the existence of external objects, e.g. in the case of the problem of other minds, or whether those proofs are conclusive. The metaphysics makes the existence of external objects more probable via arguments just mentioned. One fine grained argument goes as follows. Any one can observe, ‘It is hardly likely that I am the author of the universe as a figment of my mind. If I were the author of the universe as figment I would face all kinds of paradox. There would be figments called Germans who appear to know far more of the German language than I even though I created them.’ A more conclusive proof might require the assumption of physical theory—atomism, the quantum theory and so on. Perhaps in the final analysis we would end up admitting that even physical hypotheses have no certain purchase. It might then follow that a purely rational proof—a metaphysical or philosophical proof—of the existence of the non-necessary external objects is impossible; this in fact appears to be the case since the existence of the solipsist appears to be logically possible. This is—would be—good to know. If the metaphysics is unable to provide proof of lock-in external merely empirical—not necessary—objects, it assists in analysis of the status of the metaphysical problem. One way it does that is to provide a framework for assessing the possible options regarding the existence of objects and to suggest probabilities to associate with the options
The metaphysics shows that human empirical knowledge of the world is an infinitesimal fraction of the actual variety. While the empirical knowledge has obvious significance, one significance, then, that it does not have is the definition of the universe in extent, duration and variety. Empirical knowledge is as deficient as corrupt religions in providing insight into the existence or non-existence of a spiritual world. The metaphysics shows, first, that the term ‘spiritual’ is rather vague and that the proper distinction is that of the actual / possible and the normal: what might be termed spiritual lies, roughly, in the domain of the actual outside the normal. A more practical example is the insight provided by the metaphysics into space-time-matter of this cosmological system by locating it in a larger context of space-time-matter possibilities in the context of a universe that must go through phases of being the void. This analysis is taken up in Cosmology
The interaction of metaphysics of immanence and standard domains of empirical knowledge is immensely fruitful
Conclusions from the fact and form of experience about the nature of experiencing
That there is experience of an external world does not imply the existence of an external world. From the fundamental principle there may be domains or phases of the universe that are characterized by a single center of experience without an external object. What may be concluded from the experience of an external world is that the existence of the external world is immensely likely. It is conceivable that there are fine structures that allow a single center of experience to create the rich experiential variety of a human individual. However, in terms of most fine structures, including those that conform to human experience, it appears to be immensely unlikely that a single human mind could reconstruct the immense variety of experience
Some thoughts on the form of sentience follow
Sentience may be seen as a relation among forms. This sets up the possibility of error, paradox, and correction
Alternately, sentience may be seen as a form that includes the related forms and their relation. These forms are Forms as Forms and though they may be forms of experience, they may be revealed only imprecisely in experience
Excepting paradox, all forms have the possibility of sentience—this has been seen in an earlier discussion of mind
However, significant forms of experience may require sufficient durability for the appropriate elaboration of form
Some details of a logic of the nature of the field of experience now follow
Sentience may be regarded as a field of sentience or as a field of bodies with experience
There is no logical difference between these depictions
The sentient-field and body-experience field descriptions of organisms in the world are merely different terminologies
In some phases of the universe, a single sentient form is possible, therefore actual
Therefore, any argument against solipsism must be practical or contingent, i.e. in such and such a kind of system of beings e.g. durable evolved, solipsism would be impoverished or impossible
In this phase, a single sentient form is logically possible but, from complexity, practically so improbable that there should not be reasonable doubt that this cosmos (world) is populated as in the multiple centers of experience form of experience and intuition, i.e., by individuals. There may be fine structures—e.g. some forms of atomism—under which it is impossible that a cosmos should be a solipsist
Except for the eternal solipsist, solipsism, i.e. occasional solipsism of the universe or a domain of the universe, is possible and necessary on account of the Theory of being
Logically, universe may be seen as a solipsist. However, since it enters a phase of being the void it would not be an eternal solipsist even though the universe is eternal—it is the manifest universe that is not eternal
Given the structure of this world, the world of human experience is far richer than it could be if the individual were a solipsist
The discussions in Mind, Cosmology and Human World will elaborate conclusions from the form of experience including the experience of Identity regarding which it will be seen that the experience of an isolated identity is an approximation to a fuller experience of Identity
The behavior of this cosmological system is subject to the fundamental principle and therefore from any state of the system any state of the universe is accessible
The normal behavior of this cosmological system, however, includes deterministic-like and causal behavior. It also includes and non-causal behavior as in the quantum description at microscopic levels that often but not invariably averages out as causal or near causal behavior at macroscopic levels and which permits a number of otherwise inexplicable macroscopic behaviors. The—variation and selection—mechanism of evolution is a normal mechanism for—explanation of—evolution and, more generally, of becoming; this mechanism may be framework for other, more specific, mechanisms. The experience of space and time in this cosmological system, including its expression in the theory of gravitation—Einstein’s general relativity—are among the normal behaviors of this cosmos
The metaphysics of immanence must permit the observed behavior of this cosmos
Together with—the pure—metaphysics of immanence, the forms of this cosmological system will suggest and permit numerous conclusions of General Cosmology and possibilities for local, physical or normal cosmologies
The earlier discussions of Form, General Cosmology and Mind and Matter are relevant to the Local or Physical Cosmology and other local cosmologies
The treatment of the issues of empirical domains of knowledge is taken up in subsequent chapters, especially Mind and Cosmology. The question of the foundation of such knowledge is further addressed in Objects. Objects further contributes to the discussion via a careful analysis of the variety of objects and, especially, kinds of objects such as particular or concrete objects and abstract objects such as number, morals, and logic as an object. The metaphysics of immanence is instrumental in the definitive treatment of abstract objects which shows them to not be as different from particular or ‘concrete’ objects as has traditionally been thought
