JOURNEY IN BEING
MEANING
OUTLINE
Aims… Meaning in general (from 06 version)… Sense and reference… The lexical theory and atomism… Use and holism—meaning is a system within and of the world… The possibility of precise meaning in certain contexts
Aims… Meaning in general from ’06… The lexical theory and atomism… Meaning is a system within and of the world (‘use theory’ and holism)… The possibility of precise meaning in certain contexts… Sense and reference… Implication of the natures of concept, object and their relation
To understand semantic meaning (to elaborate on the discussion of meaning in Being.)
To see connections between grammar (logic) and meaning (sense)
To be alert to the significance of evolving and interactive meanings of the concepts of the narrative—and to recognize that while there is partial origin in the history of thought, and that there is of course a need for stability of meaning, it is not in the nature of the narrative or of thought for meanings to remain static and fixed—stability and fixity are not identical and stability may occasionally require a transient destabilization
Sense and reference—this is analogous to concept and object developed, first, as an aid to understanding ‘being’ and ‘existence,’ and then in Objects. Sense and reference is also analogous to intension and extension and similar to connotation and denotation
Sense is potential—latent, detached—reference
Without the latent reference there can be no sense
Therefore, as shall be seen in Logic, grammar and sense (meaning) are not distinct
Use—meaning arises in the world, first from being without the capacity for meaning and then in experience and intuition in negotiating the world (intuition is the innate form of experience or the capacity for form of experience)
I.e., meaning is not (and can not be) fully specified by either ostension or lexicon. Meaning must have elements of arising in and being maintained by negotiating the world—knowledge—and interaction among users—communication. These are sources of meaning, of the stability and evolution of meaning, and of holism—for full meaning, the ‘units’ of meaning must stand together
In the narrative there are many new (modified) meanings whose symbols are, mostly, old words. For comprehension, it is necessary to recognize the new meanings—from context and definition—and how they stand together as evolving wholes
On Definition (from 06 version)
The discussion of meaning in Being has the following aims. (1) Comment on shift and extension of meaning. (2) Observe interdependence among meanings for a context, the importance of focusing on the specific often extended (sometimes to ground) meanings used here and the profit that accrues from attending to the relationships. (3) Note that meaning has empirical content; mention of sense and reference and their practical place in clarifying meaning; analysis of existence using the tools of sense and reference. (4) Observe that the words use here are often important terms from the history of ideas; that it is therefore important in understanding the text to fix on the present meanings and no other (other meanings may of course be suggestive and illuminating)
To analyze the ability that makes it possible to analyze meaning i.e. to analyze the ability to see language as an object
To discuss the lexical theory of meaning – the idea whose caricature is that every word has a meaning that can be made explicit in terms of other words, is unchanging and fixed by inheritance, atomic and independent of context
To discuss the relationship between the lexical theory and substance theory and determinism
To discuss sense and reference in meaning against a background of concept and object in knowledge. To establish the origin of the distinction of sense and reference – was it truly Frege? To show simultaneously (1) The efficacy of revealing and developing meaning through sense and reference (i.e. the interplay of lexical sense and use) and (2) The natural character of this approach to meaning
To point out the overlap of meaning and knowing and the built in and occasionally applied empirical content, i.e. that meaning is more than pure definition; meaning incorporates experience (of which experiment is a special and relatively discrete case) as knowledge and intuition
To discuss holism of meaning – that the meaning of the essential terms of a context are generally co-determined, at least to some extent. To discuss the related ideas that meanings cannot be fully extracted from context, that meanings change –shift and grow– as the context changes and grows; make reference Wittgenstein’s emphasis of use and Whitehead’s comment that ‘A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.’ To discuss consistency requirements in the extension of meaning. The idea and possibility of extension to the root
To establish the possibility and nature of talk of meaning, of lexicons. To analyze relationships between lexical and use theories and, consequently, a realistic conception of meaning
It is in the nature of concepts that in deploying them in the Understanding (in the present case of all being,) their meaning shall continue to be revealed. Excepting final revelation of all things, meaning shall continue to shift and change
In actual situations, analysis of a concept does not occur in isolation – the comprehension of a context or domain of being typically requires a number of concepts. The entire meaning lies in a dynamic and mutually adjusting system or field of concepts whose understanding requires that all concepts be understood in relation to the context and to one another (since the aspects of the world are interwoven.) This is clearly seen in an axiomatic system even though it might not be so clear in common use because the sense of each common concept may seem to stand independently as a result of familiarity. Meaning is distributed non-uniquely among the system (which is distinct from incomplete determination of a system in relation to understanding the world.) It is commonly thought that such revelation must be unending. However, that is not necessarily the case. That growth in understanding has not ended does not imply that it is unending. A point may come when the understanding is recognizably complete
