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Philosophy Anil
Mitra, © March 2010, © Latest Revision Contents Comparison
and contrast of science and philosophy. Does philosophy have a subject
matter? From Method
Comparison and
contrast of science and philosophy. Does philosophy have a subject matter?
I think it should be noted that
‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ are complex human activities and, as Wittgenstein
himself may have allowed, families of activities; but, more, I do not think
of them as definite families but differing—a little—from one competent
interpreter to another and from time to time… perhaps with progress.
Therefore, rather, than attempt strict definitions, it may be profitable to
delineate activities Knowledge
Consider that knowledge
involves conceptual or mental content that is in some way and to some degree
faithful to some aspect of the world that we may call the Object (this
language may require further refinement as done earlier but this
consideration may be omitted here.) In some activities we are interested in
precision of outcome and therefore some imprecision of reference may be
allowed Science. Scientific concepts require precision
but not perfect faithfulness
This is characteristic of
science where, for example, the electron as defined in, say, Dirac’s theory
of the electron need not correspond to any actual entity; the correspondence
of the theory, however, may be such that precision in the prediction of
outcomes of range experiments is good Pure metaphysics requires and philosophy has
the ideal of perfect faithfulness
In other situations we may be interested
to have faithful representation and then we will naturally also be concerned
with the meaning of faithfulness (part the refinement referred to earlier.)
And the need for the faithfulness may be that it is required for some
philosophical or metaphysical goal (e.g. knowledge of being as such.) Here,
too, it may be admissible to tolerate imperfection provided that the
faithfulness is sufficient to the purpose which is not purely
computational—it may invoke understanding Now some philosophers write, and Wittgenstein appeared to have this in mind even though he may have allowed other purposes, that consequently philosophy is not about any particular subject matter: rather it is about the nature of knowledge and understanding and the conditions that perception, thought and language should satisfy so as to be ‘about the world.’ This is or perhaps ought to be a perfectly good aim for philosophy; however I believe and shall now set out to show (suggest) that there is no reason to restrict philosophy to it and that the metaphysics developed in this narrative is an example of philosophical knowledge[1] (and in some ways, though not a science of detailed behavior and while it insists on faithfulness, it is also close to science) As a result of the evolution of
the institution of knowledge, the subject matter of philosophy has been,
dually, knowledge of knowledge as well as knowledge of the world; and since
more or less definite knowledge is the domain of the sciences and related
endeavors such as medicine and technology, philosophy deals with what is left
over. It is natural therefore, that on the world side, the subject matter of
philosophy will be about topics that have not yet reached the status of
science or that may never achieve scientific status but are still important
disciplines These disciplinary activities
include the understanding of knowledge (since knowledge is in the world it
lies dually in the world as well as, trivially, constituting field of
knowledge,) of morals, and of method itself including logic. Additionally,
philosophy retains an interest in the concepts of science since it is
characteristic of science that its concepts may remain partially or fully
un-analyzed. This is sometimes a point of contention between scientists and
philosophers and sources of contention have been naiveté on both sides—with
scientists being satisfied with prediction over conceptual analysis and
philosophers’ interest in analysis being naïve of the significance, depth and
articulation of scientific concepts and theories The fact remains that the needs of science are occasionally—especially when the conceptual foundation of the science of an era is found inadequate to the needs of emerging ideas required to explain exceptional data—analytic as well as predictive and here the recent history appears to have been that the initial conceptual analysis has been done by the scientists while both scientists and philosophers have been involved in ‘tidying up loose ends.’ There is clearly some case for broader education of both scientists and philosophers[2] and the motive for this case is the dual of better preparedness and improved communication and cooperation among the now famous ‘two cultures[3]’ It remains valid to ask that
while Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is a valid philosophical
activity, is there any logic (interpreted broadly) for evaluation of the
claim that it can be the only philosophical activity. That logic would lie in
approaches to answering the questions After the activities of philosophy
in Wittgenstein’s sense and science have been delineated is there anything
left over that could constitute conceptual knowledge of the Universe? And
if so, what is it and why is it philosophy? Consider sociology. I will
avoid the assertions sociology is / is not science but instead note that
among the activities of western sociologists there are activities that are
