natural development of this article would begin in either metaphysics from elementary beginnings or from elementary human aspiration; however, some context will be useful; and to begin with the article’s sense of ‘metaphysics’ will make for clarity; and the article will grow into metaphysics

metaphysics and its uses

here metaphysics is knowledge of the real. This already presents dilemmas—(1) knowledge of the real is impossible—v—possible, (2) it is perfect and / or pragmatic knowledge, (3) it is trivial—v—deep and powerful.—v—triviality is the source of its depth, (4) it is of the immediate and everyday—v—of the ultimate.—v—it is of both and their union and final identity, and (5) metaphysics as knowledge of the real—v—a range of other connotations or conceptions (see dilemmas of metaphysics)

it is not the intent of this article to affirm or deny other meanings. However the present meaning of metaphysics may draw from and have implications for the others

we will find metaphysics to be immensely powerful; it will reveal a true picture of the universe that goes far beyond our common secular and other views

what metaphysical dilemmas are

a metaphysical dilemma presents two or more at least apparently conflicting interpretations of the world; typically at least one is ‘standard’ while at least one other is or may seem essentially different to standard and a challenge to understanding; it may seem at least superficially impossible to distinguish the different interpretations

how metaphysical dilemmas are useful

typically, the truth of the alternative interpretations may seem indistinguishable in terms of common cumulative experience—v—once we attempt to go beyond the common, we may find that they have different domains of truth—typically the domains will overlap and one may include the other

thus, while such dilemmas may seem like curiosities in an intellectual game—v—in fact challenge our notions of the meanings of terms (concepts), the nature of the world, truth, and methods or ways of arriving at truth

two aims of the article

the first aim is to build a coherent and powerful metaphysics. It will be shown that the universe is ultimate in the sense of realization of all possibility. The ‘how’ of this development is crucial and emerges with the metaphysics—that is, epistemology is also part the development and indeed epistemology is part of metaphysics. The metaphysics has a ‘practical’ side: it shows that we are part of and realize that ultimate (death is real but not absolute) and that the metaphysics and tradition enable laying out of paths to the ultimate (for paths see the way-outline.html)

‘realization of all possibility’ is a self-contradictory concept—v—it can be rendered consistent ultimate in principle while approaching the ultimate in its explicit form (as realization of logical possibility)

we repeat that metaphysics as knowledge of the real is impossible—v—it is possible, at least in one way, i.e. by abstraction of the concrete resulting in the real

metaphysics and epistemology are distinct and one of them primary—v—they are inseparable for knowledge is part of the world and therefore knowledge of knowledge is metaphysics

the pure or abstract side—as it will be seen to be—and the pragmatic are distinct—v—they can be united by external criteria—v—hey are united in terms of intrinsic criteria from metaphysics itself

the second aim is the development and use of dilemmas. In fact explicit use of dilemmas is not necessary to the first aim. The metaphysics was developed first. Along the way I found myself being concerned with classical and other dilemmas. I found that thinking in terms of dilemmas did not alter the fundamental picture but clarified, and enhanced it, and helped secure and understand it. I have enjoyed casting the development of the metaphysics explicitly in terms of dilemmas.

approach for the article

when looking for an anchor for ideas or action, we often turn to foundations (grounding) and / or consequence and use (superstructure); however conceptual foundation almost invariably requires another and superstructure almost never extends to all Being. Therefore a strategy for anchors is to begin with the immediate; which sets aside obsession with foundation and addresses the immediate need; but it allows simultaneous or subsequent search for foundation and superstructure; and, thus Being freed of necessity, we may in fact find it

two approaches consistent with the aim are (1) to begin with the place of the individual—and society—in the world and (2) to begin with the most elementary or primitive, and therefore metaphysical, aspect of the world; it is effective to begin with #1 as it addresses the individual and motivates #2; however, the two may be seen as parallel approaches

the article beings, in the issue of what we shall do in life, with a question that every person may face; the article is addressed to those who face the issue at some points in their lives

when one enquires into ‘what to do in life’, one approach to attempt to build a true picture of the world and the place of human being in it; this begins in the immediate with dilemmas of experience or consciousness in dilemmas of metaphysics; it begins with experience as the most immediate aspect of the world and is continued in subsequent sections where further dilemmas arise and enable the building of a true and ultimate picture of the world which enable an ultimate approach to the issue of what to do in life