7. Objections and counterarguments. These arise in reflecting on the development of the metaphysics
Some objections to proof of the existence of the void have been considered earlier
It may be objected that the void is an event and not a state. It remains the case that in the void, the universe passes through a state in which there is no Form, Pattern or Law
1. What may appear to be the use of mere concepts—e.g. void, universe and domain—to demonstrate actual or real consequences. This objection arises regarding the proof of the fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence. The objection is, of course, serious, first, in its nature and second and most importantly in that, if valid, it puts the foundation of the metaphysics of immanence—it’s fundamental principle—in question. I.e. the objection is not a disproof of the fundamental principle but is a proof that the given proof lacks validity
2. Quantum theory implies that the absence of things—the ground state of the local cosmos—is be the quantum vacuum which is far from the absence of being but is a seat of enormous of energy, a place of continuous creation and destruction of particle pairs
3. The violation of common sense in the ideas of ‘something from nothing’ and the realization of all consistent systems of description and, in physics, possible violations of the principle of conservation of energy
1. The basis in mere concepts is only apparent. The actual basis has been seen to be empirical
The intensely empirical character of the—concepts of—universe, void and so on has been discussed at length. It is the fact that these necessary objects are so close to ‘seeing’ that, in their immediacy, their empirical character may escape notice. These objects are not mere concepts. There are further objections regarding the idea of ‘all being.’ One is that, as a concept, the idea may entail self-reference. There may be self-reference in that an individual referring to ‘all being’ refers also to him or herself. However, in viewing all being as an entity but not with regard to—all—its details there is no necessary self-reference. In Logic it will be seen that it is not self-reference per se that results in paradox. Another problem may be thought to arise in that all being also includes concepts. In the discussion of abstract objects, it will be seen that concepts are objects and that the concept of the concept is not a new category. A further objection to or problem with the idea of all being is the possibility of infinitely many decompositions of it into possible objects. However, although this possibility exists, it is no more explicit in reference to all being than is the same possibility for any object. The arbitrariness of decomposition is an interesting idea that is discussed elsewhere in the narrative
2. The void lies below the quantum vacuum
The quantum vacuum is the seat of patterns of behavior that are laws. The void contains no law and is therefore ‘below’ the quantum vacuum in simplicity and fundamental character. The void ‘generates’ the quantum laws of this—our—cosmological system as well as the laws and entities of all cosmological systems
3. Common sense may be violated. However, the developments are dually empirical and rational. Therefore, common sense may require reeducation
Common sense and intuition—at least for some persons—is indeed violated; there is nothing, it may appear, in common day-to-day life that suggests the origin of a cosmos out of a void. However, common sense, experience, and intuition are situated in the everyday world. It may be said of such intuition that its extrapolation to the universe is an extrapolation of a mere or contingent empirical fact—or absence of fact—to the form of intuition and, more, to the form of the necessary. Self-aware empirical common sense is silent on such issues and—should it desire to know—will seek to follow the analysis. It appears to be a fact of human variety that some individuals are bound to their experience more than others. However, as will be seen in Human being, both binding and freedom are important to being human—and to think that freedom is essentially and only destructive or essentially and only creative are essentialist over-reactions to the imperfections and possibilities of freedom. It is interesting that the integration of intuition and analysis is to algebraic thought where the partial replacement of intuition by analytic expression allows the analysis of forms not amenable to intuition… Attention now turns to the issue of violation of the principle of conservation of energy. It is an immediate consequence of the fundamental principle that, regarding the entire universe, conservation of energy does not—cannot—obtain and that—near—conservation laws are perhaps features of relatively stable worlds. However, since, in terms of physical theory, energies can be positive as well as—e.g. gravitational field energy—negative, spontaneous creation of ‘a universe’ from nothing need not violate the physical principle of conservation of energy
The discussion in this section has semantic and ‘political’ dimensions. The semantic aspect results in further clarification of meaning itself and of existence and experience. The political dimension includes the naïve one that there is a tendency to want to ‘own’ words. However, what is important is the concept and since a word may designate more than one concept, this political dimension is based upon a mistake
Another more overtly political aspect of meaning is the desire or intent to employ power charged words to a special purpose. There must always be some tension between the relatively neutral and overtly political use of a word and some of this tension is defused by pointing out that ‘political’ has more than one connotation. Here, the thought is that politics has to do with personal and interpersonal power in general rather than in any special context. In this meaning, politics is very much in the sphere of use. Therefore, it may be asked whether there is a point to distinguishing the semantic and the political. The point is this. In the present narrative, politics is one dimension of language use—even if the vague phrase ‘everything is political’ is true. There are other dimensions. There is the how-we-stand-in-relation-to-the-world dimension which is not apolitical but whose use stands open rather than committed (to any special present purpose.) There will of course be disagreement. Perhaps there is no more that can be done than to take each context, each word case by case. Perhaps, real arguments can be given; even so it would be naïve to expect to ‘win.’ Perhaps fate is the master of language, meaning, use and truth; perhaps there is no master
The general problem identified. Resolution: one word, two symbols (concepts)