not science and that many practitioners would not take exception to the claim
(while others would) Consider some of the kinds of European sociology[4]. This sort of sociology—is it philosophy, does it use a philosophical approach? An analytic (Wittgensteinian) purist would probably say that it is and does not! But a more flexible analytic philosopher might allow some overlap with philosophy as would a contingent of continental philosophers. Surely though, even the analytic purist would allow that the question whether such sociology is philosophy is philosophical. I leave answers to these questions undetermined. What might make the analyst correct is that analytic thought is the outcome of a finely honed critical trend. What might make the analyst’s position insecure is that demonstration that that could be the only trend is absent Clearly there are areas of
investigation that are problematic with regard to any universal answer to the
question whether they are philosophy Now ask whether the metaphysics
of the present metaphysics is philosophy. It cannot yet be consensus
philosophy because it has not yet been widely read by persons to whom the
label ‘philosopher’ might apply However, the present narrative
has presented strong arguments that the preoccupation of chapters Intuition
through Cosmology and significant parts of Journey and the present chapter
are about perfectly faithful and timeless knowledge, absolute in its finite
depth and previously unimagined and putatively unimaginably infinite breadth,
of the Universe. Put aside the superlative character of the claims of the
previous sentence and see that the claim regards perfectly faithful knowledge
outside the analytic pale However, I have a doubt as to
whether it is philosophy. Having spent a significant part of my life in pursuit
of questions, I am hesitant to relinquish the chase, to admit that there may
in some direction be an end to questions What other doubts may I
conceive? If I were nothing but a philosopher I might be anxious over the
loss of my self in the answering of questions. Still even if I were nothing
but a philosopher I might see that these thoughts open up adventure in new
dimensions and that it is my attachment to my self-regard (and perhaps to my
socio-economic status) that makes me hesitate at the doorstep of my
comfortable abode outside of which lies an infinite adventure in becoming and
dissolution and becoming and dissolution and pleasure and pain and pleasure
and pain and vistas of knowledge and understanding and sucked in myopias of
nothingness… Philosophy
At the dawn of philosophy a
distinction between science and philosophy was not made. Today, scholars make
this distinction. Wittgenstein insisted on the distinction. Is this an
evolution? It is an evolution but though evolution may be advance, evolution and advance are not synonymous. I think the kind of thought emphasized by Wittgenstein, a critique of the expression of thought in language[5]—an immensely careful analysis of our use of language, is important. I do not think it is all there is to philosophy—i.e. the claims are (1) That philosophy may (does) have reference to the external world (content) as does science even though criteria and kinds of analysis may be different and examples are the perfectly faithful Universal metaphysics and a variety of faithfulness seeking analyses such as those in Worlds and otherwise in the region between science and philosophy or between philosophy and itself: the nature of philosophy is a crucial issue in philosophy, (2) Wittgensteinian analysis does not exhaust the philosopher’ toolkit[6], (3) The previous claims are demonstrated in the narrative If science studies the world
and philosophy studies language / concept use, does that cover the disciplinary
possibilities for knowing the world—i.e., do philosophy as conceived by
Wittgenstein and science exhaust the kinds of conceptual knowledge? As
practical, science allows that its concepts may and need not be perfectly
faithful. Is there no higher or more abstract level at which both
practicality (reference) and faithfulness obtain? Yes, and we have seen the
elaboration of such a level in Metaphysics—Cosmology and to
some extent in Worlds; and it is a vast world even though we do not have a
direct hold (experience of) on it (recall also that the abstraction is only
initially of the kind in which detail is suppressed) Keeping in mind the arguments
here and throughout against the preemption of philosophy by the analytic and
continental approaches, let us begin to approach the idea of philosophy by
comparison with science. Referring to the corresponding comparison in the
section on Science, we tentatively suggest (1) A first concern of philosophy
shall be of generality and potential applicability (truth before application,)
(2) Experience is built into ideas and cannot be escaped but philosophy shall
occasionally take leave of experience to focus on concept formation; in the
process we may refer to but also interpret experience—intuitively and
formally; and, while the goal of reference to the world cannot recede
forever, we may be happy to delay that goal until reference may be faithful
(given that application is a goal, faithfulness may be somewhat forgone in
some disciplines / applications of philosophy but in the general case it is
only forgone so as to experiment and improve; this may suggest that outcomes
are not guaranteed and that is in fact the case,) (3) Conceptual clarity and
perfect faithfulness are (distinct) values (use is important provided that it
is understood that conceptual play is a case of use in process,) (4) In the