the beginning with experience will enable building a robust and true—and therefore ultimate—picture of the world. This will involve clarification and advance of meaning and understanding and knowledge. As part of that process there will also be advance in reason and method for they are essential to true knowledge, and they too are part of the world

plan for development of the article—a temporary section

the structure (and dilemmas) are emergent in two ways

the structure emerges with reflection and writing starting with the immediate in the individual (“what shall we do”) and the universal (“experience”), and

knowledge of the world and its nature (which, since knowledge is in the world, includes knowledge of knowledge and its nature) emerge with the progression of structure

the plan is to improve the article and import related documents, especially canonical dilemmas.2.html.

review

the form of dilemmas:—v—– and – but – however

dilemma versus analysis versus comment paragraphs

level 2 headings; use of brief temporary level 3 headings

the issue of what we shall do in life

explore and implement ‘what shall we do’—v—a laissez faire attitude—v—intend nothing

‘what shall we do?’ is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s three (famous) questions—v—it implies his questions and more

three preliminary interactive issues—inner and outer limits of the possible; the nature of the real and the universe; the existence and nature of choice and free will

(It is useful to state these issues at the beginning but to defer any analysis.)

the limits of the possible are the inner limit of the empirical—v—some region containing the empirical but contained by the greatest possibility—v—the greatest possibility

the greatest possibility is some kind of real possibility, e.g. physical possibility—v—logical possibility

the universe as the greatest possibility, especially logical possibility, is contradicted by experience and science—v—it is not—v—such contradiction is logically and scientifically impossible

for the universe the actual is limited by the greatest possibility—v—it is the greatest possibility

what are the world or universe and sapient being like? – what do we know? – metaphysics (knowledge – reason – value) and their actuality or fact—v—possibility—v—impossibility

human choice and action—free will—are unlimited except that they cannot exceed the greatest possibility for the universe—v—the options are limited not only by the logical but also by the real, e.g. the physical and perhaps the feasible—v—choice is possible under determinism due to complexity and incomplete knowledge (a case of compatibilism)—v—‘actions’* are determined and choice is an illusion

(*as conceived here, action requires choice)

the small and large scale pictures of our lives and the world

there is no big (systematic) picture—v—there is (as explained and developed below)

dilemmas of metaphysics

some metadilemmas

metaphysics is indefinite—v—there are definite forms of metaphysics

for example, knowledge of the real – knowledge of the abstract and abstract objects – metaphysics of experience – pragmatic knowledge of tradition and cumulative experience and beyond

knowledge of the real and the abstract are not possible—v—they are possible
and can and have been developed (e.g. in the way of being)

knowledge of and mapping experience is not adequate to metaphysics—v—it is
and subsumes knowledge real-abstract-pragmatic as one (and ranges in between)

some dilemmas of metaphysics

there is no experience (-as-subjective-awareness-or-consciousness)—v—there is

(for the thought that there is no experience is in experience)

experience is nothing but undifferentiated consciousness—v—it differentiated, particularly is pure** – attitudinal – active… and further into cognition, feeling and so on

**even the pureness of the ‘pure’ case is a result of somewhat arbitrary division of world into self – environment

experience is and cannot be empirical—v—there is experience of experience (in some organisms)

experience (consciousness) is trivial—v—it is the essential place of Being (see below) – significant and concept-linguistic-referential-and-other-meaning)

there is experience and there are objects of experience—v—we never get out of experience (in which there are as if objects and there is a standard secular world view—SSV—of selves, material environment, and other minds) and this is tentatively the proper interpretation of metaphysical solipsism

SSV is untenable in the universe of the possible and in some worlds but not in substance worlds

world as field of experience—FOE—is one most general interpretation consistent with experience and it is not distinct from world with matter (matter as the form of experience and its levels) and especially the special case of ESSV—extended SSV in which the material has low level experience