‘It is in the meaning of existence that in having this discussion or even in having an illusion of a discussion, there is existence’—something like that is said above. However, it might be replied, ‘No, existence does not necessarily have that kind of meaning at all. Existence has many meanings of which your meaning is but one. To assert that your meaning is the only meaning is to assert a privilege that you do not have and may not claim.’ The concern is a general one regarding meaning. The objection has semantic and—perhaps implicit—political dimensions. The semantic dimension includes that a word such as ‘existence’ may well have a variety of meanings or shades of meaning. Although they employ the same sign, ‘existence,’ they correspond to distinct concepts or shades of concept. Matters could be kept in order by using different signs but that might be confusing in certain ways
A serious version of the problem. The charge that the selected meaning of existence is untenable. Response—given the present analyses of experience and existence, the first burden of argument lies with the critic
A more serious charge might be that the selected meaning of existence is not tenable. However, as has been seen some aspect of meaning is and must be beyond analysis and for this it suffices in the beginning to identify what aspects of meaning are most immediate and the subsequent process is experimental rather than primarily analytic. The political dimension of meaning is that, in the case of a significant idea, there may be conflict regarding appropriation of the sign used to designate the concept. It is especially appealing to users of a tradition to deploy a received meaning (that it is received is not a measure of validity or invalidity.) And it is especially appealing to others—the critic, the iconoclast, the deconstructionist, the thinker who would be democratic with regard to ideas—to make negative assertions about received meaning. Naturally, the semantic and the political are not altogether independent for an aspect of appropriation may be to make the implicit claim that other meanings have no semantic validity. However, it is necessary to show that such meanings have no such validity and not merely to make the claim or to suggest that the meanings in question have been used to negative ends. If one is not a pragmatist, the ends argument may suggest that the negative ends meaning not be used but not that it is invalid and, regarding the pragmatic argument, there is a valid question of what kinds of end are to be chosen and when
If the critic does not respond to the first burden of proof but continues to insist that their meaning is the meaning they have not heard or understood the ‘one word, two symbols’ argument (assuming of course that no further argument has been produced by the critic)
The position in this narrative has been the one asserted above—that a term or word may have a variety of meanings, that in principle the variety of meanings correspond to a variety of symbols, that each meaning could be assigned a distinct word e.g. existence1, existence2 and so on but, provided the distinctions are kept in mind, this is not necessary. The thrust of the narrative has included that the chosen meanings have evolved or been selected to enable development of the ultimate metaphysics and its consequences. The task of the critic must be to show that the meaning selected here has no reference by way of emptiness or contradiction or that the present meaning is used illicitly. If a critic argues that his or her meaning is the valid one they have not understood what has just been said about ‘one word many symbols.’ If they insist on using their, different, meaning, that would not be ‘invalid,’ but the ensuing discussion would not be about the content of this narrative; rather it would be to engage in another discourse that is perhaps at most tangential to the present one
Absurdity of the one word, one symbol argument of some ‘critics’
If the critic insists on some other meaning and insists that the meanings in this narrative are but one of many then it would be necessary to employ the seeming artifice of using distinct words for the distinct symbols. It is amusing that if distinct words had not been employed there might be no argument but when the same word is accidentally used for distinct meanings there may follow what appears to be a debate about meaning but is of the form the use of z to mean Z is invalid because x actually means X. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assert that the valid criticisms of the arguments of the narrative would deploy the meanings of the narrative and show that either the meanings or the arguments are lacking in substance. In doing so the critic would face the following concern. In a critique of the meaning of one of the terms, the meanings of other terms would come into question
Proper criticism should address the entire system of meaning rather than just individual word meaning. Possibility of open ended versus closed discussion
Therefore, the criticism would employ the entire system of meaning of the narrative. In the process of criticism or discussion, certain terms might arise that are external to the system of the narrative and these terms might be either of the same kind or level as those of system or otherwise e.g. from a common but diffuse vocabulary or, perhaps, from the vocabulary of criticism. Discussion of the meanings of these extra-system terms might also arise. How might this discussion be approached? One possibility is that meaning is open ended and that there is no final settling of such matters even though there may be occasions of general agreement. Another possibility is that the meanings of the extra-system terms may be given definite meaning in terms of some system—perhaps the metaphysical system of the narrative. Would that be valid? If only the pure elements of the metaphysics were used, it would appear that this approach to the meaning of the extra-system terms is based in Logic
Reasons for confidence in the present narrative and reasons for openness to discussion
Even though it has been shown that the metaphysics is ultimate in depth and breadth, it is not reasonable to anticipate that all critical vocabulary could be brought within the system or shown to lack validity even if this should have been done for all critical vocabulary so far. Therefore, there may be a confidence in the system of the narrative. Therefore, also, there is openness to discussion. Although reason is a source of confidence, openness is and should be another. If the metaphysics is to ‘survive’ it must be open for, even if ultimate, its strength cannot be in isolation or dogmatic insistence. The power of the concept of ‘being’ is that it allows both known and unknown and it allows reference to both known and unknown to be simply empirical or, in the admission of details of what is beyond the empirical, to be non-empirical in that there are concepts that await objects on which to lock but not in that those concepts have no objects. In its origin, a basic purpose of the system lay in the service of ‘life’ and this, as well, is a fundamental aspect of openness
It is hoped that discussion should not reduce to quibbles about sign-association. An example: the ultimate versus the immediate
The metaphysical developments show quibbles about sign-association—e.g. of ‘existence’—to be trivial in relation to the illumination and deployment of a core idea in relation to ‘existence.’ If it is argued that the metaphysics implicitly values the ultimate over the immediate, the reply is that the ultimate / immediate distinction is not intrinsic to the metaphysics—what is ultimate in depth is also ultimate in immediacy, triviality and shallowness and the ultimate character derives from the trivial character. There is a practical ultimate / immediate distinction that is distinct from the conceptual and regarding the practical distinction the metaphysics makes no a priori distinction of value and allows it to emerge as a result of experience and analysis