general case universal and faithful understanding of ideas and world is the
goal of philosophy (we are describing and idea that has been abandoned but
that we have shown is immensely viable… and philosophy may be seen as the
label that we apply to this idea… and etymologically this is a good label
that, though it has fallen into disuse as a result of recent ‘evolution’ has
here been seen to deserve some resurrection) and instead of replace-ability
the corresponding philosophic ideals may be clarification of depth and
conceptual and experimental working out of the breadth or variety of being As seen here, philosophy is the
root, to which return is immensely viable and developed, from which the
modern notion of science and restricted though not empty notion of philosophy
derive Philosophy may be regarded as
general thought without restriction of subject matter except that it is
developed imaginatively and critically with reference to ideas or concepts
and experience and especial reference to the imaginative and critical use of
the history of ideas. It is understood that a variety of academic disciplines
that may thread back to philosophy are excluded by convention but that
occasion arises from time to time when interaction with philosophy is useful.
It is hardly to be expected that a single approach or subject matter should
emerge in so general an endeavor. However, the present discussion has
identified some elements of thought and experience that may be considered to
be characteristically philosophical Foundation in this world
Substance has an appeal noted
earlier. The earliest substances were stuff-like, e.g. the first
philosophical substance theory of Thales that posited water as the stuff of
the world. Water may have been suggested by its pervasion and importance, the
appeal is that in contrast to myth and religion water is of this world
and—apparently—simple However, substance is untenable Therefore consider every being or
region of being as its own explanation. What this appears to lose in
simplicity, it gains in obviousness; what it appears to lose in explanatory
power, it gains in removing need for explanation; it gains immediacy; it
cannot be ‘wrong’ There is a movement in
philosophy that eschews explanation—especially explanation of the scientific
type. The foundation in being achieves the aim of this movement It is therefore perhaps
astonishing that it is via being—that which is common to every being—that the
Universal metaphysics has been attained. On reflection, it is perhaps not so
astonishing since it is gained by abstraction and after its ultimate depth
has been achieved, depth is seen to be immediate as built in at start; and
after ultimate breadth has been achieved as a very real achieved, further
work must be—and has been—done Concepts
Concepts have been regarded as
the language of philosophy. This is a strength but is also regarded as a
weakness—it makes philosophy limp in comparison to other endeavor e.g. art,
history, religion, and music Extension to concept as mental
concept brings philosophy to life What is the relation to
science? Where science employs experiment does not philosophy employ
experience? Do not both philosophy and science employ concepts? The
difference is not only in the tools but also in the aim. Whereas science is
concerned with validity by any means, philosophy is concerned with truth as
validity. Therefore if science is able to explain domains of natural
phenomena by particles or fields of undescribed nature it is of lesser
concern if the particles are not precisely known or if they are not ultimate
or atomic entities; in philosophy the concern with the nature of the
particles is important. Perhaps because science goes to a current ultimate in
its own domain and because philosophy cannot exceed science in that domain,
science and philosophy have become separate. But the division is not as
absolute as it has been made out to be. The criteria of utility and validity
are not precisely the same and their realizations are manifest—validity as
success, validity as truth and so on—but the differences define continua. See
for example the later considerations regarding whether the Universal
metaphysics is science Approach
In the first place the method
of philosophy is that of analysis of concepts and experience as outlined in
the developments of method. In the second place it is the various special
methods of the various disciplinary applications and divisionary developments
of philosophy with interpretation of the special methods and special areas in
their own terms taken experimentally and the Universal metaphysics as
framework and as outlined earlier in this chapter and in Worlds. Then
there is the ‘philosopher’s toolkit’ which is only superficially without
content (thought and language and analysis and synthesis are in the world)
and which includes intuition and abstraction which have a variety of
applications from the core metaphysics to the analysis of mind and of space
and time. Additionally there are commonly recognized approaches in philosophy
that include doubt and wonder as motivation, formulation
of issues, conceiving and justifying responses, and criticism within
philosophy that have been occasionally encountered in the present narrative
but are not developed systematically Metaphysics
The considerations regarding
method that have arisen are at the heart of the possibility and construction
of the metaphysics. This need not be further emphasized It may need to be reemphasized
that it is not claimed that we know every detail with perfect faithfulness.