[‘Meaning’ may be regarded as being specified by ‘Sense’ and ‘Reference.’ This was emphasized by the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (b. 1848, Wismar, Germany.) The idea of sense (which is similar to connotation, intension) is conveyed by the intuitive grasp of its use and significance associated with a Concept; there are various ways in which the sense of a concept can be formalized but it is perhaps essential to have a fixed system of meaning. The idea of reference (similar to denotation, Extension) is conveyed by the collection of ‘things’ to which the concept refers. In a given system, e.g. an axiomatic system, reference is sufficient to specify meaning. However, in an open system (‘real life’) sense is required to supplement reference. There are a number of sources in the change or shift in the sense of a concept in use and over time, some of which have to do with interest and fashion; a primary and essential source of change in meaning is the growth of knowledge or ‘shifting knowledge contexts.’ As knowledge grows, the meaning of a concept may expand or shift even though the idea remains the same (similar.) The sense of a concept is required to effectively use it in varying contexts of reference. As will be seen in the section ‘Logic,’ an interpretation of mathematics is one of certain structures that axiomatic systems attempt to represent or capture. There is no guarantee that the structure that is needed will be captured even if the axiomatic system captures some structure with elegance. Here, too, the intuition (and Sense) of the concept is significant. There is a relation among intuition of Form, concept (Language,) and world. As noted later, the forms are as if Platonic but there is no separate Platonic world. In the developments that follow, it is seen that the depiction of Being in general is identical to the mathematical case except that the conceptual system is not always as neat as it is in mathematics. I.e. depiction of the world involves relations among form, intuition of form and concepts]
Above, the questions ‘What does it mean to exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were mentioned. These questions are equivalent to the question ‘What is the sense and reference of ‘to exist’ or ‘existence’?’
Relations between use and meaning are taken up later in the topic ‘Further analysis of being,’ below, and later in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
There is a classical theory of definition due to Aristotle that involves ‘genus’ and ‘difference’ and a variety of modern theories of definition that include definition as a part of the formalization of axiomatic systems
More illuminating to the present narrative is a concern with limits of clarity that may be achieved by definition
Human artifacts are generally difficult to define. Consider, ‘a table is an item of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs.’ Adopt (initially) an attitude that all objects and only those that satisfy the definition shall be tables. It follows then that a stool is a table, that a highway sign may be considered to be a table, and that a flat slab on a block is not a table. As an alternative approach an artifact may be defined in terms of its function e.g. a table is an elevated horizontal surface that is used to make objects more easily accessible. With this definition, a shelf is a table and if a ‘table’ is never used as a table it is not a table. This process of pinning down and finding exceptions could continue but it is soon recognized that artifacts have multiple and changing forms and uses, and that objects that are generally used for one function (or that have had no function) may be adapted to many others. In the realm of artifacts, then, it is clear that (variable) meaning lies in (variable) use and that definition has limited use or value. It seems that definition is contrary to the idea of artifact. Attention shall therefore shortly turn to ‘natural’ objects. Before taking up the natural object, consider a dramatization of the difficulty in defining artifacts – the story of a god creating a cosmos for her or his own pleasure. This god looks at an earlier creation, cosmos x, the one that human beings call home and has a number of thoughts. ‘Perhaps if I alter the values of some of the fundamental physical constants,’ thinks the god, ‘the place might last a little longer. Why stop at the constants… why not change the nature of the forces and particles to give the cosmos more color and variety? What shall I do about suffering? I think I’ll take language away from human beings so that they will lose malice and cunning; or perhaps I’ll just take feeling away so that beings may destroy one another but no one will feel hurt. Good!’ Aeons upon aeons later the god reflects ‘cosmos xi was disappointing. It brought me no real pleasure. Certainly it provided an improved physical display but human being xi was rather mechanical! I think I’ll revive cosmos x and experiment with it a little more…’ The god asks a philosophical acquaintance, ‘What’s a cosmos anyway? What is an electron if one cosmos has point electrons and another has ‘electrons’ with manifest structure? What should a human being be?’ The apprentice responds ‘You can’t really define the things you create when you know you can change the design and the uses to which you put your creations…’
The discussion now focuses on the difficulty in defining natural objects. It may be thought that the difficulty will be merely one of recognizing or conceptualizing given objects i.e. that the concept may change (shift and perhaps improve) while the object itself is definite. However, definitions of natural objects face difficulties that are similar to definitions of artifacts. First, as noted, the content of the definition regards the idea of the entity – the best knowledge that is had of the entity; this is in process which may be hoped to be ‘improvement.’ Second, as knowledge of the entire universe grows, i.e. as the boundary of the known changes, the context of understanding changes. Finally, it is usually thought that human being has no influence on the nature of the fundamental natural objects. One can affect an electron or a wolf, it is thought, but one cannot change the nature of the electron or a wolf. In fact, human being can affect the wolf and the outcome (not necessarily an improvement) is the dog. In anticipating what shall be called the normal view in the next section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being,’ it is true that human being does not normally affect the nature of the electron. The implication that there is a supra-normal circumstance in which the nature of nature can be affected by the denizens of nature and the quality of the possible effect (improbability rather than impossibility) is taken up in the subsequent sections
It is a common observation that entities that are easy to recognize (except boundary cases) may be difficult to define satisfactorily – may lack any satisfactory definition altogether. Why is this?