ESSV is essentially the only tenable case of FOE—v—the Brahmanic view of Vedanta is the most general world as FOE (under possibilism) and it is real and of which our case is temporarily ESSV

the elements of ESSV (self or I, world, other minds) have no clear objectivity—v—they do as shown above but the objectivity has various interpretations that in the nature of the case need not be pinned down even though they may be for various purposes but there is an ultimately inclusive FOE interpretation

nothing (truly) exists—v—‘existence’ is the name of what is there (not just here-now but somewhere in spacetime)

spacetime is adequate above—v—spacetime is assumed and the real most general case of which spacetime is a particular is sameness-difference-and-their-absence—implied by and therefore abbreviated DIFFERENZ; the purpose of the ‘z’ is to allow difference as an ordinary term)

consequently there is existence (FOE and ESSV) and existence is the defining characteristic of that which exists (the objects in FOE or beings); another world for existence is ‘Being’ (capitalized to distinguish it from beings)

as characteristic of that exists or which is somewhere in sameness, difference, and their absence, Being is and can be adequate and essential foundation of the world and knowledge—v—substance foundation is essential (even though itself foundationless)—v—all putative foundation refers to another

dilemmas of Being

though Being is central to metaphysics, it is effective for this to be a separate section

as identified by Aristotle and Heidegger, Being is a difficult concept—v—it is the most trivial of concepts: that which is (somewhere in DIFFERENZ)

metaphysics as difficult—v—trivial

Heidegger argues that Being is indeed difficult because we that are of Being are on the cusp of grasping Being which includes our Being and as a (a small putative) example of the difficulty notes that Being is not a being—v—at the level of the concrete Being is indeed not a being but here the difficulty of understanding Human Being (which Heidegger calls Dasein) lies within Being and is not of Being—v—with sufficient abstraction (omission of concrete detail) Being is a being but there are difficulties of understanding our own Being which lie within Being and this submerging is (as found below to be immensely) empowering while at the same time the question of our being emerges as part of a fundamental question ‘what is it that has Being?’

the concept of Being is indeed trivial; this implies it is not worthy of the designation ‘concept’—v—it is container for the trivial and the deep – and it leads to profound simplifications in metaphysics, particularly of definiteness and precisions of concepts and ultimacy in depth (foundation) and breadth (variety in the universe)

dilemmas of existence

there is no existent—v—there is Being (we have seen in discussing experience that this is true and that there is world as FOE and its various interpretations)

there is no measure of Being—v—power, the capacity for cause and effect among beings (not limited to classical cause) is the measure of Being—i.e. Being is the measure of Being

experience, its centrality and dilemmas

experience is epiphenomenal—v—it is a form of power (on FOE it is the only form of Being and therefore the only form of power—that all power lies in experience may be seen later)

experience has no clear Being—v—(it is clear from the foregoing) that it does

beings and Being

beings can exist in isolation over all DIFFERENZ—v—the hypothetical being that has no effect—neither affects nor is affected by other beings—is effectively nonexistent (later we will be able to drop the term ‘effectively)

the concept of Being is too abstract for pragmatic use—v—it is capable of integrating the abstract and the concrete into one system of ultimate power (which will be done and the metaphysical system will be named the perfect metaphysics or PFM)

beings and Being are and cannot be empirical—v—since known directly in experience (or indirectly by or hypothesis and experience of consequence) they are empirical

experience and Being—contingency—v—necessity

while we have seen that there is Being, Being is not necessary—i.e. it is contingent—v—Being is necessary (this may be seen to be the case in what follows)

necessity has two meanings—necessity from given facts and pure necessity or necessity ex nihilo—v—since we have seen necessity from given facts (and with Leibniz that is an interesting meaning) we may focus on necessity ex nihilo

there is no necessity to Being at all—v—all Being as we know it (and more—the PFM and all possibility—are necessary and this may be seen to be the case)

we cannot show necessity for it is beyond reason—v—it can be demonstrated (and there are heuristic argument to supplement demonstration with understanding)

science and cumulative experience argue against ‘all possibility’ for science shows to within reasonable doubt the boundaries of the world—v—the foregoing claim assumes that the world is essentially as positively shown in science which is not the case for the various putative limits of science are not real limits (e.g., at great distances and times, i.e. significantly beyond the empirical boundary—a symmetric finite or infinite solution of the equations of general relativity may merge into a far more complex and infinite solution and even into regions where the known laws give way to others including much more permissive ones; e.g. at microscopic dimensions, say far below the Planck Length there may be micro-worlds and different physics; at energies below the current empirical limit there may be unknown interactions, even other cosmoses passing through ours; and similarly at higher energies that are weakly interacting with our cosmos; and all this is consistent with science; in fact, with minor adjustments, the logically possible is consistent with science because it needs only to agree with the empirical within the empirical boundary)