This is not claimed and it is with regard to direct knowledge of detail that
metaphysics is impossible. However we know depth metaphysics and have
implicit knowledge of variety. Within this immense realm there is room for
experiment with concept and being Approach
See the corresponding
discussion for philosophy, above. In the development of the metaphysics we
encountered the additional considerations of which some now follow. (1)
Analysis of the idea of Being in terms of Experience. (2) Via abstraction
intuition (experience) is shown to have perfect faithfulness for the
necessary Objects including Experience itself, Being or existence, Universe
and Law, Domain, and Void (whose existence is demonstrated.) (3) These
concepts constitute the core of an experimentally (tinkering with concepts)
determined articulated system of concepts that constitute the metaphysics.
Each of these concepts (excepting Domain) can be conceived in a
family-variety of ways. The final selection is crucial and the articulation
essential to the structure of the Universal metaphysics. (4) The fundamental
principle is derived from the existence and properties of the Void. The
fundamental principle results in substance-free finite but ultimate depth of
foundation and the elaboration of the metaphysics including the ultimate
variety of being and the idea of Logic as the abstract concept whose
satisfaction is required for concepts to have reference. This Logic is
approximated by the logics and is therefore not empty. Logic and metaphysics
are identical and the Universal metaphysics is simultaneously metaphysics and
a metaphysic of experience (outside the pure Universal metaphysics the
identity of metaphysics and experience breaks down and knowledge is
practical.) The individual concepts of Universe, Domain and fundamental
principle lead to significant conclusions. (5) The fundamental principle
results in significant clarification of the nature of Objects, and shows that
while there are practical distinctions among particular and abstract Objects,
the distinction is not fundamental. For example while particular Objects
(typically) have being in space and time, abstract Objects are not generally
regarded as spatio-temporal. Where and when, for example, is there an event
called the number one? It is shown in Objects that abstract Objects do have
spatiotemporal being but the spatiotemporality is abstracted out and
therefore immaterial rather than non-constitutional. The result is a unified
theory of Objects that is also a ‘unified theory of Worlds’—i.e., we may talk
of a material world, a mental world, and an ideal world of Forms as though
they were distinct but there is in fact precisely one world within which all
real things and only real things reside. (5) Extension and Duration are
necessary Objects and their development results in the Cosmology. (6) The
subject matter of Worlds is detailed study of local domains,
particularly ours. This study is not purely metaphysical but here the
metaphysics is useful in assisting with some improvements of the local
disciplines. The potential is to eliminate the ad hoc and the imprecise to
the limit of the discipline; this potential is realized in some cases and
suggests lines of development in some others Induction and necessity
Although induction over infinite data is tentative, the negative judgment of Hume[7] is not universal for it necessarily applies only when the facts of the context are too large to reduce to data. The Universal metaphysics (1) concerns Objects that are finite-and-perfectly-faithful-by-abstraction and (2) entails the necessity of an infinite number of facts, the existence of an infinite variety of Objects, which infinities are bounded only by the requirements of Logic Prior metaphysics
Some prior metaphysics hints at
the Universal metaphysics, e.g. in the suggestion that Logic and metaphysics
are identical. No prior metaphysics demonstrates such a system. In the
Universal metaphysics the system is demonstrated. Since the demonstration
provides both motivation and tools, it has been possible in this narrative to
develop a metaphysics that is ultimate in depth and breadth of being and that
unifies and elaborates the ideas of Being, Object, and Cosmology, that