That the development—search—for objections and their refutation—or otherwise—must be an aspect of any method or approach. Criticism is enhanced by alternative formulation. The development of the conclusions of the theory of being is a source of objections
The following generic approaches to refutation or criticism of objections occur. Analysis of the meaning and motive of the objection—motive is significant at least in so far as it reveals implicit meaning. Repeated analysis and improvement of theory of being and its concepts e.g. the fundamental principle defines rather than merely employs logic… as the result of reflection on the ideas, as a result of learning from the tradition of knowledge, and as a response to real or apparent paradoxes. Interpretation, especially via the concept of the normal and building a coherent picture as a response to absurdity. The particular and the idiosyncratic refutation are not ruled out. Analysis of the world-view, if any, implicit in the objections and observation that the shedding of invalid or merely local ‘world-views’ is and must be liberating
8. Faith and affirmation
‘Faith’ has a variety of meanings and uses. One family of use is the one in ‘religious faith.’ The use introduced here is more akin to the one in ‘animal faith’ which is the state of living in an immediate environment as part of the environment and without doubt or need for doubt and without certainty or need for certainty. Flow of environment and organism are not at odds; they are the same flow—which is not to say that the organism does not feel pain or pleasure, fear or confidence but, perhaps, that there is no labeling of such feelings or need to label them. In the present meaning, however, the organism envisaged has the ability to label and to doubt and to want and, perhaps, to attain security or, at least, a feeling of security. The organism has gone through these activities. In a search for security, the organism is part of a tradition that has valued doubt and reason but, from reason itself, has come up against limits to reason. Since the organism and the tradition came to value doubt, the limits to reason may have left the organism with doubt but not confidence. This however, was not the original state of animal grace. The organism wishes to return to such a state but without rejecting either doubt or reason or the places for doubt and reason. These thoughts motivate the meaning of faith that is about to be suggested
Although the meaning of faith that is now suggested has distinctions from the meaning in ‘religious faith’ it is not suggested that all religious faith is of the dogmatic kind that would set it apart from animal faith or the present meaning that is an integration of animal faith and the human freedom of reason and meaning—which freedom is introduced and discussed in some detail in Human being
Faith is that attitude, routine or inspired, which is most productive of action in the face of doubt—of quality of being in the face of fear, of ends in the face of destruction. And when in a happy circumstance, faith enjoys the moments and is not preoccupied with the gloom of another time
This faith is productive of equanimity of being without foundation in something else
Faith is not refutation of analysis and reason—it is affirmation in the face of uncertainty. But this affirmation is immanent and not recited as a mantra, as a formula to ward off evil, evil spirits or the demons of an excitable imagination
In faith there is affirmation of being—over mere system, over knowledge, over means and instruments
In faith there is life in relation to the world—life of the world—rather than life apart, rather than life through knowledge, means, and instruments
The attitude of faith is not fixed but is adaptable and adapts to circumstance
Faith does not reject doubt but does not dwell in doubt
Faith does not reject reason but does not ever dwell in reason
Faith is not identical to but is not other than reason
Reason is an occasional element in faith but is not definitive of faith
However, rejection of reason would also be a rejection of faith
At least on account of limits to reason, reason cannot be all of faith
Faith is an intrinsic condition of—sentient—form
There is an enhanced meaning that includes intuition and feeling in which reason approaches faith
Faith is not belief
Adherence to what is merely absurd or merely given on authority is not what is here meant by faith
The word merely is significant. What rings of the absurd may not in fact be absurd. Authority may, on occasion, be respected for its seen or experienced authentic power in the world rather accepted as an act of submission in the face of force over the world or punishment
The significance of this meaning of faith is further developed immediately below and subsequently in Faith
9. The method or approach
Method is any approach, systematic or ad hoc, based in the nature of being and patterns of thought and transformation that are conducive to realistic thought and effective transformation. Method may be revisable in practice
The method starts the description of forms of experience that require, for their existence, corresponding general or universal forms of being—being itself, all being and so on. This aspect of the method has an affinity with what Kant labeled the transcendental analytic. In its second aspect, the method is that of formal deduction of the results of general metaphysics which includes the theory of substance and determinism, logic, and general cosmology
The necessary objects have an entirely empirical character. To say that something is entirely empirical is not to say that it is not without conceptual content. Things known must have conceptual content whether empirical or not. An object is known but not empirical when the existence is demonstrated by some means, e.g. logical necessity, but the object has not—yet—been located in perception
The existence of the necessary objects follows from the corresponding forms of experience which would not exist without the existence of the corresponding necessary objects. The one exception to this schema of demonstration is the void whose existence is a logical inference from the necessary empirical concept of domain. Although it has not been argued so before and it is not argued now, it could, perhaps, be argued that the void is empirical in the notion of that which cannot enter perception—of any organism in any phase or domain of the universe
The ‘theory of the void’ lies on the boundary between the universal forms and formal deductions and it is regarding the existence of the void that, in the discussion above, doubt has been entertained, refuted and reconsidered. There is temptation to suppress this doubt but it is not ‘honesty’ that requires it to be recorded. Rather the power of the theory and the range of vision that result would be poorly served by suppressing doubt. Whatever doubt remains stands as an invitation to grapple with it
This has already been noted
There is doubt even about the nature of the doubt. Is it necessary or is it perhaps some neurosis that forces the doubt on account of the magnitude of the vision that results from the existence of the void?