dilemmas of meaning

dilemmas of meaning as partial summary of the dilemmas of metaphysics and preliminary to the dilemmas in the construction of the metaphysics

significant meaning (‘the meaning of life’) and concept meaning (including linguistic meaning) are different—v—they have the same root—experience—but the emphasis is different: the significant must include feeling as part of it while concept meaning does not deemphasize feeling but benefits from disentangling emotion and cognition (of course allowing their interaction and integration at various levels, e.g. emotion being motive for cognition and guide where cognition is found incomplete, e.g. cognition guiding emotion)

significant meaning is ever incomplete and without foundation because we do not have knowledge of the universe (defined below) as a whole—v—we may, can, and will develop an adequate overview of the universe as a whole (PFM—as a perfect instrument of ultimate realization) but this will leave open many particular avenues of meaning and realization

concept meaning is an unclear concept for various well know reasons including doubts about whether it exists and whether it is adequate—v—referential concept and linguistic meaning can be defined that has both necessity for meaning at all and is adequate for the present purposes

such a concept of concept meaning would be difficult—v—here is one: a concept is a mental content (includes percepts and concepts-as-units-of-meaning and feeling); a concept necessarily has or is based at root in iconic concepts (in the forest, ‘tiger’ aroused fear in the English speaker because the word is associated with tigers but ‘sher’ does not even though it is the Hindi equivalent of ‘tiger’); then concept meaning is a concept and its real objects; linguistic meaning associates primitive signs with primitive concepts; thus compound linguistic signs and compound iconic concepts gain definite meaning; given places where there are no absolute primitive meanings this allows flexibility of language and meaning including its stability in limited contexts and fluidity and need for fluidity beyond the contexts of cumulative experience; it is thus a source of definiteness of meaning in context but necessary indefiniteness beyond; but with abstraction, even definiteness beyond—e.g. as in PFM; and since there are no open concepts, neither the semantic nor the logical paradoxes arise except where we make mistakes

the Being of concepts is unclear and perhaps even vacuous—v—(as seen) it is clear and definite (and a clarification of the sometimes vague term ‘mental object’)

it is not clear whether meaning lies in the experiencer or the experienced (the world)—v—it lies in FOE and is seen to be a relation among the elements of FOE—the ‘I’ the world which includes experience, self, environment, other minds, and their relations and their may be but is no need for further objectivity

dilemmas in the construction of metaphysics and knowledge of the real

the universe

the term ‘universe’ is either a limited term (physical universe, empirical universe) or vague and unscientific—v—universe as all (that has) Being (over all DIFFERENZ) is perfectly definite and the term ‘unscientific’ is meaningless in this context (as seen earlier) and this meaning may be seen to be empowering of PFM—the ultimate metaphysics, together with the concepts of Being and experience

‘all that has Being’ is not empirical—v—with sufficient abstraction it is empirical (and this is what is needed in for the metaphysics being developed)

the universe should be defined as the physical / empirical universe—v—it is most powerfully and effectively defined as all Being over all DIFFERENZ (and the discussion below justifies regarding ‘the universe is all Being over all DIFFERENZ as a fact) even while it does not eliminate other definitions but does render them lesser and sources of confusion

the number of universes is indefinite as on the physical definition—v—on this definition there is precisely one universe (and no being lies outside the universe)

the universe requires a creator as understood from the nature of causation—v—as defined here the universe neither needs nor can have a creator (and the alternative misunderstands the nature of cause and the most effective meaning of ‘universe’) but parts of the universe may be implicated in creation-causation for the universe

the existential status of the universe is unclear—v—(it is now clear that) the universe is a being—i.e. it has Being

the void

the idea of nothingness is unclear and difficult to conceive (e.g. it is not just nothing in space and time but in nothingness there ought to be no space and time)—v—(as is now clear) the void as the absence of Being is a perfectly clear and definite concept (‘the void’ is preferred due to existential and semantic confusions including trifling pedantry associated with ‘nothingness’)

there is no adequate notion of the void—v—(there is the now clear) definition of the void as the absence of Being (and we will see that we may validly use the phrase ‘the void is the absence of Being’)