applies the ideas as in Worlds, and that deploys these ideas as in Journey in
the undertaking of a realization from the immediate to the ultimate. No prior
metaphysics has accomplished this and, given the lack of demonstration of a
system of the present type, this may now be seen as expected Prior metaphysics is generally
deficient in some aspect of experience-creation-reason-articulation Aristotle’s metaphysics depends
on substance; Plato’s on form Hegel is imaginatively strong
but critically weak; and his critical weakness impedes the development of
imagination Hume’s criticism of necessity
is limited to science and has no account of the necessary Objects Kant depends on the science and
logic of his time as given. Wittgenstein is so entrenched in the critical
logic of experience that he does not think (and therefore conceive of
developing) that metaphysics of the kind that he rejects may also be a
metaphysic of experience. Interestingly, Kant is able to see beyond the
common-critical logic of experience From Contribution
Philosophy and
metaphysics
What is perhaps the problem of
the nature of philosophy is—includes—that it has come to have specialized and
limited connotations as in analytic and continental circles via its history and
relation to other disciplines. What is the status of these limited
connotations? Are they necessary? The response is that the
Universal metaphysics shows that self and externally imposed limits on
philosophy can be and are transcended and, further, in the ultimate character
of the metaphysics goes beyond anything thought and earlier recorded.
Although there are intimations of elements of content and the ideas of the
method, the various elements and ideas have not been put together
before—either separately as content and as method or combined as
content-method—and the dynamic result is a system of immense consequences
that is new, ultimate—in depth of understanding and breadth of being
revealed; and surprising—perhaps even intoxicating The
surprise lies not only in the ultimate character but also in the economy of
the development However, a focus on hastily
thought out reflections based on suggestion from limited contexts is
reflected in the recent history of academic philosophy in which every
generation barely refers to the work of the previous while the works and
questions of the seminal thinkers remain fundamental In paragraphs that follow, some
possible reasons for the uncritical acceptance of suggested limits will be
given Critical philosophy has the following
uses. First, it attempts to eliminate error. This is important. However,
elimination of error, even though we accept its fundamental importance, can
be overrated—for errors of method do not invariably imply errors of content…
and it is often important to act even in the presence of error or in the
absence of knowledge that error has been eliminated. A second use of critical
philosophy, one in which criticism is not an end in itself, is that it may
suggest or force the overcoming of error and the development of methods of
greater power than available previously. As we have seen, even neurotic
criticism may be of immense value. All too often, however, criticism is seen
as an end in itself and philosophy and thought then suffer a
self-imprisonment in which they labor under falsely held and, paradoxically,
uncritically critical ideals In any case, the present
development, demonstrates the possibility of overcoming the critical momentum
of recent thought and simultaneously realizes that possibility in the
ultimate Universal metaphysics Therefore consider the
following Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the discipline
whose concern is the outer limits of being; whose method—the method of
the rational or empirical-logical analysis of experience-meaning—shows how to
study at those outer limits; and which is revealed as a study of being of
ultimate depth and variety The goal of metaphysics may be
said to be to bring all experience—and intention and action—including the forms
of experience into a single coherent system of description of the universe.
The final concept will not include all forms because, due to consistency the
requirement, there is no Object that is the referent object of all forms.