Although it is not perfectly clear that faith is necessary to allay doubt, this is the point at which faith may enter. Although animal being may not experience faith since, in the absence of reason, there is no need to doubt, there is experience of warmth and fear. In the absence of reason there is no doubting fear. Thus life is characterized by faith. It may be said that faith in the void is removed and is thus not animal faith. Recall, though, that among the objects that may be contemplated in reason, metaphysics is most immediate
Perhaps, however, it is not taking reason far enough that is its downfall. Perhaps in the limit, reason, faith and intuition are—occasionally—one
The foregoing aspects of method have been experienced as necessary and may be labeled the method of the metaphysics of immanence or, simply, the method
The parallels and divergences of the present idea and place of faith with religious faith are remarkable. ‘Worldly knowledge’ is a source of power but is impoverished in relation to the whole person and knowledge of being. Faith is not known to be certain but is rich where worldly knowledge is poor. Therefore, faith is not more—it is the world
Here, however, parallels end. Religious faith is often regarded as dogma; here there is no dogma. Religion is often presented as against science; metaphysics of immanence subsumes science. In the world view of dogmatic religion, whoever lacks faith in dogma may find meaning in the barren landscape of science where may be found solace in the lonely stance of truth—this thought resonates with the beliefs of so many persons of a scientistic—science as truth, whole truth and nothing but truth—persuasion. The faithful are asked to believe, e.g. in Christ, in what would with any other person seem absurd. Here there is no either / or—either metaphysics of immanence or science. Science is often but only presented as the truth. The absent either / or is not only with regard to truth but also action. The person can live ‘under’ science and metaphysics… can know fullness of being and worldly power—and while the limits of the metaphysics—the doubt—are accepted are the limits of science and reason in a world once full of hope for reason but perhaps unable to find a way out—except of hope—in reason
After developing the metaphysics, focus turns, in Objects, to the questions of what objects correspond to concepts and then, in Cosmology, to study of the variety of being. Objects is largely an analysis of concepts in the light of the metaphysics. In Cosmology—Human World may be considered to be a chapter in cosmology—the approach is to study particular topics in light of the metaphysics. Here there is doubt concerning not only about precision but also about the validity of the concepts. Sustained reflection from the metaphysics as well as the particular topics may be seen to remove much of the doubts regarding validity of the concepts. For example in discussion the ‘functions’ of mind, the reflections on substance and determinism give clarification and foundation where there would otherwise be isolated fragments that, even when they have some explanatory power, lack coherence and any sense that they refer to something that is of the organism
Thus the net method integrates the method of the metaphysics of immanence with ‘disciplinary studies’ and, in this aspect, goes beyond the disciplines and is dependent on science and at most partially founded by it
It is important to note that such lines of thought also clarify science as seen briefly above and taken up further in Logic
The present method subsumes what is true in science but is not founded by it. As being of more general application than what is usually meant by science, the method cannot be equated to it
Two observations are important—and should be integrated with their further discussion below. First, method does not stand a priori over study—object—but is what method or approach that may have arisen along the way; therefore, approach is as good a term as method. Second, whereas, in the study of necessary objects, method has a necessary character, in the study of normal objects its character has a necessary side since the normal resides within the necessary and a contingent side since there are details to the normal that are not necessary in the given context
Necessary proof includes the following aspects: demonstration by proof, demonstration by recognition and naming of what is given, and demonstration by analysis of use or meaning. It has been seen incremental analysis of systems of concepts is not invariably an open loop. It may be seen that development e.g. analysis of method is not a priori given or separable from development e.g. analysis of objects and that method does not stand a priori over study—object—but is what method or approach may have arisen along the way; therefore approach is as good a term as method. As an example, Logic will be seen to be an object and this shows the essential braiding of Logic and object and that, where method is revealed as necessary so is object
Contingent proof arises in contexts where knowledge is contingent, e.g. this cosmos and Human World where contingency from what is locally interesting but not universal in nature
There is a distinction between method, discussed here, and principles of thought, discussed in Ideas. Whereas method refers to methods of demonstration, principles of thought are practices that are conducive to discovery—of both content and method. The method may be seen as included in the principles
Necessary proof begins from incontrovertible premises—especially those implicit in the conditions or meaning of presence—e.g. the premise of being e.g. the premise of this discussion or of experience. Perhaps ‘incontrovertible’ is actually weak in relation to ‘experience’ for being is in the meaning of experience and existence which are limit points of analysis. Necessary proof proceeds by simple instruments that can be seen inherent in conditions of existence / stable meaning but which also have analytic representation e.g. the propositional calculus which has analytic consistency proof. Examples of necessary proof are found in the demonstrations regarding the necessary objects—experience, being, universe, void, form and the normal objects. In Logic, it will be seen that method of proof does not altogether rise above the contingent. In contextual proof, reference is made to some special context so that premises or proof are generally though not invariably contingent
Proof is supplemented—given flesh—by interpretation—which may be necessary andor contextual. Interpretation is often essential in that what is proved is that some state must obtain somewhere in the universe but it is interpretation that shows that it obtains in some specific situation—and such interpretation may appeal to the established scientific disciplines. Demonstration has occasional use in interpretation—subject to consistency requirements, an interpretation must obtain in some situations. Examples of contextual proof are abound in Human World and are also found in demonstrations at the intersection of local or normal cosmology and pure metaphysics
10. The status of the metaphysics so far
Metaphysics is the theory of being as being and harbors within it all specialized studies as instances.