The conceptual-perceptual apparatus of human and other animals is adapted (attuned) to their world. In consequence, the recognition of common natural and social objects is, typically, effortless – for familiar objects the recognition itself does not occur at a conscious level. This adaptation covers not only the entities but the frameworks of perception including space and Time. ‘Intuition’ (which has other shades of Meaning – the sense here is that of Immanuel Kant, b. 1724, Königsberg, Prussia) is one name for these more or less automatic and pre-linguistic elements of cognition (which may require familiarization during development of the organism.) Translating the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted intuition into a linear definition in symbols (Language) is expected to be difficult and incomplete. Here, then, is one source of the incompleteness of definition. It becomes clear, however, that in common use there is no compelling need to definition – except perhaps in boundary cases; but what boundary cases show is that tight distinctions do not always obtain and are therefore unnatural to maintain
The concept of intuition is developed in the later section ‘Objects’
The intuition of an object may be clear but if there are no similar or alternative terms available for comparison, definition may be difficult. An example is the concept of consciousness that is discussed in the later section ‘Mind.’ Consciousness is so central to human experience –it may be said to be experience of the world– that there is in moment-to-moment experience no question of its being and quality. It is difficult, perhaps because it appears to occupy (is) all experience, to explain what it is except to indicate its presence – it is not the world but it is (the quality of the) experience of the world. It is relatively easy to talk of the varieties of conscious experience – of pleasure and pain, of color, of taste and so on. However, consciousness itself, though central and familiar appears to be like nothing else. Hence it is possible to talk around it but difficult to address its nature directly. If, however, it were possible and reasonable to identify a primitive and elementary consciousness among e.g. the elements of matter, human or animal consciousness might then be defined as combinations of the primitive or elementary forms at a number of levels and degrees of focus. These thoughts will be developed further in the discussion of ‘Mind’
Another source of difficulty in definition is in the fact that relative to human experience, the world (universe) is an ‘open system.’ This is true of day-to-day experience and of science. In physics, for example, the concept of ‘force’ has been central. The concept has origins in animal and human experience and has been adapted to quantitative use in mechanics – the branch of physics concerned with motion and causes of motion of material objects. The history of the concept of force dates back (at least) to Greek times and received interpretation and reinterpretation in the modern era before Isaac Newton (b. 1643, Woolsthorpe, England,) by Newton himself, in the abstract formalizations of Newton’s system, in the field theories of electromagnetism, in the quantum theories and in the relativistic theories of space, time and gravitation. The precise character and significance of the concept of force varies according to the theoretical context or environment. The case is similar with other common, scientific (and theological and philosophical) concepts
[The following brief historical information may provide context but its reading may be omitted as incidental to the progression of the narrative. The original relativistic theory of gravitation –the general theory of relativity of 1916– was the work of Albert Einstein, b. 1879, Ulm, Württemberg, Germany and, the German mathematician David Hilbert, b. 1862, Königsberg, Prussia. It is remarkable that Hilbert who was in communication with Einstein and other physicists was primarily a pure mathematician. There are disputed claims that Hilbert arrived at the field equations five days earlier than Einstein. The general or standard view gives Einstein priority for both general and special theories. There is also a dispute regarding the earlier (1905) special theory of relativity: the French mathematician Henri Poincaré, b. 1854, Nancy, France and the Dutch physicist Hendrik Antoon Lorentz, b. 1853, Arnhem, Netherlands both published results formally similar to Einstein’s special theory. Einstein is generally given priority for the ‘relativity of different frames of reference’ that enabled an understanding of the relative nature of simultaneity at different locations, a new geometry of space-time, the significance of the constancy of the speed of light, a writing of the equations in ‘covariant form’ that empowered understanding, and, generally, the physical significance of the theory. These views may be called the ‘standard position;’ acrimonious debate continues among specialists and partisans. The history of science has a number of famous priority debates: Newton versus Leibniz regarding the discovery (creation) of the differential calculus and Darwin versus Alfred Russell Wallace, b. 1823, Usk, Monmouthshire, Wales, regarding the Origin of the Species. Reasonable conclusions