However, the final Object will implicitly contain all forms of
experience-in-themselves, i.e. as concepts. Metaphysics may be said to be the
result of this goal Philosophy
It is now possible to see
philosophy as the discipline whose limits are the outer limits of being;
whose method shows how to study within those limits—the method of metaphysics
and the interactively modified methods of less general contexts; and which is
revealed as a study of meaning but also of fact and significance and a study
in lateral analysis but also in analysis via depth. The firmness of the
foundation of metaphysics is carried over to the foundation philosophy where
the limit of firmness or certainty is the modified firmness or certainty of
the special context or discipline Where philosophy has been seen
as limited on account of its boundaries in relation to other disciplines,
such boundaries may be seen as contingent or Normal. The Normal
boundaries may be seen as apportioning of subject matter, division of labor,
territorial concerns. We do not claim that the apportioning of subject has no
basis—only that it is and cannot be absolute and this has been shown. That
philosophers occasionally show naïveté regarding science shows the naïveté of
the person and not a necessary limitation; the physicist even as physicist
occasionally needs to turn to philosophical concerns that overlap the
physical Philosophy has been held to be
‘merely’ conceptual. However, as has been seen here the conceptual is not
‘mere’ in any sense but is fundamentally empirical at root Certain movements in
Continental philosophy have abandoned the ‘grand narrative.’ If ‘grand
narrative’ refers to the positing of a vast speculative scheme then there is
some validity this abandonment (the validity is not entire because there may
be value in a grand speculation.) Modern thought reveals the emptiness of
certain grand narratives of the past as does history. What history may show,
however, is that certain speculative schemes are empty; and modern
thought itself has been shown here to be immensely contingent even though it
regards itself as natural—which is the case with the thought of every age.
What history cannot show, however, is that systematic and
comprehensive metaphysics is impossible. History may suggest this
impossibility and the suggestion may turn out to be valid or not. Perhaps,
then, reason may show the impossibility of systematic-comprehensive
metaphysics. Since Kant it has been thought to have been demonstrated that
this is in fact the case. The implicit error in this thinking has been shown.
It is, first, that while there is an aspect of detail in which the central
metaphysical concepts ‘all,’ ‘part’ and ‘absence’ may be incapable of being
known by a—finite—being, the abstract versions of these concepts, i.e. the
versions devoid of detail, are supremely, necessarily, and precisely
empirical and faithful; in fact it is only in the case of such concepts that
faithfulness has explicit meaning. The second part to the error in the
anti-metaphysical thinking is the supposition that no absolute non-relativist
(yet non-substance) demonstration is possible; such demonstration has indeed
been performed here with the result that the Law of the Universe is Logic It may be a failure of nerve, a
self-aggrandizement, a parochialism that generalizes from—e.g.
historical—sequence to concept; the thinker who so generalizes commits the
error that he criticizes. It may have been a similar failure to think from
empiricism and Kantianism that no systematic-comprehensive (Universal)
metaphysics is possible—it is perhaps the case that the implicit errors in
empiricism-Kantianism were neglected in the parochial and self-aggrandizing
rush to abandon the Universe in favor of the backyard. Perhaps we should not
be critical; perhaps we should think, simply, that certain details were not
noticed, certain lucky inspirations were not had—for it is not clear to the
writer whether the present developments have occurred because of attention to
detail and luck or due to persistence and insight Here, we have developed an immense
view of the variety and connectedness of being which is not grand in the
sense that it emerges from a simple view of the elements of being, in that it
is not posited, not speculative Extensions
An extension to these thoughts
on metaphysics and philosophy is implicit in the chapter and idea of a Journey.