Pure metaphysics
Pure metaphysics is that part of metaphysics that is absolutely demonstrable, i.e., by recognition, by analysis of meaning and proof
General metaphysics
General metaphysics outside its pure part may be labeled cosmology. However the distinction between cosmology and pure metaphysics is arbitrary and in their broad meanings, cosmology and metaphysics are identical
The principles of pure metaphysics are those that establish it, i.e., they are the components of demonstration as defined above
Pure metaphysics includes its principles
As has been seen here and in Being, this is necessarily the case. The topic is revisited in Logic
As study of being, metaphysics must, in principle, include a study of its own principles and this follows since the principles have being
It may be objected that principles lack material substance, are too starkly mental to have being. This objection is countered in Mind and in Human being
The following are some results of the pure metaphysics pertinent to an assessment of the status of the metaphysics so far
The existence and properties of the universe and the void suggest the name metaphysics of immanence
The metaphysics is systematic and empirical
The metaphysics of this narrative has been shown to be simultaneously systematic and empirical. The development of the metaphysics shows the possibility of a metaphysics that is systematic and empirical
There is, in principle, one metaphysics
In talking of ‘a metaphysics’ it is not implied that there are other systems of metaphysics. There may be other forms of metaphysics but, except perhaps for level of detail, would be identical to the present one. Therefore, there is, in principle, but one metaphysics
Existence of the necessary objects
The existence of the necessary objects: experience and its forms; being itself, the universe which is all being and form and law and pattern—all objects; difference, domain and complement; change and before, now and after; the void which is the absence of being and contains no object—especially no form, no pattern and no law
Identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary
The actual, the possible, and the necessary are identical—as noted above, the meaning of ‘the necessary’ will be elaborated in Logic
The fundamental principle of metaphysics
The fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence: every consistent concept—including pictures and descriptions—is realized as a state from every other state. Or, every state is realized. Stated in this form, this implies that since the description of the void state is consistent, it, too, is realized. The apparent violence that the fundamental principle does to ‘common sense’ and science as it is known is resolved below
Every concept has an object
Although every—consistent—concept has an object, it does not follow that every concept is locked in to an object, i.e., has what, in the literature, starting with Franz Brentano, has been called an intentional relationship to an object. In some cases, of course, the concept is what may be labeled a free concept—the product of an organism with imagination and in some cases the concept is a dream or hallucination. The question of the object is whether there is anything ever that is an object that corresponds to a given concept. This is the question of the existence of the external world of which a special case is the philosophical dilemma of solipsism. Such questions are worthy of reflection, not because there is healthy doubt about the existence of an / the external world but because the reflections sharpen understanding of the nature of the world—of the nature of the relations between concepts and objects, and because the reflections may be the occasion to develop powerful tools of analysis. The answer given earlier and to be elaborated upon in Objects is that, in some phases of the universe and, possibly in some domains of the present phase which is not necessarily this cosmological system, the existence of the solipsist is not logically consistent—without assumptions or conditions regarding the structure or makeup of the phase or domain. The general conclusion is, however, that the solipsist case is immensely unlikely and, more particularly, given the fine grained structure, e.g. cellular, structure of a brain, the richness of individual experience is extremely unlikely to be the product of a solipsist imagination. Perhaps, though, Brahman, in which normal, i.e. non-solipsist, individuals participate, has the character of a single mind without an external world
Resolution of the fundamental problem of metaphysics
A resolution of what has been called the fundamental problem of metaphysics—why there is being in a strong form in which it is seen that there must be—occasions of manifest—being
The fundamental problem was regarded by Heidegger as the most important open problem of metaphysics
There are no fictions
Excepting logical contradictions, there are no fictions—the universe contains all mystery
The logical contradiction may be used, as in the work of M. C. Escher, to amuse; or it may have oblique or metaphorical reference to some point. However, otherwise, the logical contradiction is so patently impossible that it cannot be regarded even as fiction
The void is ultimately simple
The void is ultimately simple. The simplicity of the void is conceptual rather than factual. No particular importance is attached to the number of voids—which may be taken to be one or finitely or infinitely many
Every element of being has its own void
Every element of being—including the universe in a manifest state—may be regarded as being attached to ‘its own’ void. This attachment makes the necessity of spontaneous annihilation and creation most obvious
The universe is absolutely indeterministic
The universe is absolutely indeterministic and this is not only consistent with form and structure but makes them necessary
Necessary existence of normal cosmologies
The metaphysics itself requires the necessary existence of normal cosmologies in the universe of absolute indeterminism
This cosmos and its structure are logically necessary—this also follows from the identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary
Substance and determinism are twins
The problem of substance is also the problem of determinism. Each is empty without the other. I.e., since substances are introduced to explain the complex in terms of the simple, substance explanation must be deterministic or else it would not be simple. Therefore, there are and can be no substance or substances as the ground of being
The void may be regarded as the ground of being
From the fundamental principle it is a short step to see that the void—or any state—may be regarded as the ground of being. The corresponding explanation is not deterministic and is therefore not a substance theory. However, the fundamental principle does found a non-relativist philosophy without substance. This is extremely remarkable and surprising in view of the common view that a non-relativist metaphysics without substance is impossible
A metaphysics of ultimate breadth
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in breadth in that it encompasses the variety of being
A metaphysics that is ultimate in depth
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth in grounding—explanation of—all being without substance or infinite regress, i.e., in providing a non-relativist metaphysics without substance
Mind, matter and substance
In their common meanings—e.g. in physics and the philosophy of mind—mind and matter cannot be regarded as having a substance nature. Yet, as will be seen in Mind, there are extended meaning in which mind or matter could, if indeterministic explanation were allowed to be part of substance explanation, be taken as substance; this, however, would be likely to result in confusion on account of the common meanings of mind and matter. Matter, in its meaning from modern theoretical physics, could be taken to be an effective local substance but not a true substance
The methods sheds anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism
The metaphysics of immanence sheds not only—unnecessary—anthropomorphism and anthrocentrism but also cosmomorphism and cosmocentrism. However, in showing that any particular kind of being is not universal in its form, its potentiality for all form is revealed—according to the fundamental principle and as will be elaborated and explained in the theory of identity. And, that a particular being is not the center of the universe is only a statement that all particular beings are equally at center or, equivalently, there is no place or being that deserves—or should require—the title of center of the universe. Whether this leads to feelings of inconsequentiality or of significance is a function of ego-perspective
A metaphysics of form
The metaphysics of immanence is a metaphysics of form. Form is immanent in being. All forms are dynamic and have origins and ends. A static form would never manifest; however, if manifest, it would be eternal. What are typically seen as forms are the more durable, more stable and more symmetric forms. Although the metaphysics of immanence has Platonic characteristics, there is no separate Platonic world. In a purely Platonic view, actual entities would be seen as—impure—copies of perfect forms. Here, the origin of the structure of manifest being is in the dynamic aspect of form and the symmetry of actual forms is a near symmetry or one that is near to the perfect symmetry of the so-called static forms that do not and cannot exist. ‘Imperfection’ is a condition of—manifest—being
1. The universe which is all being contains all Form, Pattern and Law
2. The void that is the absence of being exists and contains no Form, Pattern or Law, i.e., no Objects
3. The universe is absolutely indeterministic; this means that there are no not-accessed states except the impossible or contradictory states—i.e., those ‘states’ whose description involve contradiction
4. The metaphysics achieves absolute non-cosmorphism, i.e., in their foundation, the metaphysics and cosmology eliminate all reference to the particular form of this or any cosmos
5. Logic, properly conceived as the theory of the possible or equivalently as the theory of the actual, or as the theory of descriptions, is the one law of the universe—of all being
Note that the characterization of the metaphysics is not yet complete and will be taken up again in Philosophy and metaphysics
Objects
Objects considers the connection between concepts and objects; the metaphysics sets this up by demonstrating the existence of the objects, by demonstrating the necessary connection between concepts and their corresponding objects in some cases, and by suggesting the probable connection in many cases. That every—consistent—concept must have some object is further instrumental in understanding abstract objects and in showing that, in contrast to received understanding, abstract and particular objects are distinguished by—their currently most productive—mode of study but are not distinct in kind—‘all objects lie in the one universe’
Logic
Logic is set up in the ideas of the identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary and in the fact that every consistent concept has an object
Meaning
Meaning is clarified through the same considerations and further in that since there can be no consistent sense whose object lies outside the universe, sense must be latent reference that may have intentional reference
Mind
The clarification of substance, form, meaning and its extension, and the notion of depth are instrumental in developing the concept of Mind and, incidentally, that of matter
Cosmology
The concept of variety, the demonstration that the metaphysics implicitly contains all variety and all kinds and the fundamental principle of the metaphysics set up Cosmology
Human World
The foregoing topics are a foundation for Human World
In some of the topics, e.g. Logic, the development is an elaboration of what is already implicit in the metaphysics. In others, e.g., Local or physical cosmology and Human World, the development is the result of interaction between the metaphysics and the specific topic; these developments are not only applications of the metaphysics to a topic but may also involve clarification and deepening—in some cases ultimate—of the topic and illumination of the metaphysics
The word ‘object’ was used somewhat loosely in the previous chapters. The object is an important concept in modern thought, especially since the time of Kant. There is a variety of problems associated with the meaning and working out of a proper conception of the object. Such a working out will be very useful from for thought and for this narrative. It is time to take up a study of objects
There is much to be learned from prior thought. However, proper thought cannot ever be restricted by the bounds of what came before. In this chapter the understanding and the development of the object goes beyond the traditions so far
The idea of an object is patterned after the ideas of entity and thing. The rough idea of an object is something in the external world—out there—whose existence and nature do not depend on perception or, more generally, on conception. However, regardless of actual existence and nature, all objects that are known to animal being are known in the concept. The first goal of this chapter is a dual one: to ask about the nature of the object-as-known and to investigate the meaning and degree of faithfulness of the object-as-known—the concept—to the object. The question of the meaning of faithfulness arises since we never get outside the object-as-known which is, possibly, of a different kind than ‘the object.’ It shall be necessary, in what follows, to investigate whether faithfulness has meaning and, if so, to investigate degrees of faithfulness. It is of special interest whether there are objects of which knowledge is perfectly faithful
In Metaphysics, it was established that ‘all objects exist.’ More precisely, for any concept there is a corresponding object provided that the concept entails no contradiction. If one conceives a unicorn, the Metaphysics shows that unless a contradiction is entailed, there must be a unicorn in some actual world. When one sees a horse in this world, one generally knows—except for illusion or philosophical or radical doubt—that the horse exists. The same is true for the objects of scientific theories even though the connection is not as direct as in the case of perception. A central goal of Objects is to locate objects corresponding to our concepts; some will be in our world or cosmological system, others in ones that are remote in space and time. This is the problem of the object. We know at once that there are certain objects whose being is entailed by the concept. These are the absolute objects of which universe, domain and void and their logical dependents are examples
In this chapter, the first goal, then, is to address the problem of the object. This problem has been the subject of intense interest in modern philosophy and the most satisfactory approach appears to derive from the thought of Kant that incorporates both empirical and ideal elements
The kind of objects addressed in the problem of the object is the particular or concrete objects—the word concrete is of course used metaphorically. While one apple is a particular object, the number one, if it is or points to an object, is not particular. ‘The number one’ has abstract character to it in that it can be associated with an object but is not—does not appear to be—an object. Similarly, a moral would appear to be abstract. The existence of abstract objects is sometimes regarded as given even though it is not clear in what sense they are objects. The abstract objects could, perhaps, be objects in Meinong’s sense in which concept and object are conflated; however since there is a far better one, it is neither necessary nor advisable to adopt Meinong’s approach here
The problem of the nature and existence of abstract objects and their relations to the particular objects is taken up below
The present approach will combine the ideas of Kant and the metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics. It is found that the problem has a satisfactory resolution for a much wider class of objects than would be thought on the Kantian approach alone
However, there is still the immense variety of objects that are neither the absolute objects nor those of our world whose existence is necessary but are not located in our immediate experience
The establishment of the location is completed in the treatment of Identity in Cosmology. As noted earlier, the treatment of identity could have been placed in Metaphysics and therefore all objects have been placed in experience although not necessarily in the experience of this life (which depends on whether the interpretation of ‘this life’ is normal or absolute)
The second goal is to address the nature of the abstract object and to compare and contrast abstract and particular objects. Abstract objects are sometimes thought to not exist in space—where, if anywhere, is the number one… and where is justice? The development provides a definitive and surprising resolution to the problem of the abstract object. It is that the difference between abstract and particular object is more one of whether the convenient mode of study is empirical or conceptual. This conclusion is deep, immensely simplifying, cuts out immense amounts of unnecessarily ethereal speculation and is surprising. However, once the solution is laid out, it shall appear to be natural and obvious
The resolution of the problem of the abstract object and the nature of the abstract-particular divide constitutes a significant advance on the question of the nature of the object in general and the nature of the abstract in particular
There are differences between the abstract and particular that must be articulated but it will be found that abstract objects may be spatial (some are not)
After establishing the nature of the abstract / particular divide, other, some lesser distinctions among objects are laid out
The establishment of distinctions of kinds leads into a discussion of the variety of being. This is a third goal of the chapter. The discussion draws from the variety already shown in Metaphysics and, so as to be complete, anticipates the discussion of categories of intuition from Human being
An immense and unsuspected variety of being is revealed. The explicit variety is immense—a greater variety cannot be imagined explicitly because, subject to the requirement of non-contradiction, once imagined any object belongs to the variety; the implicit variety is, logically, the greatest possible variety—there is no greater variety and therefore a greater variety can be neither thought nor written.
Not only are the goals achieved, the extent of the achievement is ultimate in character and necessarily constitutes an advance on all other systems that do not at least implicitly recognize the metaphysics of immanence
The present development of the theory of objects is, therefore, thought to be a contribution to the history of ideas
In establishing the nature of being, the variety of being and in locating objects in ‘our world’ the chapters Metaphysics and Objects set up the chapters Logic and meaning, Mind, and Cosmology and the division Human world. The part Journey in being, derives significantly from these developments
In use of the same name for idea and entity and in lack of complete distinction between them, there is a confusion to the study of the idea of the object that has resolution in distinguishing concept and object. A potential confusion remains in that the same word may be used to refer to both concept and object. However, with care this confusion is eliminated. An object X exists—is said to exist—if and only if, to the concept X, there corresponds an (the) object
The problem of the object concerns the faithfulness of the correspondence between concept and object
The problem—in addition to empirical concerns, the concept and the object appear to be categorially distinct and, further, every measure of faithfulness of the concept seems to be a refinement only of the concept—therefore, faithfulness appears to be a false ideal. Before proceeding, note that two aspects of faithfulness have been established: kind and accuracy. In the absence of an understanding of kind of faithfulness, it is not clear what meaning accuracy might have in general although in instrumental cases, e.g. measurement of distance, the meaning is clear enough since the comparison is of two objects and not of a concept and an object
From the metaphysics, faithfulness is given for certain objects such as the universe, domain and complement, the void and others derived from such by necessity. Such objects—concepts—are absolute in faithfulness and the question arises whether there are others. Generally, from the fundamental principle of metaphysics, every concept that neither harbors nor entails contradiction is—and must be—realized; the concern that remains is that though the object exists, its identification is not given
Also from the metaphysics as well as adaptation, some objects (concepts) are practical or sufficiently faithful. Included here are scientific theories which will be shown in Logic to be practical with regard to the world or precise with regard to some limited but imprecisely defined domain. From the concept of form, even in the case of practical concepts, the concept of absolute object has meaning—it is not implied that the form or object itself is definite or that the concept of it may be faithful. There is no simple logical limit to improvement of faithfulness but where it has no meaning it cannot be desirable—and, regarding the variety of being this is seen as positive. Given facts—regarding objects of perception / science, logical operation on such facts is possible and the universality and precision of such operations is taken up in Logic
When there is concept and object—this corresponds to the Kantian case. In Kant’s thought, intuition conforms to reality. In this thinking, Kant was inspired by Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics whose immense success resulted in their being seen as absolutely true—Euclid’s geometry, with but occasional doubt, had reigned for about 2000 years and though the mechanics of Newton had been formulated only a hundred years earlier, had brought to mechanics an order previously unknown in that field and comparable only to geometry
Given the intuition of time, space and mechanics, the expression of the intuition in symbolic terms and logical operations on the symbolic systems permitted formulation of a science of space, time and mechanics. Althou