whereas the universe clearly exists it is not clear that the void exists—v—while this is true a demonstration of existence of the void may (and will) be given

existence of the void

a deep demonstration of the existence of the void is that its existence is equivalent to its non-existence—v—the demonstration is trivial and invalid (but it is the very triviality that secures the demonstration… but let us allow doubt so as to not force dogmatism and allow a later potent interpretation)

existence of the void is difficult or impossible to understand—v—it exists together with every being as its complement relative to itself or as the complement of the universe

the void does not have Being (exist)—v—the void has Being (which we have just shown)

possibility, Logic, and science

possibility is a vague concept (for reasons to be seen) even though we earlier saw it to be have some importance—v—an ultimately potent and precise concept can be given (which gives perfect validity to its use and justifies regarding it as the concept even if it does not disallow other uses of ‘possibility’)

there are too many kinds of possibility—e.g. logical and physical—to have a single term—v—various kinds of possibility can be identified and seen as of a single concept—e.g.

a natural law is our reading of a pattern: we will identify the term ‘natural law’ with the pattern with the understanding that the agreement is limited (in precision and domain of agreement); thus laws have Being
a hypothesis about the world may have internal disagreement or disagreement with the world; the latter defines simple fact or compound fact (e.g. science and natural law) and factual and scientific truth; the former, if care is taken to see that all agreement or disagreement with world is assigned to fact defines logic and logical truth;

thus logical possibility is what is consistent with logic: and factual possibility is what is consistent with simple fact and science; the latter includes physics and biology for our cosmos and economics and political science and philosophy for our world (but this is a limited account because of the possible and to be verified existence of limitlessly many other cosmoses)

we may note a further ‘sentient-sapient possibility’ that which creatures with minds may conceive, know, design, build and so on

since ‘it is possible that the impossible is possible and the possible impossible’ possibility is a contradictory and meaningless concept—v—this has already been excluded by the definition of kinds of possibility

the notion of possibility remains vague because the precise way in which fact and logic determine the possible is unclear (e.g. given knowledge of our cosmos does this not imply that if we had knowledge of the universe there would be no content to the term ‘the possible’)—v—this may be clarified as follows

consider a block picture of the possible (later to be seen as real) universe; it is of course maximally indeterminist (which allows form and determinism and near determinism in phases); our cosmos is a rather determined phase (but of course from various considerations including free will must allow a mix of determinism and indeterminism which may be seen to be a source of choice and creativity); our cosmos determines part of the universe as it is but nowhere near determines the rest and thus for us there is a combination of universal logic and our fact that determines our Logic (called argument in some modern literature) that both determines what we know of our cosmos but allows us immense freedom otherwise

the above concepts have the further vaguenesses—(1) the distinction between factual and logical consistency for where is the boundary between fact (percept-concept) and logic (concept-concept) (here ‘concept’ is being used in its more usual sense of ‘higher concept’) but it would seem that if we eliminate ‘of the world’ then what remains is logic (2) why then are there various logics—propositional. predicate, tensed and so on—so let us first eliminate the tensed for it is about the world and then recognize that there are various forms of conception and so various ‘real’ logics that are part of logic (3) but looking deeper what is it about the world that results in logic if logic is not of the object… is it not the relation between concept and object—i.e. is not here that the possibility of reference and so of truth and falsity arise and so perhaps there is no distinction at root between logic and science at all and all is fact at some level (4) but what then of science and mathematics… we can say that what we have been calling ‘science’ (physics, biology, economics and so on) are concrete science (which will be elaborated with PFM and its limitless variety) while mathematics—is an example of abstract science formed conceptually but of abstract objects required also of PFM; (5) but what then is logic if it is about nothing in this sense that straddles concept and object… perhaps it is substitute for some of our areas of ignorance… while all the limitless forms of the concrete and abstract sciences express knowledge of limitless variety and extension

the fundamental principle

the limit of the universe is defined by the empirical—v—the limit is the possible (i.e. the Logical from the point of view of a given observer or, generally, the logical)—the latter follows from the existence of the void since (1) the void is the absence of Being (though it has Being) and therefore has no Laws and (2) if from the void a possible state did not emerge that would be a law and therefore (3) all possible states emerge (4) the relevant possibility is the maximal which is logical possibility

there are no principles—v—we have just proven one principle—we call it the fundamental principle of metaphysics (FP): the universe is the realization of logical possibility

the fundamental principle is (seems) empty vs it is rich (this is obvious now) and consequences include:

(1) the universe must exist in phases and also go out of manifest form in phases (which resolves what Heidegger called the fundamental question of metaphysics of why there is something and indeed why there must be)

(2) which opens up a new fundamental question of ‘what has Being’ which discovery has begun and continues

(3) the universe has identity and the forms and DIFFERENZ of the universe and its identity are without limit; individual identities merge with universal identity (this is the Vedantic merging of Atman with Brahman; mechanism has not yet been given; but from FP some mechanisms must exist even though realization must occur without them)

cause

the proper notion of cause is the classical one from physics—i.e., temporally and spatially contiguous physical causation—v—we no recognize a much wider variety of cause, especially necessity as the most fundamental of causes (and teleologic cause must also obtain except perhaps in a primitive cosmos, elementary cause is classical cause)

further proof; and heuristics

the proof of the fundamental principle in existence of the void is inadequate—v—here is another proof: if the universe enters a void state, by the above reasoning all possibilities must emerge; but this same void exists together with every element of Being including the universe itself; hence the fundamental principle

there is no understanding of the fundamental principle—v—heuristic arguments are available that are not proofs but enhance understanding

first heuristic argument: enquire into the scientific theories to immediately follow quantum field theory and general relativity—we may have some idea as to what to expect; but what about the next theory and the one after that and so on; we have no idea at all for we have no idea what experiment might show up (we might even need enhancements of the methods of science to include greater computational ability so as to make predictions that are now beyond our ability and to employ rationality in better and more sophisticated ways as experiment becomes more difficult); but we do know what the limit of the succession of theories of physics will be—the limit is that of logic—i.e. the fundamental principle

second heuristic argument: we do not have an explanation of the origin of our world; assume that there is one; it would not be probabilistic for then the cosmos might not exist; it would not be contingent on an earlier state for that would be no explanation at all; therefore it would be necessary; but that our cosmos and our cosmos alone should be necessary would not be a good argument for there is no reason for just our cosmos to be necessary (it would violate symmetry for necessity without prior is necessity from nothingness or the void); therefore every possible state is necessary—i.e. the universe is the realization of all possibility—which is the fundamental principle

fundamental question of metaphysics

what Heidegger called the fundamental question of metaphysics** is so deep that its resolution is remote or beyond human ability or impossible (some thinkers hold such to be the case)—v—the question has just been resolved and a new fundamental question is what has Being for what has Being is the answer to all questions (for Being refers not only to ‘entities’ but to process, interaction, cause and so on)

** this is repetition of an earlier point

the perfect metaphysics; cosmology

there is no practical way to the knowledge and realization opened up by the metaphysics so far—v—the metaphysics shows the ultimate; if we grant that we have temporal limits then our pragmatic knowledge and means are the best available for us in the process; and thus the metaphysics unites with the pragmatic to from a perfect universal metaphysics—the perfect metaphysics or PFM—and the foregoing constitutes the (ground) of the explicit meaning of the perfect metaphysics

but the perfect metaphysics does not contain its own means—v—it does, as just explained and so some of its mechanisms must come from what is valid in our traditions up to the present (‘tradition’) and reason (logic, science, experiment, repetition which are all part of the development so far); and example / examples are

(1) physics and functional biology and related technology give us preliminary mechanisms of space exploration; though they may be limited they are, per FP, in initial stages while we too are in initial stages, not limited per FP to our cosmos and human form;

(2) as an aside, the reality of our death from cumulative experience but immortality as merging with Brahman can be understood in the block picture of the universe: the block is many merging-diverging path for every point and being (absolute indeterminism implies also determinism) of a given point of being or individual and its merging with the universal identity:

(3) evolutionary biology gives us an essentially new mechanism relative to physics which is a science of behavior of the world but not at all so far of the origin of the world—which by the way from FP is seen to be necessity rather than another contingent state; the mechanism is variation and selection in which two individually non-creative processes join to form a creative process (the evolution of life; and perhaps extensible to the origin of life and of cosmoses and ideas); this suggests variation and selection as an efficient though not necessary mechanism of formation of cosmoses and of our transition from form to form in the realization of Brahman;

(4) what the above suggests is that while no mechanism is necessary per FP, the ‘new’ mechanism is efficient and would explain a preponderance of formed cosmoses in the universe; and an efficient mechanism of realization (which would include our science as well as intrinsic mechanisms such as transformation of mind by meditation and so on—even though it is currently a very primitive mechanism); it also suggests that there will be blocks—pain and difficulties—these are not to be avoided but their overcoming or going through integrated into realization

path to the ultimate; reason; intuition and imagination as part of reason

there is no approach to the ultimate—v—there is and it is reason (whose elements are explicitly identified above except perhaps essential imagination which was implicit; and which, note, explicitly includes integrated feeling and value) and tradition; and the latter includes intrinsic means (yoga, meditation, immersion in and with nature and society, art) as well as explicit means (logic and the sciences)

the role of intuition is limited since it does not prove in symbolic terms—v—it is essential and proof is an aid for the limitless of the universe must be beyond the countable and yet language and proof—as we seem to know them—countable

the opposition of intuition and the symbolic above—v—their integration since with limitlessness while a given symbolic approach may be limited there is limitless time, limitless capacity, and limitless forms of symbol which merge with intuition

the universe as revealed—as revealed and since we will do it all—is or will become stale and predictable—v—per limitlessness there are always freshness and unexplored realms for even infinite forms (as noted earlier we are not denying pain and so on but note that they are best integrated into process; and where intolerable that ought not to be denied except to note that it is limited and probably self-limiting)

metaphysics is just metaphysics—even if rational it is about Being as Being and no more—v—as we have seen it is an image of the universe, its modes of Being, and our place in it in some ways as best we can form such an image; however also as we have seen Being as Being is indeed about Being-as-abstract but (contra how Aristotle is often seen) also about all elements of Being from the categories down to the pragmatic fragments

proof, certainty, doubt, and existential dilemmas

doubts about the metaphysics

proof of the fundamental principle should be doubted—v—it is impeccable

but recall that even if we doubt or reject the proof the principle is not inconsistent with what is valid in experience, tradition, science, and reason.

the metaphysics may be accepted as an existential attitude

the metaphysics is an excellent existential attitude of course in combination with immediate concerns—v—the metaphysics should be rejected altogether

certainty is not essential especially in ultimate issues provided there is reason, value, and consistency with experience for the requirement of certainty is fundamentally limiting—i.e., the requirement of certainty is not uniform and is itself subject to reason—v—certainty is always essential in public affairs—v—certainty is always essential

a note on intuition

here it may be useful to refer to the earlier discussion of intuition

a note on epistemology

similarly we do not need a uniform or single criterion epistemology despite the appeal of purity (we have argued dual epistemology with different requirements of certainty)—v—uniform or ‘monistic’ epistemology is essential

(the drive to uniform epistemology seems to be a remnant of substance thinking)

the metaphysics as consistent and powerful universal hypothesis

parallel to the great revolutions in science and metaphysics, to treat the metaphysics as a universal theory (hypothesis) is to potentially leverage great conceptual and real power—v—we should eschew such hypothetical attitudes

to regard the metaphysics as universal hypothesis is to introduce hypotheses without limit about the real but it is the simplest of hypotheses about what does not exist

final dilemmas—significant and miscellaneous

metaphysical solipsism revisited

the universe is nothing but experience (metaphysical solipsism)—v—the universe is one of its standard interpretations (ESSV or FOE)—this is resolved;

it is important to note, for example, that the issue of other minds is not perfectly resolved and this imperfect resolution points to a greater reality—in our stable world, we are pragmatic to accept the standard view of self, other, and environment but there are other interpretations (some of them trivial and unstable) including the merging of identities into Identity

Russell’s paradoxes of the real and implications

Russell’s dilemma that the world may have been formed five minutes ago complete with our memories and evidence that it is say 13.8 billion years old—v—of course this is possible in trivial and marginal cases but the pragmatic and stable case is the standard interpretation and the pragmatic case beyond our reality is not Russell’s but the universal one of PFM in which the limitless ‘absurd’ possibilities are real but have limited purchase while the merging of identities of individuals and cosmoses into Brahma and Universe is the greatest and most inclusive