from such priority debates include: when dispute exists, priority is difficult to establish with precision; in addition to debate about content, disputes sometimes appear to concern the roles of ‘hero,’ ‘antihero’ and ‘destroyer of icons;’ there is sometimes a standard view that gives one individual priority which may be related to public image and to non-formal but important aspects of the work; in other cases, equal priority may be assigned as is the case regarding the discovery of calculus; that discovery is both communal and the work of ‘genius;’ and, perhaps most importantly, the often remarked thought there are times in the history of ideas where certain developments are natural… Quantum theory comes in a number of versions – the theories of particles and the theories of fields and in relativistic and non-relativistic versions. Although not associated with the discovery of quantum mechanics, the name of P. A. M. Dirac b. 1902, Bristol, Gloucestershire, England, for his introduction of relativity into quantum mechanics, for work in the field theories, for his interpretations, and for the introduction of powerful techniques and solution of important problems in quantum theory, lies at the convergence of the various threads in quantum theory… It is further remarkable that the work of Hilbert on certain kinds of ‘linear space of infinite dimension’ (hence the name ‘Hilbert space’) was also significant to the mathematical foundations and interpretation of quantum theory]
That an intuition may develop regarding formal (e.g. scientific) concepts and systems makes re-conceptualizing and re-definition difficult
Although closed theoretical systems may give concepts precise meaning, the world is open and as long as its Understanding is incomplete, the meanings of concepts remain in-process and definitions remain tentative. After a closed system has been developed, definitions may be placed at the beginning. In the open case, definition and investigation remain in interaction
Seeing a system (a text, a life) as closed may result in an impression of a (definite) beginning and end. ‘Beginnings’ and ‘endings’ are, perhaps, no more than stopping points…
This strand of thought is taken up again under ‘Mathematics’ in the section ‘Logic’
The human organism is sufficiently elaborate in its cognition that it knows that it knows, that it can talk about language and meaning
Therefore dictionaries are possible
The dictionary theory of meaning is a disparaging reference to the lexical theory taken to extremes, i.e. the idea that meaning is unchanging, completely fixed by inheritance, atomic and independent of context
The idea that meaning is fixed is analogous to ‘substance theory’ i.e. that the many and changing forms of the world are manifestations of uniform and unchanging substances. In monism there is one substance, in dualism there are two or more. Fixity in meaning is rather like a dualism with a large number of substances, each the fixed meaning of the basic terms. In Metaphysics, it is seen that substance theory is untenable but that this does not lead to the absence of foundation with which absence of substance is associated. Perhaps it is similarly possible to found meaning, not in word meanings but in the pointing of words to fundamental objects
Therefore, meaning cannot be altogether atomic or altogether extracted from context. It is of course possible to talk of meaning but meaning cannot be fully fixed by talk of meaning i.e. meaning is determined by use (Wittgenstein.) However, talk of meaning is not something that stands outside use… talk of meaning can be artificial but everyday use is not free of artificiality
Perhaps opposite to the extreme lexical theory is the ‘trench coat theory’ of meaning, the idea that meaning is to be discovered by going into the street in trench coats and taking notes on word use and behavior of and among ‘common speakers’
Who is the common speaker? He or she is perhaps the non-specialist who uses language unreflexively. However, it is not at all clear that anyone uses language altogether unreflexively or that new (special) situations requiring conscious reflexive use do not arise everyday… that the divide between the common user and the specialist is an essential divide is perhaps an insufficiently reflexive philosopher’s speculation
It may be thought that the moment one focuses on meaning, meaning and its context are altered. Just so; however, this too lies in the realm of meaning and use
In the origin and growth of language the formal divide between common use and creation –reflexive or primal– is perhaps a recent artifact
The following lie in the realm of use: the common speaker or writer who is supposed to use language unreflexively but who as seen above is not altogether distinct from the following categories: the lexicographer and the user of dictionaries, the linguist, the philosopher in talking of meaning, and the shaman who names an idea. Since the distinction between common and reflexive use is not at all absolute, it is incorrect to think of specialist functions mentioned as in opposition to the common function
As contexts grow and change as a result of change in nature or location of physical and social environments, meaning, too, may change in response to occasion and need
It is clear that linguistic wholes, e.g. sentences, have or point to objects (to be clarified in ‘Objects,’ below) that are not fully captured by the ‘sum’ of the meanings of the parts or words. However, in general, the whole requires the part: atomism and holism are mutually enhancing. The meaning of the whole is not necessarily divided uniquely among the parts
This is true not only of sentences but also of meaning and knowledge as a whole. The possibility of change –shift and or extension– in meaning of which introduction of new meanings (words) is a case and the possibility of redistribution of meaning constitute, together, a powerful approach to the extension of understanding from a given domain e.g. of the everyday, of a given science, of a given ethics or metaphysics to a new domain, hitherto hidden from the discoverer
In the absence of complete knowledge of the universe, a complete system of meaning will generally be lacking. Whitehead observed that ‘A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge’
In the growth of understanding, language undergoes transformation – addition, shifting, and redistribution of meaning. In the development of the metaphysics that follows, common words are used (the use of some common vocabulary enhances stability of meaning) but words accumulate, meanings shift, redistribute and grow. Since the achievement is, it is shown, a metaphysics that is ultimate in depth and breadth (the meanings of the terms will be founded and explained,) it is expected that some common meanings will be extended to the root of being. In order to understand the narrative, the reader will need to attend to the meanings as set down in the narrative
Significant meaning is almost always in process
Ultimate character of concepts in this narrative derive from ultimate character of the metaphysics
A completed meaning occurs in the context of a metaphysics or dynamic
These considerations do not eliminate the possibility of precise meaning in certain contexts. Here are some examples where precision obtains within context (1) at least some everyday uses, (2) modern theoretical physics, (3) the metaphysics developed in ‘Metaphysics.’ The context of the metaphysics will be seen to be that of the entire universe; by itself, the metaphysics says nothing of the particulars of particular domains (however there is much of consequence that follows from combining the metaphysics with the particular and this includes the results of freeing from other restrictive metaphysics)
From ‘Objects,’ below, precision of meaning (and knowledge) does have precision in the general case. In the general case, precision of meaning does not even have meaning (there being no way to get outside perceiver and perceived to determine such precision.) However, for what is impossible there can be no need… Imprecision of meaning has virtues – realization that the alienation from the world made possible by symbols is illusory and the possibility of creation and discovery
In discussing ‘A clarification of ‘existence’,’ it was found to be necessary to distinguish concept from object. Generally, as noted by Frege, meaning has these two aspects – concept and object, if any, to which the concept refers. In a previous edition, the idea of the concept-object of Meinong was introduced in attempting to elucidate ‘abstract objects.’ The concept-object is abandoned in the present edition. It is sufficient to work with concept and object; the hybrid concept-object is unnecessary even in talking of abstract objects. Discussions of abstract objects and of the sufficiency of concept and object is found in Objects
Frege spoke of sense and reference. The sense is the idea or concept whether held in mind or as marks on paper or combinations of zeros and ones in a computer. What is essential, as will be seen, is that the neither the concept nor the abstract object need be located in some abstract space or world: they are very much in this one world. The reference is the object or objects to which the sense refers. There are other similar distinctions that are shown below
|
Concept |
Object |
|
Sense |
Reference |
|
Connotation |
Denotation |
|
Intension |
Extension |
Some of the distinctions are useful and will be illustrated in what follows
Meaning lies, shifts and grows in the interplay of sense and reference
Quine thought that sense requires experience. However, intuition –the form of sense– has an innate character. In some cases the intuition is fully innate; in others the full intuition flowers within the bounds of the innate. Even if the innate has origin in someone else’s experience, e.g. in evolution, it is not the experience of the individual and further, the sense in which the ‘imprint’ of evolution is experience an issue
The following considerations derive from the section, Preliminary: revised thinking on the natures of and relation between concept and object since the ’06 version of Objects
Having a meaning (sense) does not, of necessity, completely specify an object… and a case of incomplete specification is non-specification. But, further, twin of incomplete specification is ability to specify, to generate specification, and therefore the situation described may be seen as good—intrinsically in the existence of the ability, externally in the possibility of discovery and ever-freshness of experience