This extension may be called the reflective life which is not one of pure
reflection but one in which reflection and action interact to enhance and
illuminate one another in greater realization and meaning The divisions of philosophy
Significant implications for
metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of
science, philosophy of space-time-matter, philosophy of mathematics have been
developed The academic disciplines
In addition to philosophy,
there are significant and potential implications for the sciences and method,
and for history and religion. The narrative form of ‘journey’ may be of
interest to literature and to the nature and significance of the research
article. Although art been considered only briefly and slightly, the
provision of a universal framework for being may assist in the understanding
of art and its place in human life Problems of metaphysics
It is clear that numerous classical and modern problems
of metaphysics have received illumination and resolution. Such problems
include identity, mind-body, substance, the fundamental problem of
metaphysics, the possibility of metaphysics… The problems and their
resolutions are catalogued at http://www.horizons-2000.org The essential problems of the
discipline of metaphysics concern the nature of the objects—and
categories—identified above and the problem of fitting them into a coherent
(consistent) system. A review of the actual problems reveals this to be the case
and it is not necessary to re-list the problems to prove the point What are the important Objects? First are the important metaphysical Objects taken up earlier—being, all being, void, identity, mind, matter, human being… Second are the Objects of intrinsic importance to human beings, e.g. knowledge, peace, love (it sometimes seems that love does better without analysis although some clarifications and removal of confusions of sophistry might be useful—there is perhaps a twofold philosophy of emotion or feeling, first, in the integration of cognition-feeling performed here and in greater detail in other essays of http://www.horizons-2000.org and, second, in a two-way ‘conversation’ between cognition and the emotions in which each learns from the other; this would, perhaps, be vastly better than any attempt to bring emotion under the rule of thought or the alternative abandonment of reason altogether in the domain of pure feeling.) The two classes of Object are not distinct; the analysis of the first is exhaustive; that of the second cannot and perhaps should not be exhaustive but attention to it eclectic (except of course as noted that the system of concerns is not decomposable into Objects to be addressed in isolation.) A final Object is the meta-Object such as metaphysics itself that is also addressed Resolutions
The problem of final or
ultimate explanation. The problem of
grand narratives—the problem is not of the actuality but that of positing
such a narrative for, if such a ‘narrative’ emerges in cold Rationality there
can be no stand against it except cold argument The problem of a
non-relativist philosophy without substance… of final or ultimate explanation. An encapsulation of the
resolution is to recognize the sense in which such explanation is possible
and actual. First, it is explicit with respect to depth—the foundations are
trivial even though immense and profound in implication; and, of course,
seeing the foundation is not at all a trivial endeavor. Second, the ‘final
and ultimate’ explanation is implicit with respect to breadth—All Being is
its implicit Object; however, the discovery and Experience—Capitalization
implies becoming the Object rather than merely conceiving it—is a process, a
journey The nature of the ultimate
breadth and depth of metaphysics, i.e.
of the Universal metaphysics or Metaphysics of immanence The problem of ultimate
explanation that has no application.
This problem is resolved, first, in revealing the falsity of the practical /
theoretical / immediate / ultimate dichotomies; and then in showing, in their
common meanings, both applicability and application The problem of mere being. There is no mere being—except as approximation. Human
being is not ‘mere;’ animal being is anything but ‘mere.’ Greatness does not
require being greater than The fundamental problem of
metaphysics. This is the problem of why
there is anything. Its resolution; its fundamental character is rendered
trivial. The fundamental problem becomes ‘What things exist?’ [1] I have a response to the critic who does not consider any knowledge at all to fall under philosophy but that philosophy is about clarification of language and ideas, about illumination, about edification… and that philosophy has no more than this ‘therapeutic’ character which is to eliminate the mistakes of misplaced or erroneous reference. My response is this. If that is what philosophy should be then there is an area of knowing that is neither philosophy nor science nor any other discipline and that this area of knowing draws upon this conception of philosophy for at least some of its tools. What should we call this endeavor, of which examples appear in the present narrative? I see no reason that it should not be called philosophy [2] Which is ill met by what is called ‘general education’ in American universities [3] C. P. Snow, Two Cultures, The Rede Lecture, 1959 [4] Evolving from Durkheimian positivism and structural functionalism through Marxist historical materialism and conflict theory through Weberian antipositivism and verstehen analysis (a kind of non-empirical, empathic, or participatory examination of social phenomena) to the present time when some social scientists continue to attempt to duplicate conventional science and its method while others employ critical analysis (e.g. a neo-Marxism that may be described as humanistic Marxism) and hermeneutics (in sociology, an understanding of social events in terms of meanings to human participants and their cultures) [5] David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Volume One, 1987 [6] In the words of Paul Feyerabend, cited earlier, regarding science, Anything goes. The developments of the narrative show that apparent finality of Wittgenstein’s thought regarding his own argument does not obtain and therefore we might consider being wary of any such rather dogmatic attitude on the nature of philosophy and its tools [7] Cited earlier. The reference here is to Hume’s argument that induction cannot be necessary |