Russell’s teapot—there may be a teapot in solar orbit but it is too small to be seen—as an example that there may be all kinds of ‘beings’ out there—v—this similar to the previous dilemma in that of course there may be and in some odd cosmoses (‘realities’) there are but there is little point to proof that there is not for the real understanding from the dilemma is that these are not general concerns in a stable reality except of course that there are undiscovered beings but teapots are hardly worth consideration (unless, surprise, one should be discovered)

are we a simulation?

we are a simulation (this first one is trivial and trending recently)—v—we are base reality: this is similar to the above in regard to realism and stability but note also that even if we are a simulation that does not mean that (1) we are not some level of reality or (2) that ‘base’ and ‘simulation’ levels are essentially different or (3) as some have claimed that experiments can reveal the difference (for the putative experiments assume a kind of simulation and that the simulators could not ‘fool’ us for at least a very large but finite period of time) or (4) that we cannot discover our level of simulation and that we cannot climb out of our level or (5) that there is an essential distinction between evolutionary (natural) origins and simulated (technological, artificial, or software) origins even though in our technologies there are obvious ways to distinguish so far.

religion, science, and their combined effect on thought

the dogmatic pictures of the Abrahamic Religions are either absolute or absurd—v—what we now see—they have limited purchase against the backdrop of a much greater reality and, especially in the west, since they are poor alternatives they encourage a view of the entire universe as seen in empirical science (this is a criticism of attitudes to science and not of science itself); however, this does not negate the allegorical and other values of these religions

the speculative pictures of eastern religions are absurd—v—what we now see—they have real and significant application but even they are limited either on fact or reason relative to PFM: yet they have both allegorical and suggestive value (world as field of experience, the idea of Brahman, and various other reflections including Adi Samkara’s presaging of Descartes’ cogito argument)

abstract and concrete objects

the understanding of abstract and concrete objects in modern metaphysics (of the West) in which the concrete are relatively well understood, the abstract are thought to exist but are poorly understood—they reside neither in space nor time, but perhaps the distinction is that the concrete are perceptual while the abstract are conceptual—v—as we now see the abstract and the concrete are on par for from FP they are both in the universe and lie on a continuum rather than a polarity and even though our means of study seem different they are not for the distinction between concept and percept is dissolved

space and time

the western understanding of space and time or spacetime, while well understood in some systems of physics according to those systems, is incomplete—v—PFM reveals it to be enormously incomplete but that starting from Being and DIFFERENZ (this is done in other documents), space and time and space-time-matter can be defined identified for phases of the universe; a far more complete understanding of issues such as the reason for the quantum and relativistic pictures (as limited pictures) can be given in which they are parts of a much greater reality that includes their origins from and merging with a far more transient picture (this development is qualitative)

metaphysics as deep and empirical versus trivial and merely speculative; breakdown of the empirical – rational distinction

metaphysics generally is trivial, its concepts here such as experience – Being – universe – the void – logic – science – reason are trivial (even the non-trivial ones are defined trivially) are trivial, and essentially speculative (this is largely implicit so far or repetition)—v—metaphysics is essential, deep, and broad (illustration and argument are manifest)

but is not the metaphysics so far non-empirical—v—it may seem so but all the concepts above are empirical and what we are seeing is that the distinction between the empirical and the rational has broken down under analysis

the value of metaphysical dilemmas

the sometimes obsessive concern in philosophy and metaphysics with trivial dilemmas and paradoxes is obsessive, haphazard, hair splitting, and a waste of time—v—(it is well known that paradox has been a rich motive to improving understanding but here we are focusing on a system of dilemmas to empower metaphysics and while many of the dilemmas are well known, some of them, their formulation, their juxtaposition, and systematic use are new) as we have just seen the dilemmas, some of them regarded as paradoxes, many old and some new, lead, supplemented by analysis-imagination, to profound new insights and conclusions in metaphysics and method (metaphysics may be seen to include knowledge as subject and object); and the systematic deployment of the dilemmas is synergistically powerful in its achievements including how to deploy the dilemmas; dilemmas and paradoxes often concern ordinary notions and ordinary analysis whose value is the promotion of precise thought which (i) is at least aesthetic in itself, and (ii) comes into its own when knowledge is pushed beyond the ordinary or standard boundary.