The original purpose of this document was to supplement an outline of the way, because its system of metaphysics—especially its treatment of ‘the problems of metaphysics’—a had good ideas (I think) but had become over-complex.

It now turns out to have some good new thoughts (for me), which will improve both content and organization of the outline.

1 A metaphysical system

We develop a metaphysical system before general discussion of metaphysics. This is because metaphysics—knowledge—is part of the world and therefore our understanding of metaphysics must depend on our metaphysical view of the world. That thought may not work well in practice, partly because it may be circular. However, what is developed in this chapter is a framework and therefore the development is not circular. That it does work well is borne out in what follows.

1.1 Definitions

1.1.1 On definition, meaning, and knowledge

A definition specifies a concept. Definitions may be related to but have difference from informal and received use.

In metaphysics, a definition specifies a concept that is intended to capture something real.

A meaning is a definition and the possible object (or objects).

However, capture or existence of the real ought to be shown.

Isolated definitions generally capture the real only in a context. In metaphysics it is the system of definition that captures the real.

Knowledge is meaning realized.

1.1.2 Preliminary foundation

Metaphysics is knowledge of the real.

A representation is a concept (knowledge) that is intended to depict a being.

To abstract is to remove detail from representation that is necessarily distorted.

A being (plural: beings) is that which is known to exist—i.e., to be; being is the property of beings as beings.

The universe is all being; the void is the being that has no part.

Given a representational (referential) concept, the being is possible if the concept is self-consistent (logical possibility) and consistent with the nature the universe (real possibility). Real possibility presumes logical possibility; logical possibility is the greatest possibility.

A simple fact is a minimal piece of data about the world (universe, cosmos…) relative to a knower. A compound fact is a collection of simple facts.

From the truth of one fact, the truth of another does not (logically) follow.

A pattern for a being obtains if the data to represent the being is less than the raw data.

A cosmos is a coherent part of the universe, which is the extent of observation to local beings.

A law for the universe or cosmos is a pattern that obtains there.

A law is a patterned compound fact; given a law or pattern, from the truth of one fact, the truth of another (logically independent) fact may follow.

If we regard a cosmos as constituted of physical elements which follow physical laws, the concept of a being has physical possibility if its constitution is physical and it follows the laws of the cosmos. As long as the physical laws of a cosmos are not known to be complete or eternal, the cosmos is not known to be entirely physical.

Enjoyment is a state of aware beings in which pleasure and pain are in good balance.

1.1.3 Derivative or secondary terms

For convenience, here is a list of some significant terms introduced later—the fundamental principle of metaphysics, the ideal metaphysics, the real metaphysis, observation, inference, deduction, induction, argument, inferential logic, general logic, Platonism, form, mathematical Platonism, experience, as-if-mind, as-if-matter.

1.2 The being (existence) of some beings

1.2.1 Beings

A modified form of Descartes’ cogito argument shows via abstraction that there are beings and that there is being.

Though the universe may not be known in detail, that the universe is a being follows from abstraction from the idea of all beings.

That the void may be taken to be a being follows from the equivalence of its existence and nonexistence.

Laws have being.

The void contains no law.

1.2.2 ‘Meta-being’

There is metaphysics (some has just been established; more—an ultimate metaphysics—is established below).

As the world contains itself, knowledge (including metaphysics), reason, and value, so metaphysics may be seen as an all inclusive discipline, containing metaphysics (‘proper’), epistemology, metametaphysics, logic, theory of value (including ethics, aesthetics, and their metatheories). Even if we do not place epistemology under metaphysics, it is essential to proper metaphysics for metaphysics without justification would be no more than imagination. As far as philosophy harbors knowledge, it too lies under metaphysics; and science and philosophy of science fall trivially under metaphysics.

1.3 The fundamental principle

If from the void, a possible being does not emerge, that would constitute a law of the void.

The greatest possibility emerges from the void.

The universe is the realization of the greatest or logical possibility (i.e., the universe is limitless).

This statement above is the fundamental principle of metaphysics (FPM).

1.4 Consequences

The being of the universe is necessary. It has no substance and no need of explanation in terms of substance, but, uninformatively, the void or any being could be seen as the substance of the universe.

The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless, particularly in extension, duration (the universe is eternal), variety, peak, and dissolution; there are cosmoses without end to their number or variety; all beings realize this ultimate (and while this is given, there are effective paths to the ultimate); which is not a contradiction, for individual beings merge as one. The ultimate is an ultimate knower that knows and is all (which is not negated by paradoxical conceptions of the ultimate for the logically impossible does not define a being).

From the perspective within a cosmos, its being may seem to be contingent. Beyond the cosmos there are further cosmoses and more (temporarily isolated, ultimately in contact with one another and the void). Consider the original cosmos; consider its conceptual join to others; proceeding thus, we arrive, conceptually, at the universe, which is all possibility and is necessary.

This defines an ideal metaphysics. It shows ultimates; via abstraction it is perfect as representation; and thus, it has an ultimate character as metaphysics.

As far as enjoyment is a value, it is good to be on—to negotiate—a path to the ultimate. It is not enough to follow prescriptions. It is of the essence to negotiate intelligent and shared paths on which the fortunate assist the less fortunate.

1.5 The real metaphysics

To negotiate the world in light of the ideal metaphysics, we turn, also, to received knowledge-in-process, which is a mix of the ideal and the pragmatic.

If we join the ideal to the pragmatic, the ideal guides and illuminates the pragmatic and the pragmatic illustrates and is instrumental toward the ideal. The join is not perfect by received, e.g., representational, criteria. However, it is the best available to negotiate the way to the ultimate. With enjoyment as criterion, the join is perfect. Further, as seen, in the ultimate, the ultimate knower knows and is all. Thus, the value criterion (enjoyment) approaches the representational criterion in the ultimate which is our ultimate.

The join of the ideal and the pragmatic constitute a perfect metaphysical system, which is named the real metaphysis (rmp).

Epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic are subsumed under the real metaphysics.

1.6 Why being?

The metaphysics has been arrived at without reference to ‘kind’, e.g., substance, which shows the power of being. Being is neutral to kind. It might have been thought that this neutrality would have been a weakness of the conceptual power of being; instead we see it the reason for its (ultimate) conceptual power.

1.7 Logic

Some facts are established by observation (perceiving, measuring…), others by inference (to conclusions from premises).

1.7.1 Observation

When a fact is established by perfect observation—for example, by abstraction—the truth of the fact is certain; otherwise, due to imperfection in observation, the truth of the fact may have uncertainty.

1.7.2 Inference

Though various kinds of inference have been identified, let us class inference as deduction (certain) vs induction (probable).

The following are certain inference—deduction under classical logics such as propositional and predicate calculi, deduction under extended logics (e.g., modal logic) and variant logics (e.g., many-valued logics), and deduction under some sciences, e.g., quantum theories (though outcomes may be probabilistic, the probabilities are certain) and relativistic mechanics.

The following are inductive—arriving at a deductive logic (there usually are alternative schemes for a given kind) or a scientific theory (from a limited data set), via, e.g., abduction.

Note that though logics and sciences are patterns or (patterned) inferential schemes, they may be seen as patterned compound facts.

1.7.3 Classical notions of logic vs science

It is common to compare deduction under logic to induction (or abduction) to a scientific theory.

However, the foregoing show that it is proper to compare (i) arriving at a logic to arriving at a scientific theory (uncertain) (ii) inference under logic to inference under a scientific theory (in the physical sciences, inference under the science is typically certain).

Thus, though they are not the same, logic and science in their traditional senses, may be brought under one umbrella.

1.7.4 Argument

One current notion of argument is the joint process of (i) establishing facts (simple or compound) (ii) inferences to further facts (conclusions) under a logic (or science).

It is usual in the literature to consider certain fact and certain inference. In this case, the argument is called valid if the certain inference is validly established. If, further, the fact (premise) is established, the argument is called sound. Sound argument is a particular case of argument as defined above.

Putting deductive logic and inference under science under one umbrella, we get inferential logic, whose derivation is uncertain but under which inference is certain (from the real metaphysics, sciences under which inference is not certain could be brought under this umbrella).

With this consideration, what we call argument above, may also and shall be called general logic or just logic.

As far as there are no atomic facts—i.e., all facts are compound but atomicity is relative to knowers, the distinction between fact and inference is porous, and logic in its ordinary sense becomes argument. This thought needs to be developed.

Here we may allow the certainty of both fact and inference to be relaxed. There are various special cases, which may be taken up as occasions arise.

Argument, the real metaphysics, logic—and in some sense of the terms, all good knowledge are one.

1.7.5 Mathematics

Where does mathematics fit into this scheme? It begins as a empirical science, e.g., geometry may have begun as a science of shapes and their properties. However, Euclid found it possible to axiomatize geometry. Today, we regard all systems of mathematics as axiomatic systems. What is the object of an axiomatic system? One view is that the systems are conventions and have no intrinsic objects. Original platonism—Plato’s view—was that the objects of mathematics are forms that exist in an ideal or Platonic world. Today, original Platonism is seen as fanciful. However, some thinkers subscribe to mathematical platonism, the idea that on account of their seeming necessity and universality, there are abstract mathematical objects, whose existence is independent of our thought and language. Thinking empirically, such abstract objects may be seen as idealizations of (systems of) real objects. The real metaphysics shows that for any consistent system of mathematics, the system perfectly represents the objects of some world (and pragmatically represents the objects further worlds).

Mathematics falls under logic in the inclusive sense of the previous section.

1.8 Experience

Experience is awareness in all its kinds and forms, including consciousness and agency (this is more inclusive than received use).

Without experience, we would be as-if dead. Experience may be considered to be the place of our being and the sense of significance. We will establish the universe and our being to be experiential in nature.

Experience has the following aspects—there is ‘experience of’ and ‘the experienced’; and there is the experience itself, in which the experience-of and the-experienced are related (‘pure experience’ is experience without a present object). The experience-of is as if of mind (as-if-mind, of the subject); the-experienced is as if of matter (as-if-matter, of the object).

To begin consideration of experience, let us not assume the real metaphysics. In a world strictly of non-mental matter, there would be no experience. Therefore, our world is not strictly material. If our world were strictly of a single substance—monist—the one substance would have to be experience and thus it would have to be experiential to the root. At the root, experience would be relational but not be rich, varied, and reflexive (experience of experience) as ours is.

However, the real metaphysics shows the universe to not be substance based (we could consider the void or any being to be its substance but that would be uninformative). Yet, as there is experience and experience harbors as-if-psyche and as-if-matter, experientiality is a good candidate to characterize the universe. Is there more? As experience is relational and relation of relation is relational, there is no further kind (what there is beyond our experience of experience has to do with variety and richness, not a further kind). Under the real metaphysics, the root is always capable of experientiality. We may therefore validly consider the universe to be experiential where even primitive being is experiential with, perhaps, zero but not null experientiality.

That the universe is experiential neither denies nor affirms that the universe is one or both of material and mental. However, it does affirm that the universe has as-if-psychical and as-if-material sides, and so universe as experiential loses no functionality on account of its lack of affirmation of matter and mind as real.

The universe and our being are experiential.

2 Metaphysics

Comment 1.
Think carefully on what this chapter is to do.
Firstly, it is for the chapter on metaphysics in the outline. Simplification while getting the essence is the aim.
Secondly, it is for, the problems of metaphysics in that chapter, especially the section on the categories, dimensions, and paradigms. Here, simplicity and essence are all important.

Perhaps the terms, ‘dimensions’ and ‘paradigms’ should be eliminated and only ‘categories’ retained.
Alternatively, perhaps I ought to eliminate using ‘categories’ but mentioning ‘dimensions’ as related to them. In this case, there will be ‘pure’ or high-level and ‘pragmatic’ or low level dimensions (and paradigms).

And, then, it is about the reasoning of the approach. It will derive also from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_categories.

It may involve ‘logic’ and ‘knowledge’ integrated to ‘fact’ which may be simple and compound.

From the foregoing, as knowledge of the real, metaphysics is a rational account of the universe and, equivalently, of being.

2.1 Analysis of logic

Comment 2. The idea of having vs being a property—it is good vs it has goodness; are these fundamentally different?

Comment 3. Systems of experiential logic.

2.1.1 Analysis of the real and of knowledge

2.2 What is metaphysics?

There is no single received conception of metaphysics; however, the following is a potent conception that includes much of received metaphysics (and knowledge, generally)—

Metaphysics is knowledge of the real.

2.3 What is the fundamental object of metaphysics?

The fundamental object of metaphysics is being—which harbors all beings, particularly the void, the universe, and experiential being.

2.4 What falls under metaphysics?

See the sections, the being (existence) of some beings, logic, and experience.

It remains to develop this material.

2.5 The method of metaphysics

Since we do not know more than we know and cannot (logically) know more than the greatest knower, developing metaphysics will involve (i) looking at our knowledge-in-process (ii) metaknowledge, which is analyzing our knowledge for what is fundamental and its element, perhaps enhance, by the idea of an ideal (knower), which, even if we are not that ideal, we can perhaps leverage.

This will involve analysis of logic and experience as understood in the previous chapter.

2.6 Epistemology

2.7 Theory of value

2.8 Dimensions and paradigms of being

2.9 Cosmology

2.10 Our world

2.11 Realization

3 The problems of metaphysics

We begin with an account of received problems.

3.1 A received catalog

The following is a formalization and enhancement of the problems from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on metaphysics. It is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive.

3.1.1 Classical metaphysics

The object of metaphysics—Being, First Causes, Unchanging Things

Divisions of metaphysics—Categories, Universals, Particulars

Ground and Foundation—Substance (vs Groundlessness vs grounding in Groundlessness)

3.1.2 Recent Metaphysics

Modality—i.e., metaphysical modality (if we see necessity and possibility as a kind of cause, modality will may fall under causation, below)

Identity; Persistence and Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom, and Determinism

Mind and Body (The Mental and Physical)

Metaphysics of the dimensions of being—nature (physical, biological, of psyche), society (institutions, persons, culture), the universal (world, the ultimate, logic, experience)

3.2 A rational catalog

We list two sets of problems—metametaphysics (which makes metaphysics self-contained), some received problems, and some new concerns from the real metaphysics.

3.2.1 Metametaphysics

The following were considered in the previous chapter.

3.2.1.1 Is there such a thing as metametaphysics?

Yes, but perhaps we ought to be talking as generally as ‘meta-everything’ or at least ‘metaknowledge’.

And then—is there meta-metametaphysics?

And—how ought the disciplines to be conceived or defined? Conceptually vs historically vs academically (re: academic boundaries and ‘turf’), top-down vs bottom up, holistically vs atomistically (where vs means and/or).

3.2.1.2 What is metaphysics?

And is it or does it overlap science – concrete or abstract?

3.2.1.3 What is the fundamental object of metaphysics?

3.2.1.4 What falls under metaphysics?

3.2.1.5 The method of metaphysics

“This will involve analysis of logic and experience as understood in the previous chapter.”

3.2.2 Received problems

This list contains problems of interest not dealt with earlier.

3.2.2.1 Metaphysical modality and argument

3.2.2.2 Identity

Identity; Persistence and Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom—including freedom of the will, and Determinism

3.2.2.3 Mind and body

3.2.2.4 The categories of being

3.2.2.4.1 What are categories?

3.2.2.4.2 Being itself; experientiality

3.2.2.4.3 Categories derived from logic

3.2.3 Problems arising from the real metaphysics

This list will contain new problems and considerations and new treatments of old problems.

3.2.3.1 Dimensions and paradigms of being

3.2.3.2 The new cosmology

3.2.3.2.1 Principles

3.2.3.2.2 Variety

3.2.3.2.3 Hierarchy of being

3.2.3.3 Abstract and concrete objects

And universals